DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
APO 96363

AVDG-CC

17 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

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3. Department of the Army Survey Information
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a. (C) Operations.

(1) Operation RANDOLPH GLEN continued during the reporting period until conclusion on 31 March 1970. The division continued to support combined US/GVN operations and training to upgrade the effectiveness of GVN forces; to detect, capture or destroy members of the local Viet Cong infrastructure and their sympathizers; to disrupt routes of supply between mountain base areas and the rice producing lowlands and population centers; and to support the Thua Thien Province accelerated pacification and development program. The division continued to restrict enemy infiltration and movement in the populated lowlands by conducting extensive patrol and night ambush operations in coordination with RF and PF units; radar raids to detect targets for engagement by artillery; river patrols around key bridges and populated areas; and augmentation of GVN bridge security forces during periods of high threat. The period was marked by the establishment of enemy forward logistic bases and forward staging areas in the central canopy region, suitable for supporting operations in the lowlands. The end of the period was characterized by an increase in the number of enemy ground attacks on allied fire support bases and an increase in enemy attacks by fire.

(2) Operation RANDOLPH GLEN was developed, planned, and executed in close cooperation and coordination with Vietnamese civilian and military agencies at all levels. All the resources of the entire division were committed to the accomplishment of two basic, interrelated tasks:

(a) To provide, in coordination with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN), a protective shield on the periphery of the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province.

(b) To support, to the maximum extent possible, the attainment of the goals of the 1970 Province Pacification and Development Plan.

(3) All operations conducted by the division during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN were planned to maximize security of the population and to support accelerated attainment of the eight objectives of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. These eight objectives are:

(a) Territorial security: Security is the prerequisite to insuring that social, economic, and political development in Thua Thien Province progresses and yields the desired results. The efforts of US, ARVN, Regional Forces (RF), Popular Forces (PF), People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF), and the National Police/National Police Field Forces (NPPF) must be coordinated and combined in order to insure effective security for all the people.
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(b) Protection of the People Against Terrorism: The neutralization of the VC through combined efforts at increasing the effectiveness of the Phuong Hoang (Phoenix) organization at every level, to include the effective administration of intelligence material by District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC) and Province Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (PIOCC).

(c) People's Self Defense: Better organize, train, and equip PSDP to increase their capabilities of protecting the villages and hamlets and to discharge their responsibility of helping to identify the VC.

(d) Local Administration: Development of a local administration with the capability of self-management in administrative, economic, and financial affairs; complete election of all village, hamlet, municipal and provincial councils.

(e) Greater National Unity: Continue implementation of the Hoi Chanh program with greater emphasis on rallying high and middle ranking enemy cadre to the government ranks.

(f) Brighter Life for War Victims: Increase efforts at improving life for war victims, assisting resettles in returning to secure areas and encourage their participation in local economic development.

(g) People's Information: Establishment of an effective information system based on close coordination between government agencies and between the various people's organizations, with emphasis on information aimed at educating the people and motivating them to participate in local development in every field.

(h) Prosperity for All: Continue to build on the achievements of preceding years, advancing steadily from previous economic and political successes to economic independence.

(4) The two basic tasks, territorial security and pacification and development support, were organized in the following manner:

(a) Territorial security was developed through combined operations with ARVN and territorial forces, and through an extensive training program that provided specialized instruction for ARVN units, but concentrated on training RF, PF, and PSDP units to accomplish their assigned tasks with the equipment and personnel authorized.

(b) The pacification and development goals of Thua Thien Province during RANDOLPH CLOEN were to provide adequate security for the entire population, eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure, initiate and complete
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needed public projects, improve existing economic programs, and implement economic reforms where required. These objectives were advanced through extensive psychological operations and civic action.

(5) The focal point for coordination of all efforts in Tana Thien Province was the informal Area Coordination Committee composed of the CG, 101st Abn Div (Ambl); CG, 1st Inf Div (ARN); the Province Chief; and US senior advisors. This committee coordinated broad policies for the employment of military forces to accomplish the established objectives and determine priorities for pacification and civic action. Detailed coordination to implement these policies was effected through continuous liaison at division level with the 1st Inf Div (ARN) and with province/sector officials. Brigades provided liaison teams with dedicated communications to counterpart regiments and each district in the area of operation.

(6) The conduct of Operation RANDOLPH CHEN during the reporting period was influenced by these factors:

(a) The northeast monsoons, which reduced the ability of the division to move into and sustain operations against the enemy base areas deep in the jungle canopy.

(b) The mission to provide maximum security for populated lowlands while the training of territorial forces progressed.

(c) The requirement to prevent and defeat, if initiated, any enemy offensive action during the Tet period.

As the period progressed, the impact of each of these factors on the conduct of operations diminished. Increased security measures in February prevented any significant enemy interference during the Tet holiday season. By mid-February, the weather permitted airmobile division elements to begin moving deeper into the piedmont and canopy areas. Training of territorial forces progressed satisfactorily and RF and PF units became more capable of performing their intended missions, while the training provided PSDF elements increased their confidence in their ability to defend their hamlets and villages. Weather conditions improved significantly in March and it became possible to employ to a greater extent the airmobility of the division to conduct offensive operations against the enemy base areas established during the monsoon period.

In addition to these factors, the effect of US troop redeployment continued and further reductions were announced. Planning began for future operations when the division AC may extend beyond Tana Thien and Quang Tri Provinces. One of the foremost considerations in this planning was to
minimize the interruption to both pacification and development support and the coordinated efforts of the divisions and SVN forces and agencies in the provinces. As planning progressed, courses of action were developed and analyzed, and the accomplishment of the objectives of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN were evaluated. It became clear that the basic concepts of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN remained valid and that, with the necessary adjustments in brigade missions and locations, the foundation for progress in the lowlands developed during the operation could be built upon, while providing the combat power necessary to counter the threat of enemy build-up in the western reaches of Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces. In early March, planning was completed and the decision was made to terminate Operation RANDOLPH GLEN on 31 March 1970.

(7) In mid-March, CPORD 2-70 (TEXAS STAR) was published for implementation on 1 April. This operation was planned to exploit the successes of RANDOLPH GLEN, incorporate the lessons learned during that operation, to continue the cooperation developed among all Allied elements in the province, and to provide for the movement of a portion of the 121st from Thua Thien Province if it becomes necessary.

Under Operation TEXAS STAR, the 2d Brigade assumed responsibility for pacification and development support throughout the province, while the 1st and 3d Brigades were tasked to conduct offensive operations against enemy units in the western portions of the province. Concurrent with the repositioning of division units, the areas of operation of regiments of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) were adjusted to maintain the brigade-regimental relationships developed and refined during the preceding months.

(8) The chronological sequence of combat operations for the period 1 February - 30 April 1970 is as follows:

(a) Operation RANDOLPH GLEN (7 December 1969 - 31 March 1970) was concluded during the reporting period.

† The primary missions of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN were:

a To conduct offensive operations to locate and destroy NVA/VC main force units and to interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province.

b To conduct operations to defeat VCLEF/VCI in the populated lowlands.

c To conduct limited objective operations west of the piedmont in reaction to hard intelligence.

d To conduct periodic interdiction of the A Shau Valley and place fires on acquired targets on a continuous basis.

e To conduct reconnaissance and surveillance in the AO.
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1. To provide one airborne infantry battalion as corps reserve.
2. To support GVN pacification and development plans and programs.
3. To provide civic action assistance.
4. To assist GVN forces to assume full responsibility for combat, pacification, and psychological operations in Thua Thien Province.

2. The success of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN was accomplished through the full commitment and integration of resources, energies and efforts of the 101st Abn Div (Air), 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and Thua Thien Province. Significant progress was made in training and preparing territorial forces to assume a greater responsibility for the defense and development of their homeland. Additional land was put under cultivation, schools were built, roads constructed, and resettlement progressed ahead of schedule. Accomplishment of the division's missions has laid the foundation for an effective Vietnamese security system that will continue after the departure of the division, or major portions of the division from Thua Thien Province. Detailed significant activities during Operation RANDOLPH GLEN have been submitted in Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), MACJ3-32 (R2) (U).

3. Cumulative enemy losses inflicted by Allied forces during RANDOLPH GLEN were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>FW</th>
<th>Indiv Wnds</th>
<th>Crew Served Wnds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R/P</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Total division casualties during the operation were 123 KIA, 163 WIA (evacuated), 84 WIA (minor), and 4 MIA. The 4 MIA were aboard an aircraft lost in flight, which is still unlocated.

(b) Operation TEXAS STAR (1 April 1970 - continuing):

1. Task Organization:

1st Brigade: 24 Brigade: 33 Brigade:
1-327 Inf 2-327 Inf 1-506 Inf
1-501 Inf 3-187 Inf 2-506 Inf

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Brigade</th>
<th>2nd Brigade</th>
<th>3rd Brigade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-502 Inf</td>
<td>1-502 Inf</td>
<td>2-501 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-320 Arty (105mm How) (DS)</td>
<td>1-321 Arty (105mm How) (DS)</td>
<td>2-319 Arty (105mm How) (DS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (-)/326 Engr (DS)</td>
<td>O(-)/326 Engr (DS)</td>
<td>D(-)/326 Engr (DS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st PSSG, DISCOM (DS)</td>
<td>21 PSSG, DISCOM (DS)</td>
<td>3d PSSG, DISCOM (DS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tm, 101 MI Co (-)</td>
<td>Tm, 101 MI Co (-)</td>
<td>Tm, 101 MI Co (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-265 RRC (DS)</td>
<td>2-265 RRC (DS)</td>
<td>3-265 RRC (DS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42H Inf Flt (Set Dog)</td>
<td>47th Inf Flt (Set Dog)</td>
<td>58th Inf Flt (Set Dog)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACP USAF</td>
<td>TACP USAF</td>
<td>TACP USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spt Tm 501 Sig (DS)</td>
<td>Spt Tm 501 Sig (DS)</td>
<td>Spt Tm 501 Sig (DS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Tms, 4th PSYOP Det (DS)</td>
<td>2 Tms, 4th PSYOP Det (DS)</td>
<td>2 Tms, 4th PSYOP Det (DS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2-17 Cav</th>
<th>101 Avn Co</th>
<th>Div Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co L (Ranger) 75th Inf</td>
<td>163 Avn Co</td>
<td>501 Sig Bn (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 Avn Bn</td>
<td>101 Avn Bn</td>
<td>326 Engr Bn (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158 Avn Bn</td>
<td>159 Avn Bn</td>
<td>101 MP Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>478 Avn Co (-)</td>
<td>478 Avn Co (-)</td>
<td>265 RRC (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 Abn Div Arty</td>
<td>101 Abn Div Arty</td>
<td>10th Cal Flt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-11 Arty</td>
<td>2-11 Arty</td>
<td>20th Cal Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-77 Aerial Art Arty</td>
<td>4-77 Aerial Art Arty</td>
<td>101 MT Co (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/377 Arty (Avn)</td>
<td>A/377 Arty (Avn)</td>
<td>557 Cmbt Tracker Plt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4th PSYOP Det (-) (DS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7th Plt, 29th CA Co (DS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Operation TEXAS STAR is a division operation developed in close coordination and cooperation with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and Tram Thien Province and sector officials to meet the challenge of the forward disposition of enemy forces in the division area of operation; insure the smooth transfer of pacification and development tasks from the entire division to only a single portion of the division, thereby providing a posture that will facilitate expansion of the division AO with no major interruptions to pacification and development support. Operation TEXAS STAR is designed to continue and expand the concepts, and to exploit the success and experience gained by the division during Operation HAN- DOLPH GLEN. Complete integration of effort of all agencies within the division area of operation is continuing to provide for the accomplishment of the inseparable tasks of territorial security, populace and resources control, and environmental improvement. The primary missions of the operation area:

a. To conduct extensive airborne combined operations in the area east of the A Shau Valley and west of the populated lowlands of Tram Thien Province to locate and destroy enemy units, bases camps and cache sites and to interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands to provide maximum security for the population.

b. To conduct operations in coordination with GVN forces to defeat VC/VAI in the populated lowlands.

c. To conduct combined, limited objective, airborne operations in reaction to hard intelligence within the AO.

d. To place fires on acquired targets in the A Shau Valley on a continuous basis.

e. To conduct reconnaissance and surveillance in the AO.

f. To reinforce, on order, the Mai Loc CIDG Camp.

g. To provide one airborne infantry battalion as corps reserve.

h. To support GVN pacification and development plans and programs.

i. To provide civic action assistance.

j. To assist GVN forces in the defense of Hue.

k. To assist GVN forces in providing security for the Vietnamese Railway System (VNS) within the AO.
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1. To assist GVN forces to assume full responsibility for combat, pacification and psychological operations in Thua Thien Province.

2. To prepare for operations in an expanded AO, on order.

3. To accomplish those missions the division continued to support the 1970 accelerated pacification and development program in Thua Thien Province by employing three battalions and nine mobile training teams in the early stages of TEAM STAR. The success of the mobile training team program indicated in RANDOLPH GUILD was expanded to provide 13 teams in the lowlands and piedmont area under control of the 2d Brigade. Operations in close coordination with GVN officials were conducted to isolate the lowlands from infiltration by NVA and main force units, restrict enemy movement in the populated areas, search out the Viet Cong infrastructure and eliminate their influence on the populace, and to increase the people's confidence in the local government. Two dedicated battalions continued to conduct combined operations and training in Phu Loc and Phong Dien Districts and one battalion conducted combined operations with RF units in the piedmont south of Hue to eliminate enemy infiltration into the area. The 2d Brigade conducted extensive combined operations from squad through company size to increase the participation of territorial forces in the defense of their homes. The mobile training teams continued to train territorial forces to increase their combat effectiveness and HUSF to improve their ability to defend their hamlets and villages. The brigade also maintained liaison with district headquarters to improve the capability to react to incidents of enemy terrorism and food gathering among the people.

The 1st and 3d Brigades, in conjunction with the 54th and 1st Regiments (ARVN), deployed against NVA in the canopied area between the lowlands of Thua Thien Province and the A Shau Valley. Combined airmobile operations were conducted with elements of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) to locate and destroy enemy forces, bases camps and cache sites.

Cavalry, Air Force and artillery aircraft continued to conduct extensive aerial reconnaissance throughout the area of operations and the division continued to expand the employment of unattended sensor and other surveillance devices to locate enemy targets and employ artillery and air fire power against them.

(9) Other Significant Activities.

(a) Road construction. Road building and upgrading projects were continued during the period. Although engineer efforts were primarily in support of tactical operations, road and bridge building significantly strengthened the local economy and substantially aided resettlement, particularly in Phong Dien and Quang Dien Districts.
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(b) Boundary acquisition. On 19 February the division acquired an addition to the eastern portion of the area of operation from the 1st Marine Division. The area included fire support bases Tonahawk and Los Banos and completed the embodiment of all Thua Thien Province into the division AO.

(c) F Troop. On 12 March, Troop F (Provisional), 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav was inactivated and redesignated as Co A, 101st Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl). The troop had been organized from assets of the division on 16 December 1969 to supplement division reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

(d) Personnel influx. A number of personnel from the redeploying 1st US Infantry Division joined the ranks of the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) as a result of redeployment of that unit from the Republic of Vietnam.

(e) 2d Brigade movement. 2d Brigade, three infantry battalions and supporting elements moved from Camp Sally to Phu Bai Combat Base on 13 March following the movement of XXIV Corps headquarters to Da Nang. At 1700 hours on 30 March, Camp Sally was officially released from control of the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) and transferred to the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) in a ceremony at Camp Sally.

(10) Enemy losses during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contacts</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>KKB</th>
<th>FW</th>
<th>AW</th>
<th>OSW</th>
<th>Grain - Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demolitions | Documents | SA | Ammunition | GS | Vehicles |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>88.25 lbs</td>
<td>11.25 lbs</td>
<td>20,952 rds</td>
<td>1182 rds</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>79.45 lbs</td>
<td>21.25 lbs</td>
<td>11,836 rds</td>
<td>1912 rds</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>610.00 lbs</td>
<td>15.25 lbs</td>
<td>23,358 rds</td>
<td>88,076 rds</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(11) Friendly losses during the reporting period:

February | 31 KIA | 116 WIA | 3 MIA |
March    | 56 KIA | 227 WIA | 1 MIA |
April    | 83 KIA | 443 WIA | 1 MIA |
(12) G3 Air activities:

(a) During the reporting period, close air support sorties were flown in the division area of operation as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preplanned sorties</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate sorties</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat sky spots</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flareships</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunships (Spooky, Shadow and Stinger)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Tactical air strikes expended 5682 tons of bombs and 200 tons of napalm, resulting in 46 NVA/VC KIA and the following damage:

1. 844 bunkers destroyed
2. 14 bunkers damaged
3. 23 huts destroyed
4. 4 military structures destroyed
5. 25 12.7mm gun positions destroyed
6. 259 secondary explosions
7. 256 secondary fires
8. 20 boxes of ammunition destroyed
9. 14 ammunition fires
10. 68 trucks destroyed
11. 1 bulldozer destroyed
12. 2 half tracks damaged
13. Routes 916, 9222 and 27 interdicted in 565 locations
14. Numerous trails interdicted
15. 10 tunnel entrances destroyed

(c) During the reporting period, 67 B52 strikes were conducted against targets in the AO.
b. (c) Training.

(1) In order to maximize forces available during the Tet period, battalion refresher training was suspended from 21 January to 15 February. Again on 9 April, training was suspended due to the increased enemy contact throughout the AO. Training remained suspended through the end of the reporting period. The program continued to emphasize marksmanship, small unit tactics, airmobile operations, mines and booby traps, and ambush operations.

(2) To assist in upgrading the effectiveness of the territorial forces, additional mobile training teams (MTT) were organized, trained at the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS), and employed in the division area of operation. At the end of the reporting period, 18 MTTs were deployed.

(3) During the reporting period, a total of 27 selected personnel attended one of the three cycles of the MACV Recondo School. Twenty-four personnel from the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) also attended the school. Each ARVN soldier was assigned a US buddy who was also attending the school to encourage participation by the ARVN and assist in the transition from ARVN to US instruction.

(4) Three cycles of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Sniper School were conducted during the period. Fourteen personnel from the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and 45 personnel from the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) graduated from the school. All graduates were equipped with the XM21 sniper rifle. A sniper contact team, consisting of the sniper school OIC and several instructors visited units in the field to discuss and assist commanders in planning for sniper employment.

(5) The Pathfinder Platoon conducted training in pathfinder operations for soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN). Two classes, totalling 35 personnel, were graduated. To aid instruction, the Pathfinder Handbook was translated into Vietnamese. Training stressed pathfinder principles, techniques in planning and conducting airmobile operations, and ground control of rotary wing aircraft.

(6) The 101st Airborne Division Airmobile Operations School conducted two classes at Camp Eagle during the reporting period. A total of 67 personnel from the division, the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), and MACV Advisory Team 18 attended the courses. Instruction was presented to battalion and higher commanders, 33 and 33 Air officers, and other selected staff officers. During the month of April Airmobile Operations School instructors presented classes to 33 cadre personnel of the Vietnamese Dong Da National Training Center.

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(c) Chemical.

(1) General. During February, March and April, the Division Chemical Section with operational control of the 20th Chemical Detachment (CBRC) and the 10th Chemical Platoon (DS) (Separate) continued to provide chemical combat support to the division.

(2) Operations.

(a) During the reporting period, the Division Chemical Section performed the following missions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE MISSION</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Personnel Detector</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Flame Operations</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>437</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulk CS</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>428 55 gal drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 42 M77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 4 BLU-52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical CS</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 1,120 M7A3 grenade</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 8 CBU-30/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aerial Defoliation (Herbicide)</td>
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<td>780 gallons</td>
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<td>Inspected/Installed</td>
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<td>246/186 bbl</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fuel Flare Installed</td>
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<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crop Destruction</td>
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<td>210 Gallons</td>
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<td>150 lb CS2</td>
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The Airborne Personnel Detector continued to be used as a primary intelligence gathering device to supplement or confirm intelligence concerning enemy activities and to assist in locating enemy base areas and cache sites. The brigades conducted AED missions in their respective AOs, while the 21st Squadron (AAMT), 17th Cavalry conducted missions in the reconnaissance zone and special missions requested by the brigades. The division chemical section provided technical assistance in planning the missions. An officer was also provided to serve as OIC for the conduct of the missions and for interpretation of results for immediate exploitation of the targets. Several significant trends in enemy activity were indicated by the AED readings which assisted in determining enemy locations.

Methods of exploitation by divisional units included employment of AAA, gunships, artillery, air strikes, CS, and bulk flame drops.

Aerial flame operations using both the CH47 and UH1H helicopters were conducted on booby trapped areas planned for resettlement; to clear fields of fire around fire support bases; on landing zones for clearing booby traps and to assist in expansion; and on suspected enemy positions and cache sites.

1. Two major flame projects were conducted in Huong Thuy and Phu Tho Districts to assist in clearing booby traps in areas planned for resettlement and to clear mines and booby traps from trails and dikes adjacent to inhabited areas. The operations were supported by ground elements from the infantry brigades and by Marine CAP Teams and Popular Force platoons. These personnel were responsible for marking the targets and sweeping the areas following the drops to detect booby traps exposed by the flame.

2. Flame was used extensively on landing zones to clear booby traps prior to troop insertions. The value of the aerial delivered flame munitions was demonstrated by the number of booby traps detonated, neutralized, or exposed by the flame. On one occasion a landing zone, booby trapped with Chicom claymore mines facing upward for possible detonation by rotor wash of helicopters, was cleared by the flame. Ten secondary explosions were observed immediately following the drop.
2. Several new fire support bases were constructed and several previously constructed bases were reoccupied during the reporting period. This required extensive clearing operations around the perimeters to facilitate observation and provide fields of fire. Bulk flame drops were conducted to assist in these clearing operations.

4. A major flame project was conducted for the 2d ROK Marine Brigade in booby trapped areas 20 kilometers south of Da Nang. The project was conducted to assist in clearing the booby trapped area planned for Vietnamese resettlement and to provide instruction and technical assistance in training the ROK forces in the development of their own aerial flame program. The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) provided a CH-47 helicopter and personnel for the conduct of the flame operation. A briefing was conducted at the ROK brigade headquarters to describe the concept of employment and the operational techniques. A total of 520 drums of fuel were dropped during the initial three days of the operation. Assistance was provided by the ROK forces in marking the target areas and in rigging the nets for the drops. An area of approximately one half square kilometer was cleared during the initial portion of the operation, with a total of eight secondary explosions reported and several other booby traps neutralized.

(a) The use of bulk and tactical CS increased significantly during the reporting period. The munitions were employed using both organic helicopters and USAF and USMC high-performance aircraft. Bulk CS targets included enemy base areas and major road networks leading into the northern half of the A Shau Valley. The tactical CS missions were conducted on suspected enemy locations in conjunction with artillery and air strikes and in support of troop insertions and ground operations.

1. Fifty-five gallon drums of CS-2 equipped with the XN925 impact fuse and burster assembly were dropped from CH-47 helicopters on nine separate target areas for terrain restriction and for interdiction of roads. MK77 500 pound bombs, each containing 80 pounds of CS-1, and BM-52 bombs, each containing 260 pounds of CS-2, were employed from USMC and USAF high-performance aircraft to interdict the heavy vehicular traffic bringing enemy troops and supplies into the forward base areas. The interdiction caused the enemy to divert equipment and personnel to clear the areas or construct new routes, thus exposing their position to artillery and air strikes employed against them.

2. R158 CS canisters were employed on suspected enemy positions in support of ground elements conducting sweep operations, in support of artillery and air strikes, and for combined US/ARVN operations conducted in the vicinity of FSB Henderson. The R158 canisters were employed from UNH helicopters with each aircraft carrying 10-15 canisters; X7A3 grenades were also delivered from fabricated rocket tube assemblies constructed from four 2.75 inch rocket tubes. Each tube assembly is filled with 20 CS grenades; approximately 400 grenades can be delivered by each aircraft.
In supporting the troop insertions, the munitions were employed on enemy mortar and automatic weapons positions directed at the landing zones to be used for insertion. The E52 canisters were also employed to screen the flanks of a unit conducting sweep operations. One tactical OS mission was conducted using eight GBU-30/A bombs dropped from F-100 aircraft, in support of an aerial rocket artillery raid in the northern portion of the A Shau Valley.

Helicopter defoliation missions using both diesel and oil mixture, and herbicides, were conducted with the modified Agavenno sprayer. The diesel spray operations were conducted around fire support bases in the piedmont area where herbicides could not be used due to proximity of friendly crops. Herbicide missions were also conducted on major infiltration routes leading into remote fire support bases and on areas where several large caches sites had been located.

Extensive ground defoliation operations were conducted around fire support bases and along routes where the dense foliage hampered visual observation. The diesel was sprayed using a fabricated spray system consisting of a hose and pump assembly attached to the fuel container. A major project was conducted to clear the foliage along approximately seven kilometers of the Hue-Phu Nong railroad track which had been the target of enemy mining. A method was developed employing large containers carried on railroad flat cars to spray diesel along each side of the track. The area of spray extended out approximately 50 feet to each side of the track. The sprayed areas were then burned.

A cave seeding operation was conducted on a cave and tunnel complex discovered during a sweep and clear operation. The complex, which consisted of several rooms and tunnels, reinforced with concrete, was thoroughly seeded with powdered CS-2 by placing eight pound bags of CS-2 on detonating cord located throughout the cave.

Two crop destruction missions were conducted using Agent Blue to destroy the increasing number of garden plots scattered throughout the division area. Two techniques were used in destroying the plots. The Agavenno sprayer was used in areas where numerous garden plots were concentrated and where the enemy ground fire threat was negligible. In areas of higher threat five gallon plastic collapsible containers (Log-a-jugs) filled with Agent Blue were dropped from UH-1E helicopters on the garden plots. The average coverage of the liquid using this technique is approximately 20 x 30 feet with additional coverage gained by vaporization and wind drift.

New Methods.

1 Modified Agavenno Sprayer. The Agavenno sprayer used for spraying herbicides and diesel for defoliation was modified by removing the windmill
pump assembly and replacing it with the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier bilge pump. The pump operates from the aircraft electrical system, making the spray concentration independent of aircraft speed. This modification enables missions to be flown at slower speeds, providing a heavier concentration of spray in the area desired. At a speed of 60 knots, the modified Agavenco sprayer will disperse 110 gallons of defoliant over a distance of seven kilometers. The width of spray is approximately 60 feet, providing a concentration of three gallons per acre.

2 Use of plastic containers to dispense defoliants. A system was developed using five gallon collapsible containers (jug-a-jugs) filled with Agent Orange or Blue to engage the numerous garden plots scattered throughout the division A0. Delivery techniques are discussed in paragraph c. (2). (h), above. A problem was encountered in filling the container and in retaining the cap in place to prevent spill. A more durable container with a cap providing a better seal will assist in overcoming the problem.

3 "Jeepo" containers for cave seeding operations. The "Jeepo" containers are filled with eight rounds of powdered CS-2 and were used in cave seeding operations. A fusing system was developed using a non-electrical blasting cap, a six inch length of detonating cord, and a metal shield made from a tin can. This system has proven successful, however, much time is required to assemble it. A VIAPA request was submitted requesting development of a non- pyrotechnic CS grenade similar in size to the M7A3 grenade with a 3-10 second fuse to assist in cave seeding operations.

d. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Enemy Situation.

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period enemy units were located as follows:

1 In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MTRH), local force companies were located in their normal area of operations: C113 vicinity YD4033, C14 vicinity YD4019, C115 vicinity YD6217 and C116 vicinity YD7904. The Phu Yang Special Action Unit (PYSAU) was unlocated. The Phu Loc Armed Battalion (PHAB) and the 4th NVA Regiment were operating in the Phu Loc Mountains with most activity centered in the Phu Loc (b) Headquarters and the Tan Nu River Bridge areas. The 5th NVA Regiment was deployed in its traditional area of operations southwest of Hue, with the 804th Infantry Battalion vicinity YC6195, the 810th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD7915, the 832 Rocket Artillery Battalion operating vicinity YD7299, and the unlocated Chi Thua I and Chi Thua II Sapper Battalions possibly operating vicinity YC6292. The 29th NVA Regiment was located east of the central A
Shan Valley along the Bao La River Valley, vicinity FSB Maureen (YD4812). The 803d NVA Regiment was believed operating from eastern Base Area 611 and possibly in the A Shau Valley. Elements of the 6th NVA Regiment were deployed in the proximity of the Phong Dien (D) lowlands with elements of the K12 Sapper, 800th and 806th Infantry Battalions operating with the GL13 and GL14 Local Force Companies. The maneuver battalions of the 7th Front had returned to the area west of former Base Area 101, after being refitted and reinforced.

2 In the B-5 (DMZ) Front at the beginning of the reporting period there were eight enemy units operating in the DMZ area. The 52d NVA Regiment, 320th Division was located in northwestern Quang Tri (F). The 2d Battalion, 246th NVA Regiment was in the western portion of the central DMZ, vicinity XD8363. The 2d Battalion, 27th NVA Regiment was operating vicinity YD0568. The 31st NVA Regiment was deployed throughout the eastern DMZ area and making incursions in the Quang Tri (F) lowlands. The 270th NVA Regiment was located in the northeastern DMZ vicinity YD1986. The 84th Rocket Artillery Regiment was deployed throughout the DMZ in general support of the B-5 Front. The 126th Naval Sapper Regiment was located vicinity YD2289.

(b) Enemy activity during the month of February failed to match anticipated NVN high points. Prisoners of war and captured documents indicated that Allied operations had severely restricted enemy activities in the lowlands of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces and NVA forces located in the forward edge of the jungle canopy were forced to obtain their rice from North Vietnam. There were sporadic surges of activity by the 27th and 246th NVA Regiments along the DMZ and by the 5th NVA Regiment operating south of Hue. These surges were evidenced by an increase in the attacks by fire on Allied installations and forward fire support bases. NVA forces continued a high level of logistical activity in their rear support areas. Photo and visual reconnaissance repeatedly detected signs of vehicular activity in the Vietnamese Salient and the northern A Shau Valley. The enemy increased anti-aircraft fire throughout the division area of operations, with the most numerous incidents encountered along his critical lines of communication.

(c) Enemy initiated contacts showed no significant change in Northern I Corps during March. DMZ activity was characterized by attacks by fire in the area south of the central DMZ. There was an increase in ground activity in the B-5 Front area of operations with 80 contacts in March, as compared to 64 in February. In addition to the overall increase in ground activity there was also a significant rise in the number of platoon and company sized contacts. Intelligence indicated that elements of the 304th NVA Division had moved into western Quang Tri (F). A major logistical buildup continued in the Thua Thien mountain region where NVA
forces were concentrated. Photo and visual reconnaissance missions continued to detect signs of NVA vehicular activity in the Vietnamese Salient and throughout the A Shau Valley. The enemy continued to repair roads interdicted by Allied air strikes with bulldozers and engineer equipment. During March there was an increase in the use of larger caliber weapons employed against Allied aircraft with the heaviest volume of fire still being encountered along the enemy's critical lines of communication.

(d) Enemy initiated contacts increased significantly during the first two weeks of April. DMZ activity was characterized by attacks by fire primarily in the KSB Fuller and Camp Carroll areas. The enemy used 120mm mortars in the DMZ for the first time in two years. The presence of the 66th Regiment, 304th NVA Division in the upper Da Krong Valley increased the enemy threat in central Quang Tri (P). The extensive logistical buildup continued in the Thua Thien (P) mountain region. The enemy improved and expanded logistical facilities eastward towards the lowlands, establishing cache sites, improving lines of communication and constructing bunker and tunnel complexes. Enemy offensive operations in the central Thua Thien (P) canopy and piedmont regions were characterized by attacks by fire and limited ground and sapper attacks. Aerial and ground reconnaissance and surveillance operations continued to indicate heavy vehicular activity in the Vietnamese Salient and the A Shau Valley.

(e) At the end of the reporting period enemy units were located as follows:

1 In Military Region Tri-Thien-Huc (MATTH), local force companies were located in their normal area of operations: C113 vicinity Phong Dien (D), C114 vicinity Quang Dien (D), C115 vicinity YD6614 and C116 vicinity YD8304. The Phu Wang Special Action Unit remained unlocated. The Phu Loc Armed Battalion and the 4th NVA Regiment continued to operate in the Phu Loc mountains. The K4C Battalion, 4th NVA Regiment was located vicinity ZC0195 and the K4B Battalion, 4th Regiment was located near ZC1896. The 5th NVA Regiment remained in its traditional area of operations with the headquarters located vicinity YC5282, the 804th Infantry Battalion vicinity YC6195, the 810th Infantry Battalion vicinity YO715, the 439th Battalion vicinity YC6297, the K32 Rocket Artillery Battalion vicinity YO7299, the Chi Thua I Sapper Battalion vicinity YC6282, and the Chi Thua II Sapper Battalion vicinity YC7290. The 6th NVA Regiment was deployed in the canopy south of the Phong Dien (D) piedmont area with the regimental headquarters vicinity YD3216, the 800th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2922, the 802d Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2010, the 806th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4222, the K35 Rocket Artillery Battalion vicinity YD3620, and the K12 Sapper Battalion vicinity YD5423. The 29th and 803d NVA Regiments of the 324B Division were operating east of the
A Shau Valley just south and southeast of the 6th NVA Regiment. The 29th NVA Regiment Headquarters was located vicinity XD4405, with the 7th Infantry Battalion vicinity XD5307, the 6th Infantry Battalion vicinity XD4705, and the 9th Infantry Battalion vicinity XD4907. The 993d NVA Regiment Headquarters was located vicinity XD3415, with the 1st Infantry Battalion vicinity XD4412 and the 3d Infantry Battalion vicinity XD3311. The headquarters of the 324th Division remained in Base Area 511 with 11TH Headquarter. The 675th NVA Artillery Regiment was still carried in Base Area 511. The 7th Front remained located vicinity of former Base Area 101. The 812th NVA Regiment, which had been engaged in logistical activity supporting the 7th Front, was now located well into Thua Thien (P) with its headquarters vicinity XD2525, the 4th Infantry Battalion vicinity XD2428, the 5th Infantry Battalion vicinity XD0023, and the 6th Infantry Battalion vicinity XD2025.

At the end of the reporting period, in the B-5 (DMZ) Front, there were ten units operating in the DMZ area as far south as the Ba Long River Valley. The 5th NVA Regiment, 320th Division was still carried in the northeastern corner of Quang Tri (P). The 246th NVA Regiment was operating in the western portion of the central DMZ with the headquarters vicinity XD9377; the 1st Battalion vicinity XD9451; the 2d Battalion vicinity XD8363; and the 3d Battalion vicinity XD9461. The headquarters of the 27th NVA Regiment was located vicinity XD0668, with 1st Battalion vicinity XD0564; the 2d Battalion vicinity XD0570; and the 3d Battalion vicinity XD0459. The 75th Anti-aircraft Battalion was recently deployed to the DMZ and is employed vicinity XD9561. The 36th NVA Regiment was not active during the reporting period and is carried as unlocated in North Vietnam. The 84th Rocket Artillery Regiment and the 164th Rocket Artillery Regiment appeared to alternate fire support responsibility in the central DMZ area. Headquarters, 84th Rocket Artillery Regiment was located vicinity XD9874. The 126th Naval Sapper Regiment remained located vicinity XD2169. The newly arrived 56th NVA Regiment was located vicinity XD0242. Forward elements of the 304th Division were operating south of the Khe Sanh Plateau vicinity XD438. Elements of the 27th Battalion, 31st NVA Regiment were operating in the Quang Tri (P) lowlands with the battalion and regimental headquarters in North Vietnam vicinity XD1185. The 270th NVA Regiment remained located north of the eastern DMZ vicinity XD986.

Viet Con GI Infrastructure Activities.

(a) The month of February 1970 reflected a decline in VC/VCI incidents over the previous month. The majority of incidents during the month involved the collection of rice. These collections included confiscation or were conducted under the guise of taxation. The increase in propaganda activity was indicative of the emphasis by the enemy on discrediting the Allied pacification program and the preparation of the lowlands for
possible future offensive activity. There were two VC/VCI related incidents in February that have not been recorded for some time in the lowlands. The first involved a VC local force company (probably the C113) that entered UU Thuong (H) in Phong Dien (D). The company organized a propaganda meeting and upon their departure destroyed 85% of the fence around the hamlet. The other incident occurred on 12 February when three 122mm rockets impacted in Hue City. This was classified as an incident of terrorism since all casualties were civilians. The attack probably was a political propaganda lesson implying that GVN forces cannot protect the populace and that, when US forces are withdrawn, the city of Hue will once again fall under Communist control. During the month of February a total of thirty-nine VCI were eliminated by GVN and Allied operations within Thua Thien (F). Of this number, twenty-three were considered significant under current NACV standards. Inactivity during the Tet holidays may account for the decrease in VC/VCI incidents during February.

(b) During March the total number of VC/VCI related incidents showed no significant change from February; however, a large increase in sabotage activity was noted. Sabotage was directed primarily against the Hue-Da Nang railroad in Phu Loc (D) and hamlet security forces in Phong Dien (D). A recent raider from Phong Dien (D) stated that due to heavy losses, the C113 Local Force Company has been reorganized into a group of special action units. The company has a strength of approximately forty-six personnel, organized into four special action units deployed throughout Phong Dien (D). This reorganization is consistent with the strategy outlined by GOSVN Resolution 14, which states that maximum emphasis should be placed on guerrilla warfare. During the month of March a total of seventy-seven VCI cadre were eliminated by GVN and Allied operations within Thua Thien (F). Of this number, twenty-two were considered significant under current NACV standards.

(c) During April the total number of VC/VCI related incidents rose sharply. Rice collection activity declined, however, there was an increase in the number of terrorist and sabotage incidents. On 24 April, 12 armed VC entered Doc Bui (H), Huong Lo (Y), Hung Tra (D) and kidnapped the entire village district council (six VN Giv) and five members of the PSDV. This incident is indicative of VCI attempts to frighten and terrorize the local populace, with the desired effort of dissuading the people from participating in the GVN government. During the month of April a total of forty-four VCI cadre were eliminated by GVN and Allied operations within Thua Thien (F). Of this number, twenty-one were considered significant under current NACV standards.

(d) The following table compares the VC/VCI incidents for February (left), March (center), and April (right), by district:
ANDC-CC
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, ACR G2FOR-65 (R2) (U)

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(3) G2 Air Operations.

(a) During the reporting period coordination has been effected with the Commanding Officer, 245th Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC) and the 108th Artillery Group to reduce the time required to deliver fire support in the division reconnaissance zone in response to inflight SIAR and RED HAZE reports. The system presently being used has the following features:

1. 245th SAC aircraft performing missions in support of the division enter the G2 Air net when committed to the division area of operations.

2. The FSGC of 108th Artillery Group at Dong Ha Combat Base monitors the division G2 Air net.

3. 245th SAC aircraft render inflight reports of moving targets or RED HAZE emissions to the G2 Air. These reports are monitored by the 108th Artillery Group.

4. 108th Artillery Group passes the fire mission to the firing battery.

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5. G-2 Air passes the fire mission request to the division FSB in the DTCO. The FSB obtains artillery clearance and passes it to the 108th Artillery Group.

6. 108th Artillery Group passes artillery clearance to the firing battery and the target is engaged.

(b) The 220th Reconnaissance Airplane Company has provided one additional sortie per day for a total of twelve sorties to the division daily. This sortie has been allocated to the Imagery Interpretation (II) Section of the 101st Hq Company. This additional sortie enables the II Section to perform visual reconnaissance and hand-held photographic missions into high risk areas, releasing divisional aircraft to support other areas. This added capability has greatly enhanced the ability of the division to perform reconnaissance of major infiltration routes and to obtain timely photographic coverage of transitory targets. Moreover, the aircraft which perform these missions have acted as strike coordinators when gun ships, ABA, and tactical air support have been employed against such targets as anti-aircraft installations and truck parks.

(4) G-2 Ground Surveillance Operations.

(a) The G-2 Ground Surveillance Section established secure voice radio communications with sensor readout aircraft beginning in February 1970. This secure net is used to pass significant sensor information and has improved target analysis and response to the information.

(b) The sensor monitor site at Camp Sally was closed on 15 February 1970. Strings which had been previously monitored from that site were passed to the control of the monitor site at Camp Evans. A new monitor site was established on a barge in the Dan Lap An Bay between FSB Los Banos (ATS31999) and Lang Co Bridge (AT666956) on 15 February 1970. This floating monitor site was organized with six sensor personnel equipped with three portables, a NOD, a PFS-5 radar with operators, and a security force with two 50 caliber machineguns. The site monitored 10 strings consisting of 35 minisids and 15 adasids located along the Hue-Dalang Railroad and approaches to the railroad track. This operation was established in an effort to deter the enemy from interdicting the track which has been a consistent target in the past. The raft sank during a heavy storm on 2 April 1970 and all equipment aboard sank in the bay. When the equipment was recovered on 3 April it was found that all three portables were still operational and the monitor site was reestablished at Lang Co Bridge. The track in the target area was not interdicted during the period that the sensors were in operation.

(c) A plan was developed during the reporting period to saturate
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Pre-selected target areas with acoustic sensors in such a manner as to better define enemy locations; monitor traffic into and out of an area and to determine routes of access once the target was engaged. Six strings consisting of 26 acoustic and 6 spikebouys were air delivered on 1 April 1970 in a target area vicinity PEB Airborne (1D355072). Six strings consisting of 26 acoustic and 2 spikebouys were air delivered on 14 April in another target area vicinity PEB Bradley (1D278122). To date, heavy vehicular traffic has been detected in both target areas. Artillery response to these detections resulted in numerous secondary explosions.

(a) During the reporting period, the number of operational RF sensor strings in the division area of operations increased from 47 to a new high of 76. PDE sets on hand in the division increased from 60 to 105 and operational NAS/4-1 increased from 29 to 42.

(5) Counterintelligence Section.

(a) The CI Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company engaged in a variety of activities in support of its primary mission of safeguarding the 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile) from enemy sabotage, espionage and subversion. IG and CI inspections of unit personnel, document and physical security programs were conducted to detect and eliminate security violations and vulnerable areas subject to enemy exploitation.

(b) Personnel security investigations and complaint investigations were conducted to insure the validity of security clearances within the division. Clearances for 829 replacements were validated, 359 SECRET clearances were granted, local files checks for 2296 personnel were conducted, and the intelligence records check of 354 individuals were forwarded to higher headquarters by the Personnel Security Investigations (PSI) Section.

(c) In order to reduce the threat of VC agents gaining access to 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile) base camps, the CI Section maintains current biographical data on all local nationals and third-country nationals working on Allied installations. All local national permanent hire personnel on Camp Eagle now have a security clearance or an interim clearance awaiting final determination. Close liaison is maintained with the Industrial Relations Division; Phu Bai, to insure that local nationals go through the CI Section before obtaining acceptance for employment.

(6) G2 Plans/Order of Battle Section. The G2 Plans/Order of Battle Section continued to monitor and record the enemy situation throughout Northern I Corps with increased emphasis being placed on disseminating collected intelligence. The Order of Battle Handbook was published in
February 1970 highlighted many months of research and analysis on enemy forces opposing Allied units in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. The Order of Battle Handbook was updated periodically to remain current with the changing situation.

(7) Interrogation Section.

(a) During the reporting period, the Interrogation Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company processed seven prisoners of war (2 VC and 5 NVA) and two Ho Chi Minhs (1 VC and 1 NVA) from the 101st Airborne Division (Air mobile). A number of prisoners of war and Ho Chi Minhs captured by ARVN were also interrogated.

(b) During the reporting period, 120 batches of captured enemy documents were exploited by the Interrogation Section.

(8) Weather. The Air Force Combat Weather Team, 5th Weather Squadron, continued to provide meteorological support for the 101st Airborne Division (Air mobile). The weather team provides climatological information, weather forecasts, weather warnings, special forecasts for individual flights by army aviators, current weather reports for field commanders, weather summaries used in the evaluation of past operations, and daily weather advice and interpretation for the commanding general and his staff to assist in decisions concerning planned weather sensitive operations.

(a) February 1970.

1. The weather during February was typical of the last full month of the northeast monsoon. Rainfall occurred on more days than the average. However, the total rainfall for the month was below the mean. Precipitation was measured on 12 days during February, with another 2 days experiencing a trace of rainfall. The total rainfall for the month was just under 1/2 inches. The ceilings and visibilities were typical for February. Ceilings and/or visibilities below 1500 feet and 3 miles occurred on 12 days. Ceilings below 300 feet and/or visibilities less than 1/2 mile were reported on 8 days. Fog formed almost every day during February. The average high temperature was 76°F and the average low 64°F.

2. The impact of the monsoon rainfall during February reduced the air mobile capability of the division. Aerial reconnaissance in the division reconnaissance zone was occasionally restricted by weather. Air Force tactical air support had to be cancelled on six days in February.

(b) March 1970.

1. During March the total rainfall was far below the average. However, precipitation fell on more days than the mean. The total rainfall measured
was 14 inches and occurred on 11 days with a trace of rain recorded on another 5 days. There was one thunderstorm reported, however, no rainfall was observed. Cloudiness and visibility restrictions occurred on more days than normal. Ceilings below 1500 feet and/or visibilities less than 3 miles were observed on 24 days this month. Ceilings below 300 feet and/or visibilities less than 1/2 mile were observed on 4 days. Fog formed on 14 days. Temperatures were very close to the March mean. The average high temperature was 79°F and the average low temperature was 69°F.

2 The effects of the weather during March greatly hampered airmobile operations. Air Force tactical air support was cancelled on 18 days. In general there were only 9 days when planned operations were not restricted and they occurred during the first half of the month. The most significant weather problem was the postponement of combined US/ARVN operations near FSB Ripcord from 17 through 28 March.

(a) April 1970

1 During April the total rainfall was approximately equal to the mean value of 2.1 inches. However, due to the changeover from a steady rain pattern to a showery one, some areas received more than twice the mean. The total rainfall was 2.29 inches and it occurred on 13 days which is twice the normal frequency. Thunderstorms were reported on three days along the coastal plains, however, thunderstorm activity occurred on 22 days over the mountainous area. Cloudiness and visibility restrictions occurred on more days than normal. Ceilings below 1500 feet and/or visibilities less than 3 miles were observed on 13 days. Ceilings below 300 feet and/or visibilities less than 1/2 mile were reported on 6 days. Fog formed on 15 days. The average high temperature was 87°F and the average low 72°F, which are the expected mean values.

2 The weather during April reflected the last of the monsoon season restrictions on airmobile operations. Beginning with the first four days of the month, Air Force tactical air support and visual reconnaissance flights were cancelled. The only other period of restrictive weather occurred between 12 and 16 April. Visual reconnaissance flights were cancelled on 8 days in April.

(d) Precipitation Data (Inches).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(1) Personnel. During the reporting period the division moved from fifth to first place among Army divisions in Vietnam in religious meeting hold and attendance at these services. The top ten per cent having the most significant impact on this achievement was the realignment of Catholic chaplains in an attempt to employ a modified area concept coverage and availability of transportation for chaplains to take attendance to the war. A special Easter Sunday service at Camp Eagle was attended by over 6,400 soldiers from the division and other units throughout northern I Corps Tactical Zone.

(2) Personnel Management. A program was initiated to reduce rotation length in units so that no battalion size unit could lose more than ten percent of its strength during any one month. The program has been completed through the month of August.

(3) Medical.

(a) During the reporting period, the significant epidemiological investigations were conducted. On 1 March 1970, ten officers and a platoon, members of Troop B, 3rd Squadron (Armored), 17th Cavalry, were diagnosed as having malaria. Subsequent investigation revealed that 109 individuals had sufficient contact to warrant treatment with the 14 day course of duoclozine troide. No civilian cases were reported and none using these months of was burned from division installations.

(b) The second epidemiological investigation involved an outbreak at Hospital in Company B, 1st Battalion (Armored), 39th Infantry in mid-February. Investigation revealed that the probable source of infection was a nurse station which the men of the unit used for drinking water without utilizing the prescribed precautions. Continued emphasis in field sanitation and hygiene practices is expected to preclude recurrence of this type incident.

(4) Military Police.

(a) In March, a soldier with a degree in chemistry was assigned to the military police company. This individual was then trained in sodium and the MDU's Small Laboratory, Long Bihn. Arsenal officers were made for utilization of the 9th Medical Laboratory facilities, 85th Evacuation Hospital, was led to preserve necessary evidence, greatly facilitating the completion of murder investigations. Secondly the time was reduced from approximately five weeks to one week.

(b) With the move of the 31st Brigade from Camp Eagle to the 31st Combat Base, the 31st Medical of the 161st Military Police Company was relieved of
his direct support role of the brigade and placed in general support of
Fm Bdi Combat Base on 22 March. Joint police operations were established
with the 504th MP Battalion which resulted in improved military police
coverage for the base.

(5) Finance. On 15 April, a retroactive pay raise was ordered accruing
four months pay for servicemen. This requirement resulted in a supplemental
payroll for April. The division finance office processed and prepared the
supplemental payroll prior to the end of the month.

(6) Changes in command and staff. During the reporting period the
following changes in command and staff assignments occurred:

| ACofS, G2 | LTC L.W. Bindley | succeeded Maj Zierdt on 10 Apr |
| ACofS, G4 | LTC D.R. Pinney | succeeded LTC Pickett on 4 Mar |
| ACofS, G5 | LTC J.B. Porter | succeeded LTC Deming on 6 Mar |
| IG | LTC J.E. Martling | succeeded LTC Trepagnier on 1 Apr |
| 1/327 Inf | LTC D.A. Yoder | succeeded LTC Brophy on 1 Mar |
| 2/327 Inf | LTC R.F. Pickett | succeeded LTC Fischer on 1 Mar |
| 2/501 Inf | LTC O.W. Livingston | succeeded LTC Brashears on 18 Apr |
| 1/506 Inf | LTC R.C. Holt | succeeded LTC Pinney on 2 Mar |
| 2/506 Inf | LTC A.C. Lucas | succeeded LTC Growell on 4 Mar |
| 2/319 Arty | LTC W.H. Walker | succeeded LTC Hammond on 25 Apr |
| 1/321 Arty | LTC A.A. Ely | succeeded LTC Basanes on 7 Feb |
| 2/17 Cav | LTC R.F. Molinelli | succeeded LTC Bindley on 24 Mar |

f. (c) Logistics.

(1) General. Logistical support for Operation RANDOLPH GLEN and Opera-
tion TEXAS STAR was provided through the Division Support Command (DISCOM)
Forward Service Support Elements (FSSE) using the area support concept. DIS-
COM elements CP/COM to the FSE provided direct support for the three bri-
gades in all classes of supply, medical service, and maintenance of COM/EL,
armament, and automotive equipment. At Camp Eagle, direct support main-
tenance and repair parts supply, to include avionics and aircraft armament,
was provided for division aircraft. DISCOM continued to operate two forward
aircraft refueling points at PDB Roj and PDB Birmingham, and a forward air-
craft repair point at Quang Tri.
(a) The 2d Brigade with maneuver units and attached support units relocated from Camp Sally to Phu Bai Combat Base during the first half of March. The relocation was phased to provide continuous administrative, logistical and communications support to the brigade. The 2d MSF was relocated in two phases, completing the move on 15 March. DISCOM Movement Control Center (MCC) coordinated ground transportation with the 39th Transportation Battalion to provide vehicle support for the duration of the move.

(b) The DRA Airdrop Test Program, initiated in the last reporting period, was continued into this period. Improved techniques in rigging and search and recovery have been developed. Procedures for requesting, processing and coordinating requests are being refined and criteria for the selection of drop zones also improved.

(c) Super contact teams continued to provide personnel and equipment maintenance services to units returning from operations for stand-down. The number of company size units supported were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>COMPLETE TEAM</th>
<th>PARTIAL TEAM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-327</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bde:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-501</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-502</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-501</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-506</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-506</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-187</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Supply.

(a) The trend in total tonnage of class I supplies moved upward during the period as demands for ice, which is the most prominent single item in considering class I tonnage, increased due to the onset of warm weather. Class I tonnage during the period was 2598 in February; 3160 in March; and 3328 in April.

(b) The current six hundred item authorized stockage list for class II items permits intensive management of a small number of items but does not
permit a high demand accommodation rate. The demand satisfaction average declined in March and April because of a reduction in supply response by supporting depots in the form of extended order ship time. Increased emphasis placed on expeditious shipment of critical, high demand items is expected to relieve this situation. The average authorized stockage list zero balance for the month of March increased because of the failure of supporting depots to meet required delivery dates. The following are percentages for the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Accommodation</th>
<th>Satisfaction</th>
<th>Zero Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) An upward trend in total tonnage for class III was experienced during the period and is directly related to increased flying hours in support of operations. Class III tonnage during the period was 8710 in February; 9201 in March; and 9493 in April.

(d) Class IV tonnage during the period was 214 in February, 273 in March; and 228 in April.

(e) The class V tonnage in February reflected increased fires in support of the pre-Rivet preparation period, and an April high reflected issues in support of increased offensive operations. Class V tonnage during the period was 4650 in February; 4347 in March; and 5675 in April.

(3) Maintenance.

(a) Automotive operational readiness (OR) showed steady improvement throughout the period as the OR increased from 94.1 at the beginning of the period to 95.5 at the end of the period. The favorable trend was achieved through continued command emphasis, improvement in prescribed load list performance, roadside spot check inspections, and technical assistance visits.

(b) Armament operational readiness increased throughout the period and recorded a record high of 99.8% at the end of the period.

(c) Electronics operational readiness increased from 95.9 to 97.2 during the period primarily as a result of more rapid repair in support maintenance and CONUS facilities. High priority handling of ground surveillance radars from the operator to the maintenance unit resulted in an increased OR for FPS4 and FPS5 radars.
(d) Aircraft availability remained relatively stable during the period at 82 to 83%. This high availability rate was maintained in spite of an increasing combat damage rate from 3% in January to 6.4% for April. This accomplishment was made possible by a responsive supply system, maximum effort by all aircraft maintenance personnel, and command emphasis at all levels.

8. (U) Civil Affairs.

(1) Pacification and development activities in Thua Thien Province continued at an accelerated rate during this reporting period. Territorial security, achieved through combined US and GVN tactical operations and local security measures, provided a safe environment in which long range, high impact projects were generated in all ten rural districts of Thua Thien Province, and the three urban districts of Hue City. All pacification and development efforts during this period were directed toward the achievement of the national objectives outlined in the Thua Thien Province Pacification and Development Plan, 1970. As a part of the overall effort, the division continued to improve its civic action program. The number of projects in progress at the beginning of this reporting period was 126. At the end of this period, there were 136 in progress. Eighty-nine projects from the Province Civic Action Priority List were completed. This priority list, developed in the hamlets, villages and districts, and consolidated and approved at province level serves as the guideline for selection of new projects.

