Feature Article (Mar 05)

An Uncommon Valour: The Battle of Habbaniyah

Part Three: Prepared for Anything

With the British resolve in the crisis growing by the day, and with the Germans apparently too preoccupied in the Balkans to lend a helping hand, Rashid Ali faced a dilemma of his own making: either commit his forces and engage the British militarily, or be humiliated in the eyes of his Arab brethren. (In the Arab culture, your word and honor is everything; any indication that you were not a man of your word, you were through politically...) Rashid Ali, in his zeal to grasp power, had managed to paint himself into a political corner. All of his rhetoric and anti-British posturing had brought his country to the brink of civil war and finally came to a head in the coup d'etat. And now, things had continued to escalate to the point where Rashid Ali and his co-conspirators had finally "crossed the Rubicon"—for the Golden Square it was time to either put up or shut up.

At RAF Habbaniya, even the most naïve could have figured out that war clouds were drawing nigh. As a precaution, (and in a very wise move), the preparations for battle had already been laid. On the 7 th of April, shortly after Rashid Ali's coup, the Station's commander, Air Vice-Marshall Harry George Smart, had called a special meeting of the Station's senior officers at AHQ (Air Headquarters) and issued "Iraq Command Operation Order No 1 of 1941" which specifically outlined the formation and preparation of what was to be called the "Habbaniya Air Striking Force". In the event of hostilities, this was to be the Station's primary means of defense and would be placed under the overall command of RAF Group Captain W.A.B. Saville, the Commander of the No. 4 SFTS. (It should be pointed out that even though Smart earned the Distinguished Flying Cross as a combat pilot for actions during the First World War, the majority of his career from 1923 on was that of flight school administration; Smart exhibited great humility and prudence in deferring the role of air component tactical commander to the more tactically oriented Saville...)

This "Air Striking Force" would be comprised of the Aircraft and most experienced Pilots, Tutors and Pupils of the No. 4 SFTS. Since the majority of the planes at Habbaniya were configured as trainers, (save for the Gladiator fighters and Valentia transports), extensive modifications were undertaken to allow for the carrying of offensive payloads and for crew served weapons for aerial defense. During the last week in April, the men worked feverishly on their planes, with the pilots and pupils helping ground crewman in arming their antiquated aircraft for the looming battle -- knowing full well their very lives may ultimately depend on their handiwork. Bomb cradles were either modified from existing stocks or completely fabricated altogether. All of the No. 4 SFTS Audaxes and Oxfords were modified to carry bombs; Audaxes could carry either two 250lb bombs or eight 20lb bombs, while the Oxfords could carry up to eight 20lb bombs on modified shackles. The Audaxe preparations went smoothly enough as the Type was designed from the start as an "Army co-operation Aircraft" -- Brit-speak for close air support; The Airspeed Oxfords were another story as this type of plane was designed purely for training purposes. Even the Valentias of the Communications Flight were modified to carry bombs, and ingenious machine gun mounts were devised in order to allow the lumbering biplanes a measure of defense against the very real possibility of marauding Iraqi aircraft. Personnel were also identified at this time to serve as additional gunners on the Valentias, if need be. (And, in a further anticipation of hostilities, while the forward elements of the 10 th Indian Division were unloading in Basra, on the 19 th of April six additional Gladiators had been flown to Habbaniya from stocks held as war reserves at RAF Heliopolis in Egypt. This, added to the three Gladiators already at Habbaniya, brought the total number of fighters available to Group Captain Saville to nine.)

Meanwhile, on the ground, the No. 1 Assyrian Rifle Squadron was placed on a high state of alert and preparations for fighting positions and construction on specially made squad sized block-houses were already well underway. According to the war-diary of one of the Levies present for the battle:

...defenses were skeleton manned by day and fully by night; a reserve company was always standing by at short notice, provided with the necessary motor transport [M.T.] and under the control of Officer Commanding [O.C.] Land Defenses, O.C. Levies.

Further reinforcements to the Station's meager ground defenses would arrive on the morning of 29 April. Once the Second Brigade of the 10 th Indian Division had arrived and debarked at Basra, the 400 men of the 1 st Battalion, King's Own Regiment under the command of Maj. Everett were relieved of their mission of defending the Basra airhead and quickly repositioned in the battle-space via airlift from Basra to Habbaniya. (Of special note is the fact that, according to the King's Own Regimental website, this was the first ever tactical airlift of infantry troops in combat; it would be the beginning of several "firsts" during the battle...) Once on the ground, Maj. Everett and his Soldiers quickly established a strong liaison with the No. 1 A.C.C. and the Levies, and the King's Own were rapidly incorporated into the defense scheme.

