As a shocked and bewildered World watched, the Nations of Europe fell one by one under the crushing onslaught of Hitler's war machine. Whether immobilized by the haunting specter of trench warfare during World War I, or stunned by the frightening speed with which its powerful foe moved, it didn't matter. The armies of Europe stood no chance against the newest form of warfare unleashed by the Wehrmacht in the opening months of World War II: Blitzkrieg.

Perhaps none watched more intently than a militant and power hungry Iraqi lawyer named Rashid Ali al-Gaylani. Rashid Ali was a former Ottoman Turk Captain who, after World War I, decided to go into Law. Becoming increasingly bitter about the outcome of the war and the subsequent partitioning of Arab lands, Rashid became co-founder of the pan-Arab "Muslim Brotherhood", a group that soon had cells working throughout the middle-east with the goal of someday uniting the Arab people. He was described as being fiercely anti-colonialist and together with four Iraqi Army Colonels (who, oddly enough, were all Sunnis...) helped form a new group called the "Golden Square". This secretly crafted cabal felt, among other things, that the 1930 treaty with Britain (basically an amended version of the 1927 treaty) and the commercial and diplomatic privileges it contained, were an insult to Arab (Iraqi) pride and began to meet and formulate plans to seize the reigns of government—either with or without force. (It has been written that Rashid's dearest ambition was to "expel by military force all Englishmen from the Middle East".) And though the British were far from being ruthless occupiers, considering the fact they weren't really occupiers at all, their continued presence in the middle-east was becoming to be seen more and more by young, nationalistic Arabs as a violation of Arab sovereignty and just another example of age old British Imperialism. Even though Rashid Ali and the other pan-Arabs had no particular love for Germany (or Italy, for that matter), they felt that in the prevailing world situation, the Axis powers offered the best opportunity for support in achieving their pan-Arab political goals.

Iraq, despite the growing anti-British sentiment, was still governed by a relatively neutral Prime Minister, Nuri as-Sa'id. Nuri was moderately pro-British (though being somewhat of a nationalist himself) and shortly after the fall of Poland, in keeping with the provisions of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi treaty, Iraq broke off formal relations with Germany. (But, due to an increasing pro-Axis sentiment in Iraq, as-Sa'id could not get his cabinet to declare war) This only caused the anti-British sentiment to grow even stronger -- fueled in large part by the increasingly aggressive political activities of Rashid and his henchmen. With British backing, Nuri as-Sa'id was continuing to cling precariously to power following the severing of diplomatic relations with the Reich, but it wouldn't be long until his position as Prime Minister had become untenable (due in large part to him being seen as a British "puppet") and he was forced to succumb to the political maelstrom whipped up by Rashid and his thugs. By March 1940, Nuri had resigned his post and Rashid Ali became the Prime Minister. And so, with Rashid Ali now in power, when Italy entered the war on the side of the Axis in June 1940, Iraq chose not to sever relations with Il Duce'. The British Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, was not amused.

It was about this time that the Iraqis began to seek the establishment of ties between Berlin and Baghdad and planted the first seeds for diplomatic contact in June 1940. Among the first of several secret meetings was a July 3rd rendezvous in Ankara Turkey between the Iraqi Minister of Justice, Naji Shawkat and the German ambassador to Turkey, Franz von Papen. Shawkat politely apologized for Iraq's breaking-off of diplomatic relations with Germany while stressing that the current policy of the Rashid government was to maintain normal relations with Italy, Germany's new ally. Shawkat also informed von Papen of the growing nationalist trend in the Iraqi cabinet and promised that Germany would receive the full support of the Iraqi army "when the time came." These secret meetings were to continue until the fall of 1940, culminating with a trip to Berlin in October by a high ranking Iraqi government secretary, Osman Kemal Haddad. Osman attempted to garner German military support for the removal of British forces (and Jews) from Iraq while promising to provide Iraqi support for the Germans in the form of full access to the Iraqi oil fields and thus providing the Axis powers with what they really needed: billions of barrels of crude oil to fuel their armoured legions.

With numerous campaigns either being completed or in the works, the Germans were not quite ready to give the Iraqis the military support they were looking for. But, the German mediator, Ernst von Weizsacker, did say however, that the Reich Government would "be prepared to help with captured arms and money," then carefully added the caveat that Germany could "proceed only in agreement with Italy." By this time, like Napoleon before him, Hitler had already become fascinated with the idea of moving on Russia and all available resources were being saved for the gigantic push into the Soviet Union that was to be code-named "Operation Barbarossa." (Hitler had secretly made his intentions known in the now famous Directive No. 21: "The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England... Preparations are to be completed by 15 May 1941.") So, in an effort to keep the door open to the possibility of being able to utilize Iraq's vast oil supplies, (I believe the technical term here is "hedging your bets") Germany persuaded a hesitant Italy to issue a joint statement of intent. Made public on 23 October, 1940, it read as follows:

Germany, which has always been animated by sentiments of friendship for the Arabs and cherishes the wish that they may prosper and be happy and assume a place among peoples of the earth in accordance with their historic and natural importance, has always watched with interest the struggle of the Arab countries to achieve that independence. In their efforts to attain this goal Arab countries can count upon Germany's full sympathy also in the future. In making this statement, Germany finds herself in full accord with her Italian ally.