(2) Under the national objective of "Brighter Life for War Victims," the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan listed the goals of resettling 11,848 war victims and identifying war victims who have not previously been identified. The term "war victim" classifies two types of individuals: refugees and war victims requiring resettlement. Refugees are those individuals who have not received the full measure of relief benefits as authorized by the Ministry of Social Welfare. War victims requiring resettlement are those individuals who have received temporary relief payments, resettlement payments, homecoming allowance, and enjoy the development projects at temporary camps. Individuals in this category are no longer carried as refugees even though they require resettlement at some future date. Using these definitions, no new refugees were generated in Thua Thien Province during this reporting period and the refugee population was reduced from 13,374 to 9,068. These refugees are located in the following hamlets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Hamlet</th>
<th>Coordinates</th>
<th>No Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nam Hoa</td>
<td>Cu Chanh</td>
<td>TD756169</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huong Thuy</td>
<td>Thu Nam</td>
<td>TD855160</td>
<td>2,981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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In addition to the reduction in refugee population, 1,106 persons or 1,447 families were resettled during this reporting period. Employment planning at province and district levels for the remainder of 1967 in Phong Dien, Hung Dien, and Quang Dien Districts, and planning for additional resettlement in other districts indicated that the pace will slow until the end of the year. Province headquarters approved 15 projects with a priority for five resettlement hamlets in northeast Phong Dien. Two resettlement areas were planned along the coast of Phong Dien, and five resettlement areas noted along the Strait Without Joy in Quang Dien district. The five projects include 12 wells, three schools, three health stations, and 15 hamlets. An estimated 14,000 persons in the 15 hamlets will benefit from the programs.

Coordination for the projects was performed by the Provisional Reconstruction and Development Office. Thus Phuoc Provence will furnish equipment, paint, and transportation. Territorial forces will furnish labor, while the division will furnish laborers, reinforcing materials, and nails. These projects will be initiated during the next reporting period.

(3) Significant progress was made in the MINDAP program during the period of this report. A total of 491 MINDAPs were held; 77,110 medical and dental patients were examined; 650 immunizations were administered; 13 Vietnamese were evacuated to hospitals for medical care; and 260 persons received health and sanitation training during the period of this report. Although medical treatment increased during this period, the most significant of the program is that more of the actual treatment was administered by the Vietnamese, thus freeing US medical personnel to become involved with the training of Vietnamese medical personnel and auxiliary workers.

(4) Improvements and repairs to roads and bridges throughout the province during the period of this report materially assisted the reconstruc-
tion process and the resumption of trade and commerce. While the roads and bridges were built for tactical purposes, the effort accelerated the pacification effort immeasurably. Of particular significance was the completion of 21 kilometers of road in the southern area of Phu Tho district and 12 kilometers of road in northern Phong Dien and Quang Dien districts. The Phu Tho road permitted formerly waterbound inhabitants to
(5) The territorial security provided by US and SVN forces during this period enabled local administrations to strengthen and expand the influence of the government of Vietnam throughout Thua Thien Province. All 85 villages in Thua Thien Province have elected officials, with none in exile. Of the 400 hamlets recognized by the central government in Saigon, only 12 have appointed rather than elected officials, with none in exile. Thirty-three villages held elections in April with 82% of the registered voters casting their ballot. Security for the elections was provided by local Vietnamese and national police forces. Eight of the 12 hamlets with appointed officials are included in the scheduled elections for May 1970.

(6) Major projects completed during the reporting period:

(a) Ba Lang school construction (YD907205), Phu Thu.
(b) Vinh Thai Village office repair (YD947163), Phu Thu.
(c) Tan Bao school repair (YD920186), Phu Thu.
(d) Vinh Trinh school construction (YD945195), Phu Thu.
(e) Tu Diem school repair (YD465434), Phong Dien.
(f) Trach Pho school repair (YD486425), Phong Dien.
(g) Tu Thuong school repair (YD505365), Phong Dien.
(h) My Xa school construction (YD722312), Quang Dien.
(i) Quang Dien bridge repair (YD597398), Quang Dien.
(j) Vinh Loc police station construction (3) (ZD032122), Vinh Loc.
(k) Huong Dien well construction (23) (YD633426), Huong Dien.
(l) Thanh Thuy Chanh health station repair (YD824217), Huong Thuy.
(m) Boy Scout camporee site (YD753193), Huong Thuy.
(n) Loc Thuy school construction (ZD146998), Phu Loc.
(o) Loc Tu dispensary repair (ZD205010), Phu Loc.
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(y) Duc Bui school repair (YD726240), Buong Tra.

(q) Tri Le school repair (YD735247), Buong Tra.

(x) Thanh Duong school construction (YD941246), Phu Van.

(a) Phuong Dian school construction (YD942248), Phu Van.

(t) Dian Loc school construction (YD949245), Phu Van.

(u) Phu Nau school construction (YD765273), Phu Van.

(v) Phu Tan school construction (YD814308), Phu Van.

(w) Phu Van police station construction (11) (YD782270), Phu Van.

(x) Vinh Ve bridge repair (YD806247), Phu Van.

(y) Hue Boy Scout Center (YD759225), Hue I.

(7) Other projects completed during the reporting period included 23 schools, 39 wells, 6 dispensaries, 1 market, 2 village headquarters, 14 police stations, 2 bridges, and 2 Boy Scout projects.

(8) Current projects include 15 schools, 4 administrative buildings, 13 dispensaries, 6 markets, 6 police stations, 78 wells, and 14 other projects. One of the current projects in the "other" category is the upgrading of the capabilities of the Sector Maintenance and Direct Support Logistics Center (SM & DSIC) to enable the center to provide better maintenance and logistical support to RF, PP, PDDF, and HD cadre in Thua Thien Province. Detailed plans were developed by the division support command, assisted by the division engineer, for the relocation of the SM & DSIC to a more suitable location. The plans also involved the upgrading of operational activities, with assistance being provided by appropriate elements of DISCON.

(9) Commodities issued during the reporting period:

Food 39,200 lbs
Clothing 1,480 lbs
Soap 1,530 lbs
Ammo Boxes 14,357 boxes
Faint 34 gallons
School Kits                  1,200 kits
School Desks and Benches    109 desks and benches
Trade Kits                  26 kits
Cement                      4,253 bags
Reinforcing Steel Bar        11,023 linear feet
Tin                         1,251 sheets
Scrapwood                   11,000 lbs
Sand and Rock               270 cubic meters
Construction Lumber         25,799 board feet
Electrical Wire             2,500 linear feet
Water Pipe, random size     2,020 linear feet

The majority of these commodities were salvaged items. Sources for the materials included the sanitary fill for scrap lumber, firebases for ammunition boxes, and construction units for salvaged building materials and hydrated cement. The CA/PSYWAR fund was also used to purchase needed items on the local economy. While the majority of the commodities were delivered by vehicle, helicopters were used for deliveries to areas inaccessible by other means.

h. (U) Psychological Operations.

(1) Statistics. Type and quantity of propaganda media employed:

(a) Leaflets disseminated: 150,809,000
(b) Loudspeaker broadcasts: 1,555 hours
(c) Movies shown: 258.5 hours
(d) Quick reaction leaflets: 455,000
(e) PSYOP mobile teams: 10 missions
(2) PSYOP Campaign, 1st 1970.
AVDG-63
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RGS GFQDA-65 (R2) (7)

(a) The 1970 Tet Campaign was conducted by the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) in coordination and cooperation with other PSYOP agencies and activities in this area. The overall campaign was coordinated by a combined PSYOP advisory council composed of the following representatives: the assistant province advisor, PSYOP; the chieu hoi/armed propaganda team advisor; the G5, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and his US advisor; the PSYOP officer, XXIV Corps; and the PSYOP officer, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). Areas of interest included:

1. Coverage of targets in the jungle canopy and mountainous areas southwest of Qui. The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) agreed to cover these areas.

2. PSYOP coverage of the piedmont area, which the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) agreed to accomplish.

3. Target audiences located within the populated areas along the coastal lowlands. Elements of the regional forces, popular forces, people's self-defense forces, and revolutionary development cadre groups were employed by Thua Thien Sector to cover these areas. Additionally, the assistant province advisor, PSYOP, was tasked to disseminate to hamlet level all Tet material supplied by JUSPAC.

(b) The division PSYOP intelligence analyst, in coordination with the order of battle section, G2, initiated a detailed target area study. A total of 54 known and suspected enemy locations were ultimately designated as PSYOP target areas for the 1970 Tet Campaign. Each brigade was tasked to cover targets in its AO, and the division PSYOP section covered targets located in the division reconnaissance zone. Brigade targets were grouped on the division target list in a manner that insured brigade coverage of from three to five targets daily. The 9th Special Operations Squadron (9th SOS) continued its general support of the division during the 1970 Tet Campaign. Targets not covered by the brigades on any given day were assigned to the 9th SOS for coverage.

(c) The 1970 Tet Campaign began on 15 January, using standard leaflets on hand. On 20 January, the division began delivering special Tet leaflets procured through the 7th PSYOP Battalion. The Tet Campaign was terminated on 10 February 1970.

(3) The division PSYOP section worked in close coordination with the assistant province advisor, PSYOP, and the Chieu Hoi Center in Bia on a campaign designated as "Operation Homecoming." This campaign was directed at 1,100 families who had VC affiliations in Thua Thien Province and was designed to encourage VC/VOI members to rally under the provisions of the chieu hoi program. During the period 2-5 February, the Chieu Hoi Center distributed gifts to these families. Pictures and statements were obtained from the families and were developed into leaflets which were air-dropped.
and hand-distributed. The statements contained personal appeals to the VC/VCI to return home for Tet by rallying to the GVN. The Vietnamese Information Service concentrated on an active face-to-face campaign and the national police and Phoenix Committee maintained close surveillance of the designated target areas. Special wanted posters and leaflets were developed and distributed. In spite of the deliberate planning and concentrated effort expended on "Operation Homecoming" the actual outcome, measured in terms of the number of ralliers, were far below the anticipated result.

(4) The Voluntary Informant Program (VIP) was supported by all PSYOP agencies in the province. Aerial loudspeaker support, leaflet drops, distribution of ground posters, ground loudspeaker missions, and word of mouth dissemination of the VIP were combined into an extensive campaign to publicize the program. A special effort was made to inform children of the program since it was found that information relating to the program and its associated rewards was spread rapidly by young people. A large number of weapons and munitions were turned in to friendly forces by children.

(5) On three occasions during the period, the quick reaction aerial broadcast in response to specific situations proved to be productive. Following three aerial broadcasts made by recent ralliers, three additional VC rallied to the GVN. These personal appeals combined with the low morale of VC units ultimately resulted in their decision to return to the GVN.

1. (C) Medical.

(1) The tactical deployment of companies within the 326th Medical Battalion (Airmobile) places Company A in direct support of the 1st Brigade, Company B in support of the 2d Brigade and Company C supporting the 3d Brigade. Headquarters and Support Company continued to provide area medical support for division rear units located at Camp Eagle. One major movement occurred during the reporting period when the 2d Brigade moved from Camp Sally to Phu Bai Combat Base accompanied by Company B, 326th Med Bn (Armed). Company B now occupies Combat Base Area 5, Echo Station, Phu Bai Combat Base.

(2) Medical Statistical Recapitulation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A CO</th>
<th>B CO</th>
<th>C CO</th>
<th>SPT CO</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total patients seen at clearing stations</td>
<td>2,969</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>1,793</td>
<td>3,175</td>
<td>9,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total dental patients</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total admissions</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total transferred</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(3) Continued emphasis was given to reduction of surplus equipment and supplies. A new water tower was built for Support Company and water towers were installed at Company C. Battalion Headquarters alleviated a water shortage problem by replacing small water tanks with a 40,000 gallon water tower. Water storage was increased by two thirds.

(4) During the reporting period the division medical supply office (DMSO) maintained an average 95% fill. This required considerable extra effort on the part of DMSO personnel due to Company D movement to Phu Bai. For approximately three weeks all 2d Brigade units reported directly to DMSO for medical supplies resulting in approximately 200 additional requests being processed by DMSO per week. Continued emphasis was placed on preventive maintenance programs and PML. Training of PML clerks received command emphasis.

(5) Company MEDCAP programs continued with the medical companies supporting brigade civil affairs programs. Each physician conducted one MEDCAP each week.

(6) The air ambulance platoon continued its mission to provide aero-medical evacuation support to the 101st Abn Div (Aml), 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) and ARVN units in their respective areas of operation. Two UHER air ambulances are now stationed at Camp Evans to provide quicker response to the northern regions of the area.
operating in II Corps Tactical Zone for communications between that unit and the division. Secure BATT capability was also provided when needed. Other AN SSB BATT teams continued to provide stations at the three brigades, DISCOM and DIVARTY. A capability to provide stations for contingencies was maintained at all times. The battalion responded to increased requests for four channel carrier communications by installing AN/GRC125 systems at Camp Evans, Camp Sally, Phu Loc, and at 13 forward fire bases in support of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN), a four channel shot using AN/PRC68 continued from Bue to the 3d ARVN Regimental headquarters at firebase Geronimo (YD690204). This station was reterminated at firebase T-Bone (YD659205) when firebase Geronimo closed. One additional AN/GRC163 system was installed between Dong Ha and ESF Henderson (YH081411) for ARVN/MACV support. Despite serious maintenance problems with the multiplexer AN/TCQ 70 of the AN/GRC163, the battalion maintained an overall VHF reliability of 97% during the period. The battalion continued its policy of direct exchange of equipment that could not be immediately repaired. Units were further assisted by contact teams sent to field locations for on-site repair.

(a) Forty-seven public address requests were fulfilled including support of a joint Catholic-Protestant and separate Catholic and Protestant services for approximately 5400 troops at Camp Eagle on Easter Sunday.

(b) The four division MARS stations completed 13,108 phone patches during February, March and April. A single station USARV record was set by the division MARS station with 2,801 patches during the month of March.

(2) The 63d Signal Battalion continued its area support by providing cable, 12 channel VHF and microwave communications to the brigades, major subordinate, and higher unit headquarters. In February, the 596th Signal Company completed the AN/TCQ28 dial exchange and deactivated the old AN/MTC9 manual Eagle switchboard.

k. (U) Engineer.

(1) During the reporting period the 326th Engineer Battalion (AmbL) continued to provide direct engineer support to maneuver units as firebases were reopened, new firebases constructed, road upgrading continued, and extensive mine sweep and clearing operations were conducted. Project LIENSAYER continued with a total of 84 landing zones constructed or improved. The battalion also continued to provide boats and operators in support of riverine operations.

(2) Headquarters and Headquarters Company continued to provide general support to the division during the reporting period. In addition to
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(3) The line engineers companies of the battalion provided direct support to the infantry brigades and furnished general support to the division as required. Major projects were firebase construction and rehabilitation.

(a) A minefield surrounding FSB Loc Nau was cleared, and wire obstacles were employed and barriers rebuilt to improve the defense of the firebase. Additional tactical wire was employed at FSB Arsenal and FSB Kestogen. Fire support bases Yobole, Pliest, rifle, and Kothra were prepared by B Company with major improvements in fields of fire, artillery firing plans and tactical wire employment. FSB Black and FSB Avalon were constructed and opened by placing an engineer platoon in each location with infantry security. Tactical operation centers, fire direction centers, and bunkers were constructed at firebases as required. Engineer technical assistance teams were provided to assist infantry battalions in projecting one ship landing zones throughout the AO. Daily mine sweeps were conducted and demolition teams were provided as required.

(b) During the pre-set period, an aluminum footbridge was installed at the Trail River bridge site to improve surveillance and security for the highway and railroad bridges at the site. A pneumatic raft was constructed on RAK LAF AH to provide a floating security patrol station and ground surveillance radar site for обеспечивеа providing security for the Bio-Ba Long Railroad.

(c) Special combat support missions during the reporting period included providing teams to assist in the destruction or extraction of downed aircraft and to interrupt enemy LSO in the A Shau Valley. Project MISSION support was continued by providing landing zone construction teams to expand one ship LZs to two or three LZs throughout the division area of operation.

(d) FT Jack, Luxury, Alphonse, and Joshuas were received by B Company. Support requested on three firebasees continued to FSB and bunker construction, clearing fields of fire, employing wire obstacles, improving and leveling
artillery positions, demolition and mine sweeping tasks, and opening and closing roads. In addition, FSB Granite and FSB Gladiator were opened as new firebases.

(e) Company C reopened FSB Spear and Normandy and conducted firebase improvement projects at FSB Birmingham. At FSB T-Bone one squad provided technical assistance to ARVN units in bunker construction. A major project completed during the period was the reopening of the Street Without Joy which provided not only a tactical road in Phong Dien District but was instrumental in opening the area for resettlement.

1. (c) Army Aviation.

(1) General.

(a) Throughout the reporting period the 101st Aviation Group (Combat) (Airmobile) provided aviation support to the division and non-divisional units. In addition to providing airlift and armed aerial escort support, the group provided augmentation of the aeromedical capability of the medical battalion, air traffic control and pathfinder support, and limited battlefield surveillance and target acquisition.

(b) Aviation requirements were met on a daily basis to provide necessary support for combat operations, logistical resupply, and pacification and development efforts. One aviation company was placed in direct support of each brigade with the remaining aviation assets of the group in general support of the division. Daily logistical resupply and combat assault requirements for the brigades were normally met with ten aircraft from the DS aviation company. Additional aircraft from GS assets were provided when required.

(2) The following is statistical data for the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>HRS FLOWN</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>PAX</th>
<th>TONS CARGO</th>
<th>ACFT RECOVERIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101st Avn Bn</td>
<td>14,903</td>
<td>40,461</td>
<td>54,909</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158th Avn Bn</td>
<td>16,224</td>
<td>55,936</td>
<td>64,274</td>
<td>2,181</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159th Avn Bn</td>
<td>8,245</td>
<td>21,503</td>
<td>71,325</td>
<td>30,599</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163d Avn Co</td>
<td>4,795</td>
<td>16,274</td>
<td>8,567</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Total</td>
<td>44,167</td>
<td>136,174</td>
<td>199,075</td>
<td>33,948</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(3) The number of aircraft receiving ground fire increased by 17 from the last reporting period. Thirty-nine incidents of ground fire were reported as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UH1H</th>
<th>AR1G</th>
<th>OH6A</th>
<th>CH47</th>
<th>CH5A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Throughout the period the 101st and 158th Aviation Battalions alternated providing direct support companies to the brigades. The 159th Avn Bn (ASH) provided general support to the division to conduct air movement of artillery, troops and supplies. Diversified logistical support was provided to non-divisional units throughout ICTZ. The 163d Aviation Company (GS) provided general support to the division, performing such missions as visual reconnaissance, photography, courier, psychological operations, support, airborne personnel detector, and command and control. The company provided the primary means of air transportation for the division staff.

(5) Maximum use was made of available school training quotas to increase the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the group. During the period, a total of 81 personnel attended 17 different schools and classes presented on technical subjects.

(6) The employment of flame munitions from group aircraft increased significantly during the reporting period. Increased accuracy and quick response to requests provided ground unit commanders with a valuable additional means to aid the accomplishment of their missions. The low altitude and slow air speed necessary to accomplish these missions did, however, increase aircraft vulnerability to enemy ground fire, partially accounting for the increase in ground fire incidents.

(7) Air traffic activities for the period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Eagle Tower</th>
<th>Eagle C2A</th>
<th>Liftmaster</th>
<th>Sally</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>47,396</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>11,885</td>
<td>35,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>48,220</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>10,037</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>59,821</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>6,668</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) The preparation of area studies was continued during the period to provide information to aircraft pilots and crews concerning the location of landing zones, and the location and caliber of enemy ground fire received by aircraft.
Air Cavalry Operations. Maximum use was made of the assets of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav to provide aerial reconnaissance and security throughout the division area of operation; to engage in combat as an economy of force unit; and to provide reaction forces and downed aircraft security forces for the division. To accomplish these missions extensive visual reconnaissance was conducted for the infantry brigades and in the division reconnaissance zone. Other missions included bomb damage assessment, target acquisition for artillery raids, insertion, extraction and security of long range reconnaissance patrols, airborne personnel detector missions (sniffer), screening of friendly units, and convoy escort.

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Troop. The command aviation section of Headquarters and Headquarters Troop supplied support aircraft and administrative liaison to the four lettered troops of the squadron. During the month of March, aviation support was provided to Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry for insertion, extraction and security of ground reconnaissance patrols. As a result of heavy combat damage to squadron aircraft during the month of April, headquarters was called upon to provide additional aircraft support to the lettered troops. These missions resulted in the seven aircraft of the command aviation section flying over 450 hours during the month.

(2) Troop A. All operational assets of Troop A were stationed at Quang Tri. The aero-rifle platoon remained on standby at Quang Tri throughout the period to provide immediate response to enemy ground action, ranger patrol contacts, and downed aircraft security missions. During the latter stages of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, Troop A provided support to the 3d Brigade through the employment of hunter-killer teams. The teams, composed on one AH-1G Cobra and one OH-6A light observation helicopter, worked in close support of company size ground elements, providing surveillance to the front of the maneuver unit and security to the flanks and rear. The teams also provided immediate response to intelligence, and side looking airborne radar and sensor activations. The increased enemy activity during the period and the increased reconnaissance and security effort by the squadron resulted in extensive combat damage to aircraft. Maintenance personnel provided maximum effort to keep the troop's aircraft flying.

(3) Troop B. From 1-14 February the troop provided support to the 1st Brigade. Throughout the period the aerial rifle platoon remained on standby at Camp Eagle. Troop B provided support to the III MAF Reconnaissance Company, Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry, and conducted airborne personnel detector missions. The troop also conducted tactical G3 drops in the division reconnaissance zone. This employment was particularly successful in high elephant grass and single canopy jungle areas. The EL158 cannon assembly provided excellent area coverage and forced the enemy into the open.
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(4) Troop C. The troop supported the 2d Brigade during the month of March and the 3d Brigade in April. Support was provided through employment of scout teams (two OH-6A) and hunter-killer teams. The extensive employment of scout teams reduced the flight time of the more maintenance critical AH-1G Cobra and also provided an excellent training vehicle for lesser experienced scout pilots. The aero-rifle platoon was employed to conduct detailed ground reconnaissance and performed bomb damage assessment following B-52 strikes. When not engaged in operations, the platoon was placed in a standby posture at Phu Bai Combat Base.

(5) Troop D. During the reporting period Troop D participated in 34 combat assaults, 12 106mm recoilless rifle raids, two cordon and search operations, two convoy security missions, and provided a ready reaction force at Camp Eagle. Night ambushes were also conducted by the troop on the Camp Eagle perimeter.

(6) Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry. Long range reconnaissance patrols were conducted by the ranger company in four major areas: the Go Yen (K9431) and the Hau Sanh (M5653) areas during February and March; and the Sa Long River Valley (M0941) and Racang Moom Valley (T6790) in April. Throughout the period Company L maintained an average of five teams deployed in the division AD daily.

(7) Troop F (Provisional) was released from control of the 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav on 12 March and redesignated Company A, 101st Avn Bn (AH), 101st Avn Cp (CoBt) (Amb). During the reporting period, until deactivated, Troop F provided increased reconnaissance and surveillance capability to the division by performing visual reconnaissance, airborne personnel detector, downed aircraft recovery, and ranger support missions.

n. (U) Artillery.

(1) The 101st Airborne Division Artillery (Airmobile) provided close and continuous fire support to maneuver units throughout the reporting period. Light howitzer battalions continued to provide direct support to the infantry brigades with the 2d Bn (Amb), 319th Arty (105) in direct support of the 3d Brigade; the 2d Bn (Amb), 320th Arty (105) in direct support of the 1st Brigade; and the 1st Bn (Amb), 321st Arty (105) in direct support of the 2d Brigade.

Battery D, 2d Bn (Amb), 320th Arty (105) remained attached to the 3d Bn (Amb), 505th Infantry.

Providing general support to the division were the 2d Bn (Amb), 11th Arty (155), the 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty, and A Btry (Avn), 577th Arty.

Artillery with the division, in general support of XXIV Corps, was the 1st Bn (155) (SP), 39th Arty; the 1st Bn (89/175) (SP), 94th Arty; Btry D (M42), 1st Bn, 44th Arty; and a section of Btry C (M55), 65th Arty.
(2) Artillery fires were employed throughout the division area of operation to interdict enemy lines of communication and infiltration routes. This was accomplished through artillery raids and fires in reaction to sensor activations, radar detections, aerial surveillance, and intelligence. Extensive artillery fires were employed nightly in the "rocket belt" area on the periphery of the populated lowlands to interdict enemy movement and activity directed against population centers and key installations in the lowlands.

(3) Throughout the reporting period US and ARVN artillery units continued to jointly employ fires in support of combined operations. The division artillery aerial surveillance program continued to locate targets and adjust fire on them and to provide observation for artillery registrations.

(4) During the period a total of 73 artillery displacements of battery and battery (-) size elements were made to maintain close and continuous fire support to maneuver units.

(5) On 29 April the symbolic three millionth round was fired in support of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) in the Republic of Vietnam.

(a) Information.

(1) Public Information.

(a) During the reporting period the division information office forwarded 4,733 hometown news releases to the Army Hometown News Center. A total of 271 news/feature stories and 102 photographs were released to the public and military media.

(b) Coverage was also provided for 39 distinguished visitors to the division, including Senator Peter H. Dominick, Congressman John Farah, Jr., John J. Rhodes, and J. Irving Whaley, the Honorable Thaddeus Beal, Generals Creighton Abrams, Lewis W. Walt, and Ralph E. Haines and the Reverend Dr. Richard Halverson.

(c) Support was provided to 63 correspondents during the reporting period.

(2) Command Information.

(a) During the reporting period seven issues of the division newspaper, The Screaming Eagle, and the winter issue of the division magazine, Rendezvous With Destiny, were published.

(b) The layout and copy for the 1969 Pictorial Review was approved and sent to Tokyo for printing.
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(c) Division Information Office implemented MACV requirement for presentation of monthly command information topics at unit level.

(d) Division Circular 360-1 was published concerning the distribution of Pacific Stars and Stripes from Da Nang to the division area utilizing organic aviation assets. The new system brings Stars and Stripes to the division area early enough to enable distribution to major units on the day of publication.
2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. (U) Personnel. None.

b. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Sensors in a stay behind role.

(a) Observation: Sensors can be effectively employed in a stay behind role when friendly troops evacuate previously occupied LZs, night defensive positions (NDP) and fire support bases.

(b) Evaluation: Reports indicate that the enemy will forage through vacated overnight positions. Prior to the extraction of friendly units from an LZ, NDP or fire base, a combination minisid sensor with external magid detector can be implanted at the LZ or on the approaches. The minisid is placed in the "D" mode in order to guard against false or random detections. By coordinating with supporting artillery units, planned fires may be rapidly fired in response to sensor activations. Fires should be planned on and around the sensor device as the magid will detect only personnel within ten feet of its location.

(c) Recommendation: That commanders employ sensor equipment at previously occupied positions in a stay behind role.

(2) Translation of captured enemy documents.

(a) Observation: Due to the lack of adequately trained translators, quality control of captured document analysis is difficult.

(b) Evaluation: In early March 1970, G2, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) was included in the chain of evacuation of enemy documents captured by the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). The following results were noted:

1 Document analysis in the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) provided an additional check against error and omission in the local document exploitation effort.

2 Information obtained from captured documents was processed by the order of battle section by both divisions. The results of this duplicate processing were not always identical since each section has different sources for their data base information.

3 A wider range of order of battle comment was obtained and both sections were able to benefit from the exploitation and the analysis of
the other unit.

(c) Recommendation: That captured documents be processed by the order of battle sections of US and ARVN division/agencies concurrently so that wider interpretation can be provided.

d. (C) Operations.

(1) Employment of artillery reconnaissance by fire.

(a) Observation: The effectiveness of artillery employed in a reconnaissance by fire role has been a lesson relearned by units of this division.

(b) Evaluation: The enemy's extensive use of trail watchers, who normally escape detection until they initiate contact, has resulted in a number of casualties, particularly among pointmen. Artillery fired along routes of movement makes it difficult for trail watchers to remain in concealed positions. Additionally, the rounds fired can be used as references to assist in more rapid adjustment of fires if contact is made.

(c) Recommendation: That all units consider employing artillery in a reconnaissance by fire role.

(2) AN/MPQ-4A counter-mortar radar.

(a) Observation: The initial rounds of incoming rocket or mortar fire are not often detected by the AN/MPQ-4A radar because of the narrow search beam generated by the set.

(b) Evaluation: When the radar set is oriented in the proper direction, it will accurately determine the firing position of incoming rocket and mortar rounds. With a dedicated communication system between the radar section, ground unit command posts, and artillery fire direction centers, the radar set can be quickly reoriented in the direction of the suspected enemy position when the attack begins. The location of the enemy firing position can then be determined and accurate counter-fire delivered. It is essential that the communication system function smoothly and that all maneuver and artillery units within the range of the radar be aware of the radio frequencies and call signs of the radar team so that target information can be rapidly disseminated.

(c) Recommendation: That the capabilities of the counter-mortar radar be exploited by planning communications between the radar site and supported units in order to provide rapid and accurate exchange of information.
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(Airmobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS C3108-65 (R2) (U)

(3) Employment of reaction forces.

(a) Observation: In the early morning hours of 6 April, Fire Support
Base Arsenal was attacked by a well armed NVA sapper unit. The attack was
repulsed with six NVA killed and two captured. Friendly casualties were
four NVA.

(b) Evaluation: The enemy succeeded in breaching the perimeter of
the firebase at one point but the employment of the firebase reaction
force, within minutes of the initiation of the attack, halted the penetra-
tion and ejected the enemy from the position. This immediate reaction was
a result of the positive identification of the reaction force, careful
selection of key personnel, detailed planning, and numerous rehearsals
under conditions simulating an actual attack.

(c) Recommendation: Defensive plans for all positions be frequently
rehearsed under conditions simulating an attack, to include the movement
of internal and external reaction/reinforcing forces.

(4) Difficulty in assembling the D5A tractor.

(a) Observation: There have been several instances of excessive
delay in reassembling D5A tractors that had been disassembled for air
movement to a firebase.

(b) Evaluation: When disassembled into two loads, the D5A tractor
may be airlifted to firebase bases by a C130. Reassembly on the firebase
requires an area of 20 by 75 feet of hard, level ground. Soft muddy
ground and insufficient area result in difficulty in movement and assembly.
During periods of wet weather or muddy soil conditions, several sheets of
steel matting will facilitate assembly.

(c) Recommendation: That commanders of units accepting D5A tractors
onto firebase bases recognize the requirements to facilitate assembly and
make appropriate plans.

(5) Improved techniques of clearing mined and booby trapped areas.

(a) Observation: During recent operations two new techniques were
employed in clearing mined and booby trapped areas.

(b) Evaluation: Booby trapped areas were encountered where grappling
hooks were ineffective in clearing the area because of buried, close-to-
the-surface bamboo detonators. Modifying the standard grappling hook by
flattening it and sharpening the prongs, caused the prongs to dig in and
trigger the devices. Additionally, areas subjected to flame drops were
effectively neutralized by the fire. Trip wires and triggering devices
were destroyed by the fire and in many cases the explosives were detonated.
by the fire. An added advantage of the fire was camouflage burnoff, which facilitated visual detection of any remaining devices.

(c) Recommendation: That flattening and sharpening the prongs of grappling hooks should be considered when clearing mined and booby trapped areas. The use of flame drops should be considered early in the clearing operation.

(6) Adjustment of 105mm CS munitions.

(a) Observation: Adjustment procedures for cartridge, tactical CS, XM629 in firing tablo 105-AS-2, supplement 1, requires that a 200 meter bracket be established with shell high explosive, and then the adjustment continued with CS.

(b) Evaluation: Experience in this division has been that the requirement above results in unnecessary expenditure of CS rounds and, when fired on targets in close proximity to friendly forces, introduces the possibility of CS drifting into friendly positions.

(c) Recommendation: That the following procedures be established for adjustment of CS missions: Use shell high explosive in adjustment to within 100 meters of the target; use shell smoke (HC) in subsequent adjustment insuring that the smoke drifts over the target; fire one verifying high explosive round; correct final data for shell CS; and fire for effect, saturating the target area with the agent.

(7) Employment of blocking fires.

(a) Observation: The procedure of selecting several grids for employment of blocking fires is time consuming.

(b) Evaluation: The following procedure has been developed when employing artillery fire in a blocking role: the forward observer selects one grid behind the enemy force. The fire direction officer places a target grid over the selected coordinates and orients it perpendicular to the direction of contact or enemy movement. He then selects six grids 100 meters apart, perpendicular to the direction of enemy movement. Firing data is computed using the M-18 gun direction computer (FADC). The battery FDC then computes the corrections for each 100 meter increment by the "trig mode" and sends special corrections to each firing piece. This method has reduced reaction time as much as seventy-five percent.

(c) Recommendation: That the procedure discussed above be disseminated to all units.
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(Airmobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

3) Use of yellow smoke at night.

(a) Observation: Yellow smoke is more easily identified when fired
under illumination than white smoke.

(b) Evaluation: Maneuver units engaged in night airmobile operations
have reported that yellow smoke is more easily identified under illumina-
tion than white smoke. This is particularly true when using smoke to
mark LZs or as reference points for navigation at night.

(c) Recommendation: That artillery units use yellow smoke when
smoke is being used for marking rounds under illumination.

d. (U) Organization. None.

e. (U) Training.

1) Use of demonstrators in territorial force training.

(a) Observation: According to Vietnamese custom, older men are
revered and the younger men are accustomed to seeking their advice. The
reverse is not true.

(b) Evaluation: In a training situation where a young man is used
as a demonstrator or is selected for a leadership position during practical
exercises, the older Vietnamese are reluctant to ask questions of them.
In some cases this has resulted in portions of the training not being
completely understood.

(c) Recommendation: That local customs be researched and applied in
territorial force training, such as using older Vietnamese as demonstrators
or for leading practical work.

2) Competition in territorial force training.

(a) Observation: The Vietnamese enjoy competition and the attention
that comes with success in a competitive situation. They become more
alert and attentive because of their desire to win and gain recognition.

(b) Evaluation: Territorial force training presents numerous
opportunities for competition among the Vietnamese, e.g., the cleanest
weapon or the fastest assembly or disassembly of weapons. Small rewards
for success are helpful but not always necessary, as long as the success
is recognized and commended.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RG5 CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) Recommendation: As much competition as possible should be integrated into territorial force training programs.

f. (U) Logistics. None.

g. (C) Communication:

(1) Communications contact teams.

(a) Observation: The rapid turnover of communications personnel and increased distances between units has caused a decreased reliability in communications.

(b) Evaluation: Personnel arriving in the division through replacement channels do not have the experience or training to keep communications equipment operating at peak efficiency. A technically qualified team from the division signal battalion has visited units to provide assistance and training in the employment and maintenance of communications equipment. The result has been an increased operational capability.

(c) Recommendation: That division signal facilities and personnel be employed to assist subordinate units to maintain a high degree of proficiency in communications operations.

(2) Maximum VHF equipment in the field.

(a) Observation. Employing a maximum amount of four channel VHF equipment in the field has increased communication capabilities within the division.

(b) Evaluation: The systems are normally employed to provide VHF communications from brigade to battalion command posts located at forward fire support bases. Maintaining as much VHF communications equipment as possible in field operations provides the supported unit with the capability to pass large amounts of voice traffic and insures that operators become experienced in installation and operation of the equipment. Communications personnel and equipment move with infantry battalions between firebases and gain invaluable experience in rapid deactivation and installation under combat conditions.

(c) Recommendation: That signal units employ as much signal equipment in the field as possible in order to fully exploit the capability of communications equipment.
(3) FM VHF communications.

(a) Observation: VHF communications using the AN/GRC-163 is not limited to line of sight.

(b) Evaluation: Many systems not having line of sight between two terminals have been established without a relay. This represents a savings in the personnel and equipment which would be required to establish a relay site. The log periodic antenna, a component part of the AN/GRC-163, is the primary contributing factor for this capability.

(c) Recommendation: That signal personnel continue to attempt communications which do not profile, maintain site records of the results for future operations and inform higher headquarters of the capabilities of this equipment.

h. (U) Material. None.

i. (U) Other.

(1) Psychological operations.

(a) Observation: When the Viet Cong make an incursion into the populated areas, their influence has a detrimental psychological impact on the people.

(b) Evaluation: A broadcast message designed to counter this impact is much more effective when it is made by a local official. Such a broadcast also helps to improve the communication between Vietnamese leaders and their people.

(c) Recommendation: Whenever psychological operations efforts are required to counter VC influence, local officials should be encouraged to make the primary effort.

(2) Distribution of leaflets.

(a) Observation: Airdrop of leaflets is not always the most effective method of distributing information to the people in the populated lowlands. Air drops will often miss the target or result in uneven distribution. Experience in this area has been that people lose interest when an excessive number of leaflets are dropped.

(b) Evaluation: Hand distribution of leaflets results in personal contact and demonstrates a personal interest in the people's welfare. The method insures even distribution into the hands of the people.
Recommendation: That distribution of leaflets be made by hand and that air drops take place only when hand distribution is not practical.

(3) Civic action priority list.

(a) Observation: Civic action projects should be initiated only from an approved project list which has been carefully developed beginning at the village/hamlet level, processed through the district chief, and forwarded to the US sub-zone coordinator as a request for military civic action.

(b) Evaluation: After seven months of use by this division, the civic action priority list has proven to be an excellent tool for the management of civic action projects. In contrast to the characteristic "shotgun method" for selecting civic action projects, the priority list serves to prevent duplication of effort and provides a basis for the careful allocation of resources. It facilitates proper distribution of needed materials and reduces the flow of construction materials onto the black market. The list permits a great volume of work to be accomplished and the prestige of hamlet/village, district, and province officials is increased by insisting that the desires and needs of the people are considered and that the efforts are directed through GVN channels.

(c) Recommendation: That organizations involved in military civic action coordinate their efforts through established GVN political and administrative channels, establish a civic action priority list, and support only those projects that are approved and entered on the list.

(4) Civic action accountability and follow-up.

(a) Observation: Civic action teams should require accountability of materials and conduct follow-up visits to insure reasonable progress is being made on supported projects.

(b) Evaluation: Because most US civic action materials and commodities are salvaged, unaccountable items, a portion of the material provided in support of a civic action project is sometimes diverted by local nationals and not used on the intended project. Considering the conditions that exist in a country at war, especially in the orient, the wholesale distribution of unaccountable materials invites misuse and diversion of civic action commodities unless some form of control is imposed upon the recipient. In this division, a bilingual, locally printed receipt form is used to account for all material furnished in support of a project. Further, only a portion of the total material required is furnished at one time. The village/hamlet chief acknowledges by signature his receipt of the materials and the S5 retains the receipt. The S5 monitors the manner in which materials are being used, project progress, and requirements for additional material through frequent follow-up visits.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RGSC SFOR-65 (F2) (U)

(c) Recommendation: That civic action teams use a receipt system and conduct frequent follow-up visits to projects to insure proper utilization and accountability of materials.
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Inclosure 1 (Roster of Key Personnel) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS COPFOR-65 (22) (B)

MG John K. Wright, Jr.
MG John J. Hemmersey
MG James C. Smith

COL Hugh A. MacDonald
COL John D. White
COL Raymond L. Kaspe
COL William J. Bradley
COL Christopher B. Sinclair
COL Robert H. Siegrist
LTC Richard S. Fye
LTC George D. Moore, Jr.
LTC Reaves W. Bindsry
LTC Charles W. Dyke
LTC David R. Primey
LTC Robert B. Porter
LTC James R. Klugh
COL Joseph W. Powers
LTC William F. Foley
LTC Raymond D. Wood
LTC John D. Hartling
LTC Carl W. Welborn
LTC William J. McMahon
LTC Clifford M. Keys, Jr.
LTC Hugh R. Thomas
LTC Donald A. Yoder
LTC Edward F. Fickett
LTC Roy J. Young
LTC William B. Middlema
LTC Otis E. Livingston
LTC Robert E. Koerner
LTC Hugh C. Holt
LTC Andre C. Lucas
LTC Herbert Y. Schander
LTC Joseph N. Jaggeres, Jr.
LTC Joseph L. Sites
LTC Arnold E. Pollard
LTC William H. Walker
LTC Charles A. Roestine
LTC Arch A. milk
LTC Robert F. Molinelli
LTC Thomas L. Meadows
LTC George H. Staneshjem
LTC Rupert T. Clove
LTC Thomas E. McElholland
LTC Richard W. Smarrt

Commanding General
Assistant Division Commander (Operations)
Assistant Division Commander (Support)
Chief of Staff
CO, 1st Brigade
CO, 2d Brigade
CO, 3d Brigade
CO, 101st Aviation Group
CO, Division Support Command
CO, Division Artillery
ACoffS, G1
ACoffS, G2
ACoffS, G3
ACoffS, G4
ACoffS, G5
Chemical Officer
Division Surgeon
Base Defense Coordinator
Provost Marshal
Inspector General
Staff Judge Advocate
Finance Officer
Chaplain
Adjutant General
CO, 1st Bn, 327th Inf
CO, 2d Bn, 327th Inf
CO, 2d Bn, 502d Inf
CO, 1st Bn, 501st Inf
CO, 2d Bn, 501st Inf
CO, 1st Bn, 502d Inf
CO, 1st Bn, 506th Inf
CO, 2d Bn, 506th Inf
CO, 3d Bn, 187th Inf
CO, 3d Bn, 506th Inf
CO, 3d Bn, 11th Arty
CO, 4th Bn, 77th Arty
CO, 2d Bn, 319th Arty
CO, 2d Bn, 320th Arty
CO, 1st Bn, 321st Arty
CO, 2d Sqdn, 17th Cav
CO, 101st Avn Bn
CO, 158th Avn Bn
CO, 159th Avn Bn
CO, 326th Eng Bn
CO, 501st Sig Bn
Enclosure 1 (Roster of Key Personnel) to Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Period Ending 30 April 1970, ROE CSFOR-65 (A2) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Company</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTC James M. Hesson</td>
<td>CO, 5th Trains Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL Joseph F. Powers</td>
<td>CO, 326th Med Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Ronald M. Bowman</td>
<td>CO, 426th S&amp;R Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC James F. Dunn</td>
<td>CO, 801st Med Bn</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
1st Brigade, 101st Air Div (Ambl)

HHC, 1st Bde
1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf
2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf
2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf
42d Inf Plt (Sct Dog)

2d Brigade, 101st Air Div (Ambl)

HHC, 2d Bde
1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf
2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf
1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf
47th Inf Plt (Sct Dog)
25th Pub Info Det (Fld Svc)

3d Brigade, 101st Air Div (Ambl)

HHC, 3d Bde
3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf
1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf
2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf
58th Inf Plt (Sct Dog)
34th Pub Info Det (Fld Svc)

101st Air Div Arty (Ambl)

HHR, 101st Air Div Arty (Ambl)
2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty
2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty
1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty
2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty
4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl)

266th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
311th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
388th Trans Det (Acft Maint)

Btry A (Avn), 377th Arty (Ambl)

650th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
266th FA Det (Surveillance Radar)

201st Aviation Group (Cbt) (Ambl)

HHC, 101st Avn Gp (Cbt) (Ambl)
101st Avn Bn (Aalt Hal) (Ambl)
499th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
510th Trans Det (Acft Maint)

516th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
527th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
158th Avn En (Aalt Hal) (Ambl)
159th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
168th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
273d Trans Det (Acft Maint)
169th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
159th Avn En (Aalt Spt Hal) (Ambl)
478th Avn Co (Hy Hal)
625th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
327th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
649th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
382d Trans Det (Acft Maint)
163d Avn Co (GS) (Ambl)
530th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
359th Avn Det (Div)

Division Support Command

HHC and Band
5th Trans Bn (Acft Maint and Sup) (Ambl)
326th Med Bn (Ambl)
426th S&S Bn (Ambl)
801st Maint Bn (Ambl)
101st Admin Co (Ambl)

Division Troops

HHC, 101st Air Div (Ambl)
2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav
Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf
332d Trans Det (Acft Maint)
333d Trans Det (Acft Maint)
507th Trans Det (Acft Maint)
326th Engr Bn (Ambl)
501st Sig Bn (Ambl)
101st MP Co (Ambl)
557th Inf Plt (Cbt Tracker)
265th Rdo Mech Co
10th Cal Plt (DS)
20th Cal Det (CBR Cen)
22d Mil Hist Det
101st MI Co (Ambl)
Operating Location 6
5th Weather Det (USAF)
20th TASS (USAF)
AVDC-GS

15 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) {U}

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

Hugh A. Macdonald
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

1 incl

as

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8-CG, XXIV Corps, ATTN: AVII-GCT, APO 96349
3-CG, 101st Abn Div (Amb) 1-ACofS, G1, 101st Abn Div (Amb)
1-CO, 101st Avn Gp (Cbt) (Amb) 1-ACofS, GS, 101st Abn Div (Amb)
1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.

a. (C) Operations.

(1) Operation TEXAS STAR commenced on 1 April 1970 and has continued throughout the entire period of this report. The operation was developed in close coordination and cooperation with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and Thua Thien Province and Sector officials to continue to provide territorial security for the accomplishment of pacification and development in the populated lowlands; deny the enemy access to the populace and resources in the coastal areas; and to seek out and destroy enemy forces, base areas, and cache sites.

(a) The 1st and 3d Bdes and reconnaissance assets of the division have been employed to maintain a protective shield beyond the periphery of the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province to prevent incursions of enemy forces into the populated area, and insure a secure environment for continued progress of the province pacification and development program for 1970. The Bdes operated in close coordination with the 1st, 3d, and 54th Regts (ARVN), conducting extensive patrols, surveillance, and security operations in assigned AO's to deny the use of these areas to the enemy. Combat operations by infantry elements were supported by direct and general support artillery fires, provided from mutually supporting fire support bases, secured by elements of the Bde and located on a broad front beyond the periphery of the lowland areas. Combined airborne operations were conducted within assigned AO's to eliminate enemy forces, base areas, and cache sites.

(b) The 2d Bde has been employed in the populated lowlands, piedmont and eastern edge of the canopy in coordination with the 3d and 54th Regts (ARVN), to coordinate and support the pacification and development program, conduct security operations on the edge of the canopy, and secure sustained fire support bases to provide direct support artillery coverage of the area of operations. The 2d Bde coordinated and directed assistance for the ten rural districts of Thua Thien Province and assisted in the achievement of the eight goals of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan (Reported in CALL for period ending 30 April 1970).

(c) An informal area coordination committee (ACC) was established, composed of the CG, 1st Inf Div (ARVN); Province Chief, Thua Thien Province; CG, 101st Abn Div (Amer), and the Senior Advisor CORDS, to insure that the efforts of all forces operating in the province are in agreement and focused toward the same objectives and goals. Through this means, priorities were established for pacification, civic action projects, and the employment of military forces required to upgrade the degree of security and promote pacification and development in specified areas.
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(2) The division assumed operational control of Det B-52, 5th SFG (A) (Project Delta), on 10 May 1970 at SFOB Mai Loc, YD094518. The detachment began Operation BARBER GLADE on 15 May to conduct deep covert reconnaissance and tactical exploitation of intelligence and to interdict enemy infiltration and supply routes in the Khe Sanh Plain and Da Kong River Valley areas. These operations continued until 9 June, when the detachment terminated operations in western Quang Tri Province and prepared for movement to Nha Trang, RVN, for stand down. On 25 June Det B-52, 5th SFG (A), resumed special reconnaissance operations in the Delta AO, until 30 June 1970, when Operation BARBER GLADE was terminated. The detachment conducted a total of 38 ground operations, inserting elements to perform area and route reconnaissance and bomb damage assessment of air, artillery, and ARA strikes. The detachment accounted for 15 enemy KIA, 10 enemy trucks, two bulldozers, and a large amount of supplies destroyed along Route 616. Intelligence gathered by the detachment indicated that Route 616 was the main supply route for enemy units in Quang Tri Province and the laotian Salient area. The detachment also concluded that there was no indication of movement of major enemy units in the area of operation, although the short duration of the second phase of the operation (25-30 June) precluded a complete and thorough coverage of the AO (After Action Report submitted separately by Det B-52, 5th SFG (A)).

(3) Operation CLINCH VALLEY was initiated at 091315 July in response to the discovery of the 9th Regt, 304th NVA Division, infiltrating into South Vietnam. The mission of the 101st Abn Div (Airm) was to provide combat support and combat service support for operations by the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) in the KHE SANH Plateau. During the operation, elements of the 3d Bde and 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div (ARVN) were employed in western Quang Tri Province to locate and destroy elements of the 9th NVA Regt, discovered by armed aerial reconnaissance elements on 8 July (After Action Interview Report submitted separately). Artillery was provided by XXIV Corps, 101st Abn Div (Airm), 1st Inf Div (ARVN), and the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) to support reconnaissance in force operations by the 1st and 2d Battalions, 3d Regt (ARVN). FRAGO 25 (CLINCH VALLEY) to OPORD 2-70 (TEXAS STAR) suspended combined operations by the 3d Bde in the vicinity of fire support/operations bases (FS/OB) AIRBORNE, GOODMAN, and BRADLEY to located and destroy enemy rear service areas.

(4) Operation CHISAGO PEAK/LAH SGN 363, in the mountains northeast of the A SHAU Valley, was originally scheduled to commence on 10 July, but was postponed with the commitment of assets to Operation CLINCH VALLEY. The combined operation, employing elements of the 1st Bde and 3d Regt (ARVN), was rescheduled to commence on 16 July and was to be conducted in two phases. Phase I (preparation) provided for a program of intensive preparatory fires by artillery, B-52, and tactical air south of FS/OB RIFORD, in the FS/OB AIRBORNE/BRADLEY GOODMAN area, to deny enemy use of the terrain and destroy cache sites and base
OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
(AIRMOBILE), PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1970, RNCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

Areas. Persistent and non-persistent CS munitions were employed to deny enemy use of infiltration routes, for terrain restriction, and fire suppression.

Phase II (offensive) provided for the occupation of FS/0B MAUREEN on 25 July by one US battalion, occupation by artillery on 28 and 29 July, and insertion of two battalions of the 3d Regt (ARVN) on 30 July, to locate and destroy enemy cache sites, logistical facilities, and interdict routes of resupply and communication of the 803d and 29th NVA Regiments.

(5) FS/0B RIFCORD was opened in April 1970 as a key forward fire support base in the division's summer offensive plan against the 803d and 29th NVA Regiments. The fire support base was occupied and secured on 21 April by Co C, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf. Poor weather in the division AO delayed the movement of the battalion CP and Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty until 16 April. Btry C, 11th Arty (ARVN) was positioned on the firebase on 17 April to provide support for two battalions of the 1st Regt (ARVN). The light CP, 1st Regt (ARVN) collocated on the firebase with the CP, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf on 18 April, to facilitate combined operations in the area.

(a) The 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf continued security, patrol and ambush operations in the vicinity of FS/0B RIFCORD without significant enemy attacks, until 1 July 1970. The period 1-23 July was marked by increased enemy attacks by fire on and around the firebase and numerous ground attacks against units operating in the vicinity of the firebase.

(b) In early July it became obvious that NVA forces were massing in an attempt to control the RIFCORD area. Elements of the 6th NVA Regt concentrated around the FS/0B generally to the north and west, joining the 29th and 803d NVA Regiments, operating east of the A SHA VALLEY, south and southeast of FS/0B RIFCORD. With the steady increase of indirect and anti-aircraft fire, and enemy ground attacks in the RIFCORD area, it became apparent, by the third week in July, that the cost and effort required for the self-defense of the firebase, placed the successful accomplishment of operations in the BRADLEY/AIRBORNE area in jeopardy.

(c) The closing of FS/0B RIFCORD would make troops available for offensive use against enemy supply caches and logistic installations to the rear of NVA forces massed around RIFCORD. The cache sites in the AIRBORNE/BRADLEY area were believed to be part of the base areas of the 803d and 29th NVA Regiments. The concentration of NVA forces around RIFCORD would further facilitate operations in areas to the south and southeast. Therefore, the decision to extract from RIFCORD was made.
(4) RIP/COB operations were highly successful, causing heavy NVA casualties and drawing the enemy from his cache sites. His massing of forces around the Firebase presented numerous targets vulnerable to heavy air and artillery fire. The 2d BN (Ambl), 506th Inf was extracted, and FS/COB RIP/COB was closed on 23 July.

(6) G3 Air Activities:

(a) During the reporting period, close air support sorties were flown in the division area of operation as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prep. sorties</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>722</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immediate sorties</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>103</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat sky spots</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>127</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flareships</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunships (Spooky, Shadow, and Stinger)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>46</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(b) Tactical air strikes expended 7818 tons of bombs and 532 tons of napalm during the reporting period.

(7) Enemy losses during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contacts</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>KBA*</th>
<th>KBH*</th>
<th>FA</th>
<th>IWC</th>
<th>USMC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>81</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 1103 1273 73 377 16 209 97

* Killed by artillery and killed by helicopter figures included in KIA figures.
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(8) Friendly losses during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>KPI</th>
<th>NRI</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>HHG/Div</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHG/1 Bde</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHG/2 Bde</td>
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<td>71</td>
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**TOTALS** 269 1312 18 42 240 1881

(9) Operations Narrative. See Inclosure 1.

b. Training.

(1) The seven-day program for battalion refresher training was initiated on 12 May 1970. This program provides two days for troop movement (the first and last) and five days for the conduct of training and recreation. Companies are rotated for one-day stand downs at Eagle Beach during the five-day training period, allowing one day of recreational stand down and four days of training for each company. During the reporting period, all infantry battalions conducted refresher training, and three battalions completed a second refresher training cycle. Under the previous battalion refresher training program,
infantry battalions conducted ten days of training on a rotational basis. A separate program for recreational stand down was conducted, allowing infantry battalions a three-day recreational period at Eagle Beach, on a rotational basis. This separate program caused the time required for a complete cycle of battalion refresher training to be excessive. The system was not flexible enough to respond to operational requirements, causing several postponements of refresher training. The new system is more responsive to operational requirements because of its decreased length and the fusion of recreational and training stand downs. It allows infantry battalions to conduct refresher training every 50-60 days. This increased frequency of training periods enables more effective integration of replacements, correction of unit tactical weaknesses, and implementation of lessons learned.

