AVDO-CS

24 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Commanding General
XXIV Corps
ATTN: AVII-GCT
APO 96349

(U) The inclosed Operation Report - Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with USARV Supplemental 1 to AR 525-15 and XXIV Corps Regulation 525-2.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl

[Signature]

Colonel, as
Chief of Staff

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CO, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) w/incl
CO, 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) w/incl
CO, 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) w/incl
CO, 101st Avn Gp (Cbt) (Ambl) w/incl
CO, 101st Abn Div Arty (Ambl) w/incl
CO, 2d Sqdn (Ambl) 17th Cav w/incl
CO, 326th Engr Bn (Ambl) w/incl
Table of Contents

1. Operations, Significant Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Operations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Training</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Chemical</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Intelligence</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Personnel</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Logistics</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Civil Affairs</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Psychological Operations</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Medical</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Signal</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Army Aviation</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Engineer</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Air Cavalry Operations</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. Artillery</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. Information</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Personnel</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Intelligence</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Operations</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Organization</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Training</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Logistics</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Communications</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Material</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Other</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inclosure

1. Operations Narrative/Significant Activities
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971. RCS CSFOR-65 (N3) (U)

1. (C) Operational Report

a. Operations.

(1) During the reporting period, the division continued close coordination and cooperation with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and THUA THIEN Province and District officials. This close coordination has contributed greatly to the progress of Vietnamization. During this period, numerous combined operations were conducted with the ARVN. The largest operation combining ARVN, division and nondivisional assets was LAMSON 719 in QUANG TRI Province and LACO. JEFFERSON GLENN/MONSOON PLAN 70 operations continued throughout the reporting period.

(2) The primary objective of JEFFERSON GLENN/MONSOON PLAN 70 is to provide a protective shield for the populated lowlands of THUA THIEN Province, to locate and destroy enemy forces, staging areas and forward cache sites, to protect vital lines of communications and to assist GVN officials to meet their pacification and development goals for 1970. The operation continues the concept of a complete integration of efforts of all agencies within the division area of operation to improve territorial security, protect the people against terrorism, improve the People's Self Defense Force (PSDF), develop local self management in administrative, economic and financial affairs, develop a greater national unity, improve the life of war victims, establish an information system to educate and motivate the people to participate in local development, and continue to build toward prosperity for all.

(3) To accomplish this mission during the northeast monsoon season, division units were repositioned in the piedmont and eastern mountain regions from their dry season dispositions deep in the canopied areas to the west. This repositioning permitted resupply operations by road which were necessary during extended periods of inclement weather. The division carried operations back into the canopy, conducting artillery raids and search and attack operations, as weather conditions improved beginning in January.

(4) Enemy losses inflicted by the division during Operation JEFFERSON GLENN/MONSOON PLAN 70 as of 30 April 1971:

Killed in Action (confirmed) 886
Detainees 41
Prisoners of War 36
Detainees 2
Individual Weapons Captured 434
Individual Weapons Destroyed 9
Crew Served Weapons Captured 33
Crew Served Weapons Destroyed 43

DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(5) Division Task Organization for the end of the reporting period for Operation JEFFERSON CLIN/MONSOON PLAN 70 Frago 41 (LAMSON 720 continuing).

1st Bde

1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf
2nd Bn (Ambl), 502nd Inf
2nd Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty (DS)
Co A, 326th Engr Bn (DS)
42nd Inf Plt (Set Dog) (DS)
1/265th RRC
TACP 20 TASS (USAF)
1st FSS (DS)
FSE/A/501st Sig Bn (Ambl) (DS)
1/101st MP Co (Ambl)
TM 101st MI Co (Div) (DS)

2nd Bde

2nd Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf
1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf
3rd Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf
1st Bn (Ambl), 502nd Inf
Co C, 326th Engr Bn (DS)
47th Inf Plt (Set Dog) (DS)
2TM, 101st MI Co (Div) (DS)
1/265th RRC
TACP 20 TASS (USAF)
FSE/A/501st Sig Bn (Ambl) (DS)
2nd FSS (DS)
2/101st MP Co (Ambl)
34th PT Det (Field Service)
CP & Weather TM, 5th Weather TM
4 TMs, 4th PSYOP Det (DS)
1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arm (DS)

3rd Bde

1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf
2nd Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf
3rd Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf
2nd Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf
2nd Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty (DS)
Co B, 326th Engr Bn (DS)
58th Inf Plt (Set Dog) (DS)
TM, 101st MI Co (Div) (DS)
3/265th RRC
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (AirMobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

TACP 20 TASS (DSAF)
VSE/A/501st Sig Bn (Ambl) (DS)
3rd FSSE (DS)
3/101st MP Co (Ambl)
25th PI Bn (Field Service)
CET Weather TH, 5th Weather TH
2 THs, 4th FSGRS Det (DS)

101st Div Arty (Ambl)
HHB (Ambl)
2nd Bn (Ambl), 11th Arm
4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty
Btry A (Avn), 377th Arty (Ambl)
266th FA Det (Surv Radar)

101st Avn Gp (CET) (Ambl)
101st Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl)
158th Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl)
159th Avn Bn (ASH) (Ambl)
163rd Avn Co (GS) (Ambl)

101st Div Spt Gp (Ambl)
HHQ & Bnd (Ambl)
5th Trans Bn (Ambl)
326th Med Bn (Ambl)
426th S&S Bn (Ambl)
801st Maint Bn (Ambl)
101st Admin Co (Ambl)

Division Troops
501st Sig Bn
326th Eng Bn
2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav
101st MP Co
101st MI Co

(6) LAMSON 719

(a) Operation LAMSON 719 was initiated on 30 January 1971 as a FRAGO of JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70. The mission of the division was
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (AirMobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS GFOR-85 (R3) (U)

to continue JEFFERSON GLEN and provide support to the combined XXIV Corps/I Corps Operation LAMSON 719 in Western QUANG TRI Province.

