Feature Article (May 05)

An Uncommon Valour: The Battle of Habbaniyah

Part Five: We Strike the Hostiles

After a week of siege and 4 days of fairly sharp combat, the defenders of Habbaniya faced a terrible dilemma. Either attack the Iraqis now, or slowly succumb to the siege and eventual surrender. Unable to receive adequate supplies of food, ammunition and fuel for the aircraft, the senior leaders realized that in order for the station to survive, they would have to go on the offensive. The losses of the past four days had inflicted a terrible cost on the defenders already and it was feared that any more losses would make an assault on the Iraqi forces on the plateau not only unfeasible but suicidal. Of the original fleet of 80 aircraft, the Air Striking Force now possessed only 40 flyable planes. About the only bright side to the otherwise dire situation was the fact that, for the most part, the ground forces were still near full strength and had already successfully repelled several Iraqi probing attacks. Additionally, the Iraqis didn't realize the state of the British defenses at the time and given the stiff British resistance, they probably figured the British were in a much better position than they really were. The Iraqis on the other hand, had taken a terrific pounding by the ad hoc flotilla of training aircraft and on the night of the 5th, most of the tribal militia began to pull off of the plateau and go home. This got many of the regular Iraqi army commanders thinking and it was decided that for them, enough was enough; in the early hours of 6 May, the main Iraqi forces investing the plateau began to withdraw towards Sinn Al Dhibban, a small village about a mile and a half east of Habbaniya.

At AHQ, it was decided that, based on the reports from reconnaissance aircraft, an attack to drive the Iraqis fully off the plateau would indeed be made in the morning. Lt. Col Everett, 1st Kings Own Commander, was informed that the Kings Own would be the main effort, with No.4 Company, Assyrian Rifles, as supporting effort. The Kings Own would attack east through what is present day "Coolie Camp", and then swing south in an effort to cut-off withdrawing Iraqi forces. The No.4 Company Assyrian Rifles, under the command of Capt. Thomas, would head south out of what is essentially now the main gate and swing eastward, skirting the escarpment of the plateau. All of this would be done under the watchful eyes of a section of armoured cars from the No.1 ACC along with 10 Audaxes to provide close support.

At 0730, armored cars rumbled south out of London Gate and began to sweep the plateau, looking for any Iraqi stragglers. At approximately the same time, the two companies of the 1st Kings Own began to move out of attack positions on the east side of the station, quickly formed the companies along a somewhat broad front and began heading east towards Sinn El Dhibban. The Audaxes were fuelled, bombed up and standing by, just in case. At blockhouse No. 10, the commander of the ground defenses, Lt. Col. Brawn was joined by the 1st Kings Own commander, Lt. Col. Everett (Who had recently received a battlefield promotion from Major) on top of the blockhouse for a view of the battlefield. The assembled commanders watched closely as their men headed out and waited for the plan to unfold.

An Assyrian soldier serving with the No.4 Company recorded in his diary the following:

At 7.30 the armoured cars left the London Road Gate and started to search the Plateau, and shortly afterwards the attack by the Kings Own commenced. The enemy, who had dug in and camouflaged very well, was stronger than expected. They allowed the leading Coy of the 1st Kings Own to get very close to Sinn El Dhibban, and then poured in a withering fire, with a large number of Bren and Vickers Guns, from the front and left flank. The armoured cars meanwhile, were dealing with the right flank, operating eastwards along the Plateau...The Kings Own at first bravely persisted, but eventually, having suffered a number of Officer and O.R. ["other ranks" or enlisted] casualties, some of them began to withdraw. To Lt. Col. Everett (Kings Own) and Lt. Col. Brawn (Iraq Levies), together viewing this action from No.10 B.H., the very serious nature of the situation appeared. This was reported by phone to Col. Roberts, A.H.Q., who had ordered the attack, and at the same time O.C Land Defences got the Kings Own headquarters and informed the Adjutant of the situation, advised him that the sewage farm [about 400 meters due east of Habbaniya] was a good place to get close contact and carry out any re-organisation should it be found necessary. There was a phone there with which he could keep touch with his O.C at No.10 B.H. Capt. Boyes was thereafter at the Sewage Farm and in touch with Capt. Cottingham, who was supporting the Kings Own from there.

Unbeknownst to the Kings Own, the Iraqis had apparently set up what amounted to a brigade sized blocking position along the Baghdad-Fallujah road and proceeded to send the rest of withdrawing force to Fallujah. A vicious battle soon developed between the withdrawing Iraqis and the desperate defenders of Habbaniya. Caught in the open, completely by surprise, the lead elements of the Kings Own were fixed by horrendous Iraqi automatic weapons fire from the left (east) flank. The attack had stalled.