But, even while No. 31 squadron with it's brand new Douglas DC-2's and elderly Valentia's were busy flying the King's Own Regiment north, another dramatic airlift was about to take place in the east...

The atmosphere had become so tense in Baghdad that, on the morning of 29 April, British Ambassador Cornwallis, becoming increasingly concerned that the rapid decay in the situation could open the door to the possibility of reprisals against non-combatants, managed to secure an accord with the Iraqi government to allow safe passage for the dependants of British officials serving in Baghdad. Their destination: Habbaniya. Throughout the remainder of the day, over 250 women and children were hurriedly evacuated to Habbaniya, primarily using RAF transport. This additional influx of refugees to the Station (as well as others from the various British enclaves in Iraq) would help cause the civilian population on RAF Habbaniya to swell to what was by most accounts no less than an unbelievable 9,000 people!

(Observation: Undoubtedly, part of Rashid Ali's dilemma, and one could argue the largest part, was that he questioned his army's readiness; and he needn't say as much -- his hesitancy to commit his forces confirmed it. And, even though the Iraqi air force actually looked better on paper than the British (having newer, more modern types of aircraft -- and more of them at that), Rashid was unsure of their overall flying ability, again, with his actions proving this to be true by his stalling tactics while waiting for Luftwaffe assistance. Obviously, he forgot that this was the same Luftwaffe that the RAF had defeated 9 months prior... Never the less, Rashid Ali, realizing that he had to make a decision, finally committed his forces and ordered his army henchmen to deploy their divisions.)

According to the official RAF report submitted by Air Vice-Marshall B. A. Casey after the battle, (Casey having arrived at Habbaniya on 18 May), appendix "C" indicates that the first large scale Iraqi troop movements were noted at approx. 0300 LST (local standard time) on the 30 th of April and that shortly afterwards there was a "Wireless signal received at Air Headquarters [Habbaniya] from the British Embassy, Baghdad, stating that large bodies of Iraqi troops from Rashid [Iraqi military barracks in southern Baghdad] were crossing the bridges and moving out of Baghdad Westwards." By 0430 The General Alarm had been sounded and all defenses at RAF Habbaniya were fully manned. A lone Audaxe was sent out from the Station at 0500 for a reconnaissance flight over the plateau. Upon his return, the pilot's report only confirmed Smart's worst fears:

Iraqi troops with guns are in occupation of the Plateau on the South of the Cantonment. The strength of the Iraqi forces is estimated to be roughly two battalions with a few guns." (the exact number of guns not determined)

Even worse, was the fact that it appeared that the numbers of Iraqi troops "investing the plateau" were "steadily increasing"... In the following excerpts from his war-diary, a Soldier with the No. 1 A.R.S. gives a rare a first hand account of the events as they unfolded:

04/30/1941
Early in the morning reliable information reaches us that large bodies of Iraqi troops were approaching the Cantonment, and on instructions from O.C. Land defenses (O.C. Levies) the General Alarm was sounded at 04.20 hours. This was done in order to get the R.A.F reserves out into the sectors, as the perimeter was already fully manned by the Levies. On this day the Kings Own (1st), assumed operational control of O.C. Land Defenses (O.C Iraq Levies) and also the 1st Armoured car company [ACC] consisting of a Headquarters, and three sections each of 6 Armoured Cars and two Wireless Tenders. The large and very unstable population of the Civil Cantonment was quietly informed of the situation and there were remarkably few signs of panic. All the women and children had been practising weeks beforehand in getting into A.R.P [Air Raid Precaution] trenches and a proper organisation of A.R.P Wardens was in being. The morale of the troops was excellent; we were besieged no doubt, but prepared for anything. The strength of Levies at Habbaniya on this date was British Officers 17, British Warrant Officers and N.C.O.s 5, Sub Assistant Surgeons 3, Assyrian Officers 40, Native Other ranks 1134, Total 1199

At 0600, an Iraqi officer (By some accounts, a General) arrived under white-flag at the main gate leading on to the Station and demanded to speak with the Commander. He was escorted to AHQ and was "conducted" to Air Vice-Marshall Smart's office. Once there, he handed Smart a letter that read:

For the purpose of training we have occupied the Habbaniya Hills. Please make no flying or the going out of any force of persons from the cantonment. If any aircraft or armored car attempts to go out it will be shelled by our batteries, and we will not be responsible for it.