This was not exactly the kind of overt help the Iraqis were looking for, but it was better than nothing and it certainly left the door open for the possibility of German military assistance in the future, which the Iraqis were sure to need if they wanted to expel the British forcefully. In the meantime, the British could do little, if anything, to try to correct the decaying situation in Iraq because, in the ensuing months, she herself had been busy combating a new Italian enemy in the Western Deserts of Libya while fighting off the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain, climaxing in what has been hailed as Britain's "Finest Hour" and the Luftwaffe's first real taste of defeat in September of 1940.

Gladiator in Flight Despite all of this, life went on as usual at Habbaniya; a little more tense, perhaps, given the serious anti-British overtones, but given the remote location, went on peacefully none the less. With the war effort demanding the best and newest equipment elsewhere, the No 4 SFTS and the Communications flight were forced to make do, keeping the rather motley collection of relics in their possession flying by whatever means available. The No 1 RAF Armoured Car Company was affected as well, continuing to patrol the perimeter fence and bouncing around the cantonment in their 20 plus year old Rolls Royces. The base's Infantry forces were comprised of an ad-hoc battalion fielding six companies of local militia; of which, only the four companies of Assyrian Christian conscripts, or Levies, could be considered reliable--indeed, many would later say invaluable. Since the uneasy situation of having Rashid Ali as Prime Minister was always deemed to require more of a political solution than a military one, these forces were felt adequate to the task, given the perceived unlikelihood of an Iraqi military attack.

Still, the relationship was less than ideal and in his memoirs, Sir Winston Churchill describes the atmosphere:

[T]he situation gave us much anxiety. But with our preoccupations elsewhere, military action was out of the question, and we had to carry on as best we could.

It was obvious to the British that something had to be done in order to shore up what was being viewed by many as a weak flank and to secure Britain's vital interests in the region, namely, the oil. And so by December 1940, with the Luftwaffe licking it's wounds (and Hitler preoccupied with the rest of Europe and making his plans for the assault on Russia) British demands for the removal of Rashid Ali became increasingly terse, until finally, he was forcibly replaced with General Taha el Hashimi by the British in January, 1941. (The Brits decided to buttress their support in the Iraqi government and proceeded to install a pro-Anglo Regent, Emir Abdul-Illah, at the same time) Although El Hashimi turned out to be another pan-Arab, he was certainly more amicable towards London than Rashid Ali.

Rashid Ali was obviously not happy with this arrangement and working closely with his "Golden Square" accomplices, (one of whom was Khairallah Talfah-the uncle that raised Saddam Hussein) Ali immediately began to make plans to regain power. The ensuing struggle between the Golden Square and London was to set in motion a series of events that would bring both countries to the breaking point. Soon, the Italian Legation in Baghdad had become the chief source in Iraq for Axis propaganda and greatly assisted the Golden Square in fomenting anti-British feeling. By the spring of 1941, with the volatile combination of Arab nationalism rising among Iraqi army officers and the tensions created by Rachid Ali's anti-British posturing, Iraq was on the brink of civil war. On the night of 31 March 1941, after being tipped off that conspiring army officers planned to move against him, the Regent, Abdul-Illah, escaped across the Tigris River in a motor boat and made his way to Habbaniya, from where he was flown to Basra and the safety of the H.M.S. Cockchafer. By 3 April, Rashid Ali had once again seized power (in a classic coup d'etat) and with the help of the Army and Air Force officers of the Golden Square, proclaimed the formation of the "National Defense Government". He promptly sent a note to the British ambassador that warned against any intervention in Iraq's internal affairs and proceeded to dispatch a force to Basra in an effort to try to deny the British from landing troops there – which is exactly what the British did.

The coup in Baghdad threatened British interests for three reasons:

It severed the vital air link and the supplemental land route, between India and Egypt.
It endangered the vital oil supply from the northern Iraqi oilfields, upon which British defense of the Mediterranean depended.
An Arab nationalist success in Iraq could prove contagious and subvert Britain's tenuous political position in Egypt and Palestine.

Iraqi Army, 1941 Churchill's first logical move, therefore, would be to secure the Iraqi port city of Basra (by armed intervention if need be) as this would be a critical debarkation point for follow-on forces trying to reinforce and secure the two RAF bases in the region, Shaiba and Habbaniya. The Prime Minister sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for India, L.S. Amery, which said in part: "The situation in Iraq has turned sour. We must make sure of Basra..." and on 8 April, at Churchill's personal request, Secretary Amery, in concert with the Army Commander-in-Chief India, General Sir Claude Auchinleck, diverted the forward elements of the 10th Indian Division, consisting of the HQ, 10th Indian Division, 20th Indian infantry brigade and a regiment of field artillery, to Basra. (Most of which was already on board a ship steaming for Malaya.)