(2) A ranger strike operations course was organized at the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School to train the Nac Bao (Black Panthers) Reconnaissance Company of the 1st Inf Div (ARNV) in the use of airmobile techniques during small unit raids against selected enemy targets. The training program is eight days in duration, with subject areas in map reading and land navigation, small unit airmobile operations, patrolling, and the use of demolitions. The training program is concluded with a field exercise against a target in the division reconnaissance zone, selected from division intelligence sources. Instruction is conducted by SERTS cadre; a special cadre team composed of one officer and four enlisted men from Company L (Ranger), 75th Inf; and specialized instruction presented by the 326th Engr Bn, the 326th Med Bn, and the G2 Imagery Interpretation section. Interpreters are provided by the 1st Inf Div (ARNV). The cadre team from Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf accompanies the platoon in all training, to include the field exercise. During the period of this report, three platoons completed the training, and an additional three platoons were scheduled to receive the training during the month of August.

(3) The division continued its intensified training program in the populated lowlands with one dedicated battalion and a varying number of mobile training teams. The dedicated battalion is assigned the mission of conducting operations in Phu Loc District, employing 100 percent of its assets and resources in pacification and development and upgrading the combat effectiveness of territorial forces. The district has had a long record of Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) incidents. The battalion assists the district chief in all aspects of his administration, training, and operations. To accomplish this mission, the battalion headquarters is collocated with the district headquarters, and elements of the battalion conduct joint operations with Regional Force, Popular Force, and Peoples Self Defense Force units, down to and including squad level. All operations are integrated with those of the district forces. In coordination with MACV mobile advisory teams (MAT) and sector
officials, RF and FF units are rotated to Phu Loc District to receive training with the dedicated battalion. On-the-job training is provided by the dedicated battalion through coordination with the district chief and district senior advisor. Training is tailored to the specific requirements of the unit being trained and is conducted primarily with equipment on hand and available to the unit being trained. In addition to the dedicated battalion, mobile training teams are provided by elements of the 2d Brigade to train and assist RF, FF, and PsDF forces throughout the lowland area. From 20 to 22 mobile training teams (MTT) were provided during the reporting period to assist territorial force commanders in the conduct of combat/security operations and training as required. The concept of employment of MTTs was changed on 19 May 1970 at the request of GVN officials. The primary role of the MTT had been to provide formal training. This has been changed to the technique of on-the-spot corrections during the conduct of operations as the primary instructional vehicle. Formal classes are presented only upon request of and for specific instruction desired by GVN officials. Three types of MTTs are employed. District (subsector) teams are organized to assist the district staff in improving training and operational effectiveness of FF platoons and PsDF in the district. Three of these teams were deployed as of 31 July 1970. Regional Force group teams are organized to maintain liaison between RF group headquarters and US battalions. They assist the RF group commander and staff in improving the operational effectiveness of the staff and assigned companies. Emphasis is placed on MTT participation with RF companies on actual operations. Seven of these teams were deployed as of 31 July 1970. Separate regional force company teams are organized to improve the operational effectiveness of the separate RF companies by assisting and advising the RF company commander in the planning and conduct of all combat/security operations. Emphasis is placed on MTT participation during the conduct of operations. Twelve separate company teams were deployed as of the end of this reporting period. All MTTs operate in close coordination with the district chief and district senior advisor to identify weaknesses and take corrective action in an effort to upgrade the combat effectiveness of the territorial forces. A fixed, rigid program is avoided, and formal training is tailored to correct specific weaknesses of units. It is presented on a level commensurate with the skills required by the unit to perform its mission. During the three months of the reporting period, MTTs conducted training for one RF company group, 25 separate RF companies, 20 FF platoons, and 842 members of the PsDF. They also participated in seven RF group operations, 99 company-size operations, 109 platoon-size operations, and 203 squad-size operations. This program of intensified training in the populated lowlands of the division area of operation has been extremely successful. It has substantially improved the capability of local forces and, more importantly, it has established a cadre that can continue its own development.
The 101st Avn Gp (Cbt) (Ambl) conducted classes on pathfinder operations from 4 to 15 May and from 25 May to 5 June. A total of 30 members of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) received this training. On 22 and 23 May, a training team from the 101st Airborne Division Support Command (Ambl) conducted classes on helicopter load preparation for 106 members of the 48th ARVN Artillery Battalion at Dong Ha. Instruction included care, maintenance, and capabilities of air items and general sling load preparation procedures for artillery units. The 101st Airborne Division Artillery (Ambl) provided four separate teams consisting of one officer and one NCO to train artillery units of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) in fire direction and firing battery procedures and techniques. Each unit received two weeks of training, and a total of 14 ARVN artillery batteries received this instruction.

During the reporting period, a readiness report was formulated for Regional Force (RF), Popular Force (PF), and Peoples' Self Defense Force (PSDF) elements. Data for the report are collected from Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) reports, PSDF status reports, and weekly MTT reports. The readiness report provides a concise and comprehensive evaluation of the readiness level of four major areas of development - personnel, equipment, training, and operational proficiency. Reports are prepared each month. The first two monthly reports were completed during this reporting period. Initial indications are that the report will provide an effective means of evaluating the development of territorial force units and will serve as a useful management tool for the deployment of divisional MTT resources.

c. (C) Chemical.

General. The division chemical section, with operational control of the 20th Chemical Detachment (CBDR) and the 10th Chemical Platoon (DS), performed a variety of chemical missions in support of division operations during the reporting period. A discussion of each type mission follows.

(a) Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) Operations. The Airborne Personnel Detector continued to be employed as an intelligence gathering device to supplement and/or confirm other intelligence concerning enemy locations and activity. During April, all APD missions were conducted by the 2d Squadron (Airmobile), 17th Cavalry. Beginning in May, missions were performed by the 1st and 3d Brigades as well as by the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav. A total of 128 missions were conducted during the reporting period. APD reading indicated several areas where enemy activity had significantly increased, assisting the ability of division units to engage the enemy during his incursions into forward base areas. Routes of infiltration were engaged with artillery and air strikes.
b) Aerial Flame Operations. Aerial flame missions were conducted in areas believed to be booby trapped, to clear fields of fire around fire support bases, to clear and expand landing zones, and to destroy suspected enemy positions and cache sites. Both CH47 and UH1H aircraft were used in flame drop operations. A total of 52 flame missions was conducted during the period. As the weather in the division AO improved and division units moved deep into the canopy, several new forward fire support bases were constructed and several abandoned bases reoccupied. Extensive clearing operations were conducted around perimeters to facilitate visual observation and to provide fields of fire. Bulk flame drops, using eight to ten 55-gallon drums of thickened fuel, were conducted utilizing an external pinging load from a CH47 helicopter. In April and May, a total of 1992 drums of thickened fuel was dropped in 240 sorties during clearing operations. The principal fire support bases cleared were KIRKWOOD, GRANITE, GLADIATOR, KAKASAN, FALCON, WEGHEL, STIKE, KATHY, BRICK, and SHOCK. A major flame project was initiated and completed for the 2d ROK Marine Brigade in an area 20 kilometers south of Da Nang during the months of April and May. The project was conducted to assist in clearing a booby trapped area, which had been chosen for resettlement by Vietnamese civilians, and to provide technical assistance and training for the ROK forces in the development of their own flame program. During the operation, 370 drums of thickened fuel were dropped in 87 aircraft sorties. A total of 15 secondary explosions was observed during the drops. The division provided a CH47 helicopter and necessary personnel for the execution of the mission. Division chemical officers explained concepts of employment and operational techniques in briefings at the ROK brigade headquarters. ROK forces assisted in the operation by marking target areas and rigging drop nets. As a result of training provided by the division, ROK forces commenced their own flame drop program in coordination with the 1st Marine Division. During the month of May, three heavily booby trapped landing zones were cleared using flame fuel. As a result of the six sorties conducted, 27 large secondary explosions occurred.

c) CS Operations. Bulk CS2 missions were conducted, using both organic CH47 helicopters and Air Force high performance aircraft on routes of infiltration in the division reconnaissance zone. The drops and bombings were targeted to restrict heavy vehicular traffic, thus interdicting enemy tactical and logistic advances into forward base areas. Loads consisting of 55-gallon drums of CS2, rigged with the XN925 impact fuse and burster system, were dropped from CH47 aircraft from an approximate height of 4000 feet. Bulk CS2 missions, using BLU52 bombs, were conducted by Air Force high performance aircraft. These bombs were directed against roads leading into the northern A SHAU and the DA KRONG River Valley. Tactical CS missions were conducted.
against suspected enemy locations, during combat assaults, in support of artillery raids, during search operations, and in support of combined US/ARVN operations. TACTICAL CS was employed in support of a 1st Brigade artillery and air raid covering three distinct target areas. UH-1H helicopters delivered CS on all targets. Two aircraft carried ten EA-158 CS canisters, while a third dropped 16 to 20 rocket tube assem bles, each containing 20 M7A3 CS grenades. Canisters were dropped from a height of 1000 feet, while grenades were delivered at low level. A total of 80 canisters and 710 grenades were dropped during the operation.

A tactical CS mission was conducted to support a search operation of the 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav. Four EA-158 CS canisters were dropped on target areas along the sweep route. Weather conditions did not adversely affect the retention of CS in the canopy vegetation. No ill effects were experienced by friendly ground troops.

A tactical CS mission employing 37 EA-158 canisters was conducted in support of a combined US/ARVN operation in the vicinity of FS/OB HENDERSON. To support troop insertions, munitions were employed on enemy mortar and automatic weapons positions directed against the proposed landing zones. Throughout the operation, tactical CS was employed on nine separate occasions on suspected enemy locations and during combat assaults without ill effects to friendly troops.

(d) Aerial Defoliation Operations. Diesel defoliation missions were conducted around fire support bases in the plains area, where herbicides, such as Agent Blue, could not be used due to the proximity of friendly crops. The diesel spray retarded the growth of the foliage and assisted in burning. Targets included areas adjacent to CAMP EAGLE, CAMP EVANS, and FS/OB BIRMINGHAM to clear fields of fire.

Herbicide defoliation missions, using Agent Blue, to reduce foliage were executed against major NVA infiltration routes west of FS/OB RIPCORD. Areas around FS/OB BASTOGNE and VEGHEL, and Route 547 connecting them, were sprayed to create and preserve fields of fire. Plans were formulated to conduct increased herbicide operations around permanent fire support bases with the approach of the dry season.

(e) Smoke Operations. Smoke operations in support of combat assaults were conducted by the 158th Aviation Battalion (Amb). The XM52 Integral Smoke Generator was used to create smoke screens which effectively obscured enemy observation, limiting his capability to concentrate well aimed fire on assaulting troops and aircraft.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RG3 GSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

The M4A2 smoke pot was used by the 1st Brigade in conjunction with psychological operations. A column of smoke, lasting for a five hour period, was created and used as a reference point for enemy soldiers desiring to rally.

(2) Statistics: The following statistics pertain to chemical operations during the reporting period:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

d. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Enemy Situation

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period, enemy units were located
as follows:

In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTTH), local force companies
were operating in their traditional areas of operation - Phong Dien Special
Action Unit (PDSAU, formerly C113) vicinity Phong Dien (D), Quang Dien
Special Action Unit (QDSAU, formerly C114), vicinity YD4724, C115 vicinity
YD6614, and C116 vicinity YD8304. The Phu Vang Special Action Unit
(PVSAU) was unlocated. The Hue City Reconnaissance Battalion (HCRR) was
located vicinity YD6514. The Phu Loc Special Action Unit (PLSAU, formerly
the Phu Loc Armed Battalion) and the 4th NVA Regiment continued to operate
in the Phu Loc mountains. The 4th NVA regiment headquarters was located
vicinity YC9781 with the K4C Battalion vicinity ZG0193, and the K4B Battal-
on vicinity ZC1896. The 5th NVA Regiment was deployed south and southwest
of Hue, with the headquarters vicinity YC5282; the 804th Infantry Battal-
on vicinity YC8195, the 810th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD5715, the 439th
Infantry Battalion vicinity YC6297, the K32 Rocket Artillery Battalion vicinity
YG7299, the Chi Thua Sapper Battalion vicinity YC6995, and the Chi Thua
Sapper Battalion vicinity YG7290. The 6th NVA Regiment was deployed in
the canopy south of Phong Dien (D), with the regimental headquarters vicinity
YD1213; the 800th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2822; the 802d Infantry Battal-
in vicinity YD2010; the 806th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4622; the K35
Rocket Artillery Battalion vicinity YD3620, and the K12 Sapper Battalion
vicinity YD1423. The 29th and 803d NVA Regiments of the 324B Division were
sitting east of the A Shau Valley just south and southeast of the 6th NVA
Regiment. The 29th NVA regiment headquarters was located vicinity YD4405,
3rd Infantry Battalion YD5307, the 8th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4705,
3rd Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4907. The 803d NVA regiment head-
quarters was located vicinity YD3415, with the 1st Infantry Battalion vicinity
and 3rd Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4412, and the 3rd Infantry Battal-
on vicinity YD1110. The headquarters of the 324B Division was in Base
MRTTH headquarters. The 675th NVA Artillery Regiment
was Area 111. The 11A Reconnaissance Battalion headquarters
vicinity YC1294. The 7th Front was located in the vicinity of

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Battalion vicinity YD2333, the 814th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD3737, the K34 Rocket Artillery Battalion vicinity YD2636, the K10 Sapper Battalion vicinity YD3133, the K11 Sapper Battalion vicinity YD2842, and the K12 Transportation Battalion vicinity YD1327. The 812th NVA Regiment was engaged in logistic activity in support of the 7th Front, with its headquarters vicinity YD2025, the 4th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2428, the 5th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD0023, and the 6th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2025.

2. In the B5 (DMZ) Front, at the beginning of the reporting period, there were ten units operating in the DMZ and in western Quang Tri (P). The 52d NVA Regiment, 320th Division remained in the northwestern corner of Quang Tri (P). The 246th NVA Regiment was operating in the western portion of the central DMZ, with headquarters vicinity XD9371, the 1st Infantry Battalion vicinity XD9455, the 2d Infantry Battalion vicinity XD8363, and the 3d Infantry Battalion vicinity XD9461. The headquarters of the 27th NVA Regiment was located vicinity YD0668 with the 1st Infantry Battalion vicinity YD0563, the 2d Infantry Battalion vicinity YD0570, and the 3d Infantry Battalion vicinity YD0459. The 75th Anti-Aircraft Battalion was operating vicinity XD9561. The 84th and 164th NVA Artillery Regiments were alternating fire support responsibility in the central DMZ area. The headquarters of the 84th NVA Artillery Regiment was located vicinity XD9874, and the headquarters of the 164th NVA Artillery Regiment was located vicinity YD1090. The 126th Naval Sapper Regiment was located vicinity YD2189. The newly arrived 66th NVA regiment headquarters was located vicinity YD0335, with the 7th Infantry Battalion vicinity XD9841, the 8th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD0138, and the 9th Infantry Battalion located in the Ba Long Valley. Forward elements of the 304th Division were operating south of the Khe Sanh Plateau vicinity XD8438. Elements of the 27th Battalion, 31st NVA Regiment were operating in the Quang Tri (P) lowlands, with the battalion and regimental headquarters in North Vietnam, vicinity YD1185. The 270th NVA Regiment remained located north of the Eastern DMZ vicinity YD1986. The 33d Sapper Battalion, B5 Front was operating in the vicinity of XD9939.

(b) May 1970

1. There was a significant increase in activity by NVA units in Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTTH) during the month. The 5th and 6th Independent Regiments were responsible for attacks by fire on Allied installations in the lowlands. Enemy activity and PW reports confirmed the eastward deployment of the 812th NVA Regiment. The mission of the 812th was to
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protect rear areas and support 7th Front and 6th Regiment incursions into the populated lowlands of Hai Lang and Phong Dien Districts. A PW, captured on 4 May, listed as a penetration agent for MRTTH, stated that the 7th Front had the mission of reconnaissance and attack on the boundary areas of Hai Lang and Trieu Phong Districts, Quang Tri (P), in order to demonstrate the strength of the VC/NVA movement to villagers in these areas. 7th Front incursions into Hai Lang (D) later in the month confirmed this mission. A PW report on 4 May indicated that elements of the 6th Regiment had linked up with the 803d NVA Regiment in order to coordinate rear service activities vicinity FS/OB RIPCORD and Co Pung. US forces operating vicinity FS/OB GRANITE and FS/OB MAUREEN encountered heavy 12.7mm, mortar, RPG, and small arms fire during the month of May. The discovery of 60mm and 82mm CS mortar rounds at YD411 (1 KM E of FS/OB MAUREEN) and the use of chemical delay fused mortar rounds at FS/OB KATHRYN indicated that the 803d NVA Regiment received logistic priority along Route T7 during April and early May.

DMZ activity during the month of May was characterized by attacks by fire in the FS/OB FULLER/CAMP CARROLL area. The presence of the 66th Regiment, 304th NVA Division, in the Da Krong River Valley increased the enemy threat in central Quang Tri (P). The 66th Regiment launched two sapper attacks on Allied firebases during the month, resulting in heavy enemy losses. The 66th Regiment was the target of a B52 strike early in the month, resulting in 97 NVA KIA. Aerial surveillance in the 66th NVA Regiment area of operations indicated heavy logistic activity in the vicinity of the Laotian Salient.

c) June 1970

1 In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue, the 7th Front remained inactive throughout the month, possibly recovering from losses suffered in late May following incursions into Hai Lang (D). The 812th, 803d, and 29th NVA Regiments continued to occupy well established mountain base areas east of the Da Krong and A Shau Valleys. The mission of these units was to lure US and ARVN forces deep into the canopy, leaving the coastal lowlands exposed to infiltration by the 7th Front in southwestern Quang Tri (P) and by the 4th, 5th, and 6th Independent Regiments in Thua Thien (P). The 812th NVA Regiment continued to provide logistic support to the 7th Front and to support attacks against ARVN firebases in the central canopy. The 29th NVA Regiment
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shifted its area of operation west to avoid detection and destruction by Allied forces applying pressure from the east. The 803d NVA Regiment showed signs of increased offensive activity and attack preparations in the FS/OB RIPCORD and FS/OB MAUREEN areas. The 4th NVA Regiment launched a coordinated attack against five allied installations in Phu Loc District on 10 June and then returned to its normal low level of activity for the remainder of the month. The 5th and 6th NVA Regiments increased the number of attacks by fire against Allied forces using 60mm and 82mm mortars and 122mm rockets.

2. Enemy DMZ activity during the month of June was at its lowest level since prior to April 1970. Enemy forces in the central DMZ reduced their attacks by fire in the FS/OB FULLER/CAMP CARROLL area in order to resupply and reposition in preparation for future offensive actions in July or August. During the month, there was a significant increase in activity in western Quang Tri (P) and in the Laotian Salient. There were indications that the 9th NVA Regiment, 304th Division was infiltrating into the area to join the 66th NVA Regiment. On 21 June, a map overlay was captured in the Vietnamese Salient by the HAC BAO Company, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), showing telephone lines from forward elements of the 304th Division, located in the Laotian Salient, to the 7th Front located to the northeast.

(d) July 1970

(1) In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue, the majority of enemy initiated activity was recorded in the FS/OB RIPCORD area, where elements of the 6th and 803d NVA Regiments had begun to mass. On 17 July, the firebase received 120mm mortar fire. This was the first use of that weapon in the MRRTH area of operation in over 18 months. The enemy continued to intensify its mortar and ground attacks against US units operating in vicinity FS/OB RIPCORD until 23 July, when the firebase was closed. There was a significant decrease in 29th NVA Regiment activity, with indications that the unit had withdrawn west. At the beginning of the month, elements of the 7th Front tried again to enter eastern Quang Tri (P) lowlands, resulting in 135 NVA KIA and 17 PWS captured. Enemy units were identified as the 808th Battalion, 7th Front, reinforced by the 1st Company, K6 Battalion, 812th NVA Regiment and a signal squad from the K4 Battalion, 812th Regiment. Activity in the 4th and 5th NVA Regiment areas of operation remained at a low level, except for attacks by fire against Allied installations in the lowlands in early July.

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(2) In the B5 (DMZ) Front, enemy initiated activity was relatively light in July, although movement throughout the DMZ continued at a high level. The number of attacks by fire declined from 67 in June to 45 in July. During the latter part of July, in the central DMZ, the 84th and 164th Artillery Regiments resumed attacks by fire on FS/Ob Fuller and C-2 Combat Base. Ground contacts decreased by approximately 50%. The most significant contact during the month occurred in western Quang Tri (P) on 8 July, when Allied forces surprised elements of the 9th NVA Regiment, 304th NVA Division, attempting to infiltrate into SVN. Air Cavalry elements and troops, supported by helicopter gunships, engaged and killed 139 NVA in the Khe Sanh plains and captured four PWs. The PWS stated that the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 9th Regiment were to control the region in the vicinity of Khe Sanh and south of the Ba Long Valley. They also stated that elements of the 2d Battalion, 246th NVA Regiment were operating in western Quang Tri (P). The presence of the 9th and 66th Regiments, 304th NVA Division confirmed the enemy's determination to protect his lines of communication and base areas which had been established in that area. This build-up of NVA forces in western Quang Tri (P) also threatened Allied installations and population centers north and northeast of the Ba Long Valley.

(e) At the end of the reporting period, enemy units were relocated as follows:

In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTTH), Local force companies relocated were the Phong Dien Special Action Unit, vicinity YD3528, the Quang Dien Special Action Unit, vicinity YD5122, and the Phu Van Special Action Unit, vicinity YC9398. The 5th NVA regiment headquarters was relocated vicinity YC6382, with the 804th Infantry Battalion vicinity YC9398. The 6th NVA Regiment, while still deployed in the canopy south of the Phong Dien (D) piedmont, concentrated more around the FS/Ob RIPCORD area. Battalions of the 6th Regiment relocated were the 800th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD3725, the 802d Infantry Battalion vicinity YD3018, the 806th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4224, the K35 Rocket Artillery Battalion vicinity YD3620, and the K12 Sapper Battalion vicinity YD3423. The 29th and 803d NVA Regiments of the 324B Division were operating east of the A Shau Valley just south and southeast of the 6th NVA Regiment. The 29th NVA regiment headquarters was located vicinity YD4306, the 7th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4906, the 8th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4807, and the 9th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4203. In late July, an unidentified transportation battalion was reported to be operating vicinity YD2914. The 7th Front was still located in the vicinity of former Base Area 101, after
having made several costly incursions into the lowlands during the reporting period. The battalions relocated in the 7th Front were the 808th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD3339, the 814th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2840, the K10 Sapper Battalion vicinity YD3534, the K11 Sapper Battalion vicinity YD2546. The 812th NVA Regiment continued logistical and offensive activity in support of the 7th Front. The 4th Infantry Battalion was relocated vicinity YD2834, the 5th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD1829, and the 6th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2730. The K19B (AKA 20th) Sapper Battalion, 304th NVA Division, under the operational control of the 812th Regiment, was located vicinity YD1927.

In the B5 Front, at the end of the reporting period, there were eleven units operating in the DMZ and western Quang Tri (P) areas. The 52d NVA Regiment, 320th Division is no longer carried in the northwestern corner of Quang Tri (P); it is most likely located in North Vietnam. At the end of the reporting period, the 2d Infantry Battalion, 246th NVA Regiment was located vicinity XD7944. Forward elements of the 304th NVA Division moved farther south, vicinity XD9922, and were reinforced by the newly arrived 9th NVA Regiment. The 9th NVA regiment headquarters was located vicinity XD7738, with the 1st Infantry Battalion located vicinity XD7740, the 2d Infantry Battalion vicinity XD8236, and the 3d Infantry Battalion near the western Quang Tri (P) border west of Khe Sanh. The understrength 66th NVA Regiment, 304th Division was operating in western Quang Tri (P), with the headquarters element vicinity XD9533, the 7th Infantry Battalion vicinity XD832, the 8th Infantry Battalion vicinity XD8930, and the 9th Infantry Battalion vicinity XD0530. The 270th NVA Regiment remained located north of the eastern DMZ, vicinity YD1986, with its 4th Battalion periodically making incursions south of the DMZ.

2 Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) Activities in Thua Thien (P)

(a) The number of VC/VCI related incidents decreased slightly from 47 in April to 42 in May. Kidnappings, sabotage, and rice collections remained at the same level as reported during April, while propaganda activity decreased sharply. Terrorism and assassinations increased during May. Enemy attacks by fire directed against ARVN and GVN installations in the lowlands increased to nine attacks during May, compared to two in April. That activity was believed to have been politically rather than militarily motivated, due to the numerous Vietnamese holidays in May. NVA infiltration into the lowlands increased from three incursions in April to six in May. All of these incidents occurred in Phu Loc (D), and can be attributed to elements of the 4th and 5th NVA Regiments. This increase possibly means that NVA operations have been
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (D)

extended into the lowlands to assist VC/VCI forces in disrupting the GVN pacification and development program. VC/VCI activity in Phong Dien (D) intensified during May, with increases in terrorism, sabotage, and kidnap- ping. Further evidence confirmed the reorganization of the CL13 Local Force Company into local guerrilla units operating throughout Phong Dien (D). During the month of May 1970, a total of twenty-four VCI cadre was eliminated by Allied operations in Thua Thien (P). Of this number, nine were considered significant by current MACV standards.

(b) The number of VC/VCI related incidents decreased from 42 in May to 36 in June. Of the total incidents, 67% involved sabotage, kidnapping, assassination, or terrorist activities. The overall decrease of VC/VCI related incidents can be attributed to a lull in enemy activity from 19 to 25 June, when no incidents were reported. Enemy activity resumed on 26 June and continued through the end of the month. During June, the NVA launched a series of attacks by fire against Allied installations in the lowlands. The enemy employed 60mm mortars, 82mm mortars, and 122mm rockets during these attacks. US installations shelled during June include CAMP EVANS (4, 5, and 26 June), CAMP EAGLE (twice on 26 June), FS/OF LOS BANGS (10 June), and FS/OF TOMAHAWK (10 June). FS/OF TOMAHAWK was the only installation in which the standoff attack was immediately followed by a ground assault. FS/OF ROY, an ARVN installation, was also attacked by fire on 10 June. GVN installations shelled during June include the Phy Trach Bridge (26 June), Phong Dien (D) HQ (4 and 26 June), Phu Loc (D) HQ (10 June), and Nuoc Ngot Bridge (10 June). It is important to note that the majority of the attacks by fire occurred on 10 and 26 June. It is possible that the 4th, 5th, and 6th NVA Regiments increased their offensive operations in the populated areas in order to take advantage of US and ARVN presence in the western canopy. In Phu Vang (D), on 29 June, two election officials were attacked by three VC/VCI, resulting in one election official killed, one election official wounded, and one ARVN soldier killed. The Primary VCI objective was to show the populace what will become of those who actively participate in any activity which would enhance GVN control of the populace. During the month of June, a total of 31 VCI cadre was eliminated by GVN and Allied operations within Thua Thien (P). Of this number, eleven were considered significant under current MACV standards.

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The number of VC/VCI related incidents increased from 36 in June to 38 in July. Of the total incidents, 50% involved sabotage, kidnapping, assassination, or terrorist incidents. The overall increase of VC/VCI related activity can be attributed to an increase of enemy activity in Phong Dien and Nam Hoa Districts. An increase in rice collections was noted throughout the lowlands, indicating that enemy terrorist activity was hampered by the need for foodstuffs. VC/VCI activity in Phong Dien (D) showed increases in acts of terrorism, kidnappings, assassinations, and rice collection. The majority of terrorist incidents involved attacks by fire on GVN installations and hamlets. A marked increase in INC/VC related incidents was noted in the resettlement areas of northern Phong Dien (D). These were the first significant incidents in the area since its founding in January 1970. During July, enemy forces operating in the lowlands launched a series of attacks by fire against Allied ARVN, and GVN installations. Allied bases shelled in July include CAMP EAGLE (7 July), CAMP EVANS (26, 28, and 29 July), FS/OS T-BONE (22 and 28 July), and the VAIKH TRAUTH Training Center (5 July). Significantly, two of the attacks by fire on CAMP EVANS occurred during daylight hours. There were seven reported attacks by fire against GVN installations during July, compared to six in June. Attacks directed against US installations decreased from seven in June to four in July. During the month of July, a total of 24 VCI cadre was eliminated by GVN and Allied operations within Thua Thien (P). Of this number, eight were considered significant under MACV standards. The following table compares the VC/VCI incidents for May (left), June (center), and July (right) by district:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Fin/Econ</th>
<th>Prop</th>
<th>Sab</th>
<th>Intel</th>
<th>Kid</th>
<th>Assas</th>
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<tr>
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<td>0/1/6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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(3) G2 Air Operations.

(a) Prior to 1 May, all photo and IR missions were passed to XXIV Corps for processing. The direct support concept was introduced on 1 May. All missions which Mohawk aircraft were capable of flying were assigned by the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) directly to the 151st Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC). This proved to be more effective and enabled the division to establish priorities which resulted in a more responsive surveillance plan.

(b) The 01-D sorties allotted from the 220th Reconnaissance Airplane Company (RAC) were used in a new capacity. The aircraft were tasked to fly night surveillance around fire support bases which had received indirect fire during the hours of darkness. By sighting flashes and directing air-strikes and artillery these night surveillance missions proved to be effective in reducing the intensity of enemy indirect fire.

(4) G2 Ground Surveillance Operations.

(a) On 1 June, the Dart I sensor readout station became operational. After a two week evaluation period, the responsibility for the readout and interpretation of sensors in the division reconnaissance zone passed from the BATCAT (EC-121) aircraft to the Dart I facility at Quang Tri Combat Base. Reports of sensor activations are passed immediately to the Ground Surveillance Section, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) and 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) via direct telephonic communication for quick reaction and intelligence use.

(b) During the reporting period, the number of ground monitor sites increased to eleven with establishment of sites at FS/Ob RIPCORD (YD3419), FS/Ob BRICK (YD3999), FS/Ob KATHRYN (YD4711), FS/Ob VEGHEL (YD5503), and FS/Ob RAKKASAN (YD4919). These additional sites reflect the offensive posture of ground tactical units in their operations to the south and west against elements of the 6th, 29th, and 803d NVA Regiments. At the end of the reporting period, two of these sites, FS/Ob RIPCORD and BRICK, were closed, with relocations planned to support future operations.

(c) During the month of June, sensor-detected activity increased in the division reconnaissance zone to over 100 activations per week. A high of 190 was reached for the period 21-27 June. The major increases in sensor-detected activity occurred along OL-9, Route 616, and Route 9222. Confirmation of increased enemy activity in these areas, by visual reconnaissance, led to the employment of aerial bombardment and insertion of ground units.
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(d) During the reporting period, the number of operational RF sensor strings in the division area of operation, increased from 76 to a new high of 147, enabling the division to meet its minimum goal of one set per rifle/recon platoon. Operational USD/WIs increased from 42 to 63. Forty-two Balanced Pressure systems (BPS) and seven Infrared Intrusion Detectors (IID's) were added to the inventory for base defense of Camp Hochmuth (Phu Bai Combat Base).

(5) Counter Intelligence Section

(a) The CI Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company, engaged in a variety of activities in support of its primary mission of safeguarding the 101st Abn Div (Ambi) from enemy sabotage, espionage, and subversion. IG and CI inspections of personnel, documents, and physical security programs were conducted to detect and eliminate security hazards. Technical support, in the form of fingerprinting, safe combination changes, recovery of lost combinations, and repair of security containers, was continuously provided both by division and supporting CI teams.

(b) Personnel security investigations, complaint type investigations, and limited investigations to insure the validity of security clearances were conducted in the division. Clearances for 1086 replacements were validated; 471 SECRET clearances were granted; 3568 local files checks were conducted; and 431 intelligence record checks were forwarded to higher headquarters by the personnel security investigations (PSI) section. Additionally, 115 BI and NAC requests were processed.

(c) The base camp security program was enhanced by the establishment of liaison with the Industrial Relations Division, Phu Bai. The intent of this liaison is to increase the number and effectiveness of informants. During the reporting period, the CI section recruited 30 new informants.

(6) G2 Plans/Order of Battle Section. The G2 plans/order of battle section continued to monitor and record the enemy situation throughout northern I Military Region, with increased emphasis in disseminating collected intelligence. The order of battle handbook was updated during the reporting period to maintain an accurate description of enemy units operating in Quang
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Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. The division intelligence collection plan was published on 1 June. The collection plan contains essential elements of information (EEI) needed on the enemy mission, organization, and area of operation. Wide distribution of the plan was made to higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supporting organizations with an intelligence collection capability.

(7) Interrogation Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company. During the reporting period, the interrogation section, 101st Military Intelligence Company (Divisional) processed 13 prisoners of war (12 NVA, one VC), three Hoi Chi Minh (NVA), and 124 batches of captured enemy documents.

(8) Weather. The Air Force weather team, 5th Weather Squadron, continued to provide meteorological support for the 101st Abn Div (Aml). The weather team provides climatological information, weather forecasts for individual flights by Army aviators, current weather reports for field commanders, weather summaries used in the evaluation of past operations, and daily weather advice and interpretation for the commanding general and his staff.

(a) May 1970

1 During May, the total rainfall was normal, approximately equal to the mean average of 4.0 inches. Due to the sporadic nature of precipitation during the month, some areas received more rain than the mean. The total rainfall was 4.04 inches and occurred on 12 days, twice the normal frequency. Thunderstorms occurred over the mountains on 20 days. Low cloudiness occurred on more days than normal. Ceilings below 1500 feet were observed on 8 days. No ceilings less than 300 feet were observed. No fog occurred. The average high temperature was 94°F, and the average low temperature was 77°F, both of which are 2°F warmer than the averages expected for May.

2 May afforded the first full month of good weather throughout the division AO. Airmobile operations were hampered on five days during May (14-16 and 20-21 May), and one B52 air sortie was cancelled on 13 May.

(b) June 1970

1 During June, the total rainfall was 4.2 inches, 1.2 inches above the average. Precipitation fell on 11 days, twice the normal frequency.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

a. (U) Personnel.

(1) Chaplain. During the reporting period, the division provided continuous chaplain support to all assigned and attached units. A total of 4,381 religious services was conducted with an overall attendance of 65,878. Six of the division's 24 chaplains departed during the month of July, creating a considerable personnel problem.

(2) Personnel management.

(a) During the reporting period, total division assigned strength declined from 101.4% of that authorized on 1 May to 97.3% at the end of July. Availability of 11 series MOS personnel declined by 14%, resulting in a serious depletion of line company effective strength.

(b) Prior to 1 July, the USARV reenlistment goal was placed at a monthly reenlistment rate of 0.5% of operative strength, counting only first term RA and AUS reenlistments. As of 1 July, the goal was doubled, and all reenlistments counted. At this time, a prohibition was imposed on reenlistments out of 11, 12 and 13 series MOS into non-combat MOS. The average monthly reenlistment total for the previous reporting period had been 194. May reenlistments totaled 205; June, 145; and July, under the new criteria, 64.

(3) Finance. During the reporting period, the division finance office established the 101st Mobile Finance Forward Team (MFFT) to provide full spectrum finance services to personnel located on fire support bases. The team periodically visits fire support bases, permitting personnel to benefit from services such as partial payments, allotment changes, sale of treasury checks, collection for the savings deposit program, and acceptance of pay inquiries. The team is made available to all commanders located beyond the normal service capability of the present forward finance offices.

(4) Changes in command and staff. During the reporting period the following changes in command and staff assignments occurred:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Former Commander</th>
<th>New Commander</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>MG J.J. Hennessey</td>
<td>succeeded MG J.M. Wright</td>
<td>on 25 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC(O)</td>
<td>BG S.B. Berry</td>
<td>succeeded MG J.J. Hennessey</td>
<td>on 2 Jul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC(S)</td>
<td>COL O.B. Smith</td>
<td>succeeded BG J.C. Smith</td>
<td>on 9 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bde</td>
<td>COL W.H. Root</td>
<td>succeeded COL R.L. Kampa</td>
<td>on 15 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde</td>
<td>COL B.L. Harrison</td>
<td>succeeded COL W.J. Bradley</td>
<td>on 23 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>Previous Officer</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avn Gp</td>
<td>LTC(P) E.P. Davis</td>
<td>succeeded COL C.B. Sinclair</td>
<td>on 26 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCOM</td>
<td>COL D.E. Grange</td>
<td>succeeded COL R.H. Sigrist</td>
<td>on 25 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div Arty</td>
<td>COL L.E. Surut</td>
<td>succeeded COL R.S. Fye</td>
<td>on 29 Jul</td>
</tr>
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<td>G7</td>
<td>LTC C.A. Hoenstine, Jr.</td>
<td>succeeded LTC G.D. Moore, Jr.</td>
<td>on 2 Jun</td>
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<td>G3</td>
<td>LTC R.J. Young</td>
<td>succeeded LTC C.W. Dyke</td>
<td>on 1 Jun</td>
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<tr>
<td>G4</td>
<td>MAJ F. Masterson</td>
<td>succeeded LTC D.R. Pinney</td>
<td>on 26 Jul</td>
</tr>
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<td>G5</td>
<td>MAJ H.W. Kimmison</td>
<td>succeeded LTC B.B. Porter</td>
<td>on 17 Jul</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>LTC S.J. Lobodinski</td>
<td>succeeded LTC R.D. Wood</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>LTC T. Narvaez</td>
<td>succeeded LTC J.D. Martling</td>
<td>on 30 Jun</td>
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<tr>
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<td>on 14 May</td>
</tr>
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<td>158 Avn</td>
<td>LTC R.J. Guard</td>
<td>succeeded LTC H.R. Thomas</td>
<td>on 12 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-502 Inf</td>
<td>LTC C.J. Shay</td>
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<td>on 6 May</td>
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<tr>
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<td>on 23 Jul</td>
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<td>LTC R.J. Burke</td>
<td>succeeded LTC J.L. Sites</td>
<td>on 2 Jun</td>
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<td>LTC R.J. Guard</td>
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</table>
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f. (c) Logistics.

(1) General. Logistic support for all division operations was provided
through the DISCOM forward service support elements (FSSE), using the concept
of area support. Throughout the period, a determined effort was made to re-
duce helicopter blade time whenever possible by using vehicular transportation.

(a) To more effectively support Operation CLINCH VALLEY (9-15 July), a
forward refuel point was established at Mei Loc and a rear point at Quang Tri.
A forward element of the 3d FSSE deployed to Quang Tri in support of two ARVN
battalions, the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf for
the duration of the operation.

(b) In support of Operation CHISAG0 PEAK/LAM SON 363, the 11 refuel points
at CAMP EVANS were expanded to 25, while an additional 11 points were estab-
lished at FS/OB BIRMINGHAM. All classes of supply were drawn from the 3d FSSE
at CAMP EVANS.

(c) Super contact teams continued to provide personnel and equipment
maintenance services to units returning from operations for stand down. The
number of company size units supported were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>COMPLETE TEAM</th>
<th>PARTIAL TEAM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
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CONFIDENTIAL
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(2) DISCOM was tasked to provide civic action support in District II, Hue City and to assist Thu Thien Province in upgrading the capabilities of the Sector Maintenance and Direct Support Logistic Center (SM&DSL C). At the end of the reporting period, five of the original 11 projects had been completed, and three more had been added to the task list. Approximately 85% of DISCOM's goal for the initial phase of the SM&DSL C project had been completed by the end of the reporting period.

(3) On 1 July 1970, the 5th Transportation Battalion (Aircraft Maintenance and Supply) (Ambl) began work on a prescribed load list (PLL) to support three UH-1C aircraft scheduled to arrive in the division on or about 1 September 1970. The PLL was completed, and all requisitioning accomplished, insuring the availability of all parts in advance of arrival of the aircraft. Special emphasis was also placed on the requisition and procurement of special equipment needed to accomplish the battalion mission. At the end of the reporting period, the current authorized stockage list (ASL) for both Company A and B totaled approximately 11,000 lines. On 1 June, the quick reaction assistance team (QRAT) provided by the 34th General Support Group arrived to assist in pulling, packing, and shipping of approximately 3,000 lines of identified excess stock.

(4) The 5th Trans Bn (Acft Maint and Sup) (Ambl) provides direct support for repair of 424 aircraft authorized in the division. During the reporting period, 513 aircraft were repaired and released to division aviation units. Five 12th preventive maintenance periodic inspections on CH-47 aircraft (Operation Hook) were completed during the period, requiring an average of 16 days and 1,118 manhours per aircraft.

(5) The 801st Maintenance Battalion (Ambl) technical supply continued to process an average of approximately 20,000 requests per month. Demand accommodation fluctuated somewhat on a weekly basis, with the average for the period at 79.5%. The beginning of the period marked a very low 45% customer satisfaction average for the month of May. At this time the technical supply activity still had a 39% zero balance. Intensive studies were initiated, and the material release expediter (MRE) teams were strengthened. As a result, receipts began to rise and have brought customer satisfaction to a 70% average for the month of July. Many lines were dropped as a result of the study, and some 150 lines have been shifted to the 426th Supply and Service Battalion (Ambl). A 100% inventory was conducted in the latter part of May and
the first week in June, which created a work backlog. When processing started again, there were so many customer issues that several lines went to zero balance, and the percentage at zero balance started rising. The end of this period finds total receipts rising again to replenish the exhausted stockage. The impact of the inventory was felt for a few weeks, however, and the end result was fewer warehouse demands. The beginning of the period saw 180 warehouse demands for the month of May, compared to 176 at the present time. Technical supply is presently carrying 5,118 lines which occupy approximately 90% of available storage space.

The battalion continued to provide contact teams for the line units and maintenance stand downs. The on-the-spot contact teams have continued to increase material readiness and provide for more efficient combat units. A total of 411 technical assistance visits was conducted during the period. The country store listing was expanded to reduce further the customer unit administrative requirements for submitting parts requests.

g. (U) Civil Affairs.

(1) Pacification and development activities in Thu Tuong Province continued at an accelerated rate throughout the reporting period. The number of projects in progress at the beginning of the period was 136. During the period, 156 new projects were initiated, 102 projects were completed, and at the end of the period, 160 projects were in progress. All the division's efforts are closely coordinated with CIV officials at province and district levels. The overall effort of the division is directed toward the achievement of the national objectives outlined in the Thu Tuong Province Pacification and Development Plan, 1970. The Province Civic Action Priority List, developed at the hamlet, village, and district levels and consolidated and approved at the province level, serves as the guideline in the selection of projects to be undertaken.

(2) On 23 June, the final refugee resettlement payment was made, thereby eliminating all registered refugees from the rolls in Thu Tuong Province. The resettlement payment, which consists of $200,000 VN per family, normalizes a refugee camp, thus creating an official political entity. When conditions permit, the people of a normalized community have the option of returning to their original villages. When this is done, the returning families receive a return-to-village (RTV) payment, which consists of $100,000 VN per family. As of 30 June 1970, 63,129 of the 85,114 refugees generated during and after the Tet offensive of 1968 had been returned to their native villages. There remain approximately 22,000 people in 26 normalized camps and an additional 15,000 people scattered throughout the province, who are entitled to the return-to-village payments upon return to their ancestral homes. Continued division assistance in the program is taking the form of limited logistic and material support.
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for related civic action projects. A total of 27 projects is planned, including 15 schools, three dispensaries, three markets, and six wells. For these projects, the province is supplying cement and roofing, RF and PF cadre provide the labor, and the division supplies lumber, reinforcing steel bars, and nails. The Phase I Program achieved 136% of the Return-to-Village Program's 1970 goal.

(3) In December 1969, the division support command initiated a program to upgrade the Sector Maintenance and Direct Support Logistics Center (SMDSLC) of Thua Thien Province. From its new location in Hue, the SMDSLC will provide management, support, and services to all RF, PF, PSDF, and RO cadre and their equipment in the province. Fourteen major subprojects constitute the Division Support Command effort, with each subproject undertaken by the appropriate element of DISCOM. Of these, five have been completed, and six others are in progress.

(4) During the period of this report, a total of 405 MEDCAPs was held, and 23,465 medical and dental patients were examined.

(5) Major projects completed during the reporting period:

(a) Phu Loc District.
1. An Bang Hamlet school construction (ZD144005)
2. Thu Thuan Hamlet dispensary (ZD201012)
3. Vong Tri Hamlet school addition (ZD0803008)

(b) Phu Vang District.
1. Phu An Village dispensary (YP812862)
2. Phu Vang District dispensary repair (YD7079277)
3. Phu Tan Village dike repair (YD816301)

(c) Phong Dien District.
1. Phong Dien Hamlet Farmers' Association Bldg repair (YD528348)
2. Pho Trach Hamlet market place (YD503424)
3. Ho Dien Hamlet school repair (YD515298)
4. Phong An Village office (YD611291)

(d) Huong Dien District.
1. Dien Loc Hamlet school repair (YD595165)
2. Ke Mon Hamlet school repair (YD568164)
3. Vinh Xuong Hamlet school repair (YD551473)
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1. The My C nursery school construction (YD620456)
2. The Chi Rey Hamlet dispensary (YD620436)
3. Dien My Village dispensary construction (YD678680)

(a) Huong Tra District:
1. Long Ho Truong Hamlet school furniture (YD702182)
2. Long Khe Hamlet footbridge (YD618272)

(f) Huong Thuy District:
1. Huong Thuy District power line (YD829179)
2. Xuan Hoe Hamlet health station (YD782239)
3. Province prison farm equipment repair (YD802215)

(g) Phu Thu District:
1. Quang Xuyen Hamlet school construction (YD895245)
2. Vinh Luu Hamlet construction (YD894215)
3. An Luu Hamlet dispensary construction (YD945272)
4. Loc San Hamlet school construction (YD873236)

(b) Hue:
1. Phu Vinh Village school addition (YD758206)
2. Phu Vinh Hamlet latrine construction (YD773234)
3. Phu Ha Village reading room construction (YD769228)
4. Phu Hiep Hamlet street repair (YD770248)

(i) Vinh Hai Hamlet school repair (YD080125), Vinh Loc.

(6) During the reporting period, 102 projects were completed including 17 schools, 11 dispensaries, two village headquarters, 32 wells, 20 information boards, three bridges, two dikes, and 15 others.

(7) The division currently has 140 civic action projects underway. These include eight schools, nine dispensaries, three administrative buildings, 10 markets, 14 police stations, 77 wells, one road repair, three footbridges, and 15 other.

(8) Commodity issued during the reporting period:

Cement

2,750 bags

Tin

1,106 sheets
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Construction lumber 29,141 board feet
Paint 30 gallons
Medical supplies 686 lbs
Sand 37 tons
Crushed rock 19 tons
Wire 1,275 linear feet
Clothing 685 lbs
Ammo boxes 28,317 boxes
Food 2,040 lbs
Screen wire 8 rolls
School kits 220 kits
Culvert 875 ea
Plywood 375 sheets
Scrap wood 4,680 lbs
Reinforcing steel bar 4,042 linear feet

(9) The initial land reclamation and driver training effort in Phong Dien District was completed during the period. Two of the four Minneapolis-Moline tractors were dispatched to Phu Wang District, one to Huong Thuy District, and one is presently being repaired. The program is now entirely a Vietnamese responsibility, to include the maintenance, repair and operation of equipment.

(10) On 28 May, BG Smith, ADC(G), and COL Than, Province Chief, attended the dedication ceremony of Phong An Village Headquarters in Phong Dien District. In a speech delivered by the Phong An Village chief, it was noted that 10 years ago Phong An was a scenic and prosperous area, with a well developed economy. In 1964, the village headquarters was destroyed in a wave of disruptive activities. In subsequent years the village headquarters was relocated twice and destroyed each time. Now, 100% of the local population has resettled to its original location, irrigation canals have been constructed, and three schools have been repaired through the pacification program since early 1969.
In conclusion, the village chief pledged further development in security, economics, and education.

h. (U) Psychological Operations.

(1) Type and quantity of propaganda media employed:

(a) Total leaflets disseminated:
   Air: 23,871,000  Ground: 59,100

(b) Total loudspeaker broadcast hours:
   Air: 645:00  Ground: 1,041:30

(c) Total movies shown: 123
   Total hours: 333:45

(d) Quick reaction leaflets:
   Four missions for 290,000 leaflets

(e) Quick reaction broadcasts:
   Five missions for 17:00 hours

(f) Hoi Chau: Eight

(2) The 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and the 101st Airm Div (Airm) cooperated in the development of leaflets and tapes for employment against the 66th NVA Regiment and other NVA units in the vicinity of PS/GB HENDERSON. The operation involved 15 hours of aerial broadcast and the distribution of 360,000 leaflets. One NVA soldier rallied during the reporting period.

(3) On 29 May, an earlymor mission was conducted by the 9th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) in support of the 1st Div (Airm), 327th Inf. Several minor SOS compatibility problems were encountered but have since been eliminated. It is felt that this mission constituted a milestone in the division PSYOP effort, since this was the first time that an earlymor mission was conducted under the recently directed XXIV Corps PSYOP ground communication system.

(4) In an obvious effort to counter the strong psychological impact of the accelerated pacification and development program in Thua Thien Province, the enemy increased terrorist activities in the populated lowlands during the latter part of May. VC incidents ranged from destruction of 1,000 motes of hamlet fencing and distribution of VC propaganda leaflets to the assassination of the Phong Dien District Chief. As yet, the full impact of these incidents has not been determined. No appreciable change in the attitude c
the people toward the GVN has been detected, and it is felt that the terrorist activities will serve only to alienate the people further from the NVA/VKh.

(5) During the middle of June, a photography team from the 4th PSYOP Group supported the division with photographic coverage of successful civic action projects throughout the province, taking approximately 400 slides which were later developed in Saigon. A slide show, code named "Operation Building Block", will be shown throughout the province by the audio-visual teams in cooperation with Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) cadre, in order to stimulate populace participation in civic action projects, thus emphasizing the overall nation-building effort.

(6) Based on recent events and intelligence reports gathered on 20 June in the vicinity of the Vietnamese Salient, 100,000 quick reaction leaflets were printed by the 7th PSYOP Battalion, for employment against the 66th NVA Regiment and dropped by the 9th SOS on 21 June, exploiting the discovery of a large enemy hospital complex. In addition, the division PSYOP section conducted an aerial broadcast mission using tape recordings. Although concrete results could not be measured, it appears that quick reaction PSYOP missions of this nature have a detrimental effect on enemy morale due to the high credibility of the factual messages.

(7) On 8 July, elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl). 17th Cav, on an armed aerial reconnaissance mission, in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, observed 150 to 200 NVA in the open. In response to an immediate PSYOP mission request from the squadron, the division provided PSYOP support to the operation. Surrender or Die leaflets and safe conduct passes were dropped, and an ARVN lieutenant mode aerial broadcasts in response to the varied ground actions. Subsequent air strikes and ground operations were exploited by 1st Inf Div (ARVN) PSYWAR broadcasts and quick reaction leaflets. Total NVA losses, after several days of operations, were very heavy. This action had a significant psychological impact on the NVA.

(8) One NVA corporal rallied on 23 July in Nam Hoa District. Utilizing the Rallier's Guide, 15,000 quick reaction leaflets were prepared and printed containing the rallier's name, rank, unit, and a statement concerning his excellent treatment by the GVN. Information obtained during interrogation was used to prepare a tape which was recorded by the Honolulu for broadcast. He was later exploited by the 1st Brigade, which took him on an aerial reconnaissance over the area he had described during his interrogation to identify significant areas. Results of this effort were minimal as he could not associate the airborne view with familiar terrain.

(9) A USAF aircraft flew a timely high altitude mission in support of
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Operation CHICAGO PEAK/LAM SON 363, dropping six million leaflets into the A SHAU Valley and the immediate region to the northeast. Themes for this sortie were Surrender or Die, Beware of B-52 Strikes, and Allied Firepower.

(1) During the reporting period, tactical deployment of companies within the 326th Medical Battalion (Ambl) remained the same as in the previous quarter, with Company A in direct support of the 1st Brigade, Company B in direct support of the 2d Brigade, and Company C in direct support of the 3d Brigade. Headquarters and Support Company continued to provide area medical support for the division's rear elements located at CRMP EAGLE.

(2) Medical Statistical Recapitulation:

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(3) Movement of the 32d Medical Depot from Phu Bai to Da Nang increased the order and shipping time of medical supplies from eight to 15 days. This delay necessitated initiation of weekly circuit supply missions by the battalion. Due to the increased distance, any emergency supplies must be delivered by helicopter.

(4) Company MEDCAP programs have continued, with medical companies in support of brigade civil affairs programs. Each physician is scheduled for a minimum of one MEDCAP per week.
The air ambulance platoon continued to perform its mission of providing aero-medical evacuation support to the 101st Abn Div (Amb). The majority of this support originated from CAMP EAGLE. However, for most of the period two VH-1H air ambulances have been stationed at CAMP EVANS to provide quicker response to northern sections of the AO. During this reporting period, one of the battalion’s authorized twelve aircraft was placed with division flight standards, leaving eleven functional aircraft with the platoon.

Mandatory training required by USARV Regulation 350-1 is being actively conducted and posted to individual training records. Emphasis has been placed on OJT and MOS cross-training to increase individual proficiency and to reduce the impact of DERS losses and temporary absences of personnel. The air ambulance platoon has taken maximum advantage of unfavorable weather during the period to improve individual aviator proficiency in instrument flight and inclement weather procedures.

Signal.