The Levy soldier continues his narrative:

Wounded men of the Kings Own were being carried over the Bund near the Sewage Farm, [present day Coolie Camp] and the dust put up by M.G fire and moving troops was becoming thick. The danger of an immediate enemy attack (counter attack) was apparent and O.C land Defence (O.C Iraq Levies) asked Lt. Col. Everett if he would like quick assistance in that area. On his agreeing, Capt. Cottingham and SGT Lazar were at once sent off in the Commer truck with the Vickers Gun and a 3" Mortar and ammo, to get into action as quickly as possible in the sewage area in support of the Kings Own. They were joined shortly afterwards by O.S.M Aston who put in some very good work, killing and capturing a lot of the enemy. Later they took a hand in the final assault on Sinn El Dhibban village and ridge with No.4 Assyrian Company. The O.C Kings Own was kind enough to inform us that this prompt action saved his men a lot of casualties. Immediate Air co-operation was asked for also by O.C Land Defences after seeing O.C Kings Own, to help the Kings Own and cause diversions. He pointed out the targets to the Pilots, who at his request came up to that vicinity of No.10 B.H and their subsequent accurate and bold action had very marked and heartening effect. Owing to dust and heat haze and ever changing battle orders, Air and Artillery co-operation had to be very carefully worked out in order to gain the maximum quick effect without causing our side any casualties or alarm.

The Audaxes had been scrambled to assist the embattled Kings Own, but owing to the dust being kicked up by the Iraqi machine-guns raking the area, the pilots at first had a hard time differentiating between Iraqi soldiers and British soldiers. In a remarkable display of air co-operation, Lt. Col. Brawn assisted the Audax pilots by signaling to them the location of Iraqi targets, thereby facilitating rapid engagement by the Air Striking Force. But, however effective the close air support was, it still wasn't enough to drive the Iraqis out of Sinn Al Dhibban, or give the Kings Own the relief they needed to get out of the kill zone they had stumbled into.

At a time when the battle had seemed to hit a new low and Iraqi counterattack was immanent, the defenders of Habbaniya found a new level of courage within and fought back even harder, if such a thing was possible. Lt. Col. Brawn asked Col Roberts if he could commit the Levies in an effort to extricate the Kings Own. By now, the Kings Own had been pinned down for over six hours.

The Levy soldier explains what happened next:

Subsequently O.C Land Defences (O.C. Iraq Levies) sought and obtained permission for No.4 Assyrian Company's Captain Thomas to go through the Company of the Kings Own, who had knocked out the enemy left flank and taken Sinn El Dhibban village and the ridge behind. After having the situation and intention explained to him from No.10 B.H by O.C Levies, Capt. Thomas embused his company at 2.30 in the afternoon, and proceeded out of London Road Gate to the rifle ranges. He was covered this far by A/cars on the Plateau. Having well thinned out his troops, to guard against surprise L/A [light-arms] fire, he advanced and made a successful attack, capturing large quantities of war materials. The enemy was so demoralized and their fire so erratic that even snipers who were killed close up caused No.4 Coy no casualties.

The Levies, undoubtedly recalling the horrific massacres in the early thirties the Assyrians faced at the hands of their Iraqi tormentors, attacked the Iraqi blocking positions with such fury that it served as to inspire the remaining Kings Own Soldiers who soon joined their Assyrian counterparts in routing the Iraqis off the plateau and the positions they held near Sinn Al Dhibban. The combat was incredibly fierce and has been recorded in several places as often being hand to hand.

From an interview with a Levy Soldier who was present:

The CO called in all the Levy officers and ordered the Plateau to be cleared. Number 4 Assyrian company went out to clear the Plateau. A large number of the enemy fled in all directions. They captured around 700 prisoners; ten of them were Assyrian, one a Major!

And still another veteran of No. 4 Company gives this first hand account:

I was in the 4th Assyrian company, our job was to advance onto the plateau and clear it...Our left flank joined with the British troops. We advanced through our rifle range [just to the south of the main gate] and onto the plateau...the British unit...they received many casualties. We were under machinegun fire all the time. But the enemy was very shaken up, the bombers hit them hard. Some of them gave up as soon as they saw us. Some refused to give up; we either smoked them out or shot them. We captured 700 prisoners and killed many more. We captured an Assyrian Major, he was wounded at the time, He was the Artillery Major that directed the enemy Guns on our positions. You can imagine our surprise when he started speaking Assyrian! I don't mind telling you we wanted to finish him! But Corporal Odisho stopped us; he said the major was of his village. [The Battle] lasted for 15 hours, at 8 PM. our company was relieved.