A young Corporal with the Assyrian Rifle Squadron remembers:

An enemy General drove to London gate and demanded to speak to the commander of the Station. Our Levies asked him what he wanted. He said he has business with him [Commander, RAF Habbaniya]. So the Levies escorted him to the British commander. The General was very arrogant. He told the commander to surrender the station or he burn it (sic) and everyone in it! The day was Thursday, and the commander asked him to wait until Saturday for a reply because he had to contact HQ in Cairo. The General made more demands and went back to the plateau.

Smart thought it was quite odd that such large forces would move in and occupy commanding terrain under the cover of night on a mere "training exercise" and typed out the following reply for the courier:

Any interference with training flights will be considered an 'act of war' and will be met by immediate counter-offensive action. We demand the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from positions which are clearly hostile and must place my camp at their mercy.

By 0630, the Iraqi officer was on his way back to the Plateau with Smart's reply, and at 0650 the Iraqi demands and Smart's reply to them were reported by signal to the British Ambassador at Baghdad, the Air Ministry, RAF HQ Middle East and RAF HQ India. Ambassador Cornwallis was asked to arrange for the immediate withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from the Habbaniya area, and was informed that any increase of these forces would compel the Station to take air action.

The continuous air reconnaissance being maintained from Habbaniya showed that the numbers of Iraqi forces on the Plateau were being rapidly increased. At 0900, a signal was sent to RAF HQ Middle East, RAF HQ India, the Air Ministry in London and Ambassador Cornwallis in Baghdad reporting the increase in the strength of the Iraqi forces surrounding Habbaniya, and that there were now several field guns and five 4.5 howitzers being placed on the outskirts of the Cantonment. It was also stated that air action might have to be taken later in the day if the Iraqi forces were not withdrawn or else the Air Station would run the risk of a night attack. The signal concluded with a request for assistance to be sent by air the same day. By 0930, the British Embassy had sent a reply in which the Ambassador fully endorsed the action taken by Air Vice-Marshall Smart in reply to the demands presented by the Iraqi envoy. It troubled Smart that thus far the only reply he had received was from Ambassador Cornwallis, who was technically a civilian. No word as of yet had been received from military leaders. There was little else Smart could do but wait...

At 1130, the Iraqi Envoy presented himself again at Air Headquarters with a second message from the Iraqi Commander. This message seemed to be a little terser and accused the British of having broken the Anglo-Iraq Treaty, stating that the Iraqi Commander would not allow any training or anything else to be carried out as long as the Treaty was not respected. Before replying to this message, Air Vice-Marshall Smart reviewed the current situation with his Staff: In looking at the arguments for taking immediate offensive action, it was agreed that:

1. The steady increase in the Iraqi forces was making the chances of success for offensive action progressively less probable--delay would only result in the increase in the strength of the Iraqi force occupying the Plateau.
2. The Iraqis might wait until darkness before staging an attack. Although unlikely, in that occurrence, Habbaniya's only really effective weapon (aircraft) would not be available.

Although Smart fully realized the ramifications of not taking immediate action, he was also greatly troubled by several nagging aspects. First (and most troubling to Smart) was that there was, as of yet, no directive received from a higher military authority. Additionally, having been in Iraq (and specifically at Habbaniya) since October of 1939, Smart knew full well that the previous policy of the AOC-in-C (Air Officer Commander in Chief) Middle East had always been to avoid a flare up in Iraq at any cost. Smart also knew the existing situation in Libya and Greece made it improbable that adequate reinforcements could be spared for Iraq. There was a possibility, albeit slight, but a possibility nevertheless, that in the circumstances, higher authority might actually be willing to accept the Iraqi demands in order to avoid having to undertake a fresh campaign (not to mention the inordinate amount of civilian British casualties the Station could incur, should any proposed attacks on the besieging Iraqi army fail...) And so it was, that in view of the absence of any directive from higher authority, Smart decided against taking immediate offensive action, in spite of the risk such a course involved...