The 501st Signal Battalion (Amb) continued its mission to provide communications-electronics support for the 101st Abn Div (Amb) throughout the reporting period. RATT teams continued to support the division, the three brigades, and DISCOM. In Operation BARBER GLADE, secure RATT was provided in support of Project Delta at Mai Loc. Both AM and FM FMV stations continued in operation, and a jump capability was provided at all times. The battalion responded to increased requests for 4-channel communications, linking brigades to battalion CPs at forward fire support bases, by installing AN/GRC163 equipment at FS/OC PARRASAN, SHOCK, VEGHEL, KATHRYN, BRICK, GLADIATOR, and MAUREEN. Four channel systems continued to be provided at Phu Loc District Headquarters, FS/OC BIRMINGHAM, FS/OC BASTOGNE, CAMP EAGLE, CAMP EVANS, EAGLE BEACH, and FS/OC RIPCORD. Four channel systems were also provided at Mai Loc for Project Delta, and at FS/OBS HENDERSON, HOLCOMB and SHEPHERD, CAMP CARROL and Dong Ha in support of combined US/ARVN operations. Four channel systems were provided at FS/OBS TUM TAVERN and BARNETT in support of ARVN operations. Operational and maintenance responsibility of the 4-channel system linking FS/OC T-BONE to Hue utilizing AN/MRC68 equipment was transferred to the 1st Inf Div (ARVN). The battalion maintained an overall multi-channel reliability of 98.6% during the reporting period. This can be attributed to three factors: (a) the increased responsiveness of the ADAO in providing helicopter support to deliver equipment to fire support bases when equipment failures occurred; (b) the decrease in maintenance problems with the multiplexer AN/TOC70 of the AN/GRC163 due to familiarity gained through its continued utilization; and (c) authorization of the battalion to obtain a temporary excess of AN/GRC163 equipment, which provided reliable backup reserves.
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(2) The battalion continued its policy of direct exchange of equipment that could not be immediately repaired. Division units were further assisted by signal contact teams sent to field locations for on-site repairs. There were 921 work orders completed during the reporting period. Receipt and issue of additional crypto equipment relieved some of the past shortages and provided additional flexibility.

(3) The division's four MARS stations completed 13,843 phone patches during May, June and July. The division MARS stations set a USARV record with 3,253 calls during the month of May.

(4) The 63d Signal Battalion continued to provide cable, 12-channel VHF, and microwave communications support to major subordinate and higher unit headquarters. During Operation GLINCH VALLEY in July, contingency circuits from CAMP CARROLL to CAMP EVANS and CAMP EAGLE were activated in support of the 3d Brigade forward CP.

(5) The battalion began a program of training selected personnel of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) signal battalion. To date, three officers and six enlisted men have received two weeks of OJT in the theory and operation of various equipment in the battalion. The ARVN personnel spent two weeks living and working with the 501st Signal Battalion.

k. (U) Engineer.

(1) During the reporting period, the 326th Engineer Battalion (Ambl) continued to provide general and direct support to the division. One new firebase was opened and several old firebases reopened. Upgrading of the Phu Thu Estuary Road, the Jeanne-Knight Road, and the Street Without Joy projects, was completed in support of tactical and civic action requirements. Project LIFESAVER was discontinued during the reporting period after the construction or improvement of 15 landing zones in the division AO.

(2) During the last week of May, engineer support was consolidated and committed to establishing a forward line of hardened firebases in the division area of operation. The preponderance of engineer effort for the remainder of the reporting period was committed to this task. Initially four firebases were programmed for complete hardening. These hardening tasks committed A/326th Engr to FS/OB BRICK, B/326 Engr to FS/OB KATHRYN, Companies B and D of the 27th Engr to harden FS/OB VEGHEL and to complete construction of an access road to the firebase from Route 547, and Company D of the 14th Engr Bn to harden FS/OB RAKKASAN and to complete construction of an access road to the firebase from FS/OB JACK. FS/OB RIPCORD was designated to be hardened on a selective basis. During the last two weeks of the reporting period, two additional firebases were designated to be hardened. FS/OB GLADIATOR is to be completely hardened and FS/OB MAUROEN is to be hardened selectively.
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(3) During the summer season, with its sparse rainfall, helicopter maintenance became a prime engineer mission, with upgrading projects completed at FS/0B ARSENAL, TOMAHAWK, BASTOGNE, KATHRYN, LOS BANCOS and VECHEL; at Phu Loc, Phu Tho, and Nam Hoa district headquarters; and at various base camp helipads. Potable water was provided throughout the area of operation, with purification units located at FS/0B BASTOGNE, FS/0B VECHEL, Mai Loc, the Thu Linh Bridge, and CAMP EAGLE.

(4) At the beginning of the reporting period, a new firebase (FS/0B SHOCK), was created out of an existing landing zone. This firebase was constructed under the airmobile firebase concept of seven to 10 days occupation, and was closed after nine days of occupation. FS/0B KATHRYN, reopened during the latter part of the previous reporting period, continued to receive engineer support in the form of demolition and earthmoving work. The existing hill mass was leveled so as to support two artillery batteries. The task of hardening FS/0B BRICK encompassed the construction of one 20' x 32', three 10' x 32', and 41 8' x 12' bunkers; installation of a tactical wire barrier; clearing of adequate fields of fire and preparation of logistic helicopter landing pads. During the hardening process, a system of prefabricating and airdropping bunkers to the job site was initiated with excellent results. The hardening process of FS/0B BRICK was completed by the end of the second month of the reporting period.

(5) During the month of June two LZ cutting/bunker busting teams were inserted into western Quang Tri Province in support of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav operations. One team was inserted into the FS/0B ROBIN area to cut an LZ to permit the extraction of medical supplies and documents from an NVA hospital site and to destroy the remaining bunkers. The second team was inserted near FS/0B SNAPPER to cut an LZ to extract portions of a rice and weapons cache. This team was also used to destroy the remaining ordnance, rice, and bunkers.

(6) At FS/0B VECHEL, a project was undertaken to provide adequate drainage facilities for structures on the firebase, to lay wire barriers, and to clear fields of fire. The hardening process on FS/0B VECHEL was completed by the 27th Engr Bn in late June. An additional requirement to establish a 1st Brigade forward CP, consisting of one 10' x 24' TOC and six 8' x 12' sleeping position bunkers, was completed during the last week of the reporting period.

(7) Maneuver elements occupying FS/0B RIFCORD continued to receive engineer support throughout the entire reporting period. A refuel point for UH-1s and LCH aircraft was constructed, and bunkers were emplaced in selected positions around the firebase. Additional support included wire barriers, fields of fire, defensive positions, and adequate drainage facilities. During the latter stages of the reporting period, additional engineer support was committed to the firebase to counter increased enemy activity.
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(a) Company B was tasked with improving the defensive posture of the firebase by constructing additional bunkers, a quad-50 position, numerous revetments, a new log pad, and repair of damaged structures and positions. A new position for a 105mm howitzer battery was built after a CH-47 crashed and destroyed the existing battery, to include a massive BOM effort to deactivate and destroy the damaged artillery ammunition. Engineer elements were extracted with the closing of the firebase on 23 July.

(b) In support of increased enemy activity around FS/CE RIPCORD, FS/CE GLADIATOR was reopened. One platoon of engineers was inserted on 19 July to harden the firebase. Tasks to be accomplished included construction of 63 bunkers and two log pads, clearing fields of fire and installation of tactical wire. At present 39 bunkers have been completed.

1. (C) Army Aviation.

1) General.

(a) Throughout the reporting period, the 101st Aviation Group (Combat) (Airmobile) provided aviation support to the division and non-divisional units in I Military Region. In addition to providing airlift and armed aerial escort support, the group augmented the aeromedical capability of the medical battalion and provided air traffic and pathfinder support and limited battlefield surveillance and target acquisition.

(b) Aviation requirements were met on a daily basis to provide the necessary support for combat operations, logistic resupply, and pacification and development efforts. Aviation support was also provided for Special Forces Project Delta; GVN missions; the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized); and the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) in conjunction with the Vietnamese Air Force.

(c) Operation LIFESAVER and its program of landing zone expansion was concluded on 5 June 1970. During the reporting period, LIFESAVER teams completed 15 LZs, thereby increasing the total number of LZs created during Operation LIFESAVER to 170. All of these LZs are functional two ship LZs with high speed routes of approach and departure. During the reporting period, pathfinders controlled air traffic on as many as 14 fire support bases at one time.

2) The following are statistical data for the reporting period:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>HRS FLOWN</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
<th>TONS CARGO</th>
<th>ACFT REGO</th>
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<tr>
<td>101st Avn Bn</td>
<td>18,173</td>
<td>61,950</td>
<td>66,377</td>
<td>2,039</td>
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<tr>
<td>158th Avn Bn</td>
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<td>62,778</td>
<td>68,358</td>
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<th>PERS</th>
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<th>ACFT RECOVERIES</th>
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<td>10,917</td>
<td>30,861</td>
<td>92,098</td>
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<tr>
<td>163rd Avn Co</td>
<td>5,690</td>
<td>22,686</td>
<td>8,777</td>
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<tr>
<td>GROUP TOTAL</td>
<td>52,936</td>
<td>173,175</td>
<td>235,610</td>
<td>56,329</td>
<td>13</td>
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</table>

(3) The number of aircraft receiving ground fire increased by 98 over the last reporting period. The 101st Aviation Group experienced 187 incidents of ground fire reported as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UH-1N</th>
<th>A H-1G</th>
<th>CH-5A</th>
<th>CH-47</th>
<th>CH-54</th>
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<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
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</table>

(4) The 101st Avn Gp (Cbt) (Ambl) conducted two airmobility classes for commanders and staff officers of the division during the reporting period. The first class (15-16 May) was attended by 39 personnel. The second airmobility class, conducted on 26-27 June, was attended by 31 personnel. Two pathfinder classes were conducted to train ARVN personnel. The first, from 4 May to 15 May, graduated one officer, two warrant officers, and 12 NCOs. The second, from 25 May to 5 June, graduated one officer, two warrant officers and 11 NCOs.

(5) Air traffic activities for the period were:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Eagle GCA</th>
<th>Eagle Tower</th>
<th>Liftmaster Tower</th>
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<td>May</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>59,063</td>
<td>9,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>26,183</td>
<td>10,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>28,451</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(6) Throughout the period, the 101st Aviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter) (Ambl) and the 258th Aviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter) (Ambl) alternated their companies in providing direct combat and logistic support to the brigades of the division. The 159th Aviation Battalion (Assault Support Helicopter) (Ambl) continued to provide general support to the division for the air movement of artillery, combat troops, and supplies. Logistic support was also provided to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech); the 1st Inf Div (ARVN); and Project Delta. The 163rd Aviation Company (GS) (Ambl) continued to provide general support to the division, performing visual reconnaissance, photography missions, courier service, psychological operations support, airborne personnel detector missions and command and control. The company
provided air transportation for the division general staff. During the reporting period, the 530th Transportation Detachment (Aircraft Maintenance) (Amlb) was attached to the company and accomplished direct support maintenance on all company aircraft.

m. (U) Air Cavalry Operations. The 2d Squadron (Airmobile), 17th Cavalry continued to perform extensive armed aerial reconnaissance throughout northern I Military Region in support of Allied operations. The squadron engaged in combat as an economy of force unit, provided immediate reaction forces for enemy contact and security of downed aircraft and surveillance and security operations for the division and subordinate combat elements.

(1) The 2d Sqn (Amlb), 17th Cav is one of the primary intelligence gathering agencies of the 101st Abn Div (Amlb). With three air cavalry troops, a ground troop and Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry attached, the squadron performs extensive air and ground reconnaissance and surveillance. In the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence information, the squadron works closely with US and ARVN intelligence agencies. Close coordination is maintained with the division order of battle, imagery interpretation, ground surveillance and C-2 air sections and division INW teams. Valuable intelligence is gained through cooperation and informal coordination with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech). Based on intelligence indicators, the squadron's combat elements are targeted against specific areas of interest in order to provide the commanding general with a clear assessment of the situation in all reaches of the division area of operation.

(2) The most significant findings attributed to armed aerial reconnaissance by the 2d Sqn (Amlb), 17th Cav during the reporting period were in June, when an extensive rear service area of the 66th NVA Regt was discovered in the FS/GB Leatherneck area, and in July, when air cavalry elements discovered the 9th NVA Regt, 304th NVA Division, infiltrating into SVN.

(3) Extensive employment of the 2d Sqn (Amlb), 17th Cav throughout the division AO, with particular emphasis on the division reconnaissance zone, resulted in 2,125 spot reports of enemy activity, eight crew served and 41 individual weapons captured, 396 enemy killed and five prisoners captured.

n. (U) Artillery.

(1) The 101st Airborne Division Artillery (Airmobile) provided close and continuous fire support to maneuver units throughout the reporting period. Light howitzer battalions continued to provide direct support to the infantry brigades, with the 2d Bn (Amlb), 319th Arty (105) in direct support of the 3d Brigade; the 2d Bn (Amlb), 320th Arty (105) in direct support of the 1st Brigade; and the 1st Bn (Amlb), 321st Arty (105) in direct support of the 2d Brigade.
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Battery D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Artty (105) remained attached to the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Infantry in IX Military Region.

The 2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Artty (155), the 4th Bn (Aerial Artty), 77th Artty, and A Btry (Avn), 377th Artty remained in general support of the division.

The following 106th Artillery Group units were located in the division area of operations in a general support role: Btry A, 2d Bn (8"/175) (SP), 94th Artty at Co; Btry A, 1st Bn (8"/155) (SP), 99th Artty at FS/DB RAKKASAN; Btry B, 1st Bn (8"/175) (SP), 39th Artty at FS/DB BAMBARA; Btry C, 1st Bn (8"/155) (SP), 39th Artty at Camp Evans; Btry A, 1st Bn (82/175) (SP), 83d Artty at FS/DB RASTOGI; Btry B, 1st Bn (82/175) (SP), 83d Artty at FS/DB BIRMINGHAM; and Btry C, 1st Bn (82/175) (SP), 83d Artty at FS/DB WEGHEL.

Btry B, 2d Bn (8"/175) (SP), 94th Artty of the 106th Artillery Group was located at Camp Carroll in Northern I Military Region and provided fires in general support of the division.

Btry D (M42), 1st Bn, 49th Artty and a section of Btry C (M55), 65th Artty of XXV Corps Artillery were deployed in the division A0 to provide fires for base and bridge security.

(2) Artillery fires were employed throughout the division area of operation to disrupt enemy lines of communication and infiltration routes. This was accomplished through artillery raids and fires in reaction to sensor activations, radar detections, aerial surveillance, and intelligence. Extensive artillery fires were employed nightly in the "rocket belt" areas on the periphery of the populated lowlands and in the area adjacent to military installations.

(3) Throughout the reporting period, US and ARVN artillery units continued to employ coordinated fires in support of combined operations. The division artillery aerial surveillance program continued to locate and adjust fires on enemy forces and to provide observation for artillery registrations.

(4) During the period of heavy enemy contact in the vicinity of FS/DB RICOCHET in July, Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Artty suffered heavy damage when a CH47 aircraft crashed and burned in the 105mm ammunition storage area, causing a major fire on the firebase. All six 105mm howitzers of the battery were destroyed.

(5) Repositioning of Artillery Support:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RO 2 CFRON-65 (R2) (U)

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o. (U) Information.

(1) Public Information.

(a) Number of hometown news releases: 4,935.

(b) Number of news/feature stories released to public and military media: 175.

(c) Number of photographs released: 129.

(d) Number of correspondents provided support by the information office: 91.

(e) Coverage was also provided for 50 distinguished visitors to the division, including Representative William O. Cowgor (R-Ky) and General William C. Westmoreland, CSA.

(2) Combat Information.

(a) During the reporting period, six issues of the division newspaper, "The Screaming Eagle", and the spring issue of the division magazine, "Rendezvous with Destiny", were published.

(b) In support of President Nixon’s proclamation of the period 24-30 May as Drug Abuse Prevention Week, the information office instituted the following:

1. A half-hour discussion program on drug abuse was broadcast over AFW-TV Quang Tri at 1530 hours 30 May. The program featured one medical officer, one legal officer, and a moderator from the division.

2. A 30 second radio "spot" announcement concerning drug abuse and the division amnesty program was broadcast daily over AFW-R, Quang Tri.

3. The "Airborne Dateline" featured drug abuse and the division amnesty program each day in the cartoon and special announcement section.
4. A flier on drug abuse prevention was attached to the daily bulletin for distribution and posting.

5. USARV Fact Sheet 26-70, "Drug Abuse in the Military", was reproduced and distributed with a cover letter requiring the topic to be covered during June at all unit commandant calls.
2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

a. Personnel: None.

b. Intelligence:

(1) Use and update of intelligence data base information.

(a) Observation: A data base of intelligence information on the location of enemy bunker complexes, cache sites, trails, and other information gathered during combat operations and maintained at maneuver battalion level, provides valuable information for units conducting patrol, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations.

(b) Evaluation: Experience has shown that when small unit commanders and patrol leaders are thoroughly briefed on previous enemy positions and activities in their area of operation, from information provided by an accurate and current intelligence data base, the information gathered by the unit and returned to intelligence personnel is much more detailed and valuable. The data base can be kept current and will provide indications of enemy trends and activities in the area. The exchange of this type of information with adjacent units or units moving into the area for the first time, increases the overall effectiveness of operations.

(c) Recommendation: That unit intelligence personnel (S2) be encouraged to aggressively pursue a program of detailed intelligence gathering, collecting a data base, disseminating the data, and updating the data base from detailed debriefings.

(2) Acoustic sensors in support of ranger teams.

(a) Observation: Acoustic sensors can be effectively used to extend the surveillance capability of ranger teams for short periods of time.

(b) Evaluation: Following the insertion of Ranger Team "Cicada" on 13 April 70, six acoustic sensors were air delivered by personnel of the ground surveillance section, supported by the 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav. The primary mission of the ranger team was to monitor sensor activity and respond with artillery fire. During the seven days the team monitored the acoustic sensors, it heard metallic sounds, voices, and screaming, when artillery was employed. Conversations heard and translated by a Kit Carson Scout revealed NVA/VC plans to ambush a US unit in the area. The plan was later abandoned due to non-availability of automatic weapons. NVA/VC were also heard monitoring US radio transmissions and discussing the disposition of US forces in the area.
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(c) Recommendation: That commanders consider the use of acoustic sensors with ranger teams for target acquisition and intelligence collection.

c. (C) Operations.

(1) Territorial force operations in the jungle canopy.

(a) Observation: During the last reporting period, a program of combined operations with Regional Force elements, operating in the canopy for short periods of time, was begun. Continued combined operations during this reporting period have culminated in independent RF company operations deep in the canopy for periods of up to 15 days.

(b) Evaluation: The RF companies continue to show progress in proficiency and aggressiveness. Continued operations, farther from the populated areas, increase the responsibility and sense of urgency of the RF and PNSDF forces securing the populated lowlands.

(c) Recommendation: That continued coordination be maintained with GVN officials to encourage increased RF operations, in the canopy.

(2) Sniper team employment.

(a) Observation: A five man sniper team, employed with the PRC-5 radar, has shown to be a very effective method of interdicting enemy infiltration in the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province. The effective employment of snipers is generally limited to open, relatively level terrain of the lowlands.

(b) Evaluation: Upon initial employment of the radar/sniper teams into known infiltration areas, movement was frequently detected and engaged. Infiltration through these areas was greatly diminished, and indications were that the routes were effectively interdicted.

(c) Recommendation: That units be made aware of this technique of interdiction.

(3) Mechanical ambushes.

(a) Observation: The extensive employment of mechanical ambushes during the reporting period has led units in the field to recommend the use of monofilament fish line as trip wire, used PRC25 batteries as the power source, and clothespins for the trigger device.

(b) Evaluation: The monofilament fish line has been procured locally or through individual purchase and is much preferred over trip wire. Used
PRC25 batteries are readily available and durable in all weather conditions. The clothespin firing device is sensitive and quickly employed in the field.

(c) Recommendation: That units employing mechanical ambushes consider this technique of employment.

4. Prefabricated firebase facilities.

(a) Observation: In conjunction with the division-wide program of hardening fire support bases against enemy attack, facilities such as bunkers, latrines, showers and other structures were prefabricated or constructed in rear base areas, and airlifted to the firebase.

(b) Evaluation: This procedure reduced time, effort, and aircraft blade time required for establishing and hardening a firebase. All tools and labor were readily available in rear areas, and no excess material was delivered to the firebase requiring backhaul or destruction.

(c) Recommendation: That units establishing forward fire support bases consider the construction or prefabrication of facilities in rear areas, prior to delivery to the firebase.

5. Local patrolling around forward firebases.

(a) Observation: During the present division operation (TEXAS STAR), an active patrolling program around forward fire support bases has severely limited the enemy’s reconnaissance capability and delayed, and some times prohibited, his attack on the fire support base.

(b) Evaluation: Local patrolling around the fire support bases, from 1000 to 1500 meters out, allows the firebase defenders to employ all defensive fires and enables the patrols to locate prepositioned enemy indirect fire weapons and cache sites. An enemy ground attack against FS/08 RIFCORD was very likely pre-empted on 22 July, when Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf was engaged by an estimated two company enemy force approximately 1000 meters southeast of the firebase.

(c) Recommendation: That units consider an active patrolling program around forward fire support bases.

6. Use of E-158 GS containers.

(a) Observation: Aircraft are extremely vulnerable to small arms and mortar fire while entering and leaving a landing zone during combat assaults, extractions, or resupply.
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(b) Evaluation: Tactical CS has proven to be effective in limiting the enemy's ability of placing aimed fires into an LZ during these missions. In addition, experience has shown that it requires approximately 15-20 minutes for the enemy to place the first mortar round on an LZ. Employment of tactical CS on suspected mortar and forward observer positions, shortly after the initial insertion of troops, can assist in preventing effective mortar fire in or around the landing zone.

(c) Recommendation: That units conducting airmobile combat and resupply operations consider the use of tactical CS in restricting the enemy's indirect fire capability.

(7) Tactical CS against a fortified position.

(a) Observation: The enemy's limited protective capability against riot control agent CS makes its use against entrenched and fortified positions very effective.

(b) Evaluation: Employment of tactical CS has caused the enemy to withdraw from his fortifications, thus increasing his vulnerability to other supporting fires. Employment of CS against suspected enemy locations has also proved to be an effective means of reconnaissance by fire.

(c) Recommendation: That units consider the use of tactical CS agent against hardened targets.

(8) Quadrant system of control during airmobile assaults.

(a) Observation: The use of a standard quadrant system to divide the area around landing zones during combat assaults provides for better air traffic control and allows for continuous suppression around the landing zone.

(b) Evaluation: It has been found that a system, consisting of the four major quadrants, NE, SE, SW and NW, numbered one through four, respectively, is an excellent tool in planning for suppressive fires during combat assaults. Three quadrants are allocated a type of suppressive fire while the fourth is utilized for entrance and exit of the lift aircraft. The suppressive fires as well as airborne on call assets, i.e., tactical CS, crew recovery aircraft, and C&C aircraft, can be repositioned rapidly to meet a changing situation.

(c) Recommendation: That the system be considered for evaluation and possible inclusion as airmobile doctrine by other units conducting airmobile combat assaults.
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(9) Helicopter ground-to-air incidents during KOA.

(a) Observation: During conduct of bomb damage assessment of B52
strikes, aircraft have frequently received small arms and automatic weapons
fire and observed enemy activity in the strike zone.

(b) Evaluation: The frequency of these incidents indicates that the
enemy expects a helicopter reconnaissance after a B52 strike and that the
enemy surviving in the strike zone quickly recover to engage US aircraft.
Successful countermeasures used by the division have been to employ an air
cavalry team, consisting of a C&C aircraft, two AH1G Cobras and a LOH, imme-
diately after the strike. The employment of tactical GS (2G158 canisters),
from the C&C aircraft, on suspected enemy locations, has reduced the effec-
tiveness of the enemy fire.

(c) Recommendation: That commanders consider this technique during
the conduct of bomb damage assessment.

(10) Detailed studies have recently been concluded within the division
in an effort to minimize friendly casualties and maximize the combat effec-
tiveness of maneuver units. A study of the period 7 December 1969 through
9 July 1970 indicated that the majority of US casualties during the period
were inflicted by enemy attacks on night defensive positions (NDP). The
following lessons, some of them re-learned, have been emphasized in the
division.

(a) Preventing the enemy from knowing the location and size of night
defensive positions and denying him easy access into the area is extremely
important. The area selected for an NDP should be located in rough terrain
with thick underbrush whenever possible. This will make it difficult for
the enemy to move up to the position without being detected, and the thick
underbrush will often prematurely detonate RPG rounds fired towards the
position.

(b) Movement into the NDP should be conducted about 15 minutes prior
to full darkness, permitting personnel to establish their individual posi-
tions and begin setting up their trip flares, claymores, warning devices,
and mechanical ambushes while they still have enough light to work safely.
At this time, it is dark enough to prevent the enemy from observing those
actions from a distance of more than 100 meters away.

(c) When establishing individual positions, personnel should avoid dig-
ging in next to trees or tree stumps. The enemy will fire his RPGs against
trees and into heavy brush areas to create air bursts in order to spray the

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area with shrapnel.

(d) An NDP should not be established on the side of a hill unless the top of the hill is reconnoitered and out posted. In a recent operation, a unit went into position on a small knoll below the top of a hill. The hill had been recently occupied by the NVA, and bunkers and cleared fields of fire had been established. When the NVA began an attack from this position, they had the advantage of cover, clear fields of fire, and dominant terrain.

(e) Mechanical ambushes and trip flares should be emplaced from 100 to 150 meters away from the individual positions of the NDP. When mechanical ambushes are tripped at this distance, early warning is provided and the NDP's location is not compromised. By employing the mechanical ambushes this far out, friendly movement near the NDP perimeter is not significantly restricted.

(f) At least two trip flares should be employed on the friendly side of the ambush. Friendly forces approaching the mechanical ambush from the NDP will be warned by tripping the flare. The flares will also provide an extra means of warning should the enemy succeed in bypassing the ambush.

(g) After the recovery of early warning devices and mechanical ambushes, squad patrols should be sent out on all sides of the NDP prior to the movement of the main body. The NVA will occupy positions as close as 20 meters from the NDP, apparently in order to provide themselves a sleeping position protected from friendly ARA, artillery, and mortar fires, and a position from which to reconnoiter the NDP. The squad patrols will seek out these positions and spoil any attempt by the enemy to ambush the unit.

11 Ammunition allocation forecast.

(a) Observation: The division is required to submit a monthly forecast of expected ammunition expenditures for one month in advance. There are nearly 50 different types of ammunition which require forecasting and six different mathematical computations are required for each type.

(b) Evaluation: Because of the myriad of mathematical computations involved in the ammunition forecast it was considered an ideal type of program for the UNIVAC 1005 computer located at the division personnel center. The G3 section coordinated directly with personnel services branch to develop a computer program which would virtually eliminate the manual mathematical work on the forecast and reduce the chance of error considerably. The time required for completion of the report was reduced to approximately one day, resulting in an overall saving of 36 man hours of work. Further, the computer was able to print out the information and computations re-
AVDG-66

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quired in a usable format.

(c) Recommendation: That units consider using the inherent capabilities of the UNIVAC 1005 computer to forecast ammunition requirements.

d. (U) Organization. None.

e. (U) Training. None.

f. (U) Logistics. None.

g. (C) Communications: Field expedient antenna.

(a) Observation: Communications in the canopy between companies in the field and the battalion TOC are often difficult.

(b) Units in the 3d Bde have successfully improved radio communications by using a field expedient antenna constructed from communications wire (MD1). At Tab 1 is a diagram of the field expedient antenna.

(c) Recommendation: That units consider the use of this simple, field expedient antenna to improve radio communication in the field.

h. (U) Material. None.

i. (C) Other.

1. Civic action assistance by RD cadre.

(a) Observation: The success of civic action projects will invariably depend upon the leadership of the local Vietnamese officials. Although the majority of elected officials is very capable, there will always be some who are relatively ineffective. RD cadre are generally well trained, strong leaders, knowledgeable in civic action activities.

(b) Evaluation: RD cadre can provide valuable advice in the coordination of civic action projects and may be able to encourage completion of slow-moving projects.

(c) Recommendation: That personnel involved in civic action employ the assistance that can be provided by local RD cadre.

2. NVA Sapper Attack Against FSB Tomahawk. See Inclosure 5.

3. Department of the Army Survey Information. None.

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Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSPUR-65 (R2) (U)

(1) 29 April - 5 May 1970.

(a) On 30 April, the division commenced operations with the 54th ARVN Regiment in the area south of FS/0B HENDERSON. The 1st Bn, 54th ARVN Regt assaulted into the AO south of the FS/0B on 30 April followed by the 2d Bn which assaulted to FS/0B TUN TAWAY on 1 May. Both battalions conducted operations in coordination with the 3d Brigade. On 30 April, Co D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf assaulted to FS/0B HENDERSON and provided security for the insertion of Btry B(-), 2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty and Btry B, 12th Arty (ARVN). The company passed to the operational control of the 3d Bde.

Also on 30 April, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf terminated operations south of CAMPHAN and moved by air to FS/0B KATHAYN to commence reconnaissance in force operations to locate and destroy enemy anti-aircraft weapons and base camps in the area. The battalion (-) passed to the operational control of the 1st Bde. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf passed OPCON to the 1st Bde at 1600 hours and continued operations southwest of FS/0B RIGORD.

Four US and one ARVN battalion were now conducting operations against elements of the 29th NVA Regt in the mountains, vicinity the SONG HO River.

The 2d Bde continued to provide support for pacification and development programs in the lowland areas and assumed responsibility for the piedmont area of PHONG DIEN District south of CAMPHAN. Mobile training teams continued to improve the combat proficiency of RF and FF units and to teach PSDF fundamentals of defense.

The 3d Bde continued reconnaissance in force operations with two US battalions in operational coordination with the 1st, 2d and 4th Bn, 1st ARVN Regt south of FS/0B RIGORD and PATTAF. On 1 May, the 2d Bn, 54th ARVN Regt moved by air to LA VANG. The 3d Bn(-) moved by air to FS/0B O'BILLY to provide security for the firebase and to conduct patrol and ambush operations northwest of FS/0B RIGORD. On 5 May, Co D, 1st Bn, (Ambl), 501st Inf was relieved at FS/0B HENDERSON by Co A and the Recon Platoon. BCO then moved by air from the firebase and returned to control of the parent unit at FS/0B BASTOGNE. Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, with the Reconnaissance Platoon, moved by air to FS/0B HENDERSON to provide security for the FS/0B.

(b) Significant Activities. At 201400, vicinity YD590777, the 2d Plt, Co B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf received mortar and heavy small arms fire from an enemy force located in bunkers at a distance of 10 meters. The platoon employed organic weapons, tube artillery and ARA and was reinforced by the remainder of the company, Company C and the reconnaissance platoon. As the US elements maneuvered against the enemy force, supported by air strikes, ARA and tube artillery, the enemy fled to a second bunker complex at 1515 hours. At 1549 hours the enemy fled to a third bunker complex. The contact

Inclosure 1

Group 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.
Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CPFOR -65 (R2) (V)

terminated at dusk. A sweep revealed 15 NVA KIA, two RPG launchers, one AR-47, one 5-60 machinegun, one M-79 grenade launcher and one PRG 25 radio set. Twenty-six US were wounded in the action.

At 2325, vicinity YD436130 (FS/GB CRANITE), Co A, 2d Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf received an enemy ground attack supported by mortar and RPG fire. With flareships, USAF AC-119 "Stinger" aircraft, ARA and tube artillery supporting the company, the enemy was repulsed and a first light sweep revealed 18 NVA KIA and one PRG captured. The company suffered seven killed, seven wounded, and one missing in action.

On 30 April, FS/GB CRANITE received five separate mortar attacks resulting in 34 US WIA. ARA and tube artillery were employed on suspected enemy positions as air cavalry elements and ground forces searched for enemy mortar positions.

On 1 May, enemy indirect fire attacks continued on FS/GB CRANITE and GLADIATOR. A total of eleven attacks were directed at the fire bases as US ground units aided by counter-mortar radar and aerial reconnaissance aircraft continued to search for enemy mortar positions.

On 2 May, sixty-four 55 gallon drums of napalm were dropped in the vicinity of FS/GB HENDERSON to improve fields of fire. The 2d Bn, 54th ARVN Regt made heavy contact south of the firebase resulting in 18 enemy KIA. Enemy mortar attacks continued against FS/GB CRANITE. Air strikes against enemy mortar positions resulted in three NVA KIA, three secondary fires, four bunkers destroyed and one secondary explosion.

The search for enemy mortar positions in the vicinity FS/GB RIPCORD and CRANITE continued on 5 May, with heavy artillery support from FS/GB JACK. At 0305, CAMP EAGLE received seventeen 122mm rockets causing light damage to aircraft and ammunition supply points. Eleven US were wounded in the attack.

At 031130, vicinity YD511063 the 1st Plt, Co C, 2d Bn (Ambt), 502d Inf, while conducting patrol activities, received RPG and small arms fire from an enemy force at 40 meters. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed ARA, tube artillery and air strikes on the enemy positions. A sweep of the contact area revealed 27 NVA KIA. US casualties were one KIA and 13 WIA.

On 4 and 5 May, a heavy artillery battery again moved to vicinity FS/GB JACK and was employed against suspected enemy mortar positions in the canopy vicinity FS/GB CRANITE. The battery returned to CAMP EVANS each night.

On 5 May, contacts by units of the 1st Bde, south of the THREE FORKS area of the SONG B0 River resulted in 18 NVA KIA. US casualties were
six KIA and 26 WIA.

At 051000, vicinity YD44364 (4 KM NW of FS/OB TON TAVERN) the 1st bn, 54th ARVN Regt engaged an estimated two enemy platoons in bunkers 50 meters from their position. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew. ARA was employed and a sweep revealed 28 NVA KIA. ARVN casualties were five KIA and 26 WIA.

(2) 6 - 12 May 1970.

(a) On 6 May, the 4th Bn 54th ARVN Regt assaulted into an LZ northeast of FS/OB TON TAVERN (vicinity FS/OB MINH) and joined the 1st and 2d Bn, 54th ARVN Regt conduct operations against elements of the 65th NVA Regt in the area. On 7 May, the 2d Bn, 54th ARVN Regt was extracted and moved by air to CAMP CARROL and then by vehicle to DONG HA.

In reaction to heavy enemy activity in the FS/OB HENDERSON area on 6 May, Co B, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf and Co D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf passed to the operational control of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf and assaulted into the area north of FS/OB HENDERSON on 7 May to locate enemy units. A 3d Bde control element directed operations from the firebase. Companies C and D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf passed to the operational control of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf and continued operations south of FS/OB RIFCORD.

Co C, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf and Co D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf returned to parent unit control on 8 May and the 3d Bde terminated operations in the FS/OB HENDERSON area as the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf returned to CAMP EVANS. The 2d Bn, 2d ARVN Regt passed OPCON to the 54th ARVN Regt to provide security for FS/OB HENDERSON.

On 9 May, the 2d Bn (-) (Ambl), 501st Inf redeployed in the division AO vicinity FS/OB GLADIATOR and GRANITE with Co C and D returning to battalion control. Co A remained at CAMP EVANS to augment security and resupply.

On 10 May, the 1st Bn, 1st ARVN Regt terminated operations with the 3d Bde vicinity FS/OB RIFCORD and moved to IA WANG to provide security in the area. The 3d Bde continued operations with two US and one ARVN battalion in the mountains south of FS/OB RIFCORD and PATTON.

Also on 10 May, the division assumed OPCON of Detachment B-52, 5th Special Forces Group (A). Two companies and elements of the headquarters moved by air from NHA TRANG to QUANG TRI and then by vehicle to MAI LOC. The detachment began preparations for insertion of reconnaissance teams into the division AO on 15 May.

On 11 May, the 3d Bn, 54th ARVN Regt terminated operations with the 1st Bde vicinity the SONG BO River and moved by air to FS/OB ANZIO.

On 12 May, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved to BRU RAI COMBAT BASE to conduct battalion refresher training and returned to operational control of the 2d Bde. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf returned to OPCON of the 3d Bde and continued operations against elements of the 65th NVA Regt. The 2d of the
3d Bn, 3d ARVN Regt moved by air to PS/OS KATHRYN to prepare for assault of elements of the battalion into area south of the firebase on 13 May in OPERATION with the 1st Bde.

Throughout the period 6 - 11 May, A Btry (6-in), 1st Bn 35th Arty continued daily moves from CAMP EVANS to the area south of PS/OS JACK to deliver heavy artillery on suspected enemy mortar locations in the vicinity of PS/OS GLADIATOR and GRANTY. The battery returned to CAMP EVANS each night.

(b) Significant Activities. At 060505, PS/OS HENDERSON received RPG, small arms fire, sachet charges, recoilless rifle and mortar fire followed by a well organized and coordinated ground attack by the 8th Bn, 66th NVA Regt. Fires, started when the NVA employed flame throwers against the fire base, caused approximately 1000 rounds of 155mm artillery ammunition to explode. Defending forces supported by ARA, tube artillery and gunships accounted for 29 NVA killed. The enemy withdrew at 0720. Co B, 2d Bn (Amb.), 501st Inf moved by air to reinforce Co A, 2d Bn (Amb.), 501st Inf, and to conduct a daylight sweep. Friendly elements received incoming mortar fire sporadically throughout the day. Artillery, ARA, gunships, and air strikes were employed against enemy mortar positions. The 2d Bn, 2d ARVN Regt assaulted south of PS/OS HENDERSON to locate and destroy the remainder of the enemy force. A number of friendly casualties were caused by the exploding 155mm artillery ammunition. Thirty-two US were killed in action, 33 wounded, and two missing in action. ARVN casualties were 19 KIA and 45 WIA.

On 7 May, PS/OS HENDERSON continued to receive sporadic mortar and recoilless fire throughout the day, resulting in four US and three ARVN WIA.

At 070450, YD429123, (PS/OS MAUREEN) the 28 Plt, Co B, 1st Bn (Amb.), 506th Inf received 60mm mortar fire, small arms and sachet charges from an estimated enemy company. The platoon returned fire while a flareship and ARA were employed. Elements of the company moving to reinforce the platoon received small arms fire from an enemy force at 20 meters. The element returned small arms fire and the enemy fled. ARA, gunships and air strikes were employed on suspected enemy locations at 0700. 60mm mortar fire was received by the company at 0800 and again at 1500. Six US were killed in action and 12 wounded. A sweep revealed four NVA KIA.

On 7 and 8 May, the 1st Bn, 54th ARVN Regt continued to engage enemy forces in the PS/OS TUN TAVERN area accounting for 36 NVA KIA. At 0800, vicinity YD043360, the battalion discovered 30 graves containing 97 enemy bodies apparently killed by AF air strikes during the previous week.

At 091030, vicinity YD495954, Co A, 2d Bn (Amb.), 502d Inf received small arms and RPG fire and fragmentation grenades from an estimated 12 - 15 enemy in bunkers. The company returned fire and withdrew as artillery, ARA, gunships, and air strikes were employed. A sweep of the area revealed 18 NVA KIA. US casualties were one KIA and 12 WIA.

The period 10 - 12 May was marked by light contact in the division AO. Eighteen enemy were killed by small arms, ARA, tube artillery, gunships, and air strikes.
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101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RG3 CSFOR-65
(R2) (U)

(3) 13 - 20 May 1970

(a) On 13 May, the 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) moved by air from CAMP SALLY
to FS/UB VEGHEL to join the 1st Bde conducting offensive operations against
elements of the 29th NVA Regt in the mountains southwest of HUE. The three
ARVN companies combat assaulted from FS/UB VEGHEL with Companies A and B,
1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf, into two landing zones south of the RAM LA RIVER.
The ARVN companies conducted patrols to the south and the two US companies
conducted patrols north toward the river.

Inclement weather postponed the planned insertion of reconnaissance
teams of Det B52, 5th SFG (A) on 15 May. Two teams were inserted into the
Vietnamese Salient vicinity XD922283 and XD881240 on 16 May.

On 18 May, in response to intelligence indicating a possible enemy
attack against PHU RAI Combat Base and the DONG HA Training Center in celeb-
ration of the birthday of H0 CHU MINTHAN, Companies B and C, 21 Bn (Ambt),
501st Inf passed to the operational control of PHU RAI Base Defense. Co A
passed GFCQW to the 1st Bn (Ambt), 502d Inf to screen south of PHU RAI.
The division observed a cease fire and all offensive operations terminated
with units assuming a defensive posture from 18L200 to 18R1200 May.

On 19 May, the 4th Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) extracted from the 3d Bde A0 and
moved by air to LA VANG to refit and provide security in the area, leaving
the 2d and 3d battalions conducting operations in coordination with the 3d
Bde south of FS/UB RIPCORD.

Also on 19 May, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf completed battalion refresher
training and prepared for redeployment into the division A0. Company C
assaulted from PHU RAI Combat Base to FS/UB BRICK and prepared to receive
artillery. On 20 May, the remainder of the battalion moved by air to FS/UB
BRICK to commence search operations in the Ta TRACH River Valley, and passed
to the operational control of the 1st Bde.

On 20 May, the planned extraction of the 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf from
vicinity FS/UB KATRANY to PHU RAI Combat Base to conduct battalion refresher
training was postponed due to inclement weather.

The 2d Bde continued to operate in the piedmont and to deploy Mobile
Training Teams to increase the capabilities of territorial forces.

(b) Significant Activities. At 160423, vicinity YD487065, Co A, 2d Bn
(Ambt), 502d Inf received RPG fire from an enemy location north of their
night defensive position. Seven minutes later the company received RPG,
automatic weapons and small arms fire from the enemy east and west of the
position. The company returned organic weapons and tube artillery fire.
A USAF flareship was employed to provide illumination. At 0521 hours the
Recon Plt engaged enemy movement at YD490066. A first light sweep of both
contact areas by the Recon Plt revealed five NVA KIA, two AK-47s and one RPG
launcher captured. US losses were four KIA and 22 wounded.
At 160650, vicinity YD918236, while supporting the insertion of Recon Team 3, 552, 5th SFG(A), an ARVN from Btry C, 4th Bn (Aerial Artillery), 17th Artillery (Amb), received 23mm machine gun fire. Directed by the UH-1H command and control aircraft, the CoTs engaged the area killing 35 enemy and destroying two 2.5 ton trucks. The 1st Plt, 2d Co, 61st Abn Rgr Bn (ARVN SF) was inserted near the target area to conduct further assessment of the AREA fires. The element made contact with an estimated 30 enemy, killing three and sustaining one US and one ARVN WIA. The platoon was unable to reach the target area and was extracted from a hot landing zone at 1820 hours by Co B, 158th Avn Bn (AH) (Amb).

At 171035, YD417390, a CH-47 from Co B, 159th Avn Bn (AH) (Amb) received ground fire, crashed and burned. The aircraft was a total loss and five US were killed.

At 181045, a UH-1H aircraft from Co C, 158th Avn Bn (AH) (Amb) was reported missing with four crew members and two passengers aboard. The Aerial Rifle Platoon, Troop B, 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav was inserted at YD355236 on 19 May to conduct a search for the aircraft. The platoon was unsuccessful in locating the aircraft and was extracted prior to darkness. One member of the missing aircraft crew, who had walked from the crash site to a small landing zone, was extracted at 191400 hours by a UH-1H from Co A, 101st Avn Bn (AH) (Amb) on a mission for the 301st Signal Bn (Amb). The injured crew member stated the aircraft was hit by ground fire, attempted to make a forced landing on a landing zone, crashed and rolled down a hill into a canopy covered area. He had no knowledge of the exact location of the aircraft or other crew members.

On 19 May, the 2d Co, 81st Abn Rgr Bn (ARVN) was inserted vicinity XD 907234 to conduct assessment of the AREA attack conducted on 16 May. The company photographed two destroyed 2.5 - 5 ton type vehicles and was extracted on 20 May. Sporadic contact with the enemy resulted in 13 ARVN WIA during the operation.

At 201135, vicinity YD496069, the Recon Plt and Co A, 2d Bn (Amb), 502d Inf received intense small arms and RPG fire from three sides at 15 meters. The element returned fire, employed AREA and maneuvered against the enemy. Contact terminated at 2330 hours as the enemy fled leaving one KIA. US casualties were three KIA and nine WIA.

The 2d Bn (Amb), 501st Inf completed refresher training on 19 May and redeployed to the AO on 20 May. The BN conducted a combat assault vicinity FSB BRICK to conduct search operations in the TA TRACR River Valley and passed to the operational control of the 1st BN.

Throughout the period 13 - 20 May elements of the 2d and 3d Battalions

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1st Regt (ARVN) made contact with the enemy vicinity FSB BARBARA resulting in 63 NVA KIA and 11 ARVN WIA.

(4) 21 May - 1 June 1970

(a) On 21 May, the 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf moved by air from FS/GB KATHRYN to PHU BAI Combat Base and began preparation for battalion refresher training. The battalion passed from the operational control of the 1st Bde to OPCON of the 3d Bde. The 3d Bde assumed responsibility for the portion of the TENG FORES area of the SONG HO River vacated by the extraction of the 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf as Co B, 1st Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf moved by air from FS/GB RAKKASAN to FS/GB KATHRYN to provide security for the firebase and conduct local patrolling. The 1st Bde continued combined operations southwest of PHU with the 2d Bn (Ambt), 503d Inf and the 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) conducting operations against remnants of two battalions of the 29th NVA Regt in the vicinity of FS/GB VEGHEL.

On 24 May, Companies A and B, 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf moved by air to FSB KATHRYN and passed to the operational control of the 1st Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf to conduct patrol operations north and south of the firebase. This movement was made in reaction to increased enemy activity in the area.

Also on 24 May, the 1st Bn (Ambt), 327th Inf terminated operations vicinity FS/GB BASTOGNE and moved south to FS/GB VEGHEL to assume control of area Tang to conduct operations in coordination with the 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN). The 2d Bn (Ambt), 502d Inf terminated operations in the vicinity of FSB VEGHEL and moved north to FS/GB BASTOGNE, assuming control of area Uniform.

On 26 May, the 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) terminated operations in coordination with the 3d Bde, vicinity FS/GB O'HEILLY and BARBARA, and moved by air to LA VANG to conduct stand down. The 4th Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) moved by air from LA VANG to vicinity RD 2453, east of FS/GB BARBARA, to conduct reconnaissance in force operations in the area.

On 27 May, Companies A and B, 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf were released from OPCON of the 1st Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf and returned by air to FS/GB BIRMINGHAM and control of the parent unit. The 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf terminated battalion refresher training and assumed control of area Whisky from the 1st Bn (Ambt), 503d Inf. The 1st Bn (Ambt), 502d Inf moved to PHU BAI Combat Base to prepare for battalion refresher training to begin on 28 May.

The 3d Bde continued operations in the piedmont in the northern fringes of the canopy of THUA THIEN Province and conducted extensive patrol and night ambush operations in coordination with territorial forces to deny the enemy access to the population in the coastal lowlands.

The division continued to employ extensive ground and aerial sensor devices.
to locate and monitor enemy movement and continued to engage suspected enemy locations with artillery fires and USAF aircraft. Det B52, 5th SFG(A) continued Operation BARBER GLADES maintaining reconnaissance and roadrunner teams in the division area of operation.

(b) Significant Activities. On 21 May, two OH6A helicopters from the 2d Spin (Amb), 17th Cav received ground fire at 1355 hours, vicinity YC 495389, and at 1625 hours, vicinity XD781246, crashed and burned. Both aircraft were total losses and three crew members were wounded in action.

At 230940, vicinity XD499069, Co A, 2d BN (Amb), 502d Inf discovered twenty 4′x3′x4′ bunkers containing bodies of twelve NVA killed by artillery, small arms and helicopter fire.

At 231655, vicinity XD912271, a URIH from Co B, 158th Avn BN (AH) (Amb), while conducting visual reconnaissance in support of Operation BARBER GLADES, received ground fire, crashed and burned. Six US and two ARVN were killed in action, including the commanding officer, Det B52, 5th SFG(A).

At 231800, and again at 2000 hours, at FSB KATHRYN, Co A, 1st BN (Amb), 506th Inf was attacked by fire with 60mm and 82mm mortar fire impacting inside the perimeter. Two to three 82mm mortar rounds, received during the 2000 hour attack, contained agent CS. ARA and tube artillery was employed against suspected enemy locations. Results of the two attacks were three US KIA and 25 WIA.

At 240600, vicinity XD075994 (2 km SW of FSB HENDERSON), the 4th BN, 54th Regt (ARVN) received RPG and small arms fire from an estimated enemy company surrounding their night defensive position. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed ARA and tube artillery. A sweep of the contact area revealed 45 NVA KIA. ARVN casualties were four KIA and 16 WIA.

At 261010, in reaction to a contact by elements of Co G, 2d BN (Amb), 506th Inf which resulted in two US WIA, a URIH Medevac helicopter from Co G, 326th Med BN (Amb), while lowering the jungle penetrator at XD332206, received one RPG round in the fuel cell, crashed and burned. All four crew members were killed in action.

At 271048, vicinity XD436124, the Recon Plt, 1st BN (Amb), 506th Inf, while conducting patrol activities near FSB MAURER, received RPG and small arms fire from an enemy force at 35 meters. The element returned organic weapons fire and tube artillery. The enemy broke contact and fled. ARA was requested and arrived on station at 1105 hours and a pink team arrived at 1145. One NVA was killed by ARA fire. At 1800 hours the platoon engaged two enemy with small arms fire at 75 meters. An enemy force returned RPG, automatic weapons and small arms fire. ARA and gunships arrived on station.

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and immediately engaged several enemy. Contact terminated at 1915 hours. A sweep of the area revealed six NVA killed by helicopter fire, six by ARA fire and seven by small arms fire. Two US were wounded in action.

At 220130, FS/0B O’REILLY, the 1st and 2d Companies, 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received mortar fire followed by a ground attack employing RPG and small arms fire. Elements on the firebase returned organic weapons fire and tube artillery. A flareship and ARA were requested and on station at 0155 and 0205 hours respectively. The enemy was repulsed before daylight and a first light sweep revealed 77 NVA KIA, two FN, 29 AK-47’s, eight RPG launchers, three Soviet LEO flame throwers and two Chicom radios. Three ARVN were killed and 15 wounded in the action.

At 221930, vicinity Y0581709, the PHONG DIEN District Chief was killed while driving to his home when he was attacked by Viet Cong employing B-40 rockets.

During the period 29 May to 1 June, 15 enemy were killed in sporadic activities throughout the division AO. Seven were killed by helicopter fire, four by small arms fire, two by tactical air strikes and two by artillery fire. An additional five NVA KIA were discovered in graves.

(5) 2 - 9 June 1970

(a) This period was marked by an increase in enemy contact with ARVN units and light contact with units of the division. ARVN and territorial force units accounted for 232 NVA and 20 VC killed in action. Thirty-seven enemy were killed in light contact with units of the division during the period.

On 2 June, the division provided aviation assets in support of the 2d Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN) in the successful defense of FS/0B TIN TAVEN against a determined attack by elements of the 66th NVA Regt which had moved from the BA LONG Valley area. Troops A and B, 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav provided continuous air cover in the area during the period of contact.

At 021255, the 2d Bde passed OCPON of the 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf to the 3d Bde and assumed operational control of the 1st Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf which moved by air from FS/0B KATHERIN to CAMP EVANS to assume the mission of Division Ready Force and prepare for battalion refresher training. The 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf moved by air from FS/0B BIRMINGHAM and ARSENAL to FS/0B KATHERIN and assumed responsibility for area Sierra. The 1st Bn (Ambt), 502d Inf redeployed in the AO vicinity FS/0B BIRMINGHAM to provide security for the firebase and conduct patrol and ambush operations in the area.

On 3 June, division aviation assets supported the insertion of the 3d
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BN, 1st Regt (ARNV) and the extraction of the 2d BN, 54th Regt (ARNV) in the FS/OB TUN TAVERN area. The 3d BN, 1st Regt (ARNV) passed to the operational control of the 54th Regt (ARNV). The 1st BN, 1st Regt (ARNV) moved by air from FS/OB BARRABABA and O'REILLY to LA VANG. The 2d BN, 1st Regt (ARNV) remained in the FS/OB BARRABA - O'REILLY area and assumed the security mission for FS/OB O'REILLY.

At 080800, the 3d Bde assumed OPCON of the 1st BN (Ambl), 506th Inf from the 2d Bde as the battalion completed refresher training and moved by air from CAMP EVANS to FS/OB RIPCORD and GRANITE to provide security for the firebases and conduct operations in area Quebec. The 2d BN (Ambl), 506th Inf terminated operations vicinity FS/OB RIPCORD and moved by air to CAMP EVANS to prepare for refresher training and assumed the mission of Division Ready Force.

Also on 8 June, the 1st BN, 1st Regt (ARNV) moved by air from LA VANG to FS/OB O'REILLY to provide security for the firebase and conduct local operations in the vicinity of the firebase. The 2d BN, 1st Regt (ARNV) moved by air from FS/OB O'REILLY to LA VANG to provide security in the area and stand down.

On 9 June, Det B52, 5th SFG(A) extracted all teams from the division area of operation and conducted stand down at MAI LOC. During the period 16 May - 9 June the detachment accounted for 50 enemy killed in action while sustaining seven US KIA, eight US WIA, 4 ARVN KIA and 56 ARVN WIA.

(b) Significant Activities. At 020430, FS/OB TUN TAVERN, the 2d BN, 54th Regt (ARNV) received an attack from all sides of the firebase by the 9th BN, 66th NVA Regt employing 62mm mortar, 75mm recoiless rifle, RPG and small arms fire. Elements on the firebase returned organic weapons fire and employed flareships, ARA, tube artillery and air strikes. The enemy penetrated the perimeter and was able to occupy bunkers on the east side of the firebase. The situation was static at 0645 hours. At 0930 hours a renewed assault was made on the firebase from the north and northwest but was immediately repulsed. The enemy was driven from the firebase by 1115 hours although it continued to receive 75mm recoiless rifle and 82mm mortar fire sporadically throughout the day.

A sweep of the contact area revealed 81 NVA KIA and one POW. Three US from the 501st Bn (Ambl), in support of the 1st BN, 54th Regt (ARNV) were casualties. Two were killed and one was wounded in action. ARVN casualties were 50 KIA and 119 WIA. Two US and one Australian advisor were wounded in action.

At 031453, vicinity YD22354 (1 KM W of FSB LANCELY), the 1st BN, 54th Regt (ARNV) discovered 20 NVA killed by air force and two bunkers with overhead cover destroyed by air strikes.

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At 041500, vicinity FS/OB TUN TAVERN (DM063020), the 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN), in a sweep conducted near the firebase, discovered 45 NVA killed by air strikes within the previous 72 hours. At 1640 hours the battalion engaged an enemy force with organic weapons fire, killing 10 NVA while sustaining two KIA. On the following day, elements of the battalion killed four more NVA that had attacked with 82mm mortar and small arms fire one kilometer southeast of FS/OB TUN TAVERN.

At 060550, the 3d Co, 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) engaged an estimated two enemy companies with small arms fire at a range of 150 meters at DDO43331. Tube artillery and ARA were employed and a sweep revealed 71 NVA KIA. At 1440 hours, vicinity DDO55343, elements of the 1st Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN) discovered the bodies of 12 NVA KIA.