The actual figures of captured Iraqi soldiers were less than the Levy Soldiers claims, and in an after action report submitted by a British Officer the number was as follows:

In the attack on Sinn El Dhibban the enemy suffered 1,000 casualties and 25 officers and 408 men were captured. The Kings Own lost 7 killed and 12 wounded. Assyrian Levy casualties were two wounded. The result of the encounter was a great encouragement to all ranks, and very good for morale. The Assyrian Levies had the opportunity of really putting their training into practice, and showed a high standard of marksmanship with all weapons in the field.

But the real miracle of Habbaniya was yet to happen. Late in the afternoon, Iraqi stragglers getting into Fallujah reported to the commander of the garrison about the battle that had developed at Sinn Al Dhibban. Realizing the importance of holding the line there and trying to capitalize on the possibilities of an Iraqi counterattack, the commander ordered a mixed brigade to proceed to Dhibban immediately. A motorized battalion, several armoured cars, a few light tanks and even an Iraqi cavalry unit set out westward along the Baghdad – Fallujah road. All of this was carefully watched by an RAF plane flying a reconnaissance mission out of Habbaniya. The Iraqi reinforcements hadn't traveled far when they met up with the forward elements of the retreating forces from the plateau. The commanders of both columns got out of their vehicles and conferred as to what to do. Sitting in the middle of the open desert, with absolutely no security and oblivious to the Audax flying a few miles away, the Iraqis dismounted their vehicles and waited while their commanders discussed what they should do.

Meanwhile, the pilot quickly flew back to Habbaniya and reported to Group Captain Seville, who knew exactly what to do; Seville quickly ordered all remaining aircraft to attack the Iraqi relief column at once, hurling all 40 of the precious aircraft at the confused Iraqis. The results were devastating. Caught in the open by the remains of the Air Striking Force, the Iraqi column was mercilessly strafed and bombed, causing the road to erupt into a sheet of flame nearly 500 metres long. The planes continued their attack until the entire column was virtually annihilated.

A British officer with the Levies described the action:

In the late afternoon a report was received that Iraqi reinforcements consisting of cavalry, a BN in M.T. and A.F.V.s were on this side of Fallujah. Our bombers went over and completely broke up this force. They were caught on the open road and many direct hits were scored causing indescribable confusion.

B.A. Casey's narrative explained:

A late attempt by the Iraqi Commander at Fallujah to restore the situation by sending up a mixed force of motorised infantry and guns met with disaster; the column was heavily attacked from the air and virtually annihilated, nothing being left of it but a line of wrecked lorries, many of them burnt out or exploded, which littered the road between Fallujah and Canal Turn in desolate array, and remained for some weeks afterwards as mute evidence of the Iraqi defeat.

And with the destruction of the Iraqi motorized column, effectively, the siege of Habbaniya was over. Although Habbaniya would incur sporadic air attacks, the defenders and civilians of RAF Habbaniya no longer had to fear being overrun and shelled continually. As B.A. Casey stated, "...the greatest benefit enjoyed by the garrison was psychological - a feeling of freedom and of now having room to breathe".

The British and their Assyrian counterparts captured much war material during the rout. This badly needed equipment would later be used against the Iraqis during the drive on Fallujah and subsequently Baghdad in order to evict Rashid Ali.

Casey lists an incredible amount of equipment:

The material results of the raising of the siege of Habbaniya were important and included: seven 3.7" Howitzers; two Anti-Tank guns; three 20 mm anti-aircraft guns; forty five Bren guns; eighteen Vickers guns; three Hotchkiss machine guns; three Lewis guns; four Italian machine guns; ten Crossley armoured cars; one Italian light tank; three dragons; seventy nine motor vehicles of various kinds; seven motor cycles; and a vast quantity of rifles, machine gun spares and ammunition and other equipment. This booty, particularly the guns, Bren guns and MT was invaluable; and it now became possible to operate aircraft in greater security and their repair and maintenance had no longer to be carried out under intermittent shell and machine gun fire. Above all, foraging parties were able to bring in sheep and cattle from the countryside to augment the not very large stocks of food in the Cantonment.

Upon receiving the news back in London, on the 7th of May, the Prime Minister sent a wireless message which said: "Prime Minister to Air Vice-Marshal Smart; Your vigorous and splendid action has largely restored the situation. We are all watching the grand fight you are making...Keep it up."

To be continued in next month's newsletter...