After invoking the rights afforded by the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and under the cover of a British airborne battalion which had arrived at RAF Shaiba the day before, the brigade battle group disembarked without Iraqi opposition at Basra on 18 April. (Once they were safely ashore, Churchill ordered the Government of India to follow them up with two more brigades of the 10th Division, also assigned to Malaya.) Meanwhile, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, being the coolheaded statesman, assured the jittery Iraqis that the British troops were merely "transiting" Iraq, on their way to Palestine. Although Churchill wanted the Rashid government to have the impression that the troops were in transit to Palestine, this was really not the case and he was clearly intent on securing Basra. Sir Winston Churchill explains his motives in the following letter to the British Foreign Secretary on 20 April 1941:

It should be made clear to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis that our chief interest in sending troops to Iraq is the covering and establishment of a great assembly base at Basra and that what happens up-country, except at Habbaniya, [emphasis mine] is at the present time on an altogether lower priority. Our rights under the treaty were invoked to cover this disembarkation and to avoid bloodshed, but force would have been used to the utmost limit to secure the disembarkation, if necessary. Our position at Basra therefore does not rest solely on the treaty, but also on a new event arising out of the war. No undertakings can be given that troops will be sent to Baghdad or moved through to Palestine and the right to require such undertakings should not be recognized in respect of a Government which has in itself usurped power by a coup d'etat, or in a country where our treaty rights have so long been frustrated in the spirit. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis should not however entangle himself by explanations.

(Observation: Although the reason to invoke the Treaty of 1930 is stated as wanting to "avoid bloodshed", Mr. Churchill, not known as one to back down from a confrontation, also says he would have used force "to the utmost limit... if necessary." This seeming contradiction in words was simply a shrewd political move on Sir Winston's part, as playing the "Treaty trump card" would definitely be the safest way to go. From a purely military standpoint, it is highly unlikely that any British military planners felt that they had sufficient combat power on the ground at that time to facilitate such a move, and are likely to have advised the Prime Minister that try to force the issue would be risky and dangerous—No matter how you look at it, not a good situation to be in.)

Rashid Ali made the next move in this deadly game of global chess and on 19 April had his henchmen contact their new found friends in Berlin. The German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, had already been made privy to the military and global implications of Rashid's coup about 10 days prior, in a meeting with Ernst Woermann on 9 April. Woermann, the head of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry, explained to von Ribbentrop that "there was now a cabinet which was to be considered the most nationalist and pro-Axis thus far, and that according to the available reports, this cabinet has the full support of the Iraqi army." Woermann also stated that the Rashid government "was putting up stiff resistance to the English wishes for the stationing of English troops in Iraq and a more or less unrestricted right of passage."

By 10 April, von Ribbentrop had acquired Hitler's approval for the dispatch of captured arms to the Iraqi rebels. However, shortly after the vanguard of the British 10th Indian division arrived at Basra, in a 21 April message to Hitler, von Ribbentrop made it clear that "the possibilities of giving assistance [had] been studied," and that "speedy assistance [was] possible only by air." The Foreign Minister concluded, saying that "direct intervention by Luftwaffe units in Iraq [was] out of the question, since it exceeded the current operational range of the Luftwaffe." Von Ribbentrop did suggest, however, that arms could be flown to Iraq by individual aircraft--provided they were given the benefit of stopping-over in Syria. (This notion, incidentally, signaled the un-official introduction of the Vichy French government as a participant in the German-Iraqi scheme and opened the possibility of using Syrian bases as refueling points for combat aircraft...)

Meanwhile, when Ambassador Cornwallis informed Rashid Ali that more troop transports should reach Basra on or about the 30th, Ali quickly balked at the idea and in an effort to buy more time, refused to give permission for any more landings until the troops already at Basra had passed through the port, ostensibly on their way to Palestine. Ali also said that the total number of British troops in Iraq at any one time should not exceed the strength of one mixed brigade. The Iraqi government went even further, stating that the British government, by its apparent effort to establish a base at Basra, was in violation of a June 1940 amendment to the Anglo-Iraqi treaty. (Referring to a unilateral amendment made by the first Rashid government stating that "bases will not be established or troops stationed in Iraq") With the British resolve in the crisis strengthening by the day, Rashid Ali was becoming increasingly frustrated by the lack of Axis action: time was not on his side. On 24 April, Italian officials in Baghdad reported that "the Iraqi government was quite annoyed because it had, as of yet, received no reply to its request for Axis support by way of aviation," and that "the situation was becoming downright critical." Critical indeed; the situation had, in fact, spiraled to the point of no return.

On 28 April, Cornwallis replied to Ali that the treaty did not contain the limitations which the Iraqi government "had suggested" and in accordance with the British Prime Minister's unwavering stance, the landings at Basra were going to go forward regardless if they had Iraqi permission or not. The Brits had called his bluff. So now, Rashid Ali, who had been counting on the assistance of German aircraft and was instead watching his plot unravel before him, had no other choice and was forced to go into action.

To be continued in next month's newsletter...

SFC John F. Kohne
Battalion Fire Support NCO