At 1150 Smart sent a note back to the Iraqi Commander (in reply to his second message) and merely stated that he had raised a "... political question which was being referred to the British Ambassador, as it is outside the province of the AOC" (Air Officer Commanding--Smart). The note again asked for the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces. Shortly afterwards, at 1155, a signal was sent to HQ RAF ME (Middle East), the GOC (General Officer Commanding) Basrah, HQ RAF India, the Air Ministry in London and Ambassador Cornwallis in Baghdad, giving the gist of the second message received from the Iraqi Commander and Smart's reply to it. The signal also stated that the AOC at Habbaniya had decided not to issue an ultimatum to the Iraqi Commander, in view of the policy so far pursued by HQ RAF ME, and that offensive action would be deferred until the Iraqis opened fire. Smart requested an immediate directive, together with what the possibility was of receiving reinforcements.

At approximately 1330, a third message from the Iraqi Commander was delivered to Smart by the Iraqi Envoy. Somewhat conciliatory, the message stated that the Iraqi forces would not do anything hostile as long as the Habbaniya garrison did not, but that the Iraqi forces would not be withdrawn without orders from Baghdad. Wisely, Smart asked the Iraqi Commander to keep the troops well clear of the Cantonment during the hours of darkness so as to avoid the possibility of an incident.

Later in the afternoon, the Ambassador to the Foreign Office in London sent a signal to Air Headquarters. The Ambassador to the Foreign Office recommended the use of force to restore the situation; he considered the Iraqi threats as acts of war justifying immediate air action. The Ambassador was pressing the Iraqi Government for the immediate withdrawal of their forces, while awaiting the official Foreign Office decision whether the issue was to be forced. This would only serve to exacerbate Smart's anxiety over the situation as he still had not heard from military sources regarding the crisis (thus far, he had only heard from civilian authorities...) and was beginning to wonder if he would ever receive word from his chain of command recommending a suitable course of action. (This situation was soon to play a significant role in the deterioration of Smart's psychological well being...)

Later on in the evening, Smart received word from the Foreign Office Ambassador in London that he "would have preferred quick action", but conceded that he realized Smart's "difficulties in the absence of definite instructions from HM (His Majesty's) Government." Finally, at about 1900, a signal was received from the AOC-in-C Middle East affirming the action taken by Smart and promising to immediately send 10 Wellington medium bombers (a detachment from No. 70 Squadron) to Shaibah, keeping a further 10 standing by in Palestine. A directive was given that "subject to the Ambassador's views, you should take immediate action with the Wellingtons from Shaibah and such aircraft as are at Habbaniya if Iraqis open fire". Even though he had finally heard from someone in his chain of command and being grateful for the pledge of the No. 70 Squadron Wellingtons, Smart still could not understand the overall hesitancy in the military channels for the issuance of orders.

The morning of May 1 st dawned bright and clear. Col O.L. Roberts of the 10 th Indian Division flew up from Basrah to lend his tactical expertise and supervised as preparations continued throughout the morning with the finishing touches being put on the Station's defenses. Sandbagged emplacements were prepared for Lewis machine guns for air defense--it was all they had. During the afternoon, air reconnaissance reported that even more Iraqi forces were being brought up, including extra artillery. This increase of force made it clear that the Iraqis were not likely to accept an ultimatum unless threatened with the immediate use of air power. Smart therefore decided that the ultimatum would be given at 0545 hours LST the following morning (02 May) to the local Iraqi Commander. If he accepted it, he would be given half an hour's grace to get his initial moves started; otherwise full air action would have to be taken.

At approximately 1605 that afternoon, Smart sent a signal to Ambassador Cornwallis in Baghdad stating that he could not take air action before the following morning as there was insufficient daylight left. He also impressed on the Ambassador the necessity for doing nothing to compromise surprise.

Shortly afterwards, at about 1730, a signal was received from the AOC-in-C Middle East in which Smart was directed to act in accordance with either of the following two alternatives:

1. To announce the continuance of full flying training, and to put the announcement into effect. If this caused the Iraqis to open fire, air attack should be commenced against Government offices in Baghdad and at Rashid Camp.
2. To give an ultimatum for the removal of the Iraqi forces surrounding Habbaniya. If this ultimatum was not accepted, air action should be taken firstly against Government Offices in Baghdad.