On 8 June, elements of the division discovered the bodies of seven NVA killed by artillery and air strikes in previous contacts and accounted for 11 more NVA KIA on 9 June as contact with enemy elements in the division AO remained light.

(6) 10 - 16 June 1970

(a) On 10 June, elements of the K46 Bn, 4th NVA Regt launched attacks by fire against units of the 2d Bde occupying FS/CH LOS BANGS, PHU LOC District Headquarters and NUNG NEW Bridge. A simultaneous ground and mortar attack was directed at FS/CH TUMI HAWK. As part of the reaction to this contact, the division provided aviation assets to the 44C NCU Company and territorial forces for movement and assault into PHU LOC District to regain contact with the enemy after their withdrawal.

Also on 10 June, Det 552, 5th SPG(A) moved by vehicle to QUANG TRI and prepared for movement to NHA TRANG for stand down.

Poor weather conditions on 12, 13 and 14 June caused postponement of several tactical moves by air and the cancellation of 19 sorties of tactical air support. Improved weather conditions on 15 June permitted the division to continue extensive armed aerial reconnaissance in the division AO and to accomplish the repositioning of several units.

At 150900, the 1st Bn (Amph), 501st Inf moved by air from FS/CH KATHRYN and passed from the operational control of the 3d Bde to OPCON of the 2d Bde. The battalion assumed responsibility for security of FS/CH RAKKASAN and initiated patrol and ambush operations in area Romeo to prevent infiltration of NVA and guerrilla forces into the populated lowlands.

The 1st Bn (Amph), 506th Inf moved by air from the vicinity of FS/CH RIPCORD to vicinity FS/CH KATHRYN to assume responsibility for area Sierra.
and conduct operations to locate and destroy elements of the 803d NVA Regt.

The 2d Bn (Amm), 506th Inf, completed battalion refresher training and redeployed in the AO moving by air from CAMP EVANS to TAN/2 RIFCORN to assume responsibility for area Quebec. The battalion provided security for the firebase and initiated reconnaissance in force operations in the area.

The 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN), operating in coordination with the 1st Bn (Amm), 327th Inf, conducted a combat assault on 15 June into the area north-east of FSB GEORGIA, vicinity D4406, and began reconnaissance in force operations to the south on two area.

(b) Significant Activities. At 100140, the 4th NVA Regt began four separate attacks on US units located in FSB LOC District. Co D(-), 2d Bn (Amm), 327th Inf at FS/GB TONOBANK, received a ground attack supported by 82mm mortar, RPG, and small arms fire by the 713 Sapper Company. Tube artillery, 81mm mortars, grenades, and organic weapons were employed against the enemy. Contact was broken at 0216 hours, although sporadic mortar fire continued until 0550 hours. None of the enemy, estimated to be 70 in strength, penetrated the perimeter. Twenty-eight NVA were killed and three prisoners were captured. One US was killed and two were wounded in action.

At 100144, FSB LOC District Headquarters and the command post, 2d Bn (Amm), 327th Inf received two RPG rounds, one 122mm rocket and 20 - 25 82mm mortar rounds resulting in eight US WIA, including two US MACV advisors and one USMC.

Between the hours of 0450 and 0445, Co B(-), 2d Bn (Amm) 327th Inf, at FS/GB LOC BANG received approximately twelve 82mm mortar rounds, most of which impacted outside the perimeter. One US was wounded in action.

At 100158, mobile training team number 10, located vicinity NTOC NGOT Bridge (20152010), received 15 mortar rounds, followed by three more at 0540 hours. The element employed 81mm mortar fire on suspected enemy locations.

At 100520, the 1st Co, 4th Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN), at FS/GB ROY, received 10 - 20 82mm mortar rounds. Counter mortar fires were employed, no casualties were sustained.

The period 11 - 14 June was marked by light activity in the division AO. Two US were killed in action as the division accounted for 19 NVA KIA. Twelve NVA bodies were discovered KIA from earlier contacts. The bodies were found in graves or hidden from view in heavily vegetated areas. Gunships from the 2d Sqdn (Amm), 17th Cav accounted for three NVA KIA, USAF air strikes killed two NVA, and ground action resulted in two NVA KIA.
At 150945, gunships from Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav engaged an enemy force vicinity XD869365. At 1034 hours the Aerial Rifle Platoon, Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav was inserted to sweep the contact area and confirmed twelve NVA killed by helicopter. The platoon engaged one enemy at 50 meters at 1215 hours resulting in one NVA KIA.

On 16 June, in area Oscar, vicinity FSB GEORGIA, the 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARNVN) made contact with enemy forces employing small arms, RPK and 60mm mortar fire at 0945, 1030 and 1430 hours. The 1st and 2d Companies employed small arms and artillery fire resulting in three NVA killed by artillery and eight NVA killed by small arms. One ARVN was killed and 20 wounded in the contacts.

(7) 17 - 25 June 1970

(a) On 17 June, at XD898316, elements of Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, while conducting visual reconnaissance in the FSB LEATHERNECK area, observed 10 NVA in the open, 150 - 200 man reinforced bunkers, 15 pup tents, two burning camp fires, numerous lean-tos, 10 latrines and a network of trails leading into the area.

Extensive visual reconnaissance by elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav throughout the day on 18 June revealed heavy enemy activity and a large number of additional bunkers in the FSB LEATHERNECK area. The area was engaged by gunships, artillery and air strikes throughout the afternoon. There were two incidents of ground fire in the area.

On 19 June, elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, while conducting bomb damage assessment of air force tactical air strikes, located an evacuated 600 man hospital complex west of FSB LEATHERNECK. Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav was inserted into the area and discovered medical supplies, rice, grenades and miscellaneous equipment.

On 21 June, Trp D and the Reconnaissance Company (HHC B50), 1st Inf Div (ARNVN) conducted a combined assault into the FSB LEATHERNECK - ROBIN area to seek out and destroy enemy bunkers and cache sites. Continuous air cover was provided by the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav.

Also on 21 June, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 503d Inf redeployed in the AO, passing to the operational control of the 1st Bde and moving by air to FSB BASTOGNE. Co A secured the firebase while Companies B, C and D initiated search and attack patrols in the vicinity of the firebase.

The 3d Bn (Ambl), 503d Inf moved by vehicle from vicinity FSB BASTOGNE to CAMP ELONG and prepared for battalion refresher training and assumed the mission of Division Ready Force.
On 22 June, a task force under control of the 3d Bde, operating in coordination with the 5th Bn, 2d Regt (ARNV), consisting of Co A, 2d Bn (Amb), 502d Inf, Co B, 1st Bn (Amb), 501st Inf, the HOC BAQ Company, and elements of the 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav, conducted operations to further exploit enemy base areas and cache sites in the vicinity of FSB LEATHERNECK and SHEPHERD. Co A, 2d Bn (Amb), 502d Inf and Co B, 1st Bn (Amb), 501st Inf passed from operational control of the 1st Bde to OPCON of the 3d Bde and assaulted into FSB SHEPHERD. Elements of the 2d Bn (Amb), 11th Arty were moved by air to FSB SHEPHERD and SARGE to provide artillery support to the task force.

On 23 June, Det B52, 5th SFG(A) returned to MAI LOC and prepared to resume Operation BARBER GLADE.

On 24 June, the 5th Bn, 2d Regt (ARNV) terminated operations in coordination with the 3d Bde in the FSB LEATHERNECK area and returned to DONG Ha.

On 25 June, the 3d Bde Task Force was withdrawn from the northwestern portion of the division AO, Co A, 2d Bn (Amb), 502d Inf and Co B, 1st Bn (Amb), 501st Inf returned to parent unit control; the HOC BAQ Co returned to AHE and was released to the control of the 1st Inf Div (ARNV); Btry C(-), 2d Bn (Amb), 11th Arty moved by air to FSB RIPCORD; and the 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav resumed normal operations. Btry C(-), 2d Bn (Amb), 11th Arty remained at FSB SARGE and prepared to redeploy in the 2d Bde AO.

Also on 25 June, Det B52, 5th SFG(A) resumed Operation BARBER GLADE with insertion of the 2d Plt, 44th Ranger Co into the vicinity of XD6344.

(b) Significant Activities. At 170340, vicinity XD441066 (Area Oscar), the light CP, 2d and 3d Companies, 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARNV), operating in coordination with the 1st Bn (Amb), 327th Inf, engaged an estimated enemy platoon near their night defensive position. Organic weapons, tube artillery, ARA, and a flareship were employed and resulted in 32 NVA KIA. ARVN casualties were four with minor wounds.

On 18 June, in the Vietnamese Salient (XD8331), gunships, ARA, and air strikes were employed resulting in 26 NVA KIA. Weather precluded the insertion of Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav into the area to conduct patrol and surveillance operations.

The weather cleared permitting insertion of Troop D on the 19th and a recently evacuated hospital complex was discovered. Nine enemy were killed in the Vietnamese Salient.

The insertion of Trp D and the ARP, Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav and the HOC BAQ Co into the vicinity of FSB ROBIN on 21 June to perform bomb damage assessment and to exploit B52 strikes, resulted in discovery of 62 bunkers, 50 tons of rice, medical supplies, six NVA killed by air force, a shirt iden-
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Tidying elements of the 7th Bn, 66th NVA Regt, and capture of two PVs. Three US were wounded in action when the ARF, Troop B, 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav received small arms fire and fragmentation grenades from 3 - 5 enemy at 15 meters. The element returned fire but the enemy withdrew and a sweep revealed no enemy casualties.

The 3d Bde combined task force, inserted into the vicinity FSB LEATHERNECK on 22 June, located and destroyed enemy installations and food stuffs until they were extracted on 25 June. Totals for the period 17 - 25 June in the area were 69 NVA KIA, two PV, 52 tons of rice, three tons of salt, 10 cases of miscellaneous foodstuffs, three individual and one crew served weapon captured, 19,500 AK-47 rounds, 4,600 12.7mm rounds, 310 RPG rounds, 40 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, and 15 122mm rockets. A total of 283 bunkers were destroyed.

At 221600, vicinity TD172266, (1/2 EM W of FSB JEROME), the 2d Co, 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) discovered a training area consisting of a rifle range, 50 huts with underground bunkers, and an ammunition bunker containing 10,000 AK-47 rounds, 200 RPG rounds and 40 NVA uniforms with no markings.

At 231045, vicinity 184256, (2 EM SW of FSB JEROME), the 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) engaged an estimated two enemy platoons with organic weapons, gunships and tube artillery. The enemy returned small arms fire and fled. A sweep of the contact area revealed 47 NVA KIA and a large enemy base camp resulting in 10 IEC, 11 CSW, 158,450 AK-47 rounds, 50,000 12.7mm machinegun rounds, 780 RPG rounds, 30 anti-tank mines, 160 bunkers, two animal cages and two PV cages. The area west and south of FSB JEROME is a known rear service area supporting the 812th NVA Regt and the 7th Front. Four ARVN were wounded in action.

At 241430, vicinity TD217232, the 1st Bn, 2d Regt (ARVN) discovered graves containing 43 NVA killed by an air force B52 strike approximately 10 days earlier.

(6) 26 June - 7 July 1970

(a) The division continued to provide aviation assets to the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) throughout this period. Assets were also provided to Det B52, 5th SFG(A), until the termination of Operation BARRIER GLADE on 30 June. There were a total of 117 incidents of aircraft receiving ground fire. One aircraft was shot down by 12.7mm machinegun fire and crashed. Nineteen other aircraft were rendered non-flyable.

The division continued extensive employment of ground sensor devices to locate and monitor enemy movement and engage suspected enemy locations with artillery and marine, navy and USAF aircraft. During the period a total of
323 activations were recorded and 3005 rounds of mixed caliber artillery ammunition were fired in reaction.

The division continued to conduct operations to locate and destroy enemy forces, staging areas and lines of communication, and to prevent enemy infiltration into the populated lowlands and disruption of elections held on 26 June.

On 26 June, division aviation assets were provided for the assault of the 4th Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN) into the area vicinity FSB BRICK. The battalion CP collocated with the CP, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf to facilitate coordinated operations against elements of the 29th NVA Regiment in area Xray.

On 28 June, an artillery raid was conducted from FSB BLAZE by Btry B, 1st Bn, 83d Arty. Preplanned targets along route 546, vicinity FSB RENDEZVOUS were engaged.

On 29 June, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf, completed battalion refresher training at CAMP EAGLE and redeployed by vehicle to the vicinity of FSB BASTOGNE. The battalion assumed responsibility for area Uniform, security of the firebase, and initiated search and attack patrols in the vicinity of the firebase. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved from FSB BASTOGNE to PHU LOC District, passed to the operational control of the 2d Bde, and assumed responsibility for area Zulu and security of FSB LOS BANGS and TOMAHAWK. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf moved by air and vehicle from PHU LOC District to CAMP EAGLE and began preparation for battalion refresher training. The battalion also assumed the mission of Division Ready Force.

On 30 June, Det F32, 5th SFG(A) terminated Operation BARBER GLADE and prepared to move by air to NHA TRANG.

The period 1 - 7 July saw a marked increase in enemy activity in the 2d Bde area of operation as elements of the 693d and 6th NVA Regiments conducted daily attacks by fire on FSB RIPCORD. More than 160 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar and 75mm recoiless rifle fire were directed at the firebase during the first seven days of July, resulting in 21 US WIA. In the vicinity of the firebase US units engaged in 25 enemy and eight friendly initiated contacts, resulting in 30 NVA KIA, nine WIA, and two CSGC. US casualties were 16 killed and 104 wounded.

On 1 July, the Aero-Mobile Platoon, Trp C, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav was inserted west of FSB RIPCORD in reaction to the enemy attacks by fire on the firebase. When the platoon received fire on the landing zone, Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav was inserted to reinforce the ARP. These elements passed to operational control of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf until they were extracted on 2 July, returning to parent unit control at 1810 hours.

Also on 1 July, the 1st Bde passed operational control of the 2d Bn (Ambl),
501st Inf to the 3d Bde and responsibility for FS/GB BRICK and area Xray to the 4th Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN). The 2d Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf moved by air from vicinity FS/GB BRICK to PHU DAI Combat Base to prepare for movement to CAMP EVANS and redeployment.

On 2 July, the 3d Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf passed to the operational control of the 3d Bde and assaulted into landing zones south and southwest of FS/GB RIFCORD. The battalion CP collocated on the firebase with the CP, 2d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf.

On 5 July, three battalions were repositioned in support of the battalion refresher training program. The 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf terminated operations in PHU LOC District and moved to vicinity FS/GB VEGHEL and passed OCON to 1st Bde. The 1st Bn (Ambt), 327th Inf terminated operations vicinity FS/GB VEGHEL and MBA to CAMP EAGLE, closing at 1812 hours, and began preparation for refresher training. The battalion assumed the mission of DIF at 0807 hours. The 2d Bn (Ambt), 327th Inf completed refresher training and returned to PHU LOC District and reassumed responsibility for area Zulu.

On 5 and 6 July, Troops C and D, 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav moved to Quang Tri, joining Troop A, to facilitate the concentration of air mobile cavalry elements in the northwest portion of the division AO. This movement was in reaction to intelligence concerning infiltration of the 9th Regt, 504th NVA Division into South Vietnam.

On 6 July, additional artillery (three 155mm howitzers) from Btry A, 2d Bn (Ambt), 11th Arty were moved from FS/GB RAKHSAAN to FS/GB RIFCORD in support of operations in that area. Six 105mm howitzers of Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambt), 319th Arty and six 155mm howitzers of Btry A, 2d Bn (Ambt), 11th Arty were located on the firebase at that time.

On 7 July, the 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) terminated operations vicinity FS/GB VEGHEL and GEORGIA and moved by air and vehicle to CAMP SALLY to begin refresher training for future operations.

(b) Significant Activities. On the morning of 26 June, CAMP EAGLE was twice attacked by fire. At 0009 hours approximately ten 82mm mortar rounds impacted in the area of the 2d Bn (Ambt), 320th Arty and the 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambt). One US was killed and eight wounded during the attack. Two UH1H helicopters and one seacat were damaged, and one maintenance tent was destroyed. At 0247 hours seven 122mm rockets impacted in the areas of Co B, 159th Avn Bn (ASH) (Amb), 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambt), 265th RHC, 801st Maint Bn (Ambt), Div Arty, and G Sector of the CAMP EAGLE perimeter. Results were four US WIA; one AH1G helicopter and one 3/4 ton M57 truck destroyed; one OH-47, one AHIC, two 2½ ton M55 trucks, two 3/4 ton M57 trucks and two M151 jeeps, damaged. Aerial rocket artillery, tube artillery and mortar fire was employed on suspected enemy locations. Aerial
reconnaissance of the rocket belt and suspected enemy firing positions revealed one NVA KIA.

At 260235, vicinity TD442118, the 1st Plt, Co B, 1st Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf received RPG and small arms fire in their night defensive position. The platoon returned small arms fire and employed ABA and a flareship. A first light sweep of the contact area revealed six NVA KIA, two AK-47s, two RPG launchers, two RPG rounds, and 25 1/2 pound satchel charges. US casualties were four KIA and eight WIA.

Light and sporadic contact in the division area of operation during the period 26 - 30 June resulted in eight NVA KIA and one US killed and eleven wounded.

On 1 July, at 0706 hours, on P/36 RIPCORD, the CP and Co D, 2d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf received fire from 50 meters rounds and small arms fire from the southwest. At 0850, the firebase received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire which impacted inside the perimeter. At 1345 hours, the enemy employed 16 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 6 - 8 impacting inside the firebase perimeter. At 1912 hours, four rounds of 82mm mortar fire landed on the firebase. Artillery, air strikes and organic mortar fire were employed on suspected enemy locations throughout the day. Fifteen US received minor wounds during the day, all from Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambt), 319th Arty, located on the highest point of the firebase. Most of the casualties occurred as the battery was employing counter-battery fire.

At 011045 hours, approximately 1500 meters southeast of P/36 RIPCORD, Co B, 2d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf received fire from 75 meters west of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and a pink team was employed. A sweep of the area after contact revealed one NVA KIA. Two US were wounded. At 2225 hours the company received 8 - 10 RPG rounds and small arms fire from 100 meters south of their position. Elements returned fire and the enemy withdrew. There were no friendly casualties or damage.

Also on 1 July, Regional and Popular force units joined by ARVN infantry and armored elements, and the RTO BCO Company, waged a 16-hour battle near Quang Tri with main force enemy units, resulting in 135 enemy killed and 17 captured. ARVN forces suffered 12 KIA.

At 020346 July, vicinity TD5717172 (Hill 302), the CP and 1st and 2d Plts, Co C, 2d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf received RPG, satchel charges and small arms fire in their night defensive position. An estimated sapper company, in a well organized and executed attack, were successful in penetrating the perimeter and occupying positions inside the NDP. The enemy sappers and elements of Co C exchanged satchel charges and fragmentation grenades in a fierce battle until the enemy within the perimeter were killed, and the remainder withdrew at ap-
approximately 0420 hours. The company commander was killed in the initial exchange of fire. The company medics immediately organized the defense of the position until relieved later by the artillery forward observer. Sporadic contact and mortar fire continued until approximately 0530 hours. Results of the action were 15 NVA KIA, seven US KIA, six US WIA and one US MIA.

On 3 July, between the hours of 1415 and 1520, in the vicinity of XD9744, seven kilometers northwest of the KHE SANH airstrip, aircraft from Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambi), 17th Cav, conducting armed aerial reconnaissance, engaged approximately 14 enemy, killing twelve. The ARP, Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambi), 17th Cav was inserted at XD790445, engaged two enemy in bunkers resulting in two NVA KIA, one US KIA, and two US and one Kiet Carson scout wounded. The platform was extracted at 1820 hours.

At 040950, vicinity XD572170, an individual from Co C, 2d Bn (Ambi), 501st Inf, while the company was conducting a search and attack operation southwest of FS/08 RIPCORD, detonated a booby trap consisting of five 82mm mortar rounds, placed along the trail and daishy chained. Three rounds were placed on the right side of the trail and two on the left. Five US were killed and five wounded.

On 4 July, FS/08 RIPCORD was attacked by fire for the fourth day in a row. A total of nine attacks were directed at the firebase, three consisting of 82mm and 60mm mortar OS rounds. Three US were wounded.

At 050010, vicinity XD771659, Co C, 2d Bn (Ambi), 501st Inf, while in their night defensive position southeast of FS/08 RIPCORD, engaged three enemy with small arms fire 20 meters to the west of their position. The enemy returned small arms fire and satchel charges, and appeared to flee. At 0650 hours the company was attacked with satchel charges and returned organic weapons fire. The enemy again withdrew and ARP and a flareship were employed. A sweep under illumination revealed no enemy casualties. Three US were wounded.

At 0605 hours, the company received 8 - 10 RPG rounds and small arms fire again from the west. This time a sweep revealed five NVA KIA, five AK-47s, twenty-eight 1-pound satchel charges and two NVA gas masks. One US was killed and 14 were evacuated for wounds.

At 051240, vicinity XD356161, three kilometers south of FS/08 RIPCORD, Co A, 2d Bn (Ambi), 506th Inf engaged 8-10 enemy with small arms and artillery fire, killing five NVA. Two US were wounded by RPG fire.

On 6 July, enemy contact in the FS/08 MAHANEN area by elements of the 1st Bn (Ambi), 506th Inf resulted in three NVA KIA and 20 US WIA. At 1730 hours, three kilometers southwest of FS/08 RIPCORD, 15 US were wounded in Co A, 2d Bn (Ambi), 501st Inf, by small arms fire and fragmentation grenades from an estimated enemy company on all sides of the friendly position.
At 061530, vicinity XD745455, a ranger team from Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf. made contact with an estimated enemy company 50 meters north and west of their position. Organic weapons, ARVN and a pink team were employed, resulting in 15 NVA KIA. Six rangers were wounded.

At 070940, vicinity, XD334194, west of FS/08 RIPCORD, while assaulting on Hill 1000, Co B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf. received small arms fire and satchel charges from an enemy force located in bunkers, 30 meters from their position. The company employed organic weapons fire, tube artillery, ARVN, and air strikes on the enemy positions. Contact was broken at approximately 1500 hours as the company moved off the hill, having suffered three KIA and 19 WIA. Six NVA were killed in the action.

Other enemy contact in the vicinity of FS/08 RIPCORD, on 7 July, by elements of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, resulted in one US KIA and 23 WIA.

(9) 8 – 16 July 1970

(a) In reaction to intelligence information indicating the possibility of infiltration by the 9th Regiment, 304th NVA Division into South Vietnam, to reinforce and replace the weakened 66th NVA Regiment, reconnaissance and surveillance efforts in the northeastern portion of the division AO were intensified. Extensive efforts to interdict the infiltration of the 9th Regt culminated at approximately 1130 hours on 8 July, as a pink team, from Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav observed 150 – 200 enemy in the open, vicinity XD8236. The area was engaged by machinegun and rocket fire from the pink team and a command and control aircraft accompanying the team. Additional gunship and ARVN support was requested, and, within 30 minutes, was on station engaging the enemy. At 1555 hours, Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav was inserted into the contact area to make a ground sweep and capture a prisoner. The troops made contact with the enemy and was extracted at 1758 hours, having captured three prisoners and a large number of enemy documents, which identified the 9th NVA Regt. Pink teams, and sections of ARVN from the 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl), providing relief on station, continued to engage the enemy throughout the day, resulting in 139 enemy killed.

In reaction to this activity, Operation CLEAVE VALLEY, employing elements of the 3d Bde and the 3d Regt (ARVN), was initiated at 091315 hours. Btry B, 3d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty was airlifted from FS/08 VEGHEL to FS/08 SARGE. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by air from FS/08 BIRMINGHAM to WAT LOC and conducted an airborne assault into FS/08 SHEPHERD to provide security for Btry A, 48th Arty (ARVN). The battalion passed from operational control of the 1st Bde to operational control of the 3d Bde. Co B secured the firebase while companies A, C and D conducted security operations in the vicinity of the firebase. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf passed from operational control of the 3d Bde to

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the 1st Bde, and moved by air from FS/GB KATHYN to FS/GB BASTOGNE, assuming responsibility for the firebase.

On 10 July, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 3d Regt (ARVN) assaulted into FS/GB SNAPPER and SMITH, respectively, to begin reconnaissance in force operations. The 3d Regt Light CP moved by air to FS/GB SHEPHERD. The 3d Bde tactical CP moved to CAMP CARROLL and maintained close coordination with the 3d Regt (ARVN).

On 11 July, division aviation assets were provided to support the assault of a platoon of the NAC BAO Company, with four members of Co I (Ranger), 75th Inf, into the CLINCH VALLEY area. The assault and subsequent patrolling operations culminated an extensive training program conducted by the Screaming Eagles Replacement Training School (SERTS).

The 1st Bn (Ambt), 327th Inf completed refresher training and moved by vehicle and air, from CAMP EAGLE, to FS/GB VEGHEL and KATHYN. The 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf moved from FS/GB VEGHEL to PHU DAI Combat Base, assumed the mission of DHR, and prepared for refresher training.

The 2d Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf moved from FS/GB RIPCORD and vicinity, to CAMP EVANS, to refit and prepare for redeployment against elements of the 603d NVA Regt, vicinity FS/GB RIPCORD. On 12 July, the battalion assaulted into the vicinity of YD3519 and YD3118 and began attacks to the south and east.

Operation CLINCH VALLEY was terminated at 151802 July, as the 1st and 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) extracted from FS/GB SNAPPER and SMITH to vicinity MAI LOC and then moved by air to CAMP SALTY. The 2d Bn (Ambt), 502d Inf moved by air from FS/GB SHEPHERD to CAMP EAGLE, returned to operational control of the 1st Bde, and prepared for redeployment.

Results of Operation CLINCH VALLEY (Period 091315 to 151802 July) were 226 NVA KIA (108 by US, 58 by ARVN), 15 IWC (ARVN), and 14 CSVC (3 by US, 11 by ARVN). There were no Allied casualties reported during the operation.

Elements of the 603d and 6th NVA Regiments continued to conduct stand-off attacks against FS/GB RIPCORD during the period 8 – 16 July. The enemy employment of 60mm and 82mm mortar and 75mm recoiless rifle fire, on 10 July, resulted in two US killed and 17 wounded, on the firebase. Ground action around the firebase, vicinity Hills 1000 and 805, resulted in ten US KIA, 52 US WIA, and 12 NVA KIA.

Between the hours of 1000 and 1600, on 16 July, the USS EDDISON fired 224 five inch rounds at bunkers and caves in the mountains north of PHU LOC District, sealing four caves, and causing two secondary explosions.

(b) Significant Activities. At 081130 hours, vicinity XD825363, aircraft from Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav observed 150 – 200 NVA in the open.
area was engaged by gunships and ARA, resulting in 50 enemy killed. Air to
ground contact continued throughout the day. At 1230 hours, ten more enemy
were killed by gunships in the vicinity of XD826363. Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ambt),
17 Cav was inserted at this location, at 1530 hours and captured three
prisoners. While collecting enemy equipment, weapons and documents for extrac-
tion, and sweeping the contact area, the troop was engaged by an estimated bat-
talion size enemy force. During the engagement, 24 NVA were killed and Trp
D suffered six KIA and five WIA before being extracted at 1750 hours. Aircraft
screening the ground troop continued to engage enemy in the area. At 1900
hours, vicinity XD825363, aircraft from Trp A observed and engaged an active
12.7mm machinegun position, destroying the weapon, one RPG launcher, one radio
and four rucksacks lying in the vicinity. At 1745 hours, a command and control
aircraft flown by the CO, 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav, landed and extracted one
wounded NVA FM. The final contact of the day occurred at 1919 hours, when
aircraft from HHT, 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav observed 10 - 15 enemy near an
active 12.7mm machinegun position. The area was engaged with M60 machinegun
fire and AH6 gunships, resulting in the destruction of the weapon and 10
enemy killed.

Also on 8 July, vicinity FG/GB RIPCORD, the enemy again refused to be dis-
lodge from Hill 1000. Companies C and D, 2d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf were engaged
with small arms and automatic weapons fire by an enemy in well fortified bunk-
ers, at 1050 hours. Intensive fire from at least three mutually supporting bunk-
ers, pinned the companies down. One bunker was neutralized with M72 LAW
fire, but the other two could not be destroyed. Contact was terminated at
approximately 1300 hours as the companies again moved off the hill. US casu-
alties were two killed and four wounded.

At 091615 hours, vicinity XD826363, aircraft from Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambt),
17th Cav observed ten NVA bodies killed during the previous night by heavy
artillery employed from CAMP CARROLL by Btry B, 6th BN, 4th Arty. Cavalry airc-
raft killed two other enemy in the KHE SANH plateau area during the day.

On 10 July, beginning at 0735 hours, FG/GB RIPCORD was attacked by fire on
eight separate occasions during the day. The enemy employed 60mm and 82mm
mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle fire, resulting in two US KIA and 17 US WIA.

Also on 10 July, aircraft from Troops A and B, 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav
killed 26 NVA in scattered air to ground contact in support of Operation
CLINCH VALLEY.

On 11 July, Troops A and B killed 14 NVA in support of ARVN ground forces
in the CLINCH VALLEY AO, and the 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) killed five enemy
while sweeping in the vicinity of XD823361.

At 110900 hours, vicinity XD833362, the 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) discovered
thirty enemy bodies killed by helicopter, and, between the hours of 1845 and
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1920, discovered 100 enemy killed by air strikes within the past 36 hours.

At 122222 hours, vicinity XD362186 (Hill 805), Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, while in their night defensive position, received 30 to 40 RPG rounds and small arms fire, from an enemy force, 250 meters to the northeast. The company returned organic weapons fire, and ARA, air strikes and a flareship were employed. Sixteen US were wounded.

At 121555 hours, vicinity XD840359 (one kilometer north of KS/OB SNAPPER), the 3d Co, 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) engaged an estimated 40 enemy with organic weapons fire. A sweep revealed 30 NVA KIA, one RED machinegun, four RPG launchers, six AK-47s, one 60mm mortar, complete, 100 rucksacks, 35 Chicom grenades, 60 RPG and 120 60mm mortar rounds, 60 Chicom gas masks, and 15 pounds of documents.

Also on 12 July, vicinity XD175240, 3½ kilometers southwest of KS/OB JEROME, the 3d Co, 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN), discovered the bodies of 65 NVA killed by air strikes within the last 3-4 days.

On 13 July, General William C. Westmoreland visited the division.

At 140203 hours, vicinity XD362186, Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, while in their night defensive position on Hill 805, again received RPG and small arms fire from an enemy force, 20 meters northeast of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed M55 50 caliber fire (Quad 50) from KS/OB RSOFCORD, and 81mm mortar fire, air strikes, and ARA. Contact terminated at 0307 hours and a first light check of the area revealed five NVA KIA. The company suffered six KIA and nine WIA. At 2255 hours, the company received small arms fire and RPG fire and satchel charges, and at 0159 hours, received thirty-seven 82mm mortar rounds, impacting around their BDP. Organic weapons, ARA, tube artillery and mortar fire was employed against the enemy. One US was killed in the action. A first light sweep revealed numerous blood trails.

On 14 July, Companies A and B and the Recon Bt, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, in yet another attempt to eject the enemy from Hill 1000, was engaged by RPG, small arms and mortar fire, resulting in one US KIA and 20 WIA. Organic weapons, ARA, tube artillery and air strikes were employed against enemy positions and well fortified bunkers on the hill. Partial sweeps of the area revealed five NVA KIA. Elements withdrew to the vicinity of XD325189, where, at 1715 hours, they received 82mm mortar fire without casualties. Artillery was employed on the suspected enemy location.

Operation CLINCH VALLEY was terminated at 151802 July.

At 161815 hours, vicinity XD360186 (Hill 805), Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf discovered two NVA killed by artillery within the last 24 hours.
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(10) 17 - 23 July 1970

(a) On 17 July, FS/08 RIPCORD received sporadic mortar fire throughout the day with light damage and casualties on the firebase. The enemy employed 120mm mortars for the first time since the firebase was opened in April 1970. The planned extraction of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf was postponed due to high winds in the RIPCORD area.

The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by air to LZ ANN (vicinity FS/08 TECHNIK), staged, and conducted an assault into three landing zones south of FS/08 BLAZE. The battalion initiated search and attack operations in the TENNESSEE area.

On 18 July, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved by air from FS/08 RIPCORD to CAMP EVANS and then by vehicle to FUS BATT Combat Base to begin preparation for refresher training and assumed the mission of DRT.

At 111330, a CH-47 in logistical support of FS/08 RIPCORD, was shot down by enemy ground fire and crashed in the 105mm ammunition storage area, causing a major fire and extensive damage on the firebase. All six 105mm howitzers of Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty were destroyed. In reaction, the 1st Bn (Ambl) (-), 501st Inf passed to operational control of the 2d Bde, and assaulted into FS/08 GLADATOR to secure the firebase for insertion of Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty. This move was made to insure adequate artillery coverage for the RIPCORD area.

On 19 July, FS/08 RIPCORD continued to receive sporadic mortar fire, causing light casualties but not interfering with damage repair and clean-up operations on the firebase.

Also on 19 July, the 4th Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN) terminated operations in area Xray and moved by air from FS/08 PRINC to FS/08 ROY and ANZIO.

On 27 July, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf terminated operations in search of elements of the 29th NVA Regiment, in the vicinity of TENNESSEE and extracted by air to CAMP EAGLE to refit and prepare for future operations to support insertion of Allied forces into the FS/08 AIRBORNE-BRADLEY area.

On 22 July, the 1st Bde passed responsibility for FS/08 BASTOGNE and Area Uniform to 2d Bde. Co A, 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by vehicle from FS/08 BIRMINGHAM to FS/08 BASTOGNE and assumed security of the firebase. Co B, 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by vehicle from FS/08 ARSENAL to vicinity TD6409 and began patrol and surveillance operations in the vicinity of FS/08 BASTOGNE.

Because of the enemy buildup of forces and the increased tempo of enemy attacks in the FS/08 RIPCORD area, it became apparent that the cost and effort required for the self-defense of RIPCORD placed the accomplishment of future
operations in the enemy's rear supply and service areas, vicinity of BRADLEY and AIRBORNE, in jeopardy.

On 23 July, the 3d Bde directed the extraction of the 2d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf from FSB/GB RIPCORD, and vicinity. Extraction from the firebase began at 0545 hours and was completed, despite heavy indirect and 12.7mm machinegun fire, at 1214 hours. Co D, 2d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf was inserted vicinity BD363179 to assist the extraction of Co A, 2d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf. Extraction of Companies A and D began at 1305 hours and was completed without damage or casualties at 1401 hours. Seventy-four USAF, marine and navy tactical air sorties and continuous ARA and tube artillery fires were employed in support of the extraction. The battalion moved to CAMP EVANS to conduct stand down and began preparation for refresher training.

(b) Significant Activities. FSB/GB RIPCORD received six attacks by fire from enemy forces employing 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars on 17 July, beginning at 0704 hours. The last attack was at 1745 hours. Artillery and tactical air support was employed on suspected enemy locations throughout the day. Results were 16 US WIA and one Kit Carson scout WIA.

At 181330, a CH-47 aircraft from Co A, 159th Avn Bn (ASH) (Ambt), carrying a sling load of 105mm howitzer ammunition to FSB/GB RIPCORD, received 12.7mm machinegun fire while on approach to the firebase. The aircraft crashed into the 105mm ammunition storage point, causing a major fire. Extensive damage was caused in Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambt), 319th Arty, as well as the bunkers and TOG on the southern portion of the firebase. Five howitzers from the battery were destroyed and one damaged. An AN/MPQ41 counter-mortar radar, two 106mm recoilless rifles, and an AN/GRC-163 VHF radio set were also destroyed. The firebase continued to receive sporadic enemy mortar fire throughout the day, resulting in one US KIA and four US WIA. The crash of the helicopter resulted in one crew member killed and five crew members wounded. In spite of the fire, and exploding 105mm ammunition on the firebase, the perimeter remained intact, and by late afternoon the fires were brought under control and clean up operations began on the firebase. To assist in defending the firebase, artillery fires were increased from FSB/GB BARBARA, O'MEALLY and KARHANAN until Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambt), 320th Arty was laid and ready to fire from FSB/GB GLADIATOR at 1837 hours.

FS/GB RIPCORD continued to receive sporadic mortar fire on the firebase throughout the period 19 - 22 July. A total of 54 stand-off attacks were conducted by the enemy during these four days resulting in seven US KIA and 35 US WIA. All but five wounded required evacuation. A total of 51 tactical air strikes were directed into the RIPCORD area between 19 and 22 July.

On 20 July, contact by Co D, 1st Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf and Co A, 2d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf, east and south of Hill 805, vicinity FSB/GB RIPCORD, resulted in six NVA KIA. Heavy contact at 1730 hours by the 1st Plt, Co D, 1st Bn
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(Embld), 506th Inf with an enemy force employing 60mm mortar and small arms fire, vicinity YD376192, resulted in four US KIA and five US WIA. Contact terminated at 1820 hours.

At 210712 hours, vicinity YD376192, three kilometers east of PS/OB RIPCORD, Co D, 1st Bn (Embld), 506th Inf, while preparing to leave their night defensive position, received approximately eighty 60mm mortar rounds and small arms fire from an enemy force all around their position. As the company returned fire with organic weapons and employed tube artillery and AAD against the enemy, Co D, 2d Bn (Embld), 506th Inf, air assaulted from vicinity YD352430, to an LZ north of the contact area. The company attacked to the south to reinforce Co B, 1st Bn (Embld), 506th Inf, making light contact with the enemy enroute, suffering four WIA, capturing a 12.7mm machinegun, and discovering a large bunker complex at YD372196. Co C, 2d Bn (Embld), 506th Inf was inserted to destroy the bunker complex.

Co D, 2d Bn (Embld), 506th Inf linked up with Co D, 1st Bn (Embld), 506th Inf at 1223 hours as sporadic mortar fire continued to impact in the area until 1615 hours. Air strikes and a para team supported the contact as Co D, 1st Bn (Embld), 506th Inf suffered five KIA and 31 WIA, and accounted for eight WIA KIA.

At 0840 hours, a UH-1H helicopter from Co C, 326th Med Bn (Embld), while attempting to extract casualties from Co D, 1st Bn (Embld), 506th Inf area of contact, was hit in the tail boom by an RPG round, while in the pick-up zone, and rendered non-flyable. At 0947 hours, another medevac aircraft from Co C, 326th Med Bn (Embld) was hit by small arms fire in the same pick-up zone, resulting in one crew member killed and one wounded. The aircraft returned to CAMP EAGLE where it was found to be non-flyable. A third aircraft, from Co A, 150th Med Bn (AH), was hit by small arms fire at 1658 hours, while attempting to extract elements of Co D, 1st Bn (Embld), 506th Inf. The aircraft crashed and caught fire on the LZ. Six other aircraft received ground fire in the RIPCORD area during the day with three being hit by machinegun and small arms fire, all returned to CAMP EVANS and one was found to be non-flyable.

At approximately 1700 hours, Companies C and D, 2d Bn (Embld), 506th Inf and Co D, 1st Bn (Embld), 506th Inf were extracted from a pick-up zone at YD372196 and returned to CAMP EVANS to refit and prepare for future insertion into the RIPCORD area.

At 221300 hours, vicinity YD353167, 1.5 kilometers southeast of PS/OB RIPCORD, Co A, 2d Bn (Embld), 506th Inf received rifle grenades, mortar and small arms fire from a large enemy force attacking from the north, east and southeast. Tube artillery, AAD and tactical air support were employed against the enemy. Contact was maintained until dark when the company consolidated their position and formed a defensive perimeter. Because of the close proximity of the estimated three-company size enemy force, extraction of the wounded was not
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Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RG5 CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

attempted during the night. Most of the fifty-one personnel wounded in the company were not serious. Those who had more serious wounds were made as comfortable as possible until they were extracted on the morning of the 23d. Twelve US were killed during the day and the company accounted for 61 NVA KIA.

During the night of 22-23 July massive artillery and air strikes were employed in the RIPCORD area against known and suspected enemy locations.

More than 2200 rounds of mixed caliber artillery ammunition were fired in support of the extraction of the 2d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf on 23 July. Fourteen CH-47 aircraft were employed commencing at 0545 hours to extract 22 sorties, which included six 155mm howitzers, two M-425 dozers, communications equipment, and one M55 (Quad 90) machinegun. The CH-47 extraction operation proceeded smoothly until 0740 hours, when one CH-47 was shot down on the firebase by 12.7mm machinegun fire. The aircraft was forced to land amidst the 105mm howitzers which had been destroyed on 18 July, and thus prevented the extraction of the artillery pieces and two 106mm recoilless rifles. The CH-47 received a direct hit by an enemy mortar round, causing the aircraft to burn and explode. Eight additional CH-47 aircraft received hits during the extraction, four were later determined non-flyable. Co B, 2d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf began extraction at 0745 hours by UH1H but was delayed until 0935 hours by heavy enemy 50mm and 82mm mortar fire. The extraction was conducted by infiltrating one UH1H aircraft into the firebase at a time.

During the extraction, FS/DF RIPCORD was under continuous enemy mortar fire, with several hundred rounds impacting throughout the firebase. Air, artillery, and ARA destroyed several enemy mortar and machinegun positions. In addition, numerous enemy, driven into the open by CS were killed by US firepower.

(11) 24 - 31 July 1970

(a) With the extraction of US units from the FS/DF RIPCORD area, the division began an extensive artillery and aerial bombardment plan directed against the NVA forces massed in the area. During the period 240500 to 310800 July, over 10,000 rounds of mixed caliber artillery, 135 forward air control missions - for 225 sorties - 168 drums of persistent agent CS, and 130 barrels of thickened fuel were directed against known and suspected enemy locations.

On 24 July, the 2d Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf completed refresher training at FNU BAI Combat Base and moved by vehicle to CAMP EVANS to prepare for future operations in the vicinity of FS/DF RAKASAN. The 2d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf began battalion refresher training at CAMP EVANS.

On 25 July, the 3d Bde passed responsibility for FS/DF RAKASAN to the 3d Bde as division forces repositioned to increase security of the populated lowlands and support operations in the enemy’s rear service support areas, in
The mountains northeast of the A Shau Valley.

Operation CHICAGO PEAK/LAM SON 363 began at 250700 July, as elements of the 1st Bde., in operational coordination with the 3d Regt., 1st Inf Div (ARVN), assaulted into the operational area at 0600 hours. The 3d Bn (Ambl.), 502d Inf assaulted into the FS/OB MAUREEN area, seized and secured the firebase, and began search operations to the west. Company B received fire on their LZ at VD405119. Tube artillery, ARA and tactical CS, dropped from UH-11 aircraft, suppressed the enemy fire. There were no US casualties during the assault.

The 1st Bn (Ambl.), 502d Inf passed responsibility for FS/OB BASTOGNE to the 3d Bn (Ambl.), 187th Inf and companies A and B assaulted into landing zones south of FS/OB BIRMINGHAM and ARSENAL to conduct search and attack patrols.

Co C, 1st Bn (Ambl.), 501st Inf moved by air to FS/OB RAKKASAN and assumed the mission of firebase security.

On 26 July, the CP and Co C, 2d Bn (Ambl.), 501st Inf moved by air to FS/OB RAKKASAN closing at 1615 hours. Co C assumed mission of security for the firebase.

On 28 July, the light CP, 3d Regt (ARVN) and Btry A (155), 10th Arty (ARVN) moved by air to FS/KB MAUREEN in support of Operation CHICAGO PEAK/LAM SON 363.

On 29 July, Btry C, 2d Bn (Ambl.), 320th Arty repositioned, by air, from FS/OB BASTOGNE to FS/OB NAUREEN to provide additional artillery support for Operation CHICAGO PEAK/LAM SON 363. The battery was replaced on FS/OB BASTOGNE by Btry B, 3d Bn (Ambl.), 319th Arty from CAMP EVANS.

On 30 July, division aviation assets, coordinated through the 1st Bde., supported the assault by the 1st and 2d Battalions, 3d Regt (ARVN) into the CHICAGO PEAK/LAM SON 363 area of operation to locate and destroy enemy forces, cache sites, and staging areas. Extensive preparation of the landing zones by tactical air, ARA and tube artillery from both US and ARVN batteries supported the insertion. Light ground to air fire was received during the insertion of the 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN), which was completed at 0859 hours, with no Allied casualties. The 1st Bn was inserted at 1010 hours without incident.

On 31 July, the 1st Bde passed operational control of the 1st Bn (Ambl.), 506th Inf to the 2d Bde and assumed operational control of the 2d Bn (Ambl.), 506th Inf. The 1st Bn (Ambl.), 506th Inf moved by air from FS/OB KATHERYN to CAMP EVANS, began preparation for battalion refresher training and assumed the mission of DF. The 2d Bn (Ambl.), 506th Inf moved by air from CAMP EVANS to FS/OB KATHERYN, assumed the mission of securing the firebase, and began search and attack operations in the vicinity of the firebase.
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(b) Significant Activities. On 24 July, vicinity YD245205 (3½ kilometers northeast of F3/CH THUNDER), the 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) discovered 54 NVA bodies killed by air strikes approximately two weeks earlier. Also found were 21 individual and five crew served weapons, including two RPD machineguns.

At 261426 hours, vicinity YD415130, the 3d Plt, CO A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 503d Inf engaged 3 - 4 enemy in bunkers, at 35 meters, with small arms, mortar fire and ARA, resulting in the first three enemy killed during Operation CHICAGO PEAK/TAM SON 363. Nine 15’x10’x4’ bunkers with 3’ overhead cover were destroyed.

At 281827 hours, CAMP EVANS received four 122mm rockets impacting near the mess hall of the 150th Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl). ARA, tube artillery and a white team were employed on a suspected enemy location. The 3d Bde security platoon was inserted in the vicinity of YD450325 and discovered four 122mm rockets in launching trenches. Results of the attack were one US KIA and 13 US WIA.

At 290905 hours, CAMP EVANS received another three 122mm rockets, impacting in the vicinity of Btry C, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl), Co C, 150th Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl), and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf. No casualties or damage were caused.

The 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) made contact with the enemy almost immediately after insertion, vicinity YD358097, on 30 July. The 1st Co received small arms fire from an enemy force 100 meters to the north at 0816 hours. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed ARA and a pink team. A sweep resulted in the capture of a 12.7mm machinegun. At 1020 hours, vicinity YD346103, the battalion engaged an estimated enemy platoon with small arms fire at 30 meters. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew to the north. An air strike was employed. A sweep of the area revealed 17 NVA KIA and resulted in one RPD machinegun captured. At 1715 hours the 1st Co killed an NVA at YD358097, and, at 1500 hours, killed four more NVA.

On 31 July, the 1st Co, 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) discovered 17 enemy bodies killed by air strikes approximately three days earlier, at YD357115.
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Inclosure 2 (Organizational Structure) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RG5 CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)

HHC, 1st Bde
1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf
1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf
2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf
42d Inf Plt (Set Dog)

2d Brigade, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)

HHC, 2d Bde
2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf
3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf
1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf
47th Inf Plt (Set Dog)

3d Brigade, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)

HHC, 3d Bde
2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf
1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf
2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf
58th Inf Plt (Set Dog)

101st Abn Div Art (Ambl)

HHC, 101st Abn Div Art (Ambl)
2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Art (Ambl)
3d Bn (Ambl), 319th Art (Ambl)
2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Art (Ambl)
1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Art (Ambl)
4th Bn (Aerial Art), 77th Art (Ambl)
Btry A (Avn), 377th Art (Ambl)
266th FA Det (Surveillance Radar)

101st Aviation Group (Gbt) (Ambl)

HHC, 101st Avn Gp (Gbt) (Ambl)
101st Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl)
158th Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl)
159th Avn Bn (ARH) (Ambl)
163d Avn Co (GS) (Ambl)
359th Avn Det (Div)

101st Abn DISCOM (Ambl)

HHC and Bmd, 101st Abn DISCOM (Ambl)
5th Trans Bn (Arts & Spt) (Ambl)
326th Med Bn (Ambl)
426th SGS Bn (Ambl)
301st Maint Bn (Ambl)
101st Admin Co (Ambl)
Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS)

101st Abn Div (Ambl) Troops

HHC, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)
3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf
2d Sqn (Ambl), 17th Cav
326th Eng Bn (Ambl)
501st Sig Bn (Ambl)
101st MP Co (Ambl)
265th Radio Research Co
10th Cal Plt (DS)
20th Cal Det (GGR Center)
22d Mil Hart Det
25th FI Det (Field Service)
34th FI Det (Field Service)
101st MI Co (Div)
557th Inf Plt (Gbt Tracker)
20th TASS (USAF)

Group 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

inclosure 2
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Inclosure 3 (Key Personnel Roster - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air-mobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, NCS USFOR-65 (R2) (U))

CG
MG John J. Hennessey

AD (O)
BG Sidney B. Berry

ADC (S)
COL (P) Olin E. Smith

CofS
COL Hugh A. MacDonald

CO, 1st Bde
COL John D. White

CO, 2d Bde
COL Walter H. Root

CO, 3d Bde
COL Benjamin L. Harrison

CO, 101st Avn Grp
LTC (P) Edward P. Davis

CO, DISCOM
COL David E. Grange

CO, DEVALTY
COL Lee E. Surratt

AG, G4
LTC Charles A. Koenstine, Jr.

ACofS, G2
LTC Lavere W. Bindrup

ACofS, G3
LTC Roy J. Young

ACofS, G4
MAJ Peter Masterson

ACofS, G5
MajIgIien W. Kinnison

Chemical Off
LTC James R. Klugh

Div Surg
LTC Robert S. Day

FM
LTC Stanley J. Lobodinski

IG
LTC Thomas Normann

SMA
LTC Carl W. Walborn

Fin Off
LTC Walter J. Falconer

Chap
LTC Clifford E. Young, Jr.

AG
LTC Thomas E. Minix

CO, 1st Bn (Amb), 327th Inf
LTC Donald A. Yoder

CO, 2d Bn (Amb), 327th Inf
LTC Edward F. Pickett

CO, 2d Bn (Amb), 502d Inf
LTC Charles J. Shay

CO, 1st Bn (Amb), 501st Inf
LTC Thomas E. Aaron

CO, 2d Bn (Amb), 501st Inf
LTC Otis W. Livingston, Jr.

CO, 1st Bn (Amb), 502d Inf
LTC Arvid E. West, Jr.

CO, 2d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf
LTC Bobby B. Porter

CO, 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf
LTC John C. Ballard

CO, 2d Bn (Amb), 119th Arty
LTC Ivan C. Bland

CO, 2d Bn (Amb), 319th Arty
LTC John E. Martling

CO, 2d Bn (Amb), 320th Arty
LTC Robert J. Burke

CO, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Amb)
LTC William A. Walker

CO, 1st Bn (Amb), 321st Arty
LTC Alphonse P. Davis, Jr.

CO, 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav
LTC Charles L. Nowak

CO, 101st Avn Bn (Asst Hq) (Amb)
LTC Arch A. Ely, Jr.

CO, 158th Avn Bn (Asst Hq) (Amb)
LTC Robert F. Molinelli

CO, 159th Avn Bn (Asst Sup Hq) (Amb)
LTC William N. Peachey

CO, 326th Engr Bn (Amb)
LTC Robert J. Guard

CO, 326th Med Bn (Amb)
LTC George F. Newton

CO, 5th Trans Bn (Amb)
LTC Carl P. Rodolph, Jr.

CO, 426th Stry Bn (Amb)
LTC Robert B. Day

CO, 801st Maint Bn (Amb)
LTC Harold L. Swall

LTC Ronald N. Bowman

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Group 4
- Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
- Declasified after 12 years.
Inclosure 4 (Field Expedient Antenna) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne) Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CPME-95 (R2) (II)

Confidential

Group 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

Enclosure 4
1. The ODR for 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) has been reviewed by this headquarters in accordance with AR 525-15.

2. (c) This headquarters concurs with the report as written with the following comments:

   a. Reference the item concerning quadrant system of control during airmobile assaults, page 45, paragraph 2c(8). Using a standard reference system for all airmobile operations will assist in training of personnel and control of units. The information stated is not sufficient for adequate evaluation. However, additional information concerning techniques and control, to include examples and charts, will be provided by the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) as soon as possible. Recommend either this system or a clock system of similar nature be evaluated and considered for possible inclusion in airmobile doctrine.

   b. Reference the item concerning helicopter ground-to-air incidents during BDA, page 48, paragraph 2c(9). Assessment of BDA must be rapid and simple. However, all methods of assessment must be varied to insure the enemy does not compromise the procedure of BDA used. Recommend this procedure be evaluated and considered for inclusion in BDA techniques.

FOR THE CONSIDERATION:

W.H. SMITH
Cpt. 46C
Assistant Adjutant General

Downgraded to 3 year interval classified after 18 years.
OBSERVATION: The battalion and company commander had continually stressed the importance of soldiers manning fighting positions being awake and alert. The company commander, "King of the Hill," had instructed the platoon leader responsible for perimeter defense to have either himself, his platoon sergeant, or a squad leader continually walking the perimeter and checking the alertness of the soldiers during the hours of darkness. While checking the perimeter, the platoon sergeant detected movement in the protective wires. He killed one sapper with M16 fire as the sapper attack was initiated.

LESSON LEARNED: To successfully defend a firebase against a determined sapper attack, the attack must be detected and defeated before the sapper penetrates the inner belt of protective wire.

OBSERVATION: The communications wire (WD-1) connecting the fighting positions with the company and platoon command posts had been laid on top of the ground and was cut by the initial volley of RPG fire. Communications throughout the attack were maintained by AN/PRC-25 and AN/PRT-88 radios.

LESSON LEARNED: a. Communications wire must be buried six to twelve inches.

b. To insure adequate communications throughout the attack, dual (telephone and radio) communications must be available at each bunker/fighting position.

OBSERVATION: Ammunition storage.

a. Sufficient small arms ammunition was stored at each fighting position to defend against a determined sapper attack. For this reason, ammunition resupply was not required during the action.

b. Bulk small arms and 90mm ammunition as well as hand grenades and LAWs were stored in two widely separated ammunition dumps. Both storage areas were well protected; one below ground level, but without overhead cover, and the other, although above ground level, covered by sandbags. During the first phase of the attack, the underground storage area exploded, but caused no casualties.

c. The ammunition dump which was below ground level was located, at hand grenade range, between the line of bunkers

Incl 2
and the inner belt of protective wire. Although indications are that the ammunition explosion resulted from a well placed NVA satchel charge, it is possible that it was caused by a hand grenade thrown from a US fighting position.

LESSON LEARNED: a. Sufficient ammunition must be stored at primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions to defeat a determined sapper attack.

b. Bulk ammunition storage areas will be a target during a sapper attack.

c. Bulk ammunition must be protected and stored at a minimum of two locations.

d. Ammunition storage areas should not be located between the line of fighting positions and the protective wire.

OBSERVATION: The attacking force had been in a staging area reconnoitering FSB Tomahawk and preparing for the attack for a period of seven days. On the last two days (8 and 9 June) prior to the attack, one NVA soldier hid in shoulder high grass 400 to 500 meters from the perimeter and observed the position for 48 hours. At 092200 June, he determined the time was right for attack. He moved to a rally point and led the attacking force to the firebase.

LESSON LEARNED: a. Normally, the sapper will spend several days reconnoitering a firebase prior to attack.

b. Fields of fire and observation must be cleared well beyond the limit of protective wire.

OBSERVATION: The staging area used by the sappers was within a short walking distance of the firebase. The unit had not patrolled the area for a period in excess of nine days.

LESSON LEARNED: When occupying a firebase, the unit must continually, but in random patterns, patrol to a range of 3000 meters (82mm mortar range) around the position.

OBSERVATION: During the period 31 May through 2 June, the defensive targets were fired between 2300 and 0200 hours. On 9 June, the "King of the Hill" decided to vary the pattern and conduct the firing from 0200 to 0400 hours. When the attack began, the artillery forward observer was preparing to adjust the firebase defensive targets.

LESSON LEARNED: Detailed planning is required to vary time and type of activity to avoid establishing set patterns of defense.
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OBSERVATION: During the sappers withdrawal, they moved through an area approximately 500 meters from the perimeter which had been seeded with trip flares. When the flares were activated, the area was engaged with cannon artillery to block enemy escape routes.

LESSON LEARNED: Trip flares placed well forward of the perimeter on likely avenues of approach or escape will provide early warning of attack or indicate routes of withdrawal.

OBSERVATION: An anti-sapper fence, consisting of chain link fencing four feet high and buried one to six inches, had been placed around the firebase. Examination following the attack revealed that the sappers had been unable to cut the fence. All breaks in the wire were caused by explosions.

LESSON LEARNED: Protective wire, properly emplaced, is an effective barrier to sapper movement.

OBSERVATION: Upon initiation of the attack, the "King of the Hill" ordered his artillery forward observer outside the command bunker to adjust defensive targets and ARA. He also instructed the platoon leader to move to the point of contact to survey the situation and to submit an accurate SITREP.

LESSON LEARNED: Aggressive leadership is required to insure that proper action is taken by subordinates.

OBSERVATION: Due to a personnel shortage, LP/OPs and ambushes were not employed outside the perimeter. The "King of the Hill" stated that his defensive plans included employment of an LP/OP on the approach route used by the NVA. However, personnel shortages required him to employ all available personnel on the perimeter.

LESSON LEARNED: When determining personnel requirements for firebase defense, sufficient allowance should be made to man the perimeter and to employ early warning LP/OPs and ambushes.

OBSERVATION: During the week preceding the attack, the "King of the Hill" conducted walk-through rehearsals of the defensive plan to include the assembly and movement of the reaction force. At the initiation of the attack, the reaction force was assembled and later moved to the point of the main attack.

LESSON LEARNED: Frequent and planned rehearsals of the firebase defensive plan, to include the assembly and employment of the reaction force, insures proper and timely response by defensive forces.

OBSERVATION: The "King of the Hill" had directed that personnel
on guard occupy fighting positions rather than positions within or on top of sleeping bunkers.

LESSON LEARNED: Guard personnel are less vulnerable to RPG and sapper attack when manning fighting positions rather than positions on top or inside sleeping bunkers. Additionally, more effective fire can be delivered against the attacking sapper.

OBSERVATION: The C-130 flareship could not, for an undetermined reason, communicate directly with the "King of the Hill." Instructions for "Basketball" were relayed from the "King of the Hill" through the battalion command post to the C-130. This is an acceptable, but less desirable, arrangement.

LESSON LEARNED: The "King of the Hill" should communicate directly with all supporting aircraft.

OBSERVATION: By a study of intelligence reports and enemy activity occurring one year ago, the battalion commander determined that FSB Tomahawk was attacked on 19 June 1969. He advised the "King of the Hill" that NVA sapper attacks against firebases are sometimes repetitive from year to year and that due to a lack of flexibility in planning, NVA operations follow definite patterns.

LESSON LEARNED: Commanders should study one year old intelligence reports and enemy activity.

OBSERVATION: The platoon responsible for defense of the firebase had been there for nine days and had rehearsed the firebase defensive plan three times during that period.

LESSON LEARNED: With proper leadership and frequent walkthrough rehearsals, the assurance of a successful defense increases the longer the unit stays on the firebase.

OBSERVATION: On 1 June 1970, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf received an agent report indicating the NVA would attack Lang Co Bridge on 9 or 10 June. The report also stated that the NVA would be wearing ARVN uniforms. One NVA sapper was observed wearing a US helmet and long trousers.

LESSON LEARNED: Intelligence information should be passed to the lowest echelon possible (the individual soldier) consistent with security restrictions.

OBSERVATION: Seven fougasse wires and several trip flares positioned outside the inner belt of protective wire had been cut or tied off.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Commanding General
XXIV Corps
ATTN: AVII-GCT
APO 96349

(U) The enclosed Operation Report - Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with USARV Supplement 1 to AR 525-15 and XXIV Corps Regulation 525-2.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

1 incl

Regrated Unclassified when Separated from Classified Inclosures
AVDG-CS
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Copies furnished (cont):
CO, 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Amlb) w incl
ACofS, G1, 101st Abn Div (Amlb) w incl
ACofS, G2, 101st Abn Div (Amlb) w incl
ACofS, G3, 101st Abn Div (Amlb) w incl
ACofS, G4, 101st Abn Div (Amlb) w incl
ACofS, G5, 101st Abn Div (Amlb) w incl
CO, 101st Avn Gp (Cbt) (Amlb) w incl
CO, 101st Abn Div Arty (Amlb) w incl
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, MAR OGFOR-65 (R2) (U)

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. Operations. The reporting period was marked by continuing close coordination and cooperation with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and the Thu Thien Province and District Officials. This close coordination and cooperation was exploited in the conduct of operations designed to assist GVN forces in assuming full responsibility for all aspects of combat, pacification and development (Vietnamization).

(1) Operation TEXAS STAR, a division wide operation that commenced on 1 April 1970, continued through the reporting until termination on 5 September 1970.

(a) The division continued to conduct extensive airmobile operations in the camphor mountains of the division AO, employing the 1st and 3d Bdes, in coordination with the 1st, 3d and 54th Regts (ARVN), and division reconnaissance assets to maintain a protective shield beyond the periphery of the populated lowlands, locate and destroy enemy units, base camps and cache sites, and interdict enemy movement into the lowlands. These operations provided the necessary secure environment in which the 3d Bde, in coordination with the 3d and 54th Regts (ARVN) was able to assist GVN officials of Thu Thien Province and Districts, in pursuing national objectives related to GVN political stability and socio-economic development.

(b) In early August, Operation CHISAGO PEAK/LAY SON 363 continued in the FS/OSB MAUestival, GOODMAN and AIRBORNE area. Elements of the 1st Bde, in operational coordination with the 3d Regt (ARVN) had assaulted into the area on 25 July, followed on 30 July by two battalions of the 3d Regt (ARVN). This operation was designed to locate and destroy enemy cache sites, logistical facilities, and interdict routes of resupply and communication in the mountainous area northeast of the S SHAU VALLEY. This area was believed to contain the base areas of the 803d and 29th NVA Regiments. The operation was terminated on 12 August with moderate success. There were 95 enemy killed and 32 enemy weapons captured, compared to three ARVN KIA and no US KIA. However, no major cache sites and logistical facilities were discovered.

(c) Also in early August, intelligence information and increased enemy activity evidenced an enemy build-up of forces in the FS/OSB O'REILLY area. Intelligence gained from a Ho Chi Minh, who rallied on 12 August, indicated that the 6th NVA Regt was preparing for major assaults designed
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Operational Report - 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile), Period 20 August to 5 September 1970, and Command (RC) (R) (U)

The 20th of August saw one of the most notable operations conducted by the 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile) during the period. In response to this intelligence, the 3rd Bde, less 1st Bn, 327th Inf Regt (Air Mobile), in conjunction with the 1st Bde, less 1st Bn, 173rd Inf Regt (Air Mobile), conducted a series of operations to destroy enemy resupply routes through the use of close air support and ground attack operations. The 3rd Bde, in conjunction with the 1st Bde, conducted operations in the O'Donovan area, and the 1st Bde conducted operations in the O'Loughlin area. Combined operations continued throughout the period, with the 3rd Bde conducting operations in the O'Donovan area, and the 1st Bde conducting operations in the O'Loughlin area. The 3rd Bde, less 1st Bn, 327th Inf Regt (Air Mobile), conducted operations in the O'Donovan area throughout the period, with the 1st Bde, less 1st Bn, 173rd Inf Regt (Air Mobile), conducting operations in the O'Loughlin area.

(a) During the period 20 August to 5 September, the division began repositioning and reorganizing units in preparation for the implementation of Operation JEFFERSON GLAD/ADAMSON HUB. This repositioning included the transfer of responsibility for support of pacification, development and combat training teams to the populated localities of the division. The 1st Bde assumed responsibility for maintaining liaison with GVN officials in Nui, Hau Giang, and MY IN, while the 3rd Bde maintained responsibility for maintaining liaison with GVN officials in Loc, Hoi An, and Hue. The 2nd Bde maintained responsibility for maintaining liaison with GVN officials in Hue and Hue. The 3rd Bde maintained responsibility for maintaining liaison with GVN officials in Hue.

(b) Enemy losses inflicted by the division during Operation TEXAS 99/70 were:

- Killed in Action (KIA) 200
- Wounded in Action (WIA) 425
- Missing in Action (MIA) 1

Total division casualties during the period were:

- Killed in Action 345
- Wounded in Action 1775
- Missing in Action 7

(c) The division implemented Operation Order 13-70, JEFFERSON GLAD/ADAMSON HUB.
Operation Report - Lessons Learned, 1078 Air Div. Division (Air Battle), Fort Sam Houston, 10 October 1945, ReS ORP, (OP) (G) (N)

110th Div, 7th, on 27 00 September 1945. As this plan was being developed, the analysis of the enemy situation indicated the enemy's probable course of action would be to maintain pressure on US, Air Div, and territorial forces, while continuing to rebuild the Viet Cong infrastructure. Offensive action was expected to be characterized by attacks by fire and limited ground and air support directed against Allied maneuver units, with supporting units, and American defended outposts in the coastal lowlands. In the longer term period it was anticipated that the enemy would attempt to improve and extend existing base areas and lanes of communication eastward until it had established forward staging areas which would sustain a general offensive and/or the redeployment of US forces from NVI to provide opportunity to launch a major attack. The FWPB in USN/ROSCOM 11-70 was directed to counter these probable enemy courses of action and to exploit the lessons learned during the '45 northeast monsoon season.

(a) Air Organization

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<td>3(-) 3rd Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Art Corps</td>
<td>1-20th Inf</td>
<td>3-5th Inf</td>
<td>1-27th Inf</td>
<td>3(-) 3rd Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Art Corps</td>
<td>1-20th Inf</td>
<td>3-5th Inf</td>
<td>1-27th Inf</td>
<td>3(-) 3rd Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Art Corps</td>
<td>1-20th Inf</td>
<td>3-5th Inf</td>
<td>1-27th Inf</td>
<td>3(-) 3rd Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Art Corps</td>
<td>1-20th Inf</td>
<td>3-5th Inf</td>
<td>1-27th Inf</td>
<td>3(-) 3rd Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Art Corps</td>
<td>1-20th Inf</td>
<td>3-5th Inf</td>
<td>1-27th Inf</td>
<td>3(-) 3rd Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Art Corps</td>
<td>1-20th Inf</td>
<td>3-5th Inf</td>
<td>1-27th Inf</td>
<td>3(-) 3rd Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Art Corps</td>
<td>1-20th Inf</td>
<td>3-5th Inf</td>
<td>1-27th Inf</td>
<td>3(-) 3rd Inf</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS G3FDR-65 (R2) (U)

101 Avn Br (AH)
158 Avn Br (AH)
159 Avn Br (ASH)
475 Avn Co (-) (DS)
326 Med Br
5th Trans (Asst Maint & Supply Br)
101 Abn Div Arty
2-11 Arty
4-77 Arty (Aerial Arty)
4/377 Arty (Avn)
501 Sig Br
701 MP Co
265 RHC
10th Cal Flt
20th Cal Det
107 MI Co
557 Inf Flt
(Cbt Tractors)
4th PSTD Det (DS)
7th Flt, 29th OA Co (DS)

(b) The primary mission of JEFFERSON GLEN/MOSONON PLAN 70 is to provide a protective shield for the populated lowlands of THUA THIEN Province, to locate and destroy enemy forces, staging areas and forward cache sites, to protect vital lines of communication and to assist SVN officials in meeting their pacification and development goals for 1970. The operation continues the concept of a complete integration of effort of all agencies within the division area of operation for the accomplishment of the inseparable tasks of improving territorial security, protecting the people against terrorism, improving the People's Self Defense Force (PSDF), developing local self management in administrative, economic, and financial affairs, developing a greater national unity, improving the life for war victims, establishing an information system to educate and motivate the people to participate in local development, and continuing to build towards prosperity for all.

(a) To accomplish this mission during the northeast monsoon season, division units were repositioned in the pliedmont and eastern mountain regions. Re-positioning facilitated resupply operations by road and greatly decreased the possibility of small units being isolated deep in the mountainous forests without the capability of being reinforced, as a result of extended periods of inclement weather. The 1st Bde was positioned southwest of HUE to conduct reconnaissance and security operations in their assigned AO. Elements of the Bde secured TB/08 BASTOGNE (YD 620095), BIRMINGHAM (YD 706102), and VERSAIL (YD 548034), prepared to close VERSAIL

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Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, SCOR FOR-65 (E2) (U)

on order. The Bde continued to conduct operations in close coordination with the 3d Regt (ARVN). The 2d Bde was positioned in the lowlands, piedmont and eastern mountain regions to support the pacification and development program in close coordination and cooperation with the 54th Regt (ARVN). Elements of the Bde secured PS/OBs ARSENAL (KD 812082), BRICK (YC 835995), TOMAHAWK (KD 118013), and LOS BANOS (AT 832999). The Bde maintained liaison with the six districts of THUA THIEN Province as stated above. The 3d Bde was positioned in the lowlands, piedmont and canopy regions south of CAMP EVANS to conduct reconnaissance and security operations in close coordination with the 1st and 3d Regts (ARVN). Elements of the Bde secured PS/OBs RAJASAN (TD 483197) and JACK (TD 495287) and maintained liaison with the four northern districts of THUA THIEN Province.

(d) During the month of September, concentrated enemy activity continued in PS/OB O'HARLI area. It became apparent that the enemy remained determined to drive ARVN forces from the area by employing indirect fire attacks, followed by limited ground probes. These tactics resulted in light casualties to ARVN forces in the area. Combined search and attack operations by elements of the 1st and 3d Regts (ARVN), supported by division assets, continued to locate and inflict moderate casualties on the enemy.

(e) On 26 September, elements of the 1st Bde, in coordination with the 3d Regt (ARVN), air assaulted to conduct limited objective operations in the PS/OBs TENNESSEE and WHIP area. This operation was conducted in reaction to intelligence which indicated the 5th Regt, MUTH base areas were located in the vicinity of TENNESSEE and WHIP. During this same time period, elements of the 2d Bde conducted operations deep in the division AO in the vicinity of the HUNSE HOUNGU VALLEY to locate and destroy base areas of the 4th Regt, MUTH. Persisting low clouds, high winds and heavy rains restricted these operations during the period 1 to 3 October. Both operations were terminated on 4 October with minimal success. Small amounts of enemy stores had been located and evacuated or destroyed, but no major base areas had been discovered and no significant enemy contact had been established.

(f) Following their operation in the TENNESSEE and WHIP area, the 1st Bde and the 3d Regt (ARVN) launched a combined operation in the area north of PS/OB BASTOGNE in the vicinity of the traditional boundary of the 1st Bde and the 3d Regt (ARVN). A build-up of intelligence during the last two weeks of October indicated the presence of elements of the 810th FSB, 5th NVA Regt in this area. Operations in the BASTOGNE area continued through the reporting period with sporadic contact, resulting in 53 NVA/VC KIA and 38 individual weapons captured.
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RGS 63FOP-65 (R2) (U)

(g) FS/0B O'REILLY was closed by the 1st Rgt (ARVN) on 7 October.
Operations in the vicinity of O'REILLY were highly successful, causing
moderate to heavy NVA casualties. The massing of forces around the
firebase during August and September had presented numerous targets which
were vulnerable to allied fire support weapons systems. The decision to
close FS/0B O'REILLY was based on expected difficulty in resupplying or
reinforcing elements in the area during the northeast monsoon. The enemy
had not forced the 1st Rgt (ARVN) to withdraw from the firebase.

(3) 3D Air Activities:

(a) During the reporting period, close air support sorties were
flown in the division area of operation as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Months</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAC directed air strikes</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Sky Spot</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Gunship (Shadow and Stinger)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC Flareship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ordinance Expended

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HE (Tons)</td>
<td>2882.50</td>
<td>2007.50</td>
<td>1044.75</td>
<td>5934.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm (Tons)</td>
<td>192.00</td>
<td>116.75</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>315.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20mm cannon (rds)</td>
<td>47,610</td>
<td>99,773</td>
<td>22,420</td>
<td>170,803</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The following ARC LIGHT strikes were employed in the division AO:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Months</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>154</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Bomb damage assessments of tactical air strikes and ARC LIGHT
strikes during the reporting period revealed the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Months</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enemy killed by air force</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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## Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air-mobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS GMOR-65 (R2) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>AUA</th>
<th>BI</th>
<th>MO</th>
<th>SGMC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary fires</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary explosions</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road interdiction (craters)</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military structures destroyed</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles destroyed/damaged</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers destroyed</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers damaged</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnels/caves/fighting positions destroyed or damaged</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amm. dumps destroyed</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm. cables/wires cut</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122mm. rockets destroyed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30 (boxes)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing zones out (2 ship)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoppel landing zones out</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine guns/unidentified guns/mortars destroyed</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges damaged/destroyed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Enemy losses during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>AUA</th>
<th>BI</th>
<th>MO</th>
<th>SGMC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(5) Friendly casualties during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>KDR</th>
<th>NFI</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC/DIV</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC/1 BDE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC/2 BDE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC/3 BDE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/187 INF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/327 INF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/327 INF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/501 INF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/501 INF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/502 INF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502 INF</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/506 INF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/506 INF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/506 INF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIV ARTY</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 AVN GP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPT COMD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/17 CAV</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/75 RANGERS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>326 ENGRS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501 SIG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 MP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL**       | 30  | 178 | 0   | 10  | 55  | 273   |
Operations Narrative for period 1 August - 31 October. See Enclosure 1.

b. Training:

The current battalion refresher training program, initiated 12 May 1970, has continued with slight changes in rotation of battalions caused by operational commitments. The number of mandatory subjects and training hours have been reduced from 27 hours to 15-1/2 hours to allow battalion commanders more flexibility for instruction during refresher training.

A sniper course of instruction has been established at the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School for the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN). The intent of the program of instruction is to conduct intensive marksmanship training for selected personnel of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN). Students successfully completing the course will be highly skilled marksmen capable of engaging the enemy at extended small arms ranges. Class 1-70 will commence on 8 November 1970. The training program will be of 14 days duration.

The division began receiving infusion personnel from other commands for replacement training at SERTS on 8 September 1970. Initially, the program was of 19-1/2 hours duration. As the number of arriving personnel increased, it became necessary to reduce the instruction to 13 training hours, permitting a more rapid turnover at SERTS. The objective of the training is to provide instruction in those areas that are required to attain maximum degree of combat proficiency in airborne operations.

The division has reduced its OVN training program in the populated lowlands. The division discontinued employment of the dedicated battalion on 24 August 1970, and the number of MITs deployed decreased from 22 to 2 during the quarter due to the arrival of newly formed Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT). The remaining two teams are located in Phu Tho and Nam Hoc Districts. These two teams train and conduct operations with separate RF companies. Presently there are no MATs planned to replace these teams. It is anticipated that these teams will remain active until they are no longer needed by the respective districts. During the last quarter, the following combined operations were conducted:

- 91 company-size operations
- 15 platoon-size operations
- 22 RF squad-size operations
- 11 RF platoon-size operations

These combined operations consisted primarily of night ambushes and daylight patrols. Reconnaissances in force, combat assaults, and Eagle Flight operations
were also conducted. Formal classes were taught by NTTs when GVN officials or local commanders requested instruction in specific subject areas. Elements of the division will continue to maintain liaison with each of the 10 rural districts in Thua Thien Province for the purpose of coordinating combined operations.

(5) Preparations for the northeast monsoon were initiated in mid-August, in order to place the division in the best possible posture for the rainy period. The need for wet weather training was emphasized to all battalions. It was recommended that battalions modify refresher training lesson plans in appropriate subject areas to integrate training on operational problems caused by the northeast monsoon. It was further recommended that battalions include in their refresher training river crossing techniques, construction of defensive positions, equipment maintenance, and field hygiene during the northeast monsoon.

(6) On 1 September 1970, the NTT/M203 team arrived at the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) to begin training the 301st Maintenance Battalion (Airmobile), and armorers and grenadiers within the division on the M203 grenade launchers. The weapon was received favorably by the division. On 23 October 1970, the NTT/M203 team returned to follow-up previous instruction. The team noted that in many cases the M203 barrel would not lock in position. This has been attributed to excess plastic on the breech end of the handgrip or to the barrel latch being a fraction too long. CPT Charles White, team chief, noted that this fault had been discovered in a few isolated cases during the initial instruction. He recommended, at that time, that the specifications and plans for the barrel handgrips and barrel latches be re-examined to determine where the problem exists.

c. Chemical

(1) General. The division chemical section, with operational control of the 20th Chemical Detachment (CBRC) and the 10th Chemical Platoon (DS) continued the program of combat support.

(2) New Techniques. Employment of FMIS Slurry. FMIS Slurry has been used in several areas throughout the division AO. The slurry is an ultraviolet sensitive material of the Personnel Marking and Identification System which is used to mark and identify individuals trespassing in unauthorized areas within the division AO. Target areas are planned by division, brigade, ARVN and District Headquarters. The slurry is employed using the Agavence sprayer mounted in a UN-1 helicopter. The target areas are known or suspected enemy routes of infiltration. These routes are restricted to civilian use and have low vegetation for helicopter spray operations. A line approximately 20 meters wide and 3,000 meters long is created by making several low-level passes perpendicular to the suspected direction of enemy movement. Approximately 700 gallons of FMIS Slurry have been employed to date. Ultraviolet lanterns are used to monitor civilians to detect traces of the FMIS slurry. Monitoring is conducted at entrances to base camp areas and during cordon and search operations. Over a 3 week period
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (AirMobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RGS OSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

4,950 individuals have been monitored resulting in 39 persons being detained. Traces of the alkyd were found on their shoes, feet, and clothing. Detainees were questioned by division IPW Teams and Vietnamese National Police. Though most personnel were released, several admitted trespassing into unauthorized areas and 12 individuals were identified as draft dodgers.

(3) Improvisation. Truck-mounted diesel defoliation rig. The use of authorized herbicides (Blue and White) is restricted to areas specifically approved by Province and KAVV authorities. Requirements often arise to defoliate in areas where herbicides are not authorized. Therefore, in a continuing effort to exploit new ways to enhance support to ground unit commanders, a method was developed to burn vegetation with diesel. This is accomplished by use of a 75% diesel - 25% oil mixture dispensed from truck-mounted diesel containers using two hoses and a 100 GPH pump. Any type diesel containers, hoses, and pump that have compatible fittings will work. Three men are required to operate the rig - a truck driver, a pump operator, and a hose man. When the diesel has been dispersed in sufficient concentration and the truck removed to a safe area, the vegetation can be ignited by a portable flamethrower, trip flares, or smoke grenades. If burning cannot be accomplished because of mines, communication wires, or other equipment in the area, the diesel fuel is allowed to remain on the ground. The diesel, if left on the grass, will kill the vegetation in about seven days. In this case, a fire guard should watch the area for approximately five hours after spraying to prevent accidental ignition. After this time the diesel will have soaked into the ground and will be very difficult to ignite. The diesel defoliation operation is supervised by an officer or responsible noncommissioned officer. Fire extinguishers should be readily available. Using this method, defoliation was accomplished around five Vietnamese district headquarters, several fire support bases and base camp perimeters, and a critical bridge site.

(4) Expeditious Use of Persistent CS on enemy crops.

Due to a rapid increase in reported enemy crop locations within the division AO, an extensive crop destruction program was initiated during August using organic division assets. Lug-A-Jugs filled with herbicide agent BVB were employed on small, widely scattered plots. Three crop locations were reported with numerous large cultivated fields which would require an extensive effort to destroy employing Lug-A-Jugs. To reduce the effort required to deny the crops to the enemy, a plan was devised and executed to drop bulk CS on the three large fields to restrict enemy harvesting efforts and to contaminate the crops with CS. Two CH47 Helicopters flew a total of six sorties dropping 168-55-gallon drums of persistent CS2 on the fields from an altitude of 4000 ft AGL. Visual reconnaissance revealed 100% of the drums landed within the target areas and approximately 75% of the crops were effectively covered with CS2.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS 02F6-65 (R2), (U)

(5) During the reporting period the following missions were performed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE MISSION</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Personnel Detectors</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FlHo Slurry</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>700 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flame Drop</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>3,622 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulk CS2 (persistent)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>280 Drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>72 BDU-52s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical CS (non-persistent)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>413 E158 Cannisters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Defoliation

Herbicide, Agent Blue     | 19       | 49      | 2,775 Gallons        |

Defoliation (con’t)

Aerial Diesel             | 6        | 20      | 1,660 Gallons        |
Ground Diesel             | 12       | N/A     | 21,200 Gallons       |
Lug-A-Jugs (Agent Blue)   | 27       | 33      | 336 Jugs             |
BS GS Inchr Tnk, Inspect/Install | 15 | N/A     | 261/24 Launchers     |
Fougassee Issued          | N/A      | N/A     | 301 Drums            |
Teams Inspect/Install     | 56       | N/A     | 967/89 Drums         |
Busch Flares Inspect/Install | 24   | N/A     | 154/42 Flares        |
Maintenance Teams         | 44       | N/A     | N/A                  |
Protective Masks Inspected| N/A      | N/A     | 4175 Masks           |
Repaired/Evac             | N/A      | N/A     | 496/386 Masks        |
Decon App M11 Inspect/Evac| N/A     | N/A     | 0/0 Apparatus        |
Mity Mites Inspect/Evac   | N/A      | N/A     | 5/1 Mity Mites       |
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, ROE SME-05 (52) (0)

FFTs Inspect/Evac        N/A     N/A     25/5 Flamethrowers

Core Seeding Operations   N/A     N/A     65 Jeeps

d. Intelligence

(1) Enemy Situation

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period, enemy units were located as follows:

LOCATION

B4 611

Y09781

Z01297

Z02293

Y06926

Y06927

Y09998

Y07124

Y06995

Y07294

Y3517

Y3725

Y3018

Y4424

Y3520

Y3918

Y2130

Y2025

Y2934

Y1829

Y2730

Y1927

Y3379

Y2940

Y2626

Y3936

Y3542

Y2546

Y1327

BA 611

Y3413

Y3616
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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d Inf Bn</td>
<td>YM4412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Inf Bn</td>
<td>YD3310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91 Trans Bn</td>
<td>YD2914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Inf Regt</td>
<td>YD4306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Inf Bn</td>
<td>YD4306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Inf Bn</td>
<td>YD4807</td>
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<td>9th Inf Bn</td>
<td>YD4208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>675th Arty Regt</td>
<td>BA611</td>
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<tr>
<td>11A Recon Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Local Force Units</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phu Loc Special Action Units</td>
<td>ZQ0395</td>
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<td>Phong Dien Special Action Unit</td>
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<td>Quang Dien Special Action Unit</td>
<td>YD5122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C115 Local Force Company</td>
<td>YD5157</td>
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<td>C116 Local Force Company</td>
<td>YD5304</td>
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<td>Phu Vang Special Action Unit</td>
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<td>Hue City Recon Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>5B5 Front</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>12th AT Bn</td>
<td>XD9622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Arty Bn</td>
<td>DMZ</td>
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<tr>
<td>14th AA Bn (12.7mm)</td>
<td>DMZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Engr Bn</td>
<td>DMZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Signal Bn</td>
<td>DMZ</td>
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<td>DMZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th Med Bn</td>
<td>DMZ</td>
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<tr>
<td>33d Sapper Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>75th AA Bn (12.7mm)</td>
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<td>9th Inf Regt</td>
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<td>3d Inf Bn</td>
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<td>66th Inf Regt</td>
<td>XD8239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Inf Bn</td>
<td>XD8832</td>
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<td><strong>326th NVA Div</strong></td>
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<td>43th Inf Regt</td>
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Operational Report - 1st Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (Air-mobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970

**UNIT**

- 52d Inf. Regt
- 64th Inf. Regt
- 325th NVA Div (AKA 308)
- 36th Inf. Regt
- 88th Inf. Regt
- 102d Inf. Regt
- 27th Inf. Regt (Indep)
  - 1st Inf. Bn
  - 2d Inf. Bn
  - 3d Inf. Bn
- 31st Local Force Group
  - 27th Inf. Bn
- 138th Inf. Regt (Indep)
- 246th Inf. Regt (Indep)
  - 1st Inf. Bn
  - 2d Inf. Bn
  - 3d Inf. Bn
- 270th Inf. Regt (Indep)
- 126th Naval Sapper Regt
- 34th Arty Regt
- 164th Arty Regt
- 204th Arty Regt

**LOCATION**

- Unlocated
- XD0668
- YD0668
- YD0669
- YD0570
- YD0459
- XD1185
- YD1185
- XD9371
- XD9455
- XD7944
- XD9461
- XD1986
- YD2189
- XD9874
- XD984
- Unlocated

(b) August 1970

During August the 4th NVA Regiment continued to avoid significant contact, and for the second consecutive month, its activity remained at a generally low level. Elements of the 5th NVA Regiment continued offensive operations, with attacks by fire against allied installations along the Nam Hoa (E) piedmont and lowland areas. Activity by the 6th Regiment during August was directed against Firebase O'Reilly. They were reinforced by elements of the 29th NVA Regiment, 324B Division. Analysis indicated that the 324B Division possibly was controlling enemy operations in the FSB O'REILLY area. Activity by units of the 7th Front remained subdued, except for the 808th NVA Battalion. On 13 August, the battalion made its third incursion into the Quang Tri (P) lowlands in as many months.
2 Enemy activity in the 55 Front area of operations (INZ) continued at a high level throughout the month of August. High points of activity during the month were the incursion into the Hai Lang (B) lowlands by the 3d Battalion/9th Regiment, and the overall eastward deployment of the 9th Regiment to the Quang Tri - Thua Thien border areas. This marked the first time the 304th Division or any other element of the 55 Front had operated this far south, except for the brief appearance of elements of the Division in the hue area during the Tet Offensive of 1968. In early August, enemy activity increased significantly in the Firebase BARKETT area. By the end of the month enemy casualties were 124 NVA KIA and two NVA KIA. A PW captured from the 15th Engineer Company/256th Infantry Regiment, revealed that the 246th was responsible for constructing a road from Gau Nghi, south to Ban Rat (vicinity XD6152) through Loc, and east through Quang Tri (P) to the He Sanh area in preparation for the infiltration of the 1st and 2d Battalions/246th Regiment. Analysis of captured documents and PW interrogations revealed that the 20th Sapper Battalion/304th Division had been redesignated the 19th Sapper Battalion.

(c) September 1970

1 In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue, September began with an apparent concentrated effort by the enemy to drive ARVN forces from the mountainous areas. During the month, the enemy employed a total of 1450 rounds of 60mm, 82mm, 120mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifle and 122mm rocket fire in the Firebase O'REILLY area. Both the 6th and 29th Regiments remained firmly committed around the firebase. Activity continued to be light in the 7th Front area of operations. The 803d Regiment remained uncommitted in the northern portion of the A Shau Valley. Although activity in the 4th Regiment area of operations increased during the month of September, the regiment generally continued to avoid significant contact with allied units. The overall level of enemy initiated activity decreased in the 5th Regiment 40. The month was marked by limited probes and attacks by fire against US and ARVN installations.

2 Enemy activity in the 55 Front during September showed a 50 percent decrease when compared with August. Evidence was found confirming operations by the 27th NVA Regiment in the central DNZ area, indicating that the unit was reequipped and resupplied, and possibly was assuming a more aggressive role. Activity in the western DNZ and in western Quang Tri (P) pointed to the possibility of an enemy build-up in the He Sanh area, as sensor activations in this area were sustained at a relatively high rate throughout the month. Activity in the area of operations of the 304th Division decreased substantially during September. The 66th Regiment possibly withdrew southward in order to maintain control of the vital infiltration and logistical routes of western Quang Tri (P). Though there was a lack of identifiable contact with the 9th Regiment, it was believed that elements of the regiment may have deployed to the O'REILLY-SANBARA area. At the end of September, intelligence pointed to a possible NVA monsoon offensive in the 55 Front area of operations.

(d) October 1970

1 During October, the 66th Regiment concentrated on interdicting the Hue-DaNang Railroad, but otherwise continued to avoid significant contact.

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Activity in the 5th Regiment increased steadily throughout the month, culminating on 22 October with attacks by fire on Camp Eagle and Firebases BURMINGHAM and ARSENAL. Significant contact with the 6th Regiment indicated increased interest in the lowlands as several contacts occurred east of QL-L. Activity in this area dropped significantly with the closing of Firebase D’REULLY. The 7th Front, after a period of little or no consequential activity, ambushed a mine-sweep team on 17 October vicinity YD32372, resulting in two US KIA, seven US WIA, 12 ARVN KIA and 11 NVA KIA. Contact with the 303d Regiment at the beginning of the month was negligible. However, by the end of October, the regiment had completed resurfacing and was returning to a combat role.

2 Enemy activity in the B5 Front throughout October appeared to be following the basic outline of the Second Phase of the Fall Campaign. This phase consisted of the following stages: collecting information and stockpiling food and equipment, weapons preparation and troop rest, and attacks on selected targets beginning in early November. Firebase MUDAH remained a frequent target for attacks by fire. Ground attacks remained at a low level. Significant contacts developed as a result of Allied operations rather than because of enemy operations. On 8 October, in response to heavy sensor activations, Trp C, 3d Sda, 17th Cav engaged possible replacements for the 304th Division at XD654357, resulting in 29 NVA KIA. On 14 October 3d Co, 4th Bn, 2d Regt (ARVN) engaged an enemy force at XD964594, resulting in three NVA KIA and miscellaneous supplies and equipment captured.

(a) At the end of the reporting period, enemy units were relocated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNITS RELOCATED</th>
<th>NEW LOCATION</th>
<th>OLD LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chi Thue I Sapper En</td>
<td>YC62195</td>
<td>XG6995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Regt Hq</td>
<td>126128</td>
<td>XD9127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>302d Inf/Bn/6th Regt</td>
<td>YD2619</td>
<td>YD3517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139 Sapper En</td>
<td>YD2619</td>
<td>YD2619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3248 Div</td>
<td>YD2717</td>
<td>BA 511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf/Bn/803d Regt</td>
<td>YD3212</td>
<td>XD3616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Inf/Bn/803d Regt</td>
<td>YD3608</td>
<td>YD4412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Regt Hq</td>
<td>YD3117</td>
<td>YD4306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Inf/Bn/29th Regt</td>
<td>YD3623</td>
<td>YD4906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Inf/Bn/29th Regt</td>
<td>YD3015</td>
<td>YD4807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Inf/Bn/29th Regt</td>
<td>YD2319</td>
<td>YD4208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Regt/304th Division</td>
<td>YD0925</td>
<td>YD7738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf/Bn/9th Regt</td>
<td>YD0925</td>
<td>YD7740</td>
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<tr>
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<td>YD1731</td>
<td>XD8236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Inf/Bn/66th Regt</td>
<td>YD8336</td>
<td>YD8832</td>
</tr>
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<td>8th Inf/Bn/66th Regt</td>
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<td>YD8903</td>
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<td>YD6668</td>
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<td>2d Inf/Bn/27th Regt</td>
<td>YD9235</td>
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</tr>
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<td>246th Regt Hq (Indep)</td>
<td>YD9269</td>
<td>YD9371</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, ROCS G-20E-65 (E2) (U)

### UNITS RELOCATED

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<tr>
<th>Old Location</th>
<th>New Location</th>
<th>Old Location</th>
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<td>KD6268</td>
<td>KD6452</td>
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<td>2d Inf Bn/246th Regt</td>
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<td>64th Arty Regt</td>
<td>KD9294</td>
<td>KD9874</td>
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<tr>
<td>27th Inf Bn/31st Local Force Group</td>
<td>Y11144</td>
<td>Y11185</td>
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### UNITS NOT PREVIOUSLY LOCATED

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### UNITS NOT PREVIOUSLY CARRIERS

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### UNIT IDENTIFICATION REDESIGNATED

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C116 Local Force Co</td>
<td>Amon Thuy Special Action Unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) Activities in Thua Thien (P)

(a) August 1970

The number of VC/VAI related incidents increased from 36 in July to 46 in August. There was a significant increase in sabotage activity and a slight increase reported for propaganda and assassination incidents. However, the majority of the incidents (40%) were for rice-tax collection, and limited incidents. Attacks by fire against US installations increased, while attacks against GVN and ARVN installations decreased. There were two separate incursions into the lowlands by the NVI during August. Both of these incursions occurred in Hai Lang (D), Quang Tri (P), indicating a continuing enemy interest in this area. During the month of August, a total of nine VCI were neutralized by GVN and Allied operations within Thua Thien (P). Of this number, none were considered significant under current MACV standards.

(b) September 1970

The number of VC/VAI related incidents decreased significantly from 46 in August to 29 in September. Terrorist and rice-tax collection incidents remained at approximately the same level as in August. These two categories constituted 70% of the total number of incidents.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RGS O3PDR-65 (R2) (0)

It was reported that the VC/VCI were attempting to infiltrate into the lowlands by breaking up the Special Action Units into smaller teams to facilitate the gathering of rice. This reflects the success of Allied efforts to stop VC/VCI rice collection during the September harvest. VC/VCI neutralization for the month of September totaled 15, with air being village level or below, while seven were district level or higher.

(c) October 1970

The number of VC/VCI related incidents decreased significantly from 29 in September to 19 in October, the lowest monthly total since July 1969. Rice/tax collection incidents (eight) continued to constitute the largest single category of incidents. There were two intelligence gathering incidents during the month, marking the first such attempts recorded since January 1970. During September, October and November 1969 there was an average of 42 VC/VCI incidents per month. This year's sharp decrease in incidents could result from a weakened VC/VCI organization, resulting from the increased effectiveness of recent RF, PF, and PSDF operations. The following table compares the VC/VCI incidents for August (left), September (center), and October (right) by district:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>MIN/ECON</th>
<th>PROP</th>
<th>SAB</th>
<th>INTEN</th>
<th>KIP</th>
<th>ASSAS</th>
<th>TERROR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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</table>

(3) G2 Air Operations

(a) During the reporting period, 498 photo targets were scheduled to be flown by direct support aircraft. Of this figure, a total of 300 were completed. A total of 391 infrared targets were scheduled, and 162 were completed. The major cause of incomplete missions was bad weather, particularly during October.

(b) Infrared missions were concentrated within single brigade areas of operations to avoid boundary areas and thereby expediting artillery clearances.
On 8 October, a meeting was held with representatives from the 131st Surveillance Airplane Company to discuss the effectiveness of the infrared surveillance program. A series of tests conducted by the 131st indicated the optimum operational altitude for their infrared system to be between 1,500 feet and 2,000 feet above ground level. As a result of this meeting, a new series of preplanned infrared targets was prepared with the main consideration being the altitude of terrain features in the target area. Targets were planned to allow the aircraft to fly close to the optimum altitude over the majority of the terrain in each target area.

(c) Photo targets scheduled by G2 Air prior to 24 September were usually strip photos along prominent terrain features (i.e., roads and streams). A few area targets were flown with a requirement for imagery sidelap. The strip targets were easier for the imagery interpreter to plot because of the identifiable terrain features. However, the amount of activity on the imagery was only a small portion of the total enemy activity believed to be in that target area. On 24 September, a new policy was instituted for developing photo targets. A new format was used to provide coverage of the 10 x 10 km areas including a recognizable terrain feature. Keeping within the guidelines set forth by the 131st Surveillance Airplane Company that no more than four passes be made over a Priority III target area, the new format was determined to be acceptable when the requirement for sidelap was deleted. The intelligence gained from these area targets has shown a significant increase over the old system of strip targets. However, the strip target remains a valuable aid for surveillance of infiltration routes and avenues of approach into the lowlands.

(4) G2 Ground Surveillance Operations

(a) The DART I sensor readout station continued to readout and interpret sensors in the division reconnaissance zone. DART I has successfully replaced manual readout in the Batcat aircraft. Batcat, an Air Force EC-121, now functions entirely as an airborne antenna relay for DART I. DART I is currently being modified to accommodate Phase III sensor equipment. The addition of Phase III sensor equipment, coupled with the increased analytical capability of DART I over the manual readout system, will enable ground surveillance operations to continue to develop as a major asset in monitoring enemy movement in the division reconnaissance zone. Although reliance upon the DART I system has increased, particularly during the northeast monsoon, the Air Force reduced the on-station time for Batcat from 24 hours to 21 hours. However, this three-hour period when Batcat is not on station falls during the daylight hours when sensor activity is generally low.

(b) The number of Patrol Seismic Intrusion Devices increased from 147 to 209, which attains the division goal of two sets per line platoon.
(c) During the reporting period, the number of ground monitor sites decreased from eleven to ten. The sites at FB RHI-OLD (YD3419), Lang Co Bridge (AT3855), FB KATHRYN (YD4711), FB VECHEL (YD5503) and FB BASTOGNE (YD6309) were closed. The following sites were opened: DP CHECATE (YD6308), "USS Screaming Eagle" (AT3998), FB BRICK (TC3999), and FB JAGK (YD4928).

(d) In anticipation of the limitations which weather conditions will impose on the majority of available surveillance systems during the northeast monsoon, the division is expanding its electronic ground surveillance system to provide greater coverage throughout the division. Phase III equipment has been requisitioned for ground monitor sites. Upon receipt of this equipment, the division's electronic surveillance capability will allow coverage of areas inaccessible to visual surveillance. Phase III sensors are already being employed in the division reconnaissance zone. This added sensor coverage will be of considerable value in the surveillance regime when adverse weather conditions preclude aerial reconnaissance for extended periods of time.

(e) There was a significant decrease in sensor activation during the reporting period. During August, the activations dropped to an average of 60 per week, and fell to an average of 40 per week in September. Most activity noted during these months occurred in the division reconnaissance zone, specifically, along Routes 616, 922, 9222, 548 and 77.

(f) Radars operating in the brigade areas of operation continued to detect enemy movement. An average of 44 radar sightings per week were recorded during the months of August and September. Increased emphasis has been placed on the maintenance of radars to the 301st Maintenance Battalion, resulting in a greatly reduced radar down-time.

(5) Counterintelligence Section

(a) During the reporting period, the Counterintelligence Section continued to provide the division with intelligence support in the areas of sabotage, espionage, subversion, personnel security and physical security. Seven cases of possible espionage, five cases of security violations, six cases of possible disaffection and five cases involving Fitz Carson Scouts, daily hire civilians and security clearances were investigated by the section.

(b) The FBI Section continued to validate security clearances within the division. The office performed a total of 785 FBI actions: 375 cryptic accesses were granted; 589 USArmy checks were made; 3792 local file checks were conducted; 70 AS and 550 requests were processed; 478 SECRET, INTERN, SECRET, TF SECRET and HIERARCHICAL CLEARANCES were granted; five FBI cases were handled; 1362 new personnel were processed; and 1312 clearances were validated.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne),
Period Ending 31 October 1970. RG 318, RG 65 (II) (U)

(a) During the reporting period, a total of 119 operations involving
safe openings, recovery of lost combinations, combination changes and lock and
safe repair were conducted. The Counterintelligence Section also provided a
DSAE (Defense Against Sound Equipment) trained agent who conducted a preliminary
survey of the DEC.

(6) G2 Plans/Order of Battle Section. The G2 Plans/Order of Battle Section
continued to monitor, analyze and report the enemy situation throughout Northern
Military Region 1. Continuing emphasis was placed on the timely dissemination of
the collected intelligence to all consumers. Change 4 to the Order of Battle
Handbook was published during the reporting period. An addition was made to the
Division Collection Plan in order to present collection agencies with 101st
Airborne Division (Airborne) essential elements of information (EEI). The Order
of Battle section assisted O-5 in preparing a handbook on enemy units to be used
in targeting psychological operations.

(7) Interrogation Section. During the reporting period, the IPW Section,
101st Military Intelligence Company (Divisional), processed six prisoners of
war (four NVA/PW; two VC/PW), one VC Ho Chi Minh, and 34 batches of enemy documents
captured by units of the 101st Airborne Division (Airborne). In addition, 58
prisoners of war (1NVA/PW, 17 VC/PW), two VC/, and 13 ralliers (eight NVA/HC,
five VC/HC), and an unknown number of enemy document batches from ARVN units in
the tactical area were processed.

(b) Weather

(a) August

The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 4.3 inches which is
0.6 inches more than expected. Thunderstorm activity was higher than normal
with 10 thunderstorm days recorded over the coastal plain and 15 recorded
over the mountains. No ceilings less than 1000 feet were recorded over the
coastal plain. Fog was recorded on four days, but visibility was restricted
for only a few hours each day. Maximum temperatures were two degrees higher
than normal, with an average maximum temperature of 95 degrees Fahrenheit.
Minimum temperatures remained at their seasonal average of 77 degrees Fahrenheit.

The bad weather restricted airborne operations on three days during August. Operations by the 2d Sqdn (Aircraft) 17th Cavalry were delayed on 7 and 8 August by
bad weather. On 18 August, rain and limited visibility caused cancellation of
18 TAC Air sorties and one company-sized assault.

(b) September

The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 16.3 inches, which was
about an inch more than normal.
Thunderstorm activity was above normal with 10 thunderstorm days recorded over the coastal plain and 20 over the mountains. Ceilings less than 1000 feet were observed on six days. Ceilings less than 300 feet occurred on four days. Fog occurred on three days, but visibility was restricted for only a few hours each day. Maximum temperatures were four degrees higher than normal with an average temperature of 92 degrees Fahrenheit. Minimum temperatures remained near their seasonal average of 75 degrees Fahrenheit.

2 Airmobile operations were restricted for only three days during September. High winds and clouds restricted aerial reconnaissance of the division reconnaissance zone on 2 September. High winds and clouds restricted aerial reconnaissance and movement in the southern and western portions of the AO on 27 September. On 30 September, heavy rain, low ceilings and high winds caused the cancellation of three battalion-size moves.

(a) October

1 The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 47.19 inches which is approximately 25 inches above normal. Thunderstorm activity was lower than normal with two thunderstorm days recorded over the coastal plain and one over the mountains. Ceilings less than 1000 feet were observed on 14 days. Ceilings less than 300 feet were observed on 1 day. Fog occurred on 16 days and occasionally lasted the entire day. Both maximum and minimum temperatures were two degrees lower than normal. Maximum temperature averaged 81 degrees Fahrenheit and minimum temperature averaged 70 degrees Fahrenheit.

2 During October airmobile operations were restricted for thirteen days and were cancelled on four other days. On 1-3, 19-22, and 26-31 October, persistent low clouds, high winds, and heavy rains restricted use of divisional aircraft assets. impending typhoon conditions halted operations on 15, 16, 24 and 25 October.

(d) Precipitation Data in Inches (Coastal Lowlands).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Personnel

(1) Chaplain. During this period the religious program of the division has been carried on without notable problems. All division and units have been provided with chaplain coverage.
Operational Report - 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, 12 ZULU Yd

The availability of air transportation continues to be the key to the success of the program. A total of 1,754 religious services were conducted with attendance of 59,361.

(2) Finance. During the reporting period, the division finance office continued the use of Mobile Finance Teams to provide full spectrum finance services to personnel located on fire support bases. The team periodically visits fire support bases, permitting personnel to benefit from services such as partial payments, allotment changes, sale of treasury checks, collection for savings deposit program, and acceptance of pay complaints. Conversion of military payment certificates to series 692 was initiated on 7 October. The 101st Military Police Company assisted division finance in the initial notification process and provided security throughout conversion operations. Conversion was completed with no significant difficulties.

(3) Staff Judge Advocate. Court-martial and Article 15 statistics for the reporting period are as follows:

1. General courts-martial cases tried - 8
2. Special courts-martial cases tried - 137
3. Summary courts-martial cases tried - 3
4. Article 15's - 1265
5. Bad conduct special courts-martial cases tried - 9
6. Court-martial and Article 15's involving command interest offenses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>GMG</th>
<th>SPGM</th>
<th>SPGM-BCD</th>
<th>ART 15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Currency manipulations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackmarket activities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Narcotics</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marijuana</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Offenses against SVN civilians:
   a. Personal
      i. 0
   b. Property
      i. 0

(3) Key personnel roster as of 31 October 1970 and changes in command and staff assignments which occurred during the reporting period.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

MG John J. Hamnessay

BG Sidney B. Berry

BG Glenn R. Smith promoted to Brigadier General Sep 27

COL Hugh A. Macdonald

COL Paul F. Gorman

COL Walter H. Root

COL Benjamin L. Harrison

COL David E. Johnson

COL Lee E. Sumrall

LTC (P) E. P. Davis

LTC C. F. Barlow succeeded LTC C. L. Hooton, Jr. 26 Oct

MAJ E. S. Johnson succeeded LTC J. S. Crumen 14 Sep

LTC J. P. Young

LTC C. M. Kicklighter succeeded MAJ F. Vanterson 29 Aug

LTC H. Varouil succeeded MAJ W. H. Kincaid 7 Aug

LTC G. Jackson succeeded LTC J. R. Klugh 1 Sep

LTC A. Day

LTC J. Lebedowski

LTC Naivarz

LTC R. S. Hawley succeeded LTC C. W. Welborn 11 Sep

LTC W. J. Falker

LTC J. F. Smolinski succeeded LTC G. E. Keys Jr. 16 Aug

LTC T. K. Minix

LTC G. R. Narcotzos succeeded LTC D. A. Yoder 8 Aug

CO, 1st Bn (Amb) 327th Inf
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Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, ROG CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

CO, 2d Bn (Amm) 327th Inf
LTC J. J. Garda succeeded LTC E. F. Pickett 1 Sep

CO, 2d Bn (Amm) 502d Inf
LTC C. J. Shaw

CO, 1st Bn (Amm) 501st Inf
LTC A. G. Dister succeeded LTC T. S. Aaron 28 Sep

CO, 2d Bn (Amm) 501st Inf
LTC M. A. Boos succeeded LTC O. W. Livingston Jr. 20 Oct

CO, 1st Bn (Amm) 502d Inf
LTC R. N. Lang succeeded LTC A. E. West 16 Sep

CO, 1st Bn (Amm) 506th Inf
LTC B. B. Porter

CO, 2d Bn (Amm) 506th Inf
LTC J. C. Bard

CO, 3d Bn (Amm) 167th Inf
LTC R. J. Sutton succeeded LTC L. G. Bland 26 Oct

CO, 3d Bn (Amm) 506th Inf
LTC J. E. Martling

CO, 2d Bn (Amm) 11th Arty
LTC R. J. Burke

CO, 2d Bn (Amm) 319th Arty
LTC R. S. Keropal succeeded LTC W. A. Walker 15 Oct

CO, 2d Bn (Amm) 320th Arty
MAJ (F) H. H. Brandt succeeded LTC A. B. Davis 26 Oct

CO, 1st Bn (Amm) 321st Arty
LTC J. L. Zorn succeeded LTC A. A. Ely Jr. 15 Aug

CO, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty) 77th Arty (Amm)
LTC G. L. Nowalk

CO, 2d Sqdn (Amm) 17th Cav
LTC R. F. Molinelli

CO, 101st Avn Bn (Airlift Hel) (Amm)
LTC W. N. peachey

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f. Logistics.

(1) General. Logistic support for all division operations was provided through DISCOM forward service support elements (SSS), using the area support concept. Throughout the period, a conscious effort was made to offset the reduction of blade time resulting from adverse weather conditions. DISCOM continued to provide civic action support in District II, HUE City and to assist THUA THIEN Province in upgrading the capabilities of the Sector Maintenance and Direct Support Logistic Center (SMASLSC). At the end of the reporting period, five projects remain to be completed.

(2) DISCOM continued to provide Super Contact Teams to units returning from operations for refresher training. The number of battalion or company size marshalling operations conducted during the reporting period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Bde</th>
<th>Complete</th>
<th>Partial</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/501</td>
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<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Operational Report — Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, ROG CSFOR-68 (R2) (3) 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2d Bde</th>
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<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/502</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/501</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/506</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/327</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>56</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3d Bde</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/187</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/506</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/506</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) The 5th Transportation Battalion (Aircraft Maintenance and Supply) (Ambt) continued to provide direct support maintenance for repair of the 474 aircraft authorized the division.

(a) During the reporting period, 684 aircraft were received on work orders from divisional aviation units and 633 were released back to the units. On 16 September 1970, the battalion was given overall responsibility for supplying support for the conversion of the CH47 Super C aircraft back to the normal CH47 configuration, requiring the change out of 54 T55-L11 engines, and replacement with 54 T55-L7G engines. Conversion was begun on 17 Oct 70 and by the end of this reporting period 17 aircraft conversions had been completed. The conversion program has gone smoothly and all aircraft are expected to be completed by 3 Nov 70. The battalion also performed its first 18th IFP on a CH47 aircraft, during this period. The IFP was accomplished by contract personal assigned to B Company, 5th Transportation Battalion, during the period 4-29 Oct 70, requiring 25 days and 2200 manhours.