But, by the time this signal had been received, the situation had deteriorated even further. Air reconnaissance reports showed that 27 additional guns were being placed in positions covering the Cantonment, and, unlike the previous night, the outskirts of the Cantonment had been occupied at dusk by Iraqi troops. The air station was literally surrounded. The alternative courses directed by the AOC-in-C would no longer be able to solve the situation and the normally reserved Smart decided that air action would have to be taken the following morning without the issue of an ultimatum (A wise move since an ultimatum would give the tactical advantage away and allow the Iraqis to attack first.)

While all the political maneuvering was taking place, the military preparations were being refined and improved, just in case. By the early evening of May 1st, the forces at Habbaniya were as ready as they would ever be, with the main problem being the lack of pilots. (It was later decided to use the most advanced pupil pilots to make up the numbers to full strength so that all aircraft could be committed to the battle if need be) Impromptu landing fields were created by flattening the polo "pitch" on the north-western corner of the Station and the golf course; this was in case the main airfield's position outside the fence proved to be untenable, and also served to provide the pilots with a measure of concealment, afforded by the numerous rows of Oleanders and the western-most hangers along the southern edges of the polo field. Trenches were dug between the perimeter's block-houses while nurses and wives brought water to the laboring soldiers and airmen. (Early May of 1941 was already unseasonably hot and dry; daytime temperatures were creeping into the low 100's and during the course of the battle, temperatures would peak over 110...)

As per "Iraq Command Operation Order No 1 of 1941", the various aircraft of the No. 4 SFTS were already formed into the "Habbaniya Air Striking Force", dispersed for survivability and organized as follows:

("Bomb-aimers" and rear gunners would be taken from the remaining pupils and any spare ground members who were willing to go along...)

The swirling dust clouds kicked up by the menacing Iraqi army on the Plateau undoubtedly lent an air of urgency to the surrounded garrison. According to Air Vice-Marshall Casey's official report:

...by the evening of 1 May, it was estimated from air reconnaissance that the Iraqi Forces in the vicinity of Habbaniya amounted to: One Infantry Brigade plus two Mechanised Battalions; One Mechanised Artillery Brigade (Twelve 3.7 Howitzers); One Field Artillery Brigade (Twelve 18 Pdrs and Four 4.5 Howitzers); 12 Armoured Cars; One Mechanised Machine Gun Company; One Mechanised Signal Company; One Anti-Aircraft/Anti-Tank Battery... They were disposed mainly on the Plateau and astride the road to Baghdad, but with at least two guns North of the River Euphrates, and a few troops (possibly one Company of Infantry) in Fallujah.

The reports of field guns north of the Euphrates were also mentioned in the diary of an Assyrian Rifle Squadron soldier, who also noted the use of cavalry by the Iraqis:

05/01/1941
The Iraqi forces in the vicinity of Habbaniya have been roughly estimated as follows: One Infantry Brigade, One Mechanised Artillery Brigade, 12 Armoured Cars, One Mechanised M.G Company, Tanks. All these were on the high ground to the South and South East of the Camp. In addition, there was one company of Infantry at Fallujah; two 3.7 Howitzers and several M.Gs on the far side of the river North of the Camp, and one Field Brigade (Horsed) on the Baghdad-Fallujah Road.

All told, the 2,200 some odd defenders of Habbaniya faced an Iraqi army of at least 10,000 regular soldiers, an estimated fifty field guns, and an untold number of tribal militia. (Some reports claim that the number of militia present actually exceeded that of the Iraqi regulars.)

With their backs to the Euphrates River; with all land routes blocked or cutoff; surrounded by an angry mob masquerading as an army and with the lives of 9,000 civilians counting on them (many of them the wives and children of the soldiers and airmen of the Station...), for the defenders of RAF Habbaniya, their date with destiny had apparently arrived: it was time to do or die. They realized that, in the words of the War Office Chiefs of Staff, it was their "... duty to defend Habbaniya to the last." This was duly confirmed when, in the early hours of May 2 nd, Air Vice-Marshall Smart finally received the directive he was waiting for. At about 0400, AHQ Habbaniya received a signal from the Prime Minister in London. Sir Winston Churchill himself sent a very short and succinct wireless message which read: "If you have to strike, strike hard. Use all necessary force"...

To be continued in next month's newsletter...