(b) Documentation, classification, and retrograde of turned-in equipment and supplies has kept both DSU's working around the clock. In October, the battalion retrograded 5,322 serviceable lines valued at $422,232.67 and 1,145 lines of unserviceable supplies valued at $5,159,782.92. The present authorized stockage list of the two tech supplies totals approximately 11,700 lines. The battalion processed 40,583 requisitions during this period.

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The 301st Maintenance Battalion (Amph) continued to provide direct support maintenance to divisional units. A recapitulation of support maintenance activity during the reporting period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMODITY</th>
<th>BEGIN</th>
<th>END</th>
<th>AVERAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* % deadline of total authorized

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JOBS RECEIVED</th>
<th>JOBS COMPLETED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>6316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>1806</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Technical Supply Activities. The 301st Maintenance Battalion technical supply continued to process an average of approximately 22,153 requests per month. Demand satisfaction has fluctuated somewhat on a weekly basis with an average for the period of 59%, while demand accommodation remained almost constant, averaging 89%. Demand satisfaction reached a high of 60%, while demand accommodation has been maintained at 79.7%. Receipt of major assemblies has increased greatly, resulting in a low deadline rate in each major commodity area.

(b) M16A1 barrel exchange program. During the quarter the battalion up-graded 2,164 M16A1 rifles. Over 18,500 barrels have been inspected and over 4,000 old barrels have been replaced.

(5) The 426th Supply and Service Battalion (Amph) continued to provide basic supply support to the division by air and ground means. The battalion rigged external sling loads of Class I, II, III, IV and V requiring 5,560.
Operational Report — Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RG 23908–65 (22) (U)

air-sorties during the reporting period. Battalion trucks drove 55,003 miles
during the quarter, delivering 2,975 passengers, 1544 short tons of freight,
1,196,794 gallons of water and 277,868 gallons of fuel.

g. Civil Affairs

(1) Pacification and development activities in Thua Thien Province
continued at a high rate during the reporting period. In these three months,
77 projects were completed, and at the end of the period 62 were in pro-
gress. The overall effort of the division is directed toward the achieve-
ment of the national objectives outlined in the Thua Thien Province Pacifi-
cation and Development Plan, 1970. All efforts are closely coordinated
with GVN officials, and all operations are undertaken at the request of the
province chief. The province Civic Action Priority List, developed at the
hamlet, village and district level and consolidated and approved at the
province level, serves as the guideline in the selection of projects to
be undertaken.

(a) During the period, phase I of the "Vietnamization" program has
concluded with considerable success. Between 15 August and 8 October,
complete responsibility for control of cement issue for military civic
action projects was passed by 101st Am Div (Ambl) 05 to Thua Thien Pro-
vince Property Book Officer. Additionally, combined district inspection
of all military civic action projects in the province was undertaken.
This resulted in identifying weaknesses, improving reporting, increasing
impetus for completing projects, and establishing closer ties between
province, district, village and hamlet officials.

(b) Phase II of the civic action "Vietnamization" program will involve
the passage of responsibility for the control and allocation of all civic
action supplies now stored at the G5 warehouse to the Thua Thien Province
Property Book Officer.

The decision to move into phase II was based on the successful assumption
of responsibility by province for receiving, controlling and issuing the
2,000 bags of cement moved from Camp Eagle during phase I above. Excel-
lent cooperation and understanding which exists between Thua Thien Province
officials and their GVN advisors has made this progress possible.

(2) The Phu Laiang Hospital was dedicated and opened for outpatient
care of expectant mothers during the reporting period. Work on this facili-
ty, which will have an inpatient capacity of 200, is in response to a
request from the Thua Thien Province Chief and the Province Senior Advisor.
Materials issued from the G5 warehouse in support of the hospital include:
75 bags of cement, 24 rolls of barbed wire, 32 sheets of roofing tin, 160
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CMOR-55 (R2) (U)

engineer stakes, 900 feet of rebar, two rolls of reinforcing wire, 12 pieces of 12" culvert, 24 pieces of 24" culvert, 126 board feet of 4"x10" lumber, 36 board feet of 4"x6" lumber, and eight board feet of 4"x4" lumber. Additionally, from the 101st Am Div (Ambl) PSYOP/Civic Action AID Fund, seven Vietnamese carpenters were hired to construct furniture in the G5 warehouse for the hospital. So far 40 beds, six desks and six benches have been delivered. Six more desks, six benches and 60 night stands are presently under construction. These items will be delivered to Phu Luong Hospital upon completion. The estimated labor cost for the complete project is 149,980 $VN.

(3) Significant progress was made in the resettlement of 200 Montagnard families (607 people) who had immigrated to Thua Thien Province from Quang Tri Province. A decision was made by province officials to relocate 200 Montagnard families from Ou Chanh IV Hamlet (ID 747166) in Ham Hoa District to Dien Bang (ID 746136) also in Ham Hoa. Coordination for the operation was affected by the CORPS War Victims Advisor, the Ham Hoa District Senator Advisor, the division, and the 5th and 7th Platoons of the 29th Civil Affairs Company. Land was cleared by the 27th Engineer Bn and framing lumber for house construction was procured from XIV Corps and delivered by the 7th Platoon. Five GP medium tents were delivered by the 7th Platoon for use as temporary shelter. The 7th Platoon has continued to deliver framing lumber and scrap plywood from the G5 warehouse, and also delivered 500 ammo boxes which were assembled by the 35 of the 1/302 Inf Bn. To date 226 pieces of framing lumber (4"x4"x14' and 2"x4"x14'), 500 ammo boxes and 2,300 board feet of scrap plywood have been delivered. Province has provided tin roofing for the houses. A total of 100 two-family dwellings are planned, and to date 21 houses have been completely finished.

(4) Thua Thien Province has continued to make steady progress in its Return to Village (RV) program. Phase II of the 1970 RV program started on 1 July 1970 and ended 31 October 1970. During the period 1 August - 31 October 1970, a total of 448 families (2,728 people) were returned to their ancestral homes. Of these, 309 families (1,507 people) have already received their RV payment (10 sheets of tin and 7,500 $VN). The great majority of the returnees have, since 1 August, been resettled in Phu Tho District. A few have returned to hamlets in Quang Dien District. The Phu Tho RV was directed by the 7th Platoon of the 29th Civil Affairs Company, which secured trucks from province and the 2d Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for the move. To date, Thua Thien has resettled 64,226 of the 85,114 refugees during and after Tet of 1968.

(5) The 501st Signal Bn completed a poultry house in Hue City, chickens imported from Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, and hatcheries in the Haigon area will soon be supplementing the diets of the inhabitants of the An Hoa Old
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RGOS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Folks Home. Present GVN programs provide only 15 cents a day for food for these people, and a dietary protein deficiency exists. During the reporting period a poultry house was completed on the grounds of the home. Some 200 chicks per cycle will be purchased when one day old at a cost of between $5 and $10 GVN. After 10 weeks, some will be sold at a profit of about $6 GVN per chick, and the rest will be kept for consumption. Those sold will keep the project self-sustaining while the meat from those consumed will alleviate the protein shortage.

(6) During the period of this report a total of 994 MEDCAPs were held and 19,644 medical and dental patients were examined.

(7) Major projects completed during the reporting period:

(a) Loc Son Village bridge repair (YD 930008), Phu Loc.
(b) Co Bau Hamlet school repair (YD 705277), Hoa Trung.
(c) Thong Bang Hamlet bridge (YD 768143), Nam Hoa.
(d) Hai Trung Hai Hamlet village office (YD 965175), Phu Thu.
(e) Van Trinh Hamlet school (YD 515402), Phong Dien.
(f) Dong Lao Hamlet school furniture (YD 385012), Phu Loc.
(g) An Luong Dong Hamlet school furniture (YD 937057), Phu Loc.
(h) Phu Quong Hamlet market repair (YD 145001), Phu Loc.
(i) Ke Non Village school repair (YD 568464), Hoa Trung.
(j) District HQ - Hue II conference room (YD 769237), Hue II.
(k) Phuoc Loc Hamlet road repair (YD 135015), Phu Loc.
(l) Lieu Quan Hamlet school construction (YD 912352), Phong Dien.
(m) Pho Track Hamlet school construction (YD 5062437), Phong Dien.
(n) Luong Mai Hamlet school construction (YD 525440), Phong Dien.
(o) An Le Hamlet aid station (YD 625308), Phong Dien.
(p) Con Son Hamlet pipeline (YD 560340), Phong Dien.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CEFOR-65 (82) (7)

(q) An Hoa Hamlet poultry house (ID 742225), Phu Loc.
(r) Thuy Dong Hamlet footbridge (ID 191004), Phu Loc.
(s) Loc Hai Village school construction (AT 890562), Phu Loc.
(t) Van Za Hamlet school repair (ID 859159), Huong Tra.
(u) Trach Nhi Hamlet school construction (ID 579396), Phong Dien.
(v) Loc Bon Village market repair (ID 927094), Phu Loc.
(w) Tan Nguyen Hamlet school repair (ID 527346), Phong Dien.

(8) During the reporting period 77 projects were completed. This number
includes 13 schools, one dispensary, two administrative buildings, 52 walls,
three bridges, and six others.

(9) The division currently has 62 civic action projects underway.
These include four schools, eight dispensaries, two administrative buildings,
one library, 21 walls, one footbridge, seven markets, eight washstands, four
road repairs, one pier, and five others.

(10) Commodities issued during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>766 bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin</td>
<td>277 sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>49,021 board feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrap lumber</td>
<td>6,940 board feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nails</td>
<td>146 kilos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masonite</td>
<td>8 sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paint</td>
<td>18 gals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>198 sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammo boxes</td>
<td>4,259 boxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culvert</td>
<td>214 sections</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcing wire</td>
<td>3 rolls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penoprime</td>
<td>18 gals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dirt fill</td>
<td>4,200 cubic yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbed wire</td>
<td>36 rolls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lugr stakes</td>
<td>306 stakes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand bags</td>
<td>2,500 bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tint</td>
<td>7 kilos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lime</td>
<td>25 bgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand</td>
<td>7 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screen</td>
<td>9 rolls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damaged pallets</td>
<td>75 pallets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>18,414 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>1,735 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap</td>
<td>206 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical supplies</td>
<td>262 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desks</td>
<td>120 desks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benches</td>
<td>120 benches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackboards</td>
<td>46 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beds</td>
<td>40 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School kits</td>
<td>50 kits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English books</td>
<td>40 books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swing</td>
<td>1 swing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seesaw</td>
<td>1 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firewood</td>
<td>1 trailer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RM S 03451-65 (E) (U)

h. Psychological Operations.

(1) Four separate atrocities were perpetrated by the enemy against
the local populace of Tua Chien Province prior to daybreak on 2 August 70.
Detachment L, 7th PSKOP Bn, OFCOM to 2d Brigade, 101st Abn Div (Ambl), re-
acted to these incidents by immediately coordinating with the districts
involved and deployed their ground teams to the sites. Upon arriving, they
were met by representatives of the Vietnamese Information Service and togeth-
er collected the anti-GVN and anti-PWMAF leaflets that had been distributed
by the enemy. Immediately upon arrival, the ground loudspeaker teams began
broadcasting pro-GVN messages and the effect of the VC propaganda was effec-
tively negated. Photographs and tape recorded interviews were made for pos-
sible future use.

(2) Two quick reaction aerial broadcast missions were conducted in
support of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) on 12 and 14 Aug 70. The broadcasts were
directed at elements of the 3d Bn, 9th NVA Regiment which had sustained 199
KIA, 17 WIs and five rations within a three day period.

(3) A 2LT railler was received by a reconnaissance element of the 1st
Inf Div (ARVN) on 12 Aug 70 in the vicinity of FS/08 O'REILLY. For the fol-
lowing six days, the Ho Chanh was exploited solely as a source of current
intelligence on enemy activities in the area. On 18 Aug 70, the Ho Chanh
made a Chin Ho tape directed at his former unit, 6th Company, K-10 Bn,
6th NVA Regiment, where the Ho Chanh had been a political commissar since
the unit's arrival in South Vietnam. The tape was used against the 6th Regt
during the period of 19-20 and 23-24 August 1970. No positive results
from the missions were noted except for an increased amount of hostile fire
directed at PSKOP aircraft. A translation of the Ho Chanh's tape follows:

"Dear comrades of KI/6 Co. Can you identify me? I am LT Le Ba Que,
Political Commissar of KI/6 Co. Do you remember that the Bn CO (Dong)
and the Political Commissar (Co Van Seu) told us many times about plans to
encircle the enemy? After several days of fighting, do you see any of our
comrades who fought with us in the front? What has happened? I hope any
survivors still on the 652 mountain (FSB O'REILLY) become clearheaded enough
to understand the hollow promise of our cadre. I advise you to allow your-
self the opportunity to rally to the GVN like me or go back home, leaving
the battlefield. Do you know that no one buried Minh, Phi, Link, Chieu or
Seng of CI/KI who died on top of 652 mountain?"

(4) On 16 Aug 70, the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) captured an NVA FPC from the
5th Co, 2d Bn, 9th NVA Regt. After interrogation of the FNC and review of
captured documents pertaining to the same battalion, the division PSKOP
section initiated a three day campaign against the 2d Bn, 9th NVA Regt
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RG 350 For 65 (R2) (U)

during the period 23–25 August 1970. The themes used during this campaign were as follows:

(a) Your Leaders Lie.
(b) Sick and Wounded.
(c) Food and Medical Treatment.
(d) Allied Air and Ground Fire Power.
(e) Helicopters and 352's.
(f) Malaria.

(5) During the period 7–15 Aug, the 4th Detachment ground teams provided 43 broadcast hours in support of the village and hamlet elections held on 16 Aug 70. A detailed breakdown of the districts covered follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Broadcast Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haong Tr</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phong Dien</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haong Thuy</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Thu</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nam Hoa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Urging voters to get out and vote during the national elections held on 30 August 1970 was the theme of a joint US/VN PCKP campaign conducted during the period 19–29 Aug. Again support was provided by the 4th Det, 7th PCKP Bu. The program was designed to instill a feeling of democracy in the people and to get them to the polls with a reassurance of their personal safety. A detailed breakdown of hours by district was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Broadcast Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haong Thuy</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Loc</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, 208 KRF08-65 (22) (V)

Phu Quoc
6

Bang Tra
14

Nam Hoa
17

Phong Dien
29

Phu Tan
8

Phong Son
10

Phong Lieu
1

Total
112

(7) The Volunteer Informant Program (VIP) received greater emphasis
within the division at the onset of the northeastern monsoon. The program is
designed to restrict the VC/NVA from gaining food, shelter and control within
the lowland villages and hamlets. In coordination with province officials,
the ground loudspeaker and audio-visual teams, in direct support of the
division, broadcasted more than 40 hours of the VIP theme from 1-15 Sep 70.
On some teams distributed over 30,000 reward handouts in the lowland
districts.

(9) A change in brigade IAs within the lowlands was affected at
the termination of Operation TEXAS STAR, aligning the four northern districts
of the province with the 3d Bde. With this change of alignment, two ground
loudspeaker teams were transferred from the 2d Bde to the 3rd Bde. The change
was completed on 20 Sep 70.

(10) In response to a quick reaction leaflet request from the 1st Bde,
23 PSTOP printed 10,000 leaflets on 26 Sep 70. The leaflets were dropped
the following day by the brigade. The leaflet was targeted against the 5th
NVA unit with a rally appeal theme.

(11) On 21 September, the division was visited by XXIV Corps and NR
PULMiMA staff members in lieu of the Corps Quarterly PSTOP/POLMAR Conference.
A 3d briefing was presented covering the 101st Abn Div (Ambt) activities
in civil affairs, civic action and psychological operations. The briefing
concluded with an aerial broadcast and "Earlybird" demonstration.

(12) A Hoi Chanh rallied to the village chief of Quang Phuoc, Quang
Dien District at 1:00 hrs, 6 Oct 70. He was the Military Prosecturizing Chief
for Quang Phuoc Village and a member of the Quang Dian Special Action Unit
(JOASAC). Upon notification of the Hoi Chanh, the 3d Bde requested leaflets
to exploit the information received from the raider. The leaflets were re-
quested through XXIV Corps G2 PSTOP, developed and printed by the 7th PSTOP
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Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCE CSFOR-65 (R2) (I)

In, and disseminated by the 9th SOS over the target within sixteen hours. The Hoi Chanh led government forces to numerous bunkers in northern Thin Thien Province, accounting for six enemy NVA, five FNW, and capture of individual weapons, ammo and medical supplies.

(12) A combined operation including the 1st Bde and 3d Regt (ARVN) was supported by division PSYOP and 1st Bde PSYOP. Four priority leaflets requested by CO 1st Bde were developed by 7th PSYOP for dissemination by the 9th SOS during the operation. The leaflets were rally appeals and instructions on how to rally within the specific area of operations. Information obtained from documents captured during this operation was used to target known NVA units by name and location. The 1st Bde provided a sketch of the area, related to a NVA map, and erected red beacons to instruct potential ralliers where to rally safely.

(13) At request of the 1st Bde, division PSYOP developed a quick reaction (QR) leaflet, focusing on the "ultra-modern" treatment given to all FNWs. The leaflet was targeted against the 4th Co, 510th Bn, 5th NVA Regt. This leaflet was the first of a series of leaflets targeted against the 510th Bn by the 1st Bde. A great majority of these were priority leaflets that were printed by 7th PSYOP Bn and dropped in conjunction with aerial broadcasts with the same general themes. The campaign is continuing at the end of this reporting period.

(14) At the request of the Assistant Province Advisor for PSYOP, the division PSYOP section on 14 Oct 70 dropped 1,000,000 leaflets publicizing the Voluntary Informant Program and Phoenix Program to the people of the lowland areas of Thin Thien Province. A follow-up drop was accomplished on 22 Oct by 2d Bde PSYOP, with another 1,000,000 leaflets with the same themes in the same areas.

(15) In order to publicize President Nixon's new peace proposal, division PSYOP requested a leaflet summarizing his five points. The leaflet was printed by the 7th PSYOP Bn and was dropped exclusively in the canopy to point out to the NVA the unwillingness of RVN to make peace.

(16) In order to inform the people of Phu Loc District of a new curfew going into effect on 15 Oct, the 2d Bde PSYOP section requested a leaflet to be developed and printed by division PSYOP. Twenty thousand handbills were turned over to 2d Bde and were distributed the following week by 4th Det, 7th PSYOP Bn ground teams.

1. Medical

(1) During this reporting period the tactical deployment remained the same as in the previous quarter with Company A in direct support of 1st Bde, Company B in direct support of 2d Bde, Company C in support of the 3d Bde and MGs and Spt Company in support of division rear units located at Camp Eagle.
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Period Ending 31 October 1970, RG 133 (R5) (U)

(2) Medical statistical recapitulation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Co A</th>
<th>Co B</th>
<th>Co C</th>
<th>Set Co</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patients seen at clearing station</td>
<td>2,097</td>
<td>2,070</td>
<td>1,860</td>
<td>2,609</td>
<td>8,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental patients</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>2,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admissions</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferred</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recapitulation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Co A</th>
<th>Co B</th>
<th>Co C</th>
<th>Set Co</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lethal</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>1,096</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Medical Diseases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>Co A</th>
<th>Co B</th>
<th>Co C</th>
<th>Set Co</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOOS</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin Diseases</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>1,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/P</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot problems</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastroenteritis</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heat Injuries</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med-evac missions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) The Air Ambulance Platoon continued its mission to provide aeromedical evacuation support to the 101st Airborne Division. The majority of support came from Camp Eagle base camp; however, for most of the period, two HH-9 air ambulances have been stationed at Camp Evans to provide quicker response to the northern regions of the area. During this reporting period the one aircraft which had been placed with Division Flight Standards, was
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(5) Accident/incident experience in the 101st Aviation Group for this reporting period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accidents</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced landings</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precautionary landings</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat damaged A/C</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Engineer.

(1) On 6 August, Company A assumed the rehabilitation project at FS/03 BASTOGNE, clearing the old 105mm artillery area and cutting slots for pre-fabricated bunkers. As FS/08 HAUREEN was closed, Company A removed the bunkers intact from that firebase by air and emplaced them at BASTOGNE. Based upon an estimate of the engineer and security effort required to keep route 547 open from FS/08 BASTOGNE to FS/08 VEGHEL during the northeast monsoon, it was decided that VEGHEL would be closed before the wet season set in, but would be kept operational for as long as weather permitted. Accordingly, a program was developed to retrograde bunkers from VEGHEL to BASTOGNE by road and by air. Company A executed the program at both ends, dismantling and preparing bunkers for lift out at VEGHEL, and reconstructing and emplacing bunkers at BASTOGNE. The program began at a slow pace in mid-August and accelerated rapidly toward the end of the month as the rainy season approached. A total of 65 bunkers were back-hauled by air and ground operations. On 9 August, Company C, having completed the mess hall at FS/08 BINGHAM, began construction of a mess bunker at BASTOGNE. The structure, 20' x 16', with a concrete floor and built-in drains, was brought near completion by Company C on 1 September and turned over to Company A for finishing touches. On 14 August, Company C began reconstruction of FSB JACK, unoccupied since early May. JACX was constructed as a two-battery FS/08, incorporating all the lessons learned in firebase construction during the spring and early summer and incorporating a feature not often used in the division area of operations: a perimeter berm. The project was planned and executed by Company C. In early August, enemy mining activity increased, particularly along Route 547 between FS/08s BASTOGNE and VEGHEL. As a result, daily minisweeps were resumed on the more secure roads and sweeping procedures in all companies were reviewed and adjusted to meet the challenge. Company A, conducting the sweep east from VEGHEL toward BASTOGNE, and non-divisional engineers sweeping west from BASTOGNE, frequently found mines of varying types.
Throughout August, Company C worked at FS/GBs LOS BANOS and TOMAHAWK clearing mine fields, erecting wire, building bunkers, and improving the access roads at those locations. On 23 August, one platoon from Company B joined Company C in the construction of FS/GB JACK. Also on 23 August, FS/GB CLADDASER was closed, and the 64 bunkers replaced by Company B. All defenses developed through its six-week occupation were left intact. Similarly, KATHER was closed and left intact on 21 August as the division adapted its monsoon posture. On 29 August, Company C opened and began reconstruction of FS/GB BRICK. Company C, on 1 September, began construction of a raft for use in Lang Co Bay as a sensor-readout station, a radar and a quad fifty-caliber machine gun platform. A float made of steel pontoons, "New cubes," was procured, and Company C placed a deck on the float which measured 22' x 77' and constructed a 10' x 30' bunker on the float for living and working space for the personnel manning the facility. Throughout August, all lettered companies performed numerous landing zone construction missions in support of the brigades and the cavalry squadron. On 4 September, Headquarters Company began construction of the Muong Thuy Road, a civic action project, to improve the existing trail between Route 4-1 and the bridge built by Company C in the same area several months before. During July and August, base development and other support projects were accomplished in large numbers. Typical of these were construction of a post exchange storage facility at Camp Evans, billets, and office for the 1st 3d commander at Camp Eagle, 3d 3d officer's mess at Camp Evans, repair of the SENS rappel tower at Camp Evans, improvement of Company C and 2d 3d area in Phu Bai, help with and road maintenance at Camp Eagle, and many other earthwork and minor vertical construction projects.

(2) As Operation JEFFERSON CLEM began, work continued on all active FS/GBs with bunker construction and preparation of the bases for the coming monsoon rains. Monsoon preparations included placing rock on interior and access roads to maintain trafficability; shaping roads to create proper drainage; cleaning and lining of drainage ditches to promote effective runoff of water; cleaning, replacement, and addition of culverts and construction of proper headwells; improvement of drainage around bunkers and other structures; and the use of various other techniques. All bunkers scheduled for retrograde from FS/GB CIMIN, had been removed by mid-September to STARGOOG and BIRMINGHAM. Company A began bunker construction and culvert emplacement at BIRMINGHAM on 2 September, and moved into monsoon preparations there as the month progressed. Company C completed initial construction of the raft for Lang Co Bay on 9 September. On 23 September further work was begun to widen the roof of the raft-bunker for a helipad. The roof expansion was not completed by the end of the month due to material shortages. The raft, dubbed the "SS Screaming Eagle," was operational in the Lang Co Bay from 9 September, but was plagued by leakage problems, requiring continual attention from battalion personnel. Company C began bunker construction at FS/GB TOMAHAWK on 12 September and at FS/GB ASHLAI on 13 September; both projects included a 40' x 32' mess bunker.
At RAKKASAH in late August and early September, Company B added eleven 10' x 24' and three 9' x 12' bunkers and other miscellaneous structures to the base and through September expended much effort in monsoon preparations at that location. On 19 September, Company B constructed one bunker at the An Lo Bridge. Company A supported the reopening of OP Checkmate on 16 September, and expended the position into a bridge forward command post complex, clearing fields of fire and cutting slots for bunkers. Eight 8' x 12' bunkers were flown into location, and completion of the bunkers on 2 October marked the end of the project. Several artillery raids and short-term infantry operations were supported by Companies A and C in September; by Company A at FSB NORWAY, FSB TENNESSEE, and FSB WHIP; and Company C at FSB BAGS. In mid-September, Headquarters Company completed all work at the Sector Maintenance and Direct Support Logistic Center facility. This project took over six months. Work at Huong Thuy Road was severely hampered by rain, and the project was eventually suspended in late September. Earlier in the month, Headquarters Company replaced poles supporting radio power lines above the level of a raised dump truck bed. Company A continued the mine-sweep of Route 547 between RAKKASAH and Tan An. Work continued at Jack and Bricket. Companies B and C completed construction of the 90 bunkers at Jack on 26 September, and Company D began concentrating on monsoon preparation there. Company E, at FSB Bricket, completed construction of the 49 bunkers at that location on 28 September and also began to concentrate on monsoon preparations. Development of FSB RAKKASAH progressed well, with 90 bunkers completed at the end of the month and monsoon preparations proceeding concurrently with bunker construction. During September, both Company B at Camp Evans and also Company A at Camp Eagle accomplished the relocation of numerous 73A huts in support of tenant units at those camps. Company B performed landing zone construction in support of the second and third Brigades and the 22 Sqdn 17th Cav (Mech) during the month. Throughout September, Headquarters company concentrated their efforts to prepare roads for fire support bases for the approaching rains. Headquarters Company, grading and shaping roads and drainage areas, spreading rock, applying emulsions, repairing and replacing culverts, and filling potholes, worked day and night into October with the monsoon preparations. The move of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, and Company A into the area vacated by Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 10 in mid-September was made quickly and efficiently without any decrease in engineer support to the Division.

(3) Company C, on 1 October, began construction of a 40-foot steel stringer bridge on New Providence Road near the 5th Transportation Battalion area at Camp Eagle. The single-lane, class 60 bridge was constructed beside an existing single-lane concrete-and-steel bridge to relieve a traffic bottleneck and safety hazard at that location. The bridge was completed on 26 October. Headquarters Company completed rehabilitation of the road to OP-56 on 6 October. In early October, a period of heavy rainfall caused deterioration of roads at Camp Eagle and at some fire bases.
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Headquarters Company redoubled the effort already being put into Eagle roads, and the lettered companies, supported by headquarters equipment, worked at the firebases to repair damage and to upgrade the roads so that additional rain would not cause further deterioration. Road work included grading, compacting, paving/priming, filling with rock where necessary, installing and repairing culverts, and other assorted tasks. On 10 October, Company B began construction of latrines which were built at CAMP EVANS and lifted to FS/OB BASTogne by OH-1 aircraft. Six latrines were completed by 27 October.

Company A returned to OP CHECKMARK on 15 October for additional work on clearing fields of fire, installing defensive wire, and performing minor work on bunkers. Work at OP CHECKMARK was completed on 26 October. From 27 to 22 October, Company B replaced a large section of 60-inch culvert in the 801st Maintenance area at CAMP EVANS. Company A completed bunker construction at FS/OB BASTogne on 16 October, with a total of one hundred-seven 8' x 12' bunkers, seven 10' x 24' bunkers, and a 20' x 104' mess bunker constructed since early August. Also on 18 October, Company A began construction of four aviation turning-markers for aircraft control points outside CAMP EAGLE. The 16-foot-high structures were built in the shape of truncated pyramids with checkerboard-painted sides. On 18 October, Company C completed widening the bunker roof of the Lang Co raft. The raft continued to have leakage problems throughout October, and much work was done in an effort to solve that problem. Headquarters Company began rehabilitation of the perimeter road in Foxholt sector of CAMP EAGLE on 19 October, and on 22 October, began resurfacing the auto-rotation strip at FS/OS BIRMINGHAM.

Company C from 21 to 24 October, cleared 150 meters of an old antipersonnel mine field at FS/OB LOS HANGS, utilizing thirty-four cases of Bangalore torpedoes. On 22 October, Company A began rehabilitation of the Division Headquarters Company mess hall. Headquarters Company completed rebuilding the Hotel sector perimeter road on 23 October, and on 23 and 24 October, did additional work on the Huong Tuy road, on which work had been suspended in late September because of rain. After two days of heavy rain again caused work to cease on that civic action project. Company B, on 23 and 24 October, constructed a 10' x 24' bunker for MACV advisory personnel at the Huong Teo RF/PT compound. Throughout October, Company A continued the development of BIRMINGHAM, constructing bunkers and working on drainage problems. At the end of the month, Company A had completed 27 bunkers on that firebase. Company B continued support of FS/ObS RAILROAD and Jack, concentrating on drainage improvement and minor construction on bunkers and facilities. At JACK, Company B installed numerous culverts and placed over 500 cubic yards of rock on interior roads to improve the traffic-ability and drainage there. Company C continued bunker construction and firebase development at BRICK, ARSENAL, and TOMAHAWK, completing the mess bunker at TOMAHAWK. Mine-sweeping missions were continued on CAMP EAGLE access roads and on Route 547 between BIRMINGHAM and BASTogne.
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Company B assumed responsibility for the minesweep of the road to RAKKACHAN on 23 October and on 26 October, sustained casualties of one killed and two wounded in the performance of that mission. As the wet season set in, boat platoons supported daily operations over the entire area of operations.
Base camp construction and maintenance was performed by all lettered companies throughout October. Headquarters Company performed numerous small earth-moving tasks.

(4) The reporting period closed with the battalion continuing to provide general and direct support to the division and extensive emergency rescue and resupply for the Vietnamese during a severe flood. On 29 October, Headquarters and A Company commenced an around-the-clock debris-removing operation that saved the 616-foot Pohl bridge on Route 547. More than 5,000 pounds of explosive were used. Four boat rescue teams were dispatched during the flood. The first team, on 30 October, was airlifted to Phong Dien district and rescued 732 civilians and resupplied 3,000 more with critically needed food. The second team, on 30 October, moved overland to the Song Bo river and resupplied 3,200 civilians and two RF companies with rice and fish. The third team, on 31 October, rescued three persons and transported 300 pounds of rice to isolated civilians in Huong Thuy district. The last boat team was airlifted to Phu Zu district to provide resupply of stranded individuals.

m. Air Cavalry Operations.

(1) During the reporting period, 2d Squadron (Airmobile), 17th Cavalry continued its role of providing reconnaissance and security and was targeted in areas of known or suspected enemy activity.

(2) The Squadron, in support of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) during August, detected enemy movement and concentrations near PB/05 O'KEEFE. This early warning of enemy activity and constant support for the ARVN during August and September around O'KEEFE resulted in the eventual halt of the enemy advance. During September, the Squadron moved a forward command post to Da Nang and conducted extensive operations in the ELEPHANT VALLEY, searching for rear bases areas of the 4th and 5th Independent Regiments/ARVN. Poor weather during the last half of October restricted the Squadron's reconnaissance efforts.

(3) Results of reconnaissance during the reporting period:

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<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
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<tr>
<td>Spot Reports</td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>1,422</td>
<td>728</td>
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<td>CSWC</td>
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(4) During the quarter, Squadron medical assets have continued to be used to augment existing medical aid in Thua Thien Province. Nearly a thousand Vietnamese were treated in Squadron MEDCAPs. Three patients were taken to Hue Hospital for specialized treatment. The Squadron has set a goal of two MEDCAPs per week, thereby providing greater medical assistance to Vietnamese in District III. Currently, these MEDCAPs are established in the two villages which, according to the district chief, have the greatest need for assistance. The MEDCAPs provide not only medical assistance to the people but also medical training to the Vietnamese health workers. Each MEDCAP includes one Vietnamese health worker and a minimum of one nurse.

(5) The Squadron has a quota of 300,000 leaflets to be dropped each week to augment the leaflets dropped by the 9th SOS Support Company. Targets for the drops have been: trails, suspected base sites, areas of enemy contact, and airstrike targets.

(6) Ranger activities.

(a) Company L (Ranger) 75th Infantry, under operational control of the 2d Squadron (Airmobile) 17th Cav provides division with the capability of conducting long range reconnaissance patrols, surveillance of enemy infiltration routes and prisoner of war snatch missions when tactically feasible.

(b) During the month of August, Company L (Ranger) 75th Infantry employed Ranger teams in the vicinity of LEATHERNECK, XA 9331 and south of CANE BAY or the KUONG KUONG Valley, at XG 6090, and in the JIANG area, near XG 7090. A total of 28 teams were deployed by the company during the month. Fourteen enemy sightings were made and contact was initiated on ten occasions. As a result of these contacts, two NVA/VC were killed. The company sustained three KIA and nine WIA.

(c) During September, Co L employed Ranger teams in the A Shau Valley in the vicinity of XA 0001, and the KUONG KUONG Valley area, near XG 4090. A total of 24 teams were deployed by the company during the month. Thirteen enemy sightings were made and contact was initiated.
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By Ranger personnel on six occasions. As a result of these contacts, five M14s were killed. The company sustained one KIA.

(a) Co L deployed a total of 24 teams during the month of October. Two teams were inserted in the vicinity of Bach Ma; four teams were inserted along route 547; and the remainder were inserted in or near the Bua Gua, Hao Trang and Song Do river valleys. Ranger teams established contact with the enemy on five occasions and had visual sightings on eight occasions.

b. Artillery.

(1) The 101st Airborne Division Artillery (Airmobile) provided close and continuous fire support to maneuver units throughout the reporting period. Light howitzer battalions continued to provide direct support to the infantry brigades with the 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Art (105) in direct support of the 1st Bde; the 1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Art (105) in direct support of the 2nd Bde; and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Art (105) in direct support of the 3d Bde. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Art (155) and the 4th Bn (Aerial Art) 77th Art (Ambl) continued to provide general support artillery fires to the division. Additionally, Btry A, 4th Bn (Aerial Art), 77th Art (Ambl) was general support reinforcing 1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Art; Btry B, 4th Bn (Aerial Art), 77th Art (Ambl) was general support reinforcing 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Art; and Btry C, 4th Bn (Aerial Art), 77th Art (Ambl) was general support reinforcing 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Art.

(2) The following 106th Artillery Group units provided heavy artillery support to allied forces in Northern Military Region 1. The 1st Bn (8"/175mm SP), 39th Art, general support reinforcing 1st Inf Div Art (ARVN); 1st Bn (8"/175mm SP), 33d Art, general support reinforcing 101st Arm Div Art (Ambl); 2d Bn (8"/175mm SP), 94th Art, general support reinforcing 5th Bn (155 SP), 4th Art.

(3) Btry D, 1st Bn (AW, SP), 44th Art, Btry G (AW), 55th Art, and Btry G (SLT), 29th Art, whose parent units are general support to XXIV Corps, were deployed in Northern Military Region 1 to provide support for base and bridge security.

(4) Artillery fires were employed throughout the division area of operation in response to sensor activations, radar detections, aerial surveillance, and intelligence. Artillery support for ARVN/GVN forces was provided through direct coordination between collocated ARVN and US artillery fire direction centers or through liaison officers or US advisors with ARVN/GVN forces. US and ARVN artillery units continued to employ coordinated fires in support of combined operations.
(5) During the reporting period, the 4th BN (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl) played an increasingly important part in the support of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN). The number of contact fire missions flown in support of ARVN units greatly outweighed the number flown in support of US forces. A close and effective liaison effort between the battalion and the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) produced commendable results. Through classes and experiences, Aerial Rocket Artillery sections have maintained a ratio of one enemy killed per 16 rockets expended, in support of ARVN units.

(6) During the northeast monsoon season, emphasis is placed on taking advantage of all division aircraft assets to maintain visual reconnaissance in the division AO. In expectation of receiving an increase of visual reconnaissance missions, Battery A (Aviation), 377th Artillery (Ambl) commenced an extensive training program in early August. Pilots are trained by experienced aviators who are fully qualified in low level flight with the OH-6A aircraft. Individuals must volunteer for these missions prior to starting the training program. This training is thorough and has proven successful in that Btry A has not experienced any accidents during low level visual reconnaissance missions.

c. Information

(1) Public Information

(a) Number of hometown news releases: 3,004

(b) Number of news/feature stories released to public and military media: 193

(c) Number of photographs released: 235

(d) Number of correspondents provided support by the information office: 63

(e) Coverage was also provided for 26 distinguished visitors to the division, including Mr. Robert Johnson, assistant secretary of the Army, and Pam Eldred, Miss America, 1970.

(2) Command Information

(a) During the reporting period, seven issues of the division newspaper, "The Screaming Eagle", and the summer issue of the division magazine, "Rendezvous with Destiny", were published.

(b) A special issue of the "Airborne Dateline" was published on 8 October on President Nixon's address to the nation on Southeast Asia.
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(c) Two command information fact sheets entitled "You and VD" and "Drug Abuse" were printed and distributed to division personnel.

(d) Two taped reports were released for use of AFVN by the division's radio broadcast section.

2. (c) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

   a. Personnel. None

   b. Intelligence.

   \(1\) Use of sensors during periods of bad weather.

   (a) Observation: Unattended ground sensors are of greatly increased importance as intelligence sources during periods of bad weather.

   (b) Evaluation: During periods of poor visibility or severe storm conditions, available methods of surveillance become limited. Unattended ground sensors are only slightly affected by adverse weather conditions - an increase in false activations caused by a higher ambient noise level. This slight increase in false activations can be offset by training.

   (c) Recommendation: Commanders consider the value of unattended ground sensors during periods of bad weather.

   (2) Use of aerial photographs for briefing Ranger teams.

   (a) Observation: Aerial photographs greatly enhance the planning and orientation of individual team members prior to operations.

   (b) Evaluation: During the planning phase of ranger team operations, the team leader and his assistant normally are afforded the opportunity to make an aerial reconnaissance. The remaining team members must rely solely on the memory of the team leader and/or his assistant for terrain orientation. The use of aerial photographs of the operational area during the mission briefing to familiarize each team member with terrain, vegetation, landing zones and pick-up zones, has proven to be a valuable assistance to Ranger teams.

   (c) Recommendation: Ranger units consider using aerial photographs for planning and orienting team members.

   (3) Traditional AO boundaries provide the enemy sanctuaries.
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RNS G708-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Observation: The enemy sets up base camps along traditional boundary lines.

(b) Evaluation: For well over a year, the 13 grid line has been the traditional northern boundary line between the 1st Bde and the 3d ARVN Regt. When any reconnaissance or offensives were initiated into this area, the enemy would simply move across the boundary line, thus occupying what amounted to a sanctuary. A coordinated offensive by the 1st Bde and the 3d ARVN Regt into this area resulted in 53 NVA/VC KIA and 38 INC. All indications show that elements of the 810th Bn have operated in the sanctuary for at least two years.

(c) Recommendation: Units should exercise a more coordinated and manual surveillance of their AO boundaries.

(5) Enemy returning to base camps.

(a) Observation: The enemy reuses his old base camps.

(b) Evaluation: In many cases, the enemy constantly utilizes the same base camps along a known route of travel. In the area north of NSE BASTONGS, elements of the 810th Bn operated for over two years. An element of 1/327 Inf was reconnoitering an old base camp when the enemy, unknowingly, revisited the same base camp. The encounter resulted in a P/W and miscellaneous documents.

(c) Recommendations: Set up a systematic plan for the ditching and reconnaissance of known enemy base camps.

(5) Liaison with indigenous woodcutters.

(a) Observation: Woodcutters can be excellent sources of intelligence.

(b) Evaluation: Since woodcutters travel into the canopy to extract their products, there is a good chance they are approached by NVA/VC. There should be some installation or opportunity for these woodcutters to report such engagements. An excellent example is the 1st Bde aid station. It is located next to the woodcutter checkpoint, and is open to all woodcutters for the treatment of minor wounds. An interpreter and medic are always present.

(c) Recommendation: Maintain and expand facilities which increase contacts with woodcutters.

(6) Pinpointing weather information.
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSMR-65 (R2)-(U)

(a) Observation: Valuable blade time may be lost due to a lack of specific weather information around individual F3/08s. During periods of marginal weather, attempts to resupply F3/08s have been aborted after arrival of the aircraft over the F3/08. Conversely, resupply sorties have been cancelled prior to take off during periods of marginal weather when conditions at a particular F3/08 were acceptable.

(b) Evaluation: Pinpointing weather information can readily assist the planning and conduct of airmobile resupply operations. Pathfinders are located on F3/08s to provide aircraft traffic control and are trained to provide area weather information. Requiring Pathfinders to provide hourly weather information during periods of marginal weather has improved the utilization of blade time.

(c) Recommendation: Commanders consider adopting this program during periods of marginal weather.

Op. 2

(1) Expedient calibration for Radar Course Directing Control, AN/TPQ 10A.

(a) Observation: The USMC Air Support Radar Team (ASRT) located at F3/03 BIRMINGHAM is required to calibrate the Radar Course Directing Central, AN/TPQ 10A monthly and as required due to specific maintenance or repair operations. The specified calibration procedure requires that an air or ground observer spot the strike of the bomb against a predetermined prominent terrain feature. Inclement weather conditions severely restrict observed calibration and has resulted in the AN/TPQ 10A RADAR being considered nonoperational even though the equipment is correct mechanically.

(b) Evaluation: In order to conduct calibration while maintaining an adequate troop safety margin, the C3 Air arranged for calibration of the AN/TPQ RADAR using a Radar Set, AN/MPQ 4 to determine bomb strike locations and a second air tracking radar (USAF AN/MSQ 77 or USMC AN/TPQ 10A) to verify the attack aircraft in-flight characteristics. When a flight of two attack aircraft is available, the use of a second air tracking radar is not necessary. Calibration using the above controls in an adverse weather environment resulted in Circular Error Probable (CEP) accuracies of 20 meters and 25 meters on successive calibration runs. These CEP's were within the required 50 meters CEP and were accepted by Marine Air Support Squadron 3 as being adequate. Use of this alternate calibration procedure resulted in having the ASRT operational a minimum of two days earlier than could have been obtained by waiting for suitable weather conditions.

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Additionally, an ABRT adverse weather calibration procedure has been established and is expected to prove highly beneficial during the northwest monsoon.

(c) Recommendation: That units supported by USMC Air Support Radar Team adopt this alternate calibration system when inclement weather conditions restrict observed calibration.

(2) Use of peneprima "road mix" as an expedient surfacing technique.

(a) Observation: Secondary roads in MR 1 utilize laterite soil for subgrade, base courses, and surfacing. An expedient means of dust control in the summer, and waterproofing in the winter is the application of a surface coating of peneprima. This surface coating of peneprima is satisfactory during the dry season but erodes quickly during the frequent torrential rains in the wet season.

(b) Evaluation: Once the peneprima surfaced surfacing erodes, the action of water and heavy truck tires quickly breaks through to the base courses, and in time, to the subgrade. Roads to firebases were impassable for several months (November, December, and January) last year because of this. In an attempt to rectify this situation, employing available equipment and material, a superior field expedient surfacing technique was developed. The road surface is first scarified to a depth of four to six inches. The first application of peneprima is a 30/70 peneprima/JP4 mixture. After this is thoroughly windrowed, a second mixture is then applied 70/30, and windrowed. This is followed by two more 70/30 applications. This mixture is then graded and compacted. The final step is two applications of a conventional surface coating of peneprima. Depending on the temperature and humidity, the road is trafficable in 1-3 days. This method provides both the dust-inhibiting characteristic of the conventional peneprima surface plus an impermeable wearing course.

(c) Recommendation: That units consider adopting the expedient surfacing technique stated above.

(3) Use of Soil-cement Sandbags in Drainage Systems.

(a) Observation: A substitute for culvert was found to be necessary because of the high price of the culvert and the difficulty in its procurement.

(b) Evaluation: In lining open drainage ditches, soil-cement sandbags were found to be an adequate substitute for culvert sections.
When the sandbags are properly mixed and shaped, they form a solidified lining that satisfactorily prevents excessive accumulation of mud in the ditches.

(c) Recommendation: That soil-cement sandbags be used in lining ditches when standard culvert is not available. This results in conservation of materials and avoids the delay encountered in requesting materials through supply channels. Another appropriate use for the soil-cement sandbags would be in the construction of culvert headwalls where ordinary sandbags require greater stability.

(4) Rapid engagement of radar acquired targets.

(a) Observation: Enemy targets acquired by the TFS-25 radar must be engaged rapidly by artillery for fires to be effective.

(b) Evaluation: Several measures can be taken to expedite processing calls for artillery fires to engage these targets. Radar sightings recorded over a period of several months have revealed patterns of enemy activity. Many sightings have concentrated in a relatively small number of grid squares. These grid squares are precleared daily. Permanent air warning data to the center of mass of the precleared grids have been posted with the AWCC station. When a radar spotting is received the AWCC station is requested to post the air hazard, and the target is fired.

(c) Recommendation: That the procedures discussed above be used for engagement of radar acquired targets.

(5) Ladder Roll-outs

(a) Observation: In August 1970, Ranger team Japan II executed a roll-out exchange with team Japan I. Three hours after the insertion, team Japan II made contact. A roll-out is accomplished when a helicopter enters a landing zone and one team exits the aircraft from one door while the ground team boards the aircraft through the other door. If this is accomplished in a touch down LZ in less than 15 seconds, the method is acceptable. When using ladders for roll-out, one team climbs down one ladder while the other team ascends the other ladder. To execute the ladder roll-out of Ranger team Japan II, the aircraft hovered in the LZ for seven minutes.

(b) Evaluation: Seven minutes in a LZ is too long for any operation. The theory of using a roll-out is sound when executed properly. Ladder extractions necessitate that the aircraft hover in one position.
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for a prolonged period of time allowing the enemy to determine the location of the ground elements.

(a) Recommendation: Roll-outs should only be conducted when a ground element has a confirmed touch down LZ. This minimizes the time the aircraft is actually in the landing zone and enables a faster exchange of ranger teams.

(6) Counter mortar target engagement using direct fire.

(c) Observation: Permanent enemy mortar positions must be plotted and fired prior to darkness on the first day of occupation on a new firebase.

(b) Evaluation: When a howitzer battery occupied FSB HUATT, several possible enemy mortar locations were plotted and fired using direct fire on the high ground to the west of the firebase. This was accomplished prior to nightfall on the first day of occupation. When the firebase came under indirect fire attack three nights later, the battery immediately engaged the preplanned targets with direct fire, silencing the mortar and causing a secondary explosion.

(c) Recommendation: Employ direct fire on possible enemy mortar locations prior to darkness and give specific assignments to each gun section on action to be taken if the firebase comes under attack. When rounds begin to fall on firebase all sections engage assigned targets with 10-15 rounds and then await further instructions to expand on known enemy locations.

(7) Carrying 17-pound rockets on inboard wing of AH-1G aircraft.

(a) Observation: A modification in the manner in which 17-pound, HE warhead, 2.75 inch, Folding Fin Aerial Rockets are carried on AH-1G aircraft equipped with four 159C rocket pods has increased the possibilities of reducing major damage to aircraft during emergency conditions.

(b) Evaluation: The 17-pound warhead rockets are loaded in the inboard wings only, while lighter munitions are carried in the outboard stores. The heavier inboard wing stores can be jettisoned during engine failures or other emergency conditions and the lighter outboard stores can be retained for stability and assistance in maintaining an upright attitude, once ground contact is made.

(c) Recommendation: Aerial Artillery units consider the use of the
above stated method of carrying rocket munitions.

d. Organization. None.

e. Training. None.

f. Logistics. Care of equipment during the rainy season.

(a) Observation: The northeast monsoon creates special problems in the care of equipment. In the past, existing drying facilities have not been adequate to handle the necessary large quantity of wet and soiled equipment.

(b) Evaluation: Preparations for erection and establishment of drying facilities for items of equipment being retrograded during the rainy season poses a major problem. The utilization of drying tents or other suitable facilities have not been considered adequate to supplement the existing laundry facilities during the influx of wet equipment from field locations.

(c) Recommendation: Units consider the amount of tentage or building space required to satisfy their particular needs. Periodically, as units return from the field for a short stand down, their equipment is placed in the drying facility to prevent mildew and other damage from moisture. These facilities should be available in forward and rear positions. The construction of field expedient heating devices from 55-gallon drums cut in half and properly ventilated will provide a suitable heat source. Diesel fuel is used in conjunction with discarded paper products which are not otherwise usable for construction material. Despite the distasteful odor, the equipment can be dried. Fire burning material should be kept outside the tent; a stove pipe should be run through the structure to provide radiant heat. If available, a fan should be used for circulation.

g. Communications. None

h. Material.

(i) Engine Failure.

(a) Observation: Five of the 10 accidents experienced during the reporting period were a direct result of engine failure over unsuitable forced landing areas.

(b) Evaluation: Preliminary analysis of the engine failures indicates 4th stage compressor failures and foreign object damage are the primary causes.
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(c) Recommendation: In view of the unsuitable terrain in MR 1, it is essential that positive steps be taken to eliminate in-flight engine failures. A combination of proper fuel handling procedures, aircraft spectrometric oil analysis, turbine engine analysis, daily engine recording, jet-cal analyzer and go-no-go checks will prevent any possible fuel starvation failures if properly employed and monitored.

(2) Excessive non-available tire on engineer equipment due to flat tires.

(a) Observation: Graders, scoop loaders, tractors, and backhoes have continued to be deadlined from six to 24 hours because of flat tires at job sites. Normally, when one of these critical pieces of equipment becomes inoperable, other equipment also ceases to work.

(b) Evaluation: It has been found that when an item of engineer equipment has a flat tire, it requires between six and twenty-four hours to dismount, backhaul, repair, return, and remount. Normally, engineer equipment will perform only one operation (i.e., loading, dozing), and is dependent on other equipment to complete a mission. Hence, when one piece is deadlined, other equipment must cease work. Normally, wheeled engineer equipment does not come from the factory with spare wheels and tires as does ordinance equipment. Consequently, each time a flat occurs, that tire must be repaired and returned. Spare wheels can be ordered through normal supply channels. It is feasible to maintain spare tires for this equipment in the rear area or to mount the spares on the equipment. Either method saves time.

(c) Recommendation: Sufficient spare wheels and tires for engineer equipment must be ordered through supply channels. These spares can then be utilized in the same manner as spare tires on ordinance vehicles.

1. Other.

(1) Portable flame throwers used to fight fires.

(a) Observation: During the summer months several large fires created by enemy activity destroyed property on forward fire bases which were inaccessible to effective fire fighting equipment.

(b) Evaluation: A search for portable equipment resulted in costs of the portable flame thrower filled with "Lite Water," MS 210-035-1116. Lite Water is a concentrated foaming agent which produces flaking foam when mixed with water and sprayed under pressure. Normally, one pressurized tank will employ two loads of lite water.
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Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS 05003.65 (R2) (U)

Once this employment technique was developed, a message was dispatched
directing commanders to establish a fire point on each occupied firebase
which included two portable flamethrowers. These portable flame throwers,
H2A1 or M9-7, and a pressurized 55-gallon drum of lité water, are now
required to be maintained for fighting fires. It was found that the pressure
regulator on the H2A1 should be adjusted to an operating pressure of 150psl. The
M9-7 pressure regulator cannot be adjusted. This fire fighting expedient has
already been credited with saving a mess hall and an ammunition dump.

(a) Recommendation: This fire fighting expedient be adopted by other
units.

(2) Medicines for MEDCAP.

(a) Observation: Despite the generally good quality of supplies and
the performance of interpreters, there has been a lack of understanding
by the Vietnamese patients as to the use of medicines, and therefore a
failure of US Medcap assistance to meet its full potential.

(b) Evaluation: The best medicine does no good if the patient does
not know what to do with it. In fact, it could prove extremely
harmful.

(c) Recommendation: To help bridge the gap of understanding, medicine
labels should be translated into Vietnamese. This will greatly assist
Vietnamese health workers, and help preclude the misuse of drugs by the
villagers.

(3) MEDCAP Utilization.

(4) Observation: Improper utilization of MEDCAP, Phase II, is
detrimental to the psychological effect of the program.

(b) Evaluation: MEDCAP, Phase II, is for the purpose of training
Vietnamese medical personnel. After 6-8 MEDCAPs the Vietnamese health
workers with proper training become sufficiently proficient to conduct these
activities. However, when only a small number of Vietnamese can be treated
because training is being conducted, an unfavorable impression is conveyed
to those not treated.

(c) Recommendation: The surgeons with the MEDCAP team should choose
10 to 15 personnel with more serious medical problems for treatment.
Meanwhile, the Vietnamese village health workers already trained should
continue to treat the minor ailments under the guidance of the team medic. Thus, max-
imum treatment and training benefit is derived from the mission.

(4) Aerial Broadcast System in Louisiana:
(a) Observation: The most effective altitude for broadcasting in
the lowlands is 500-600 feet.

(b) Evaluation: Currently, the minimum altitude for aerial broadcast
is 1000-1500 feet. During test flights at various altitudes, observe that
the best responses were obtained at an altitude of 500-900 feet.
These responses consisted of people stopping their work to look up and
listen. Prior to these tests, their responses could not be noted.

(c) Recommendation: The existing altitude restriction placed on
12BHC aircraft over the lowlands should be lowered to 500-600
feet when the tactical situation permits.
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1. (C) On 25 July, the 1st Brigade, in operational coordination with the 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div (ARVN), initiated Operation CHISAGO PEAK/LAM SON 363. This operation continued into the reporting period.

2. (C) 1-12 August 1970

a. On 3 August, the 1st Bde assumed responsibility for FS/OB BASTOGNE from the 2d Bde, and the 3d Bn (-) (Ammi), 187th Inf moved from BASTOGNE to CAMP EVANS to increase patrol, surveillance and ambush operations south of the camp. Co B, 1st Bn (Ammi), 502d Inf and the Reconnaissance Platoon moved by air to secure FS/OB BASTOGNE and begin local patrol and surveillance operations. The 2d Bn (Ammi), 502d Inf air assaulted from FS/OB RAXASAN and the SWORD area into three landing zones southwest of FS/OB GLADIATOR. This assault was conducted in response to intelligence indications of a possible enemy attack against the firebase.

On 5 August, the 2d Bn (Ammi), 501st Inf extracted from the GLADIATOR area and moved by air to CAMP EVANS to prepare for an assault into the vicinity of MEXICO on 6 August.

The 1st Bn (Ammi), 506th Inf, having completed battalion refresher training, moved by vehicle, on 6 August, to FS/OB BIRMINGHAM and ARSENAL to secure those firebases and conduct local patrol operations. The battalion passed from the operational control of the 3d Bde to operational control of the 2d Bde. The 1st Bn (Ammi), 502d Inf terminated operations, vicinity BIRMINGHAM and ARSENAL, and moved to PHU HAI Combat Base to begin battalion refresher training and assume the mission of the division ready force.

The Mac Bao Company and Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ammi), 17th Cav air assaulted to a landing zone at YD62197, 10 kilometers west of RANGE, to conduct combined search operations in a large bunker complex observed on 5 August. All elements were extracted late in the afternoon.

On 8 August, in response to intelligence indications of an enemy build-up in the FS/OB O'REILLY area, the 1st Regt (ARVN) moved its Reconnaissance Company to augment the security of the firebase. The 3d Battalion moved to landing zones northwest, northeast and west of the firebase and conducted search and attack operations in an attempt to gain contact with the enemy.

On 9 August, while conducting armed aerial reconnaissance in the vicinity of FS/OB O'REILLY in support of the 1st Regt (ARVN),
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elements of Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav reported sighting 800 MVA on a ridge line, in the vicinity of YD299258-YD300240. In response to this sighting, 26 tactical air strikes, for 52 sorties, were flown in the area. In addition, 36 sorties of aerial rocket artillery were expended in the target area. Sky Spot missions continued throughout the night.

On 10 August, the 4th Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) air assaulted from the FS/OB BARNETT area to a landing zone two kilometers northwest of O'RAILLY to begin reconnaissance in force operations, moving south. Throughout the day, 14 forward air controlled missions were employed against known enemy locations in the O'RAILLY area.

On 12 August, Operation CHISAG PCAX/LAH 30N 363 was terminated and all units engaged in the operation began preparations for redeployment. The 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) moved to CAMP SALLIE and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf, minus Co G, moved from FS/OB MAUREEN and vicinity to CAMP EAGLE and prepared for movement to FS/OB BARNETT.

Cumulative results of the operation were 97 enemy killed (15 by US/62 by ARVN), 18 individual weapons captured (ARVN), and 14 crew served weapons captured (eight by US, six by ARVN). Three ARVN soldiers were killed in action and 43 were wounded in action. US casualties were two soldiers with minor wounds.

b. Significant Activities. On 1 August, elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav and the 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl) killed 10 enemy in two engagements near ERSKINE and GRANITE. At 1600 hours, the 1st and 2d Companies, 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) engaged an estimated enemy platoon with small arms fire three kilometers north of GOODMAN, killing 12 enemy and recovering two RPG Launchers, one AK-47, five CHICOM claymore mines, 27 RPG rounds, 110 82mm mortar rounds and miscellaneous documents. One ARVN soldier was killed and 15 were wounded.

At 021315 August, the 2d Co, 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) engaged an enemy force with small arms fire 50 meters from their position at YD156333 (MIAMI). A search of the contact area revealed 15 M1A KIA, one 60mm mortar (complete) and 150 60mm mortar rounds. Five ARVN soldiers were wounded in the action.

PHU BAI Combat Base was attacked by fire twice on 2 August. Four 122mm rockets were received at 2006 hours and two rockets at 2303 hours. No casualties or damage were caused. Artillery was
employed on a suspected enemy location at YD847063, southwest of the Camp.

CAMP EVANS received seven 122mm rockets at 031256 August, resulting in two US WIA; there were no other damages. Also on 3 August, the 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) killed seven enemy and recovered four individual weapons, near AIRBORNE.

On 5 August, elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, in scattered contact, killed 11 enemy and destroyed five 12.7mm machine guns. On 6 August, air cavalry elements destroyed four and captured two additional 12.7mm machine guns.

On 6 August, two platoons of Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav and the Mac Bao Company were inserted in the vicinity of YD036197, seven and one half kilometers west of RANGER, to conduct a ground EDA of an AEC LIGHT strike. The Mac Bao Company discovered 67 bunkers, 300 RPG rounds, 600 pounds of CT, 500 NVA uniforms, 50 boxes of medical supplies, 36 cases of AK-47 rounds, 100 82mm mortar rounds, 15 rucksacks and 25 pounds of miscellaneous documents.

Elements of the 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) killed seven enemy 1500 meters north of FS/OB O'REILLY on 6 August. The firebase received 82mm mortars at 1715 hours, resulting in one ARVN soldier KIA and one WIA.

Also on 6 August, at 1819 hours, HUE CITY received four 122mm rockets, which impacted in the ARVN detention center. One billet was destroyed, 14 detainees were killed and 89 were wounded.

At 0645 hours on 9 August, the 2d Co, 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received eighty 82mm mortar rounds impacting on and around their position, two kilometers west of FS/OB O'REILLY. There were no casualties. At 1115 hours, the CP, 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN), on FS/OB O'REILLY, received 82mm mortar fire resulting in one ARVN soldier KIA and 13 WIA. During the night, the 2d Co, 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) killed 12 enemy two and one half kilometers west of the firebase, and suffered two KIA.

In the area of CHICAGO PEAK/LAM SON 363 operations, the 1st and 2d Bns, 3d Regt (ARVN) killed 11 enemy near AIRBORNE.

On 10 August, a total of 36 enemy were killed in the vicinity of FS/OB O'REILLY by elements of the 1st Regt (ARVN), supported by the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav. Eight ARVN soldiers were wounded in action during the day, as the enemy made extensive use of 82mm mortars.
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The firebase received two 75mm recoilless rifle rounds and six 82mm mortar rounds, which caused no casualties or damage.

On 11 and 12 August, a total of 112 enemy were killed in the vicinity of FS/OB O'REILLY. Elements of the 1st and 4th BNs, 1st Regt (ARVN) accounted for 19 enemy killed. The 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav killed 23, and tactical air strikes and ADA killed 70. One ARVN soldier was killed and 11 wounded during the two days of contact.

3. (c) 13-25 August 1970.

a. On 13 August, the 2d BN (Ambl), 502d Inf passed from the operational control of the 1st Bde to the 3d Bde and moved from CAMP EAGLE to FS/OB BARNETT and vicinity. The mission of the battalion was to secure the firebase and conduct search and attack patrols in the area. This move released the 2d BN, 1st Regt (ARVN) to assault from BARNETT to an 12 five kilometers west of FS/OB O'REILLY, and begin reconnaissance in force operations, moving to the west.

FS/OB MAUREEN was closed at 141525 August.

On 15 August, the 1st BN, 1st Regt (ARVN) extracted from the O'REILLY area and moved to LA VANG to prepare for future operations.

On 16 August, while conducting RDA, the 1st BN, 1st Regt discovered a large medical cache at TD166270, four kilometers northeast of RANGER. To assist in exploiting this discovery, three Platoons of Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav were inserted. All elements were extracted on 17 August.

On 18 August, the 1st BN (Ambl), 327th Inf moved by air and vehicle from FS/OB VECHEL and BASTogne to CAMP EAGLE to prepare for refresher training and assume the DRF mission. The 1st Bde assumed OPCON of the 1st BN (Ambl), 306th Inf from the 2d Bde and the battalion moved by air to VECHEL and BASTogne. The 1st BN (Ambl), 327th Inf completed refresher training and began patrol and ambush operations to the south and southwest of CAMP EAGLE.

On 23 August, the 1st BN (Ambl), 327th Inf completed battalion refresher training and, on 24 August, returned to FS/BO VECHEL and BASTogne. The 1st BN (Ambl), 306th Inf returned to operational control of the 2d Bde and moved to PHU LOC District to secure FS/BO LOS BANOS and TONAHAWK. The 2d BN (Ambl), 327th Inf moved from PHU LOC District to CAMP EAGLE to begin battalion refresher training and assume the DRF mission.
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Also on 24 August, the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, which had been detached from the division since early 1968, began arriving at Phu Bai Combat Base. The battalion, with attached artillery and engineer support, most recently had been employed in the AN KRB area.

b. Significant Activities. Shortly after insertion into the PS/CO BARNETT area on 13 August, the 3d Flt, Co A and the Recon Flt, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf made contact with enemy forces resulting in six NVA KIA, one US soldier killed and three wounded.

At 151145 August, two kilometers southeast of PS/CO O'REILLY, the Light CP, and 2d and 3d Coa, 3d Bn, 1st Rgt (ARVN) received 82mm mortars, RPG and small arms fire from a company size enemy force. The elements returned organic weapons fire and were supported by aircraft from the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav and the 4th Bn (Aerial Artillery), 77th Artillery (Ambl). A search of the contact area revealed 15 NVA KIA and three CSVC. ARVN casualties were two soldiers KIA and 16 WIA.

On the night of 15-16 August, at 1D 171319, three kilometers west-southwest of PS/CO BARNETT, the 2d and 3d Platoons of Co B and the 3d Platoon, Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf, while in their NDP, engaged in a night long battle with an estimated company size enemy force. A first light search of the area, on 16 August, revealed 34 additional enemy killed in the contact area, a large number of bunkers and significant amounts of enemy equipment and supplies.

Also on 16 August, a ground HDA by elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav and the Hac Bao Company, four kilometers northeast of RANGER, resulted in the discovery of 12 bunkers, eight huts, 60 NVA uniforms, 14 medical kits, seven sets of medical instruments, 2540 pounds of rice, 100 122mm rockets, and miscellaneous documents. Additionally, elements of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) killed 27 enemy in the vicinity of PS/CO O'REILLY. Four ARVN were killed and seven were wounded.

On 180445 August, at 1D 193273, vicinity JEROME, the 1st Bn, 3d Rgt (ARVN) received RPG and small arms fire from an estimated enemy battalion surrounding their position. The ARVN elements returned organic weapons fire, resulting in 38 NVA KIA and one W captured. Thirteen ARVN soldiers were wounded in the action.

An estimated company size enemy force reoccupied a bunker complex at 1D 171319, a location which had been used as an NDP by elements of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf, supported by helicopter gunships, ARVN artillery and air strikes, assaulted the position at 0900 hours and secured the hill mass at 1130 hours. Twenty-five
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enemy were killed in the assault. The company suffered one killed and eight wounded.

On 22 August, three kilometers northwest of HICORD, the 3d Co, 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) discovered 20 enemy killed the previous day by tactical air strikes.

On 23 August, elements of the 2d and 4th Bns, 1st Regt (ARVN) killed 34 enemy in the O'REILLY area. Enemy losses included 250 one-half pound satchel charges, 100 82mm mortar rounds, and five crew served weapons. ARVN casualties were two KIA and nine WIA.

During the period 13-25 August, 290 enemy were killed in combined operations by elements of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and the 3d Bde in the O'REILLY/BARNETT/JEROME area. Six US and 21 ARVN soldiers were killed in action during the period.

4. (C) 26 August - 5 September 1970.

a. During this period, in anticipation of the northeast monsoon, the division began to reposition and realign units in preparation for Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/Monsoon Plan 70.

On 26 August, the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf completed movement from AN KHE, RVN and the 2d Bde assumed operational control of the battalion.

Also on 26 August, the 3d Bde CP at CAMP EVANS assumed operational control of the 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf and responsibility for maintaining liaison with RVN officials in districts in the division AO which are north of the Perquin River. With this change, the 3d Bde assumed a share of the responsibilities for pacification, development, and M&IE in the populated lowlands from the 2d Bde.

On 28 August, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf passed from the operational control of the 1st Bde to the 3d Bde. Co D secured PB/OB MAUREEN during the insertion of Btry C, 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty which conducted an artillery raid. In conjunction with the artillery raid, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf closed PB/OB GLADIATOR at 1945 hours. The battalion continued to conduct search and attack patrols in the RAKKASAN/GLADIATOR area.

On 29 August, the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf combat assaulted to BRICK and vicinity to secure the firebase and conduct search and attack operations. Btry D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty closed the firebase at 1515 hours.
On 30 August, the division continued realignment of forces and responsibilities in preparation for the northeast monsoon by repositioning maneuver battalions and passing responsibility for FS/OB BIRMINGHAM from the 2d Bn to the 1st Bn. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf passed from the operational control of the 3d Bde to the 1st Bde. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved from the MEXICO/GLADIATOR area to FS/OB BIRMINGHAM to secure the firebase and conduct local patrol operations. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf terminated operations in coordination with the 3d Regt (ARVN) at FS/OB BARNETT, and moved to CAMP EAGLE to begin battalion refresher training. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf assaulted from PHU LOC District into the GLADIATOR/MEXICO/GRANITE area, and passed from the operational control of the 2d Bde to the 3d Bde. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf completed battalion refresher training and redeployed to PHU LOC District. The battalion CP moved to FS/OB TOMAHAWK.

On 31 August, the 3d Bde closed FS/OB KATHRYN and MAUREEN. Btry C, 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty terminated the artillery raid at FS/OB MAUREEN and moved to CAMP EVANS. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf continued search and attack patrols in the vicinity of the firebase.

On 2 September, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved by air from the canopy east of RIFCORD to PHU RAI Combat Base and began preparation for an assault into the TENNESSEE area in reaction to intelligence and contacts developed by ranger teams. The battalion passed from the operational control of the 3d Bde to the 1st Bde.

On 3 September, the battalion moved by CH-47 to LZ ANN and began assaulting into the TENNESSEE area by URH. Co D secured the firebase for the insertion of Btry A, 1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty.

The division terminated Operation TEXAS STAR at 1800 hours on 5 September and initiated OPLAN 13-70, JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70.

b. Significant Activities. At 0930 hours, 26 August, vicinity YD332239, two kilometers southeast of FS/OB O'REILLY, the CP, and 1st and 3d Companies, 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) engaged a large enemy force. Artillery, ARA and tactical air strikes supported the ground elements, which were in contact throughout the day. A search of the contact area revealed 42 M4A KIA. Twenty-six of these were killed by ARA from the 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl). Three ARVN soldiers were killed and nine were wounded during the day.

Between the hours of 1935 and 2130 on 26 August, CAMP EAGLE received twelve 122mm rockets, which caused light damage and one minor
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Casualty. PHU BAI Combat Base received three attacks by fire between 0100 and 0618 hours the following morning. Five 122mm rockets, twenty-seven 82mm mortar, and thirty-four 60mm mortar rounds resulted in light damage and seven US personnel with minor wounds.

Later on 29 August, a UNH from Trp C, 2d Sqn (Ambt), 17th Cav, while inserting a ranger team at 1G754956, received ground fire and crashed on the landing zone. While the crew and ranger team were securing the aircraft, they received small arms and mortar fire on their position, resulting in four US KIA and four WIA. Trp D and the Aero Rifle Platoon of Trp C, 2d Sqn (Ambt), 17th Cav and Co A, 3d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf were inserted to reinforce. Artillery, ARA and tactical air strikes supported the contact. A search of the area revealed no enemy casualties.

On 31 August, 28 enemy were killed in the O’REILLLY/BARNETT area of operation by elements of the 1st and 3d Regts (ARVN) supported by the 2d Sqn (Ambt), 17th Cav, the 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambt), and tactical air strikes.

On 3 September, elements of the 1st Regt (ARVN) engaged an enemy force three kilometers south of O’REILLY, killing 24 enemy. ARA and tactical air strikes supported the contact. Six ARVN were KIA and eight were WIA.

During the period 9 August through 5 September, combined operations in the O’REILLY/BARNETT/JEROME area resulted in 614 enemy killed.

5. (C) 5 September - 15 September 1970.

a. On 5 September the division initiated OPOED 13-70, Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70 in operational coordination with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and SVN officials within Thua Thien Province to maintain pressure on enemy forces operating in the A0, to deny regular and guerrilla forces access to the lowland population, to deny the enemy access to the rice harvest, and to assist SVN officials in meeting their pacification goals.

Operation TEXAS STAR was costly to the enemy in Northern Military Region. The division killed 2053 enemy, captured over 600 individual and crew-served weapons and over 200,000 rounds of ammunition of all types, and destroyed or captured over 59 tons of rice.

On 6 September, in support of Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON
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PLAN 70, the 1st Bde CP directed extensive repositioning of forces from CAMP EAGLES. Elements of the 2d Bn (Ambtl), 502d Inf completed refresher training and assaulted to the FS/0B NORMANDY/SPAAK area followed by 3rty A, 1st Bn (Ambtl), 321st Arty which moved from FS/0B TENNESSEE. The 1st Bn (Ambtl), 501st Inf moved from the FS/0B BIRMINGHAM area to PHU BAI Combat Base for refresher training.

The 2d Bn (Ambtl), 501st Inf closed FS/0B TENNESSEE and moved to FS/0B BIRMINGHAM, while the 1st Bn (Ambtl), 327th Inf continued operations in the FS/0B BASTOGNE/VEHHEL and area along Route 527.

The 2d Bde CP remained at PHU BAI Combat Base. The Bde maintained liaison with GVW officials in NAK HOA, PHU THU, HUONG THUY, VNH LOC, PHU LOC, and PHU WANG Districts and provided mobile training teams to advise and assist territorial forces. The 3d Bn (Ambtl), 506th Inf remained at FS/0B BRICK and conducted search and attack patrols in the vicinity. The 2d Bn (Ambtl), 327th Inf and the 1st Bn (Ambtl), 502d Inf continued to conduct operations in the pincushion and fringes of the canopy to deny the enemy access to the lowland population. The 2d Bn (Ambtl), 327th Inf secured FS/0B TOMAHAWK and FS/0B LOS BANDOS and conducted operations in the area.

The 1st Bn (Ambtl), 502d Inf secured FS/0B ARSENAL and conducted operations in the area.

The 3d Bde CP remained at CAMP EVANS and maintained liaison with GVW officials of PHONG DIEN, QUANG DIEN, HUONG TRA and HUONG DIEN Districts and provided mobile training teams to assist in upgrading the combat effectiveness of territorial forces in the Bde AO. The 3d Bn (Ambtl), 177th Inf secured FS/0B JACOB and continued operations in the area. The 1st Bn (Ambtl), 506th Inf remained at CAMP EVANS and conducted search and attack operations in the vicinity of FS/0B GLADIATOR.

The 2d Bn (Ambtl), 506th Inf provided security for FS/0B RAKKASAN and conducted search and attack operations in the vicinity of FS/0B RAKKASAN/GRANITE.

The 2d Sqdn (Ambtl), 177th Cav continued to conduct ground and armed aerial reconnaissance in the AO and recon zone.

On 7 September, division aviation assets were made available to the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) to assault the 8th Bn, 358th Mar Bn (ARVN) in the western portion of QUANG TRI Province. Two batteries of ARVN 155mm howitzers were moved by air to FS/0B SARGE and HOLCOMB in support of the operation.

On 8 September, the 4th Bn (Airborne), 77th Arty (Ambtl).

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in support of the 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN), killed 20 enemy and destroyed one 12.7mm machine gun in the FS/OB O'REILLY area, while elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav began extensive armed aerial reconnaissance of ELEPHANT VALLEY in coordination with the 1st US Marine Division.

On 10 September, in support of the 1st Regt (ARVN), three CH47 aircraft dropped 2,590 gallons of thickened fuel on suspected enemy locations in the vicinity of FS/OB O'REILLY. On the following day 2,970 gallons were dropped in the area.

On 12 September, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf completed refresher training. Company A moved by air to provide security for FS/OB NORMANDY, as Company C moved by vehicle to provide security for FS/OB BIRMINGHAM. The battalion (-) conducted operations in the vicinity of FS/OB NORMANDY/BIRMINGHAM. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved to PHU Binh Combat Base for refresher training and passed to operational control of the 2d Bde.

During this period the enemy concentrated its activities in the vicinity of FS/OB O'REILLY/BARNETT/JEROME. Elements of the 1st Regt (ARVN) continued conducting operations in the FS/OB O'REILLY area while elements of the 3d Regt (ARVN) continued operation in the BARNETT/JEROME area.

b. Significant Activities. At 061420 September, Btry B, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl) supporting the 2d Co, 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) engaged and killed two NVA in the vicinity of FS/OB BARNETT.

At 070715 September, the 2d Co, 4th Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) received 10 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on FS/OB BARNETT. Artillery was employed on a suspected enemy location. At 1340 hours, seven rounds of 82mm mortar impacted near the firebase. At 1615 hours, the element received nine rounds of 60mm mortar fire. A suspected enemy location was not determined.

At 070745 September, two kilometers south of FS/OB BARNETT, elements of the 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) discovered three NVA KIA and one AK-47 resulting from a claymore trap detonation. At 0851 hours, the element received five rounds of 60mm mortar fire on their position, wounding one ARVN soldier. At 1610 hours, the element discovered four bunkers containing four NVA KIA, one AK-47 and six field telephones.
At 1630 hours, two kilometers southwest of BARNETT, elements of the 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) discovered 21 NVA killed by air strikes one day earlier.

On 8 September, elements of the 3d Regt (ARVN) engaged 15 enemy with organic weapons fire two kilometers northeast of JEROME at 0915 hours. A search revealed three NVA KIA and two AK-47s. At 1050 hours, one kilometer northeast of JEROME, five enemy were engaged with organic weapons fire. A search revealed two NVA KIA and one AK-47. At 1200 hours, two kilometers northwest of JEROME, elements of the 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) discovered 30 huts containing one GR9 radio, 20 82mm mortar rounds, three 122mm rocket fuses, 800 AK-47 rounds, one 50 caliber anti-aircraft machine gun and one 82mm mortar cleaning rod. There was evidence of recent enemy activity.

On 8 September, elements of the 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received RPG and small arms fire at 1345 hours, two kilometers southwest of FS/OB O'REILLY. At 1500 hours, the elements received an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds followed by a ground attack. ARA was employed. A search of the area revealed 20 NVA killed by ARA, five Ak-47s and one RPG launcher. There were two ARVN soldiers KIA and eight WIA.

On 9 September, Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf assaulted FS/OB BLITZ, secured the area, and passed to operational control of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf at 0840 hours. Following this assault, Stry C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty moved by air to BLITZ to provide support for operations in the area by the 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf.

On 10 September, in support of the 1st Regt (ARVN), three CB-47 aircraft dropped 2,520 gallons of thickened fuel on suspected enemy locations in vicinity of FS/OB O'REILLY. At 0508 hours, three kilometers southeast of O'REILLY, elements of the 1st Regt (ARVN) received 200 82mm mortar rounds which were followed by small arms fire. Organic weapons were employed and the enemy withdrew to the south and east. ARA was employed. A search revealed eight NVA KIA, three AK-47s, 250½ pound blocks of TNT and 50 RPG rounds. One ARVN soldier was KIA and 10 were evacuated for wounds. At 1300 hours, three kilometers south of BARNETT, an element of the 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) employed organic weapons against an estimated enemy platoon. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew. A search revealed two NVA KIA and one AK-47. Two ARVN soldiers were KIA and one was WIA. At 1500 hours, the element received two rounds of 82mm mortar fire which wounded 10 more ARVN soldiers. A suspected enemy location was not determined.
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At 102115 September, Ranger Team BUFFALO from Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf made contact three and one-half kilometers northwest of FS/OB ROCKET. The 2d Sqdn (Amph), 17th Cav provided cover and suppressive fire. Sporadic fire was received until the team was extracted at 1010 hours the following day. An aerial reconnaissance by air was made, but no enemy sightings were reported.

On 11 September, enemy activity continued around FS/OB O'REILLY. At 0208 hours, two kilometers west of O'REILLY, elements of the 3d Bn, 1st Rgt (ARVN) received small arms fire. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. A search conducted under flareship illumination revealed eight NVA KIA, one AK-47, one RPG launcher, 40 RPG rounds, and 120 one pound blocks of TNT. At 1130 hours, two and one-half kilometers southwest of O'REILLY, elements of the 2d Bn, 1st Rgt (ARVN) received small arms fire from an estimated enemy battalion. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. Artillery, tactical air strikes and ARA were employed. A search of the area produced no enemy assessments. Friendly casualties were nine ARVN KIA, 15 ARVN WIA and one Australian advisor KIA.

At 131020 September, three and one-half kilometers south of FS/OB O'REILLY, an element of the 1st Bn, 1st Rgt (ARVN) received RPG and small arms fire from an estimated enemy company. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. ARA, Pink Teams (1 OBSA and 1 AH-1G aircraft) and tactical air strikes were employed. A search of the area revealed 30 NVA KIA, three AK-47s, one RPG launcher, miscellaneous documents and 100 3"x6"x3' bunkers destroyed.

At 140235 September, two and one-half kilometers west of BARNETT, an element of the 4th Bn, 3d Rgt (ARVN) engaged an estimated enemy platoon, resulting in 25 NVA KIA. Ten of these were killed by aircraft from A and C Btry, 4th Bn (Aerial arty), 77th Arty (Amph).

At 151905 September, FS/OB ELITE received 14 82mm mortar rounds resulting in six US KIA, including the CO of the 1st Bn (Amph), 502d Inf.

6. (C) 16-30 September 1970.

a. On 16 September, Co G, 2d Bn (Amph), 227th Inf assaulted to SLEDGE and secured the area for insertion of Co A, 1st Bn (Amph), 501st Inf which passed to the operational control of the 2d Bn (Amph).
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327th Inf. Co A, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf assaulted to PISTOL. SLEDGE and PISTOL were secured and prepared for insertion of Btry B and C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 322nd Arty and Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 17th Arty the following day. FS/OF ELITE was closed by Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf which then moved by air to FS/OF SLEDGE and returned to the operational control of its parent battalion.

During the period 16 thru 19 September, the 1st Bn continued operations with three battalions in the BLENHEIM, WICHITA, BASTOGNE, and NORMANDY area with no significant contact.

On 20 September, Co C (.), 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf, under operational control of the 2nd Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf, secured and commenced construction of OP CHECKMATE X/6306. Also on 20 September, an aircraft from Co C, 158th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (Ambl), received ground fire while in support of a ranger team of the 1st Bn, 5th Inf (Nash), and crashed and burned in the vicinity of X/113725. There were nine US KIA and one US WIA. Four US KIA were from the 101st Abn Bn (Ambl).

On 23 September, the 3d Bn repositioned three battalions by air. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf completed refresher training and moved by air to the FS/OF GLADIATOR area and commenced operations. The battalion CP remained at FS/OF RAKKASAN. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved by air from the RAKKASAN area to CAMP AVANS to conduct refresher training and assume the mission of division ready force. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf continued to secure FS/OF JACK and conduct operations in the area.

On 25 September, during the air assault of the 5th Bn, 2d Rgt (ARVN) in the vicinity of X/926546, 14 aircraft from the 158th and 101st Avn Bns (Aslt Hel) (Ambl) received hits and damage from ground fire. Four aircraft were forced to land in field locations and were later extracted. Three crew members from the 158th were wounded and evacuated.

On 26 September, in the 1st Bn area of operations, Co B, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf passed to operational control of 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf and moved by air to open and secure FS/OF TENNESSEE. Division aviation assets repositioned Btry D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty from BRICK to TENNESSEE and a platoon from Btry B, 1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty from FNC BAI Combat Base to BRICK.

On 28 September, the 2d Bn (Ambl) 506th Inf, in operational coordination with the 2d Bn, 3d Rgt (ARVN), assaulted to PB WHIP.
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secured the FB for their Bn CP, Light CP, 3d Regt (ARVN), Btry D, 2d Bn (Ambl) 320th Arty, and Btry B, 14th Arty Bn (ARVN) and commenced operations in the area.

On 29 September, the 2d Bn, 327th Inf moved its CP by air from SLEDGE to FS/GB TOMAHAWK, closing FB SLEDGE.

During this period elements of the 1st Regt (ARVN) continued operations in the FS/GB O’REILLY area. The enemy initiated 16 separate indirect fire attacks in the area using 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars and 75mm recoilless rifle fires. Elements of the 1st Regt (ARVN) engaged the enemy 11 times and accounted for 95 NVA KIA.

b. Significant Activities. On 16 September, Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav conducted bomb damage assessments and discovered seven NVA KIA and also observed three enemy in the open in the vicinity of YD3027. The enemy were engaged with gunships resulting in three NVA KIA. At 0300 hours, three kilometers southwest of FS/GB O’REILLY, elements of the 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) employed organic weapons against an unknown size enemy force. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew. ARA and air strikes were employed. A search of the area revealed eight NVA KIA by small arms and 38 NVA KIA by tactical air and ARA.

At 170905 September, in the vicinity of YD312223 aircraft from Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav observed 10-15 fighting positions and one enemy soldier. The area was engaged with gunships and artillery fires. A visual reconnaissance of the area revealed seven enemy KIA.

On 18 September, four kilometers east of FS/GB JACK YD5124, individuals from Co C, 3d Bn (Ambl), 137th Inf detonated four unknown type booby traps with unknown type firing devices resulting in eight US soldiers being evacuated for wounds.

Between 1345 and 1600 hrs on 19 September, 10 CH-47 sorties dropped 9900 gallons of thickened fuel on booby trapped areas at YD5124, resulting in four secondary explosions.

At 190300 September, aircraft from Trp C, 2d Bn (Ambl), 17th Cav while conducting night armed aerial reconnaissance, observed and engaged 40-45 enemy and numerous bunkers at YD118Q49, resulting in 18 NVA KIA.

At 201229 September, 500 meters southeast of VIC, Btry A, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl) observed and engaged four
enemy and one 12.7mm machine gun position, destroying the machine gun and killing the four NVA. At 1310 hrs, three kilometers west of RIFCORD the Light CP, 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. Organic weapons, artillery, ARA and tactical air strikes were employed. A search of the area revealed 15 NVA KIA, three AK-47s, 43 RPG rounds and 250 lbs of TNT. ARVN casualties were one KIA and 21 WIA.

At 220403 September, three kilometers northwest of FS/0B RIFCORD the Light CP, 1st Regt (ARVN) received RPG and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew. A search of the area revealed three NVA KIA, one AK-47, 17 ruck sacks, 225 1/2 lb blocks of TNT, 21 RPG rounds and 16 60mm mortar rounds. There were two ARVN KIA and two ARVN WIA. At 1135 hrs, in the same area the Light CP of the 2d Co, 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received three 75mm recoilless rifle rounds impacting around their position. ARA was employed on a suspected enemy location resulting in one 75mm RR destroyed and one 7.62mm RPG light machine gun destroyed.

On 26 September, the Bao Bao Co passed to operational control of 2d Sqdn. (Aml), 17th Cav. Cavalry aircraft inserted the company three kilometers east of FS/0B BRADLEY and received 50-100 rounds of small arms fire. One OH-13 aircraft sustained two hits resulting in one US WIA. At 1203 hrs, the Bao Bao Co engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic fire. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew in an unknown direction. The action resulted in three NVA KIA and one 12.7mm machine gun captured, and one ARVN KIA. At 1415 hrs, the company discovered three NVA KIA approximately four days earlier. In the FS/0B O'REILLY area, at 0415 hrs, the 3d Co, 4th Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received RPG and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force three and one-half kilometers south of the firebase. Organic weapons, artillery, tactical air strikes and a flareship were employed. A search of the area revealed 23 NVA KIA, two NVA R, six AK-47s, three RPG launchers, 15 RPG rounds and 600 one 1lb blocks of plastic explosive.

At 251527 September, in the vicinity of YC962806 (10 kilometers southwest of A2) the Recon Plt, 3d Bn (Aml), 506th Inf received an unknown number of RPG rounds and small arms fire from an estimated platoon 200-400 meters to the north of their position. Organic weapons fire, ARA and tactical air strikes were employed. Two soldiers, US, KIA and five were WIA in the contact. At 1338 hrs, in the vicinity of YC716743 (10 kilometers southeast of THOR) Ranger in DALLAS from Company L (ENG), 75th Inf received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force resulting in one US KIA.
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On 26 September, at 0730 hrs, aircraft from Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav discovered an active 12.7mm machine gun position and engaged the area XD283130 with gunships and a tactical air strike, killing three NVA and destroying the machine gun. At 1043 hrs, elements of Trp A observed and engaged one enemy at XD277136 resulting in one NVA KIA. While conducting bomb damage assessment, elements of Trp A discovered two NVA KIA at XD280134 and one NVA KIA and one 12.7mm machine gun destroyed at XD283136.

On 28 September, while conducting visual reconnaissance in the division reconnaissance zone, aircraft from Hq and Hq Trp and Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav made seven separate observations of enemy activity in the vicinity of the RUONG RUONG VALLEY between 0745 and 1135 hrs. The sighted enemy were engaged by gunships, resulting in 17 NVA KIA. Two bomb damage assessments were conducted by elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav in the same area revealing five NVA killed by USAF air strikes. A USAF FAC also reported five NVA killed following two tactical airstrikes against troops in bunkers in the RUONG RUONG Area Y0891727.

On 29 September, in operations around FS/0B WHIP, the CP, 2d BN, (Ambl), 502d Inf and Light CP, 3d Regt (ARVN) received 26 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on and around the firebase. Artillery was employed on suspected enemy location at YC778869. Results were four US WIA and one ARVN WIA. Also on 29 September, elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, 4th BN (Aerial Art), 77th Artillery (Ambl), and USAF aircraft killed 14 NVA in the southern portion of the division reconnaissance zone. At 200530 September, three kilometers west of LANG CO BRIDGE (886958), a train on the Rue-DeNang railroad detonated a mine consisting of 40 lbs of TNT with pressure type firing device, resulting in four crottonias destroyed and three meters of track damaged.

At 013024 September, while conducting a search and attack patrol, vicinity Y092208, Co B, 3d BN (Ambl), 506th Inf received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. The element returned fire and conducted a search of the area. Friendly casualties were one US WIA.

7. (C) 1 October - 13 October 1970

a. On 1 October, the 1st Bn continued operating with two bus in the FS/0B BIRMINGHAM/BRISTOL and VEGHEL/TENNESSEE area while one bn continued offensive operations in the WHIP area in
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operational coordination with the 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN). The 2d Bde continued with two bus operating in the piedmont and fringes of the canopy, securing FS/Obfs TOMAHAWK, LCS BANGS, ARSENAL, and BRICK, while one bn continued search and attack operations south and southeast of FS/Ob PISTOL. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf passed to the operational control of the 2d Bde from the 3d Bde and assumed the mission of the division ready force. The 3d Bde continued operations with two bus in FS/Ob RAKASAN/GLADIATOR area and one bn in the FS/Ob JACK area. The 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav continued operations in the division reconnaissance zone and maintained four teams from Co L (Rgr), 75th Inf in the AO.

On 4 October, operations in the FS/Ob WHIP, TENNESSEE and VECHELIL areas were terminated and all three FS/Obfs were closed by the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf. Btry A and B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty moved by air from WHIP and TENNESSEE, respectively, to CAMP EAGLE. The 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) and Btry B, 14th Arty Bn (ARVN) moved by air from WHIP to CAMP SALLY. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf terminated operations in the FS PISTOL area and moved by air to PHU BAI Combat Base for refresher training and assumed the mission of division ready force. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved by air from PHU BAI Combat Base to PB BRICK and commenced operations south and southeast of the firebase.

On 6 October, the CP, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by air to CP CHECKMATE. On 7 October, Co's A and B assaulted to XD5611 and XD5711 (northwest of FS/Ob BASTOGNE) and Co's C and D assaulted to XD5811 and XD6012. The battalion commenced reconnaissance in force operations in the area in operational coordination with 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN).

Also on 7 October, Btry A, 17th Arty Bn (ARVN) moved by air from FS/Ob O'REILLY to FS/Ob MANCY. The 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) closed the firebase and moved by air and by vehicle to LA VANG while the 3d and 4th Bns continued patrol operations south and southwest of O'REILLY.

On 13 October, the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf completed refresher training and moved by vehicle to FS/Ob BIRMINGHAM and commenced operations in the area. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved by vehicle and air from the firebase to PHU BAI Combat Base, and assumed the mission of division ready force and prepared for refresher training.

b. Significant Activities. At 011250 October, four kilo-
meters north of BASTOGNE, the 3d Plt, Co C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf engaged three enemy with organic weapons. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew in an unknown direction. A search of the
area revealed one NVA KIA. At 012020 hrs, nine kilometers south of AX, the 2d Plt, Co B, 3d Bn (AHA), 506th Inf observed their claymore trap detonate. A search of the area revealed one NVA KIA and one AK-47.

At 020211 October, a UH-1H aircraft from Co A, 326th Med Bn (AHA), in support of Co B, 2d Bn (AHA), 327th Inf, crashed in the vicinity of YC970819 from unknown causes. There were three US killed and one injured in the crash. At 0715 hrs, four kilometers south of FS/GB O'REILLY, the 3d Co, 4th Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received 50 rounds of 60mm mortar fire followed by a ground attack from an estimated platoon. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew. A search of the area revealed 12 NVA KIA, two AK-47s, one RPG launcher, one RPD light machine gun and 58 half pound blocks of TNT. The contact produced one ARVN KIA and two ARVN WIA.

On 3 October, three ranger teams, assigned the mission of observing enemy traffic in the A SHAU VALLEY, were extracted from the AO. Ranger Team HOUSTON was inserted on 28 September, vicinity YC503887 and was extracted at 031130 October in vicinity YC501887. Ranger Team ANAHEIM was inserted on 28 September, vicinity YC482923 and was extracted at 031130 October from the same area. Ranger Team BOLIN was inserted on 28 September, vicinity YC588999 and was extracted at 031119 October in vicinity YC90898. All three teams reported little or no enemy activity in the area.

On 041947 October, three kilometers southwest of FS/GB TOMAHAWK the 3d Plt, Co B, 2d Bn (AHA), 327th Inf employed organic weapons fire against an unknown size enemy force, 50 meters to the east of their position. The enemy did not return fire and withdrew in an unknown direction. A search under flares/bomb illumination revealed three VC KIA, three AK-47s and two rucksacks.

On 5 October, the 2d Sqdn (AHA), 17th Cav observed enemy elements in seven different locations throughout the division reconnaissance zone. Gunships and Artillery were employed, resulting in 12 NVA KIA and two mortar tubes captured. At 0910 hrs, one-half kilometer east of RIFLE, YC865988, Co B, 2d Bn (AHA), 501st Inf, while conducting search and attack patrols, discovered an enemy cache in an artillery crater. The cache contained the following: nine AK-47s, one Chicco PPS submachine gun - model 43, 16 RPG - 7 rounds, 12 RPG - 2 rounds, 24 RPG boaster charges, 1000 rounds of 30 cal ammo, 10 82mm mortar fuses, 38 pull-type fuses for satchel charges, one leather holster, 17 AK-47 magazines, assorted clothing, two 10 pound bags of rice and miscellaneous documents.
At 061500 October, two kilometers south of T-BONE, the 3d Co, 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN), employing organic weapons fire and artillery, engaged an estimated enemy platoon. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew. A search of the contact area revealed 13 NVA KIA, three AK-47s, one carbine, 100 khaki uniforms (no markings), 900 lbs of rice, 100 lbs of salt, 10 AK-47 magazines and 50 RPG rounds.

On 7 October, the Recon Plt, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf observed five enemy four kilometers northwest of PISTOL at 0300 hrs. The enemy were engaged by tactical air strikes. A bomb damage assessment revealed 11 NVA KIA. At 0330 hrs, the same element engaged five enemy with organic weapons four and one-half kilometers northwest of PISTOL. The enemy did not return fire but withdrew in an unknown direction. A search revealed three NVA KIA and one AK-47. At 0702 hrs the 2d Co, 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) discovered seven NVA killed by air strikes 24 hrs earlier, three kilometers north of RFTCOED.

At 080800 October, a HOI CHANH led the 26th National Police Field Force, RF Co 144, and FF Plt 22 to a bunker vicinity XD13349. The element employed organic weapons fire against two enemy. A search of the area revealed one VC KIA, one VC FN, three detainees, two M16s, five AK-47s, one M9, one pound of C4, and miscellaneous documents. At 1325 hrs, another HOI CHANH led RF Co 921 to a bunker at XD575501 which contained two AK-47s, one RPG launcher and miscellaneous medical supplies and documents. At 1415 hrs, the HOI CHANH pointed out a second bunker in the same area. RF Co 921 engaged three enemy in the bunker resulting in two VC KIA and one VC FN. At 1540 hrs, the HOI CHANH led the company to a bunker at XD577396 which contained two enemy. The enemy were engaged by small arms fire, resulting in two VC KIA, one AK-47, one 60mm mortar tube, and one .30 cal MG barrel captured. At 1750 hrs, the VC FN attempted to escape and was killed by organic weapons fire from RF Co 921.

At 1540 hrs, elements of the 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) employed organic weapons against an estimated enemy platoon two kilometers south of PS/DB T-BONE. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew. A search of the area revealed 12 NVA KIA, two AK-47s, one RPG rocket launcher and 480 lbs of rice.

At 091720 October, vicinity of XD198120, Trp E, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav observed six NVA in green uniforms. The employment of air and gunships resulted in six NVA KIA and one 12.7mm machine gun destroyed. At 1350 hrs, elements of the 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) engaged and unknown size enemy force four and one-half kilometers...
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north of FS/OB BASTOGNE. A search of the area revealed eight NVA KIA and three AK-47s.

At 101239 October, enemy elements engaged the 1st Plt., Co D, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf with RPG machine gun fire four and one-half kilometers north of FS/OB RAKKASAN, resulting in one US KIA. The element was engaged again at 1648 hrs by small arms fire three and one-half kilometers north of the firebase resulting in three US MIA. An AH-1G aircraft from Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav crashed in vicinity 42237400, not as a result of enemy fire, killing one US soldier and injuring another. The aircraft was extracted. Two and one-half kilometers south of T-BONE, reconnaissance elements of the 1st Div (ARVN) discovered a cache containing 16 individual weapons and one crew-served weapon.

At 110900 October, four and one-half kilometers north of BASTOGNE, the 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic weapons fire resulting in seven NVA KIA and three AK-47s. Also on 11 October, Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf detonated a booby trap which wounded two US soldiers in the RAKKASAN area. Two were wounded by a booby trap in the same area on 12 October, and one US and one ROK KIA in the same area on 12 October. Two ROK KIA in the same area on 12 October. CE-47 flame drops were employed in the same area on 11 and 13 October resulting in five and two secondary explosions, respectively.

At 131340 October, four kilometers south of FS/OB DAVIS, ARA in support of elements from the 4th Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) engaged an estimated enemy platoon in the open, resulting in six NVA KIA.

8. (G) 14 October - 23 October 1970

a. On 14 October, the 1st Bde CP remained at CAMP EAGLE. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf continued operations in the vicinity of FS/OB BASTOGNE. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf with its CP at OP CHECKMATE continued reconnaissance in force operations in operational coordination with the 3d Inf Regt (ARVN). The 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th continued search and attack operations in the FS/OB BIRMINGHAM area while the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf remained at PHU BAI Combat Base, continued the mission of division ready force, and conducted Bn refresher training. The 2d Bde CP remained at PHU BAI Combat Base. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf continued to secure FS/OBs TOMAHAWK and LOS BANGS and to conduct patrol and ambush operations in the area. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf continued search and attack operations in the FS/OB ARSENAL area while the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st
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Inf continued operations in the FS/OB BRICK area. The 3d Bde GP remained at and continued to direct operations from CAMP EVANS. The 3d Bn (Ambt), 197th Inf GP remained at FS/OB JACK and conducted operations in the area. The 1st and 2d Bns (Ambt), 506th Inf maintained their CPs at FS/OB RAKASHAN to direct operations in the RAKASHAN/GLADIATOR area.

The Han Bao Co. inserted 13 October in response to enemy sightings in the DAVUS area, continued search and attack operations.

On 15 October, the division implemented OPLAN 10-70, Typhoon Tropical Storm Contingency Plan at 1105 hrs, in response to weather reports that Typhoon JOAN would dominate the entire AO causing severe weather conditions for four to five days. The plan called for all US and GVN forces to be resupplied and capable of four day operations without further resupply. Resupply was accomplished by 1730 hrs. All isolated units were repositioned by 1830 hrs, so that reinforcement would be possible should they make contact with a numerically superior force. All aircraft were secured with double tie downs and aircraft flights restricted to combat essential missions. The "USS SCREAMING EAGLE" in Lang Co Bay was cleared of all sensitive equipment. A disaster relief control center was established in the DTGC by the AGofS, G5. Typhoon readiness conditions were terminated on 17 October as weather conditions improved.

On 18 October, the 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf completed refresher training. The BN CP and Recon Plt moved by vehicle to FS/OB BASTOGNE. Co A moved by air to FS/OB BASTOGNE and secured the firebase. Co B moved by air to FS/OB WAGBEL, Co's C and D conducted assaults and began search and attack operations in the BASTOGNE/WAGBEL area. The 1st Bn (Ambt), 327th Inf moved by air and vehicle from BASTOGNE area to CAMP EAGLE, assumed the mission of division ready force and prepared for refresher training. Elements of the 2d Bn (Ambt), 17th Cav inserted Ranger Teams ARGONAUT, FALCONS, VIKINGS and PACKERS in the AO to conduct area reconnaissance and determine the extent of enemy activity. Co L (Regr), 75th Inf maintained two to four ranger teams in the western AO during the period 18-23 October.

In response to increased friendly casualties caused by booby traps during the period 14-23 October, CH-47 aircraft flew 45 sorties and dropped 22,165 gallons of thickened fuel to clear suspected booby trapped areas. Additionally, two sorties were flown to spray 350 gallons of diesel oil to clear perimeters for Quang Dien District.
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UH-1H aircraft flew two sorties to spray 160 gallons of retroreflective slurry on enemy infiltration routes.

b. Significant Activities. On 14 October the 3d Flt, Co A, 2d Bn (Amb), 502d Inf was laying concertina wire around CP CHECKMATE. While driving engineer stakes, the element hit what appeared to be a 105mm dud round. The dud round detonated, wounding four US soldiers. At 1115 hrs, three kilometers east of STELLA, a trooper from the 2d Flt, Co D, 1st Bn (Amb), 501st Inf was wounded when he detonated an unknown type booby trap with a pressure type firing device. Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav killed four NVA in three separate engagements in the central division reconnaissance zone while Hunter Team HUNTINGTON observed, engaged and killed one NVA carrying an AK-47 at D356173.

At 150820 October, two and one-half kilometers southeast of O'REILLY, the 3d Co, 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) observed an enemy platoon and engaged with ARA. A search of the area revealed seven NVA KIA, two M16s, and one RPG launcher.

At 170550 October, in the vicinity of PS/CB JACK, an OH-6A aircraft from the 3d Bde Amn Flt observed one individual with an AK-47 waving a Chieu Hoi leaflet. The individual was picked up and taken to CAMP EVANS. At 1430 hrs, elements of the 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) employed organic weapons fire and artillery to engage an estimated squad three and one-half kilometers south of CP LION. A search of the area revealed five NVA KIA, two AK-47s and two 61x84mm bunkers destroyed.

On 18 October, the Hoi Chanh picked up the preceding day by the 3d Bde was working with a recon team of Co E, 2d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf three and one-half kilometers north of HUE when he detonated a booby trap consisting of one M26 fragmentation grenade with pressure type firing device, resulting in one Ki Co, 1st Scout wounded in action. The Hoi Chanh stated that he had infiltrated from the north and had only been in the area for three days. He proved to be of little assistance. At 0840 hrs, vicinity HD118093, an OH-6A aircraft from Trp C, 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav received 100 rds of ground small arms fire, resulting in one hit in the canopy and one hit in the fuel cell. Two US personnel received minor wounds. The aircraft returned to Phu Bai Combat Base and was declared non-flyable.

At 201640 October, a UH-1H aircraft from Co C, 101st Amn Bn (Aalt Mob) (Amb) received machine gun fire while inserting elements
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At 210930 October, four kilometers southwest of FS/0B ROY, the 3d Co, 1st Bn, 55th Regt (ARVN), employing organic weapons fire, engaged an estimated enemy platoon. The enemy did not return fire but withdrew to the south. A search of the area revealed five VC KIA, three RPG rounds, 100 rounds of 7.62mm ammo, one M60 machine gun and two M26 fragmentation grenades.

On 22 October, enemy activity increased. At 2030 hrs vicinity ED15082, a Trp C, 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav aircraft observed eight to 10 NVA in the open. The enemy was engaged with gunships. A visual reconnaissance revealed 15 NVA KIA. In the 1st Bde area at 0635 hrs, a bridge YE680092 on route 547 between BIRMINGHAM and BASTOCHE was discovered to have been sabotaged by demolitions. At 1855 and 2023 hrs, FS/0B BIRMINGHAM received a total of 25 unknown type mortar rounds which impacted outside the perimeter. At 1935 hrs, at YE670090, Co D, 3d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf received 30 unknown type mortar rds. In the 2d Bde area at 1900 and 2030 hrs, FS/0B ARSENAL received two mortar attacks totaling eight 82mm rds which impacted 500 meters outside the perimeter. There were no casualties or damage. In the 3d Bde area at 0030 hrs, CAMP EVANS received 25 rds of 82mm mortar fire, wounding one US soldier. At 1350 hrs, at YK46243, a trooper from the 3d Plt, Co D, 2d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf detonated an unknown type booby trap killing one US soldier and wounding another. At 1845 hrs, CAMP EAGLE received two 122mm rockets which impacted outside the bunker line.

At 230800 October, one kilometer southwest of HELEN, the 3d Plt, Co A, 2d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf, employing organic weapons fire, engaged five enemy. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew to the south. A search of the area revealed one VC KIA and one AK-47. At 1145 hrs, vicinity XR424082, Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav aircraft received 50-100 rds of small arms fire. The area was engaged by gunships resulting in three NVA KIA. At 2315 hrs, Trp C aircraft observed seven NVA in the open at YE711098. The area was engaged with gunships resulting in four NVA KIA.

9. (C) 24 October - 31 October 1970

a. On 24 October impending typhoon conditions (Typhoon KATE) caused the division to again implement OPPLAN 10-70. Typhoon Tropical Storm Contingency Plan. Based on weather reports, the division moved into

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Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, HOS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Typhoon Condition 1 at 1500 hrs. All aircraft were secured and a disaster relief control center was established in the DTCG. In the 1st Bn area the 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf completed refresher training on 23 October and moved by air to the FS/0B VECHARL and OP CHECKMATE area. The battalion commenced search and attack operations in the VECHARL/BLAZE/CHECKMATE area. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by air and vehicle to CAMP EAGLE on 23 October, assumed the mission of division ready force and commenced battalion refresher training on 26 October.

TYPHON KATE moved over the coast of Military Region 1 south of Da Nang on the morning of 25 October, causing heavy rains and winds up to 50 knots throughout the division AO. TYPHON KATE rapidly dissipated on 26 October, but persisting low cloud ceilings and scattered rain showers precluded complete utilization of division aircraft assets.

On 26 October, the 1st Bde CP remained at CAMP EAGLE and maintained liaison with the 3d Regt (ARVN). The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf continued operations in the FS/0B EASTONE area. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf conducted search and attack operations vicinity of FS/0B VECHARL, while the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf continued operations in the FS/0B BIRMINGHAM area. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf continued the mission of division ready force and conducted refresher training at CAMP EAGLE. The 2d Bde CP remained at PHU DAI Combat Base and maintained liaison with the 54th Regt (ARVN). The 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf continued operations in the FS/0B TOMAHAWK/ LOS BANGS area. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf continued operations south and southeast of FS/0B BRICK while the 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf continued operations in the FS/0B ARSENAL area. The 3d Bde CP remained at CAMP EVANS and maintained liaison with the 1st Regt (ARVN). The 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf continued operations in the FS/0B JACK area, with elements north and northwest of MEXICO. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf continued operations in the FS/0B PARKASAN area while the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf continued search and attack, and patrol and ambush operations in the platoon, vicinity CAMP EVANS.

On 27 October, a northeastern cold front moved into the division area bringing persisting low cloud ceilings and rain which severely restricted use of division aircraft. This cold front, typical of the transition from the southwest to the northeast monsoon, influenced weather in the division area of operations through 31 October. Heavy rains resulted in floods throughout the populated lowlands of northern Military Region 1.

On 30 October, the division Disaster Relief Control Center became operational in the DTCG and commenced coordination with US and ARVN officials to provide support for flood victims in the populated lowlands. Division aircraft assets were provided to XXIV Corps to evacuate flood victims in

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the DA NANG area. On 31 October, division aircraft evacuated 534 flood victims and distributed 54 tons of C-rations in support of civil affairs operations in the DA NANG area. Disaster relief operations continued in the division area through the end of the reporting period.

b. Significant Activities. On 24 October, aircraft from Trp B, 24 Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav killed seven NVA in four separate engagements in the vicinity of FS/QB BECHEL. At 1300 hrs, four and one-half kilometers north of FS/QB BASTOGNE, a trooper from Co A, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf detonated an unknown type booby trap with an unknown type firing device located on a trail, resulting in one US soldier WIA. At 1720 hrs, three and one-half kilometers south of FS/QB JACk, a trooper from Co C, 3d Bn (Ambl), 107th Inf was wounded when he detonated a Soviet mine with a pressure type firing device. At 1440 hrs, two and one-half kilometers west of O'REILLY, elements of the 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) employing organic weapons fire, engaged an unknown size enemy force. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew in an unknown direction. A search of the area revealed two NVA KIA, one AK-47, one RPG, eight graves containing eight NVA killed by tactical air strikes approximately two weeks earlier, three huts containing eight AK-47 rifles, one unknown type machine gun and two RPG launchers. At 1600 hrs, the element received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on and around their position. One US advisor and three ARVN soldiers received minor wounds. At 2223 hrs, HNU 32D Combat Base received 14 rds of 82mm mortar fire which impacted throughout the compound. There were two US personnel WIA.

On 251030 October, elements of Co C, 326th Engr Bn (Ambl) and Co A, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf were returning to FS/QB KHAMSAH after conducting road clearing operations when a three-quarter ton truck detonated an estimated 15 lbs of TNT at YD490222. The team had cleared the road at the point of detonation approximately one hour prior to the incident. There was one US soldier KIA and 3 were WIA.

On 28 October, an ambush in the vicinity of C Sector, CAMP EAGLE (YD802178), received small arms fire and an unknown number of RPG rds from an estimated enemy squad. The ambush element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. Six US soldiers were wounded.
Inlosure 3 (Area of Operation) to Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RG 35 CSFOR 63(—)

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 11 YEARS