(b) The concept of the operation called for the 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) with one battalion from the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl)有机 to attack and secure Route 9 to the LAOTIAN border; secure Fire Base VANDERGRIFT and KHE SANH; and to cover and protect the deployment of US artillery to western QUANG TRI. On order, the 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) was to assume ORCON Task Force L-61 from 1st Bde 5th Infantry (Mech) and conduct a coordinated defense of the central and eastern DMZ. An engineer Task Force was placed ORCON to the 45th Engineer Group for the initial combat engineer work in opening QL-9 and construction of the assault air strip at KHE SANH. Engineer elements from the 101st were to release engineer equipment on order to ARVN engineer units to complete the air strip at KHE SANH. The ARVN objective of LAMSON 719 was to attack into IACS toward the NVA Base Area 604 to inflict maximum damage on enemy forces and supplies along the eastern HUE CITY MINH TRAIL.

(c) The 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) provided an infantry battalion to the 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) in QUANG TRI at the onset of the operation. In addition, the division assumed the operational and security responsibilities of units of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) in THUA THIEN and QUANG TRI Provinces, thus permitting their deployment into IACS. The Division opened Route 547 into the A SHAU VALLEY and conducted artillery raids as a diversion during Phase I of the operation. The 3rd Bde and four infantry battalions deployed to QUANG TRI Province. In March the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) assumed operational control of all United States Army tactical units in QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces and lines of communication supporting LAMSON 719. The Division's assets and resources were the reservoir from which LAMSON 719 was supported. The division closed KHE SANH and secured the movement out of western QUANG TRI of RVNAF and US units during the closing stages of the operation.

(d) LAMSON 719 proved to be a successful allied operation both in terms of achieving its objectives, and in demonstrating the ability of ARVN to conduct large scale operations. Direct assessment of destruction and damage produced by the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) across the VIETNAMESE/LAOTIAN border was limited to that attained by aerial observation. Most of the results were gathered by the ARVN and reported to I Corps.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, ROCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(a) The following are confirmed US totals for QUANG TRI Province in support of IAMBON 719 (30 Jan - 7 Apr)

**Enemy Personnel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>POW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Bde, 23rd Inf Div</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Abn Div (Ambl)</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>330</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Equipment Destroyed or Captured**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IW</th>
<th>GSW</th>
<th>Mortar or Rocket RPG</th>
<th>Bunkers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Bde, 23rd Inf Div</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Abn Div (Ambl)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>158</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Total killed by Helicopter (confirmed) for IAMBON 719.

2-17th Cav, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) 634
4-77th Arty, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) 1183
101st Avn Gp, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) 137

(g) Maneuver units and aviation assets arranged under parent organizations that participated in IAMBON 719.

101st Abn Div (Ambl)

HHC (-) 101st Abn Div (Ambl)
HHC 3rd Bde
1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf
2nd Bn (Ambl), 502nd Inf
1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf (-C & D Co)
2nd Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf
3rd Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf
2nd Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty
2nd Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty
4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl)
Co B, 326th Engr Bn (Ambl)
2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav
101st Avn Gp

CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RG5 CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

101st Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl)
158th Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl)
159th Avn Bn (ASH) (Ambl)
571st Med (67th Med GP)
263rd Sqdn (CH-53 III MAF)

1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)
1st Bn, 11th Inf (Mech)
1st Bn, 77th Armad
3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav
5th Bn, 4th Arty
Co A, 7th Engr
1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech)

23rd Inf Div
HHC, 11th Bde
2nd Bn, 1st Inf (Mech)
4th Bn, 3rd Inf (Mech)
6th Bn, 11th Arty
Btry C, 1st Bn, 82nd Arty
Btry A, 3rd Bn, 82nd Arty
Co C, 26th Engr Bu
14th Avn Co (AH)
71st Avn Co (AH)
174th Avn Co (AH)
Trp F, 8th Cav
Trp K, 17th Cav
132nd (ASH) Co

1st Avn Bde (USARY)
Trp B, 7th Sqdn, 1st Cav
Trp C, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav
223rd Avn Bn HHC
173rd Avn Co
48th Avn Co
179th Avn Co
235th Avn Co (Aerial Wpn)
CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

1st Cav Div (Ambl)

C-3 (Aerial Wpn), 227th Avn Bn

(7) LAMSON 720.

(a) On 14 April 1971 the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) initiated Operation LAMSON 720 under PRAGO 41 to JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSUN PLAN 70. The order called for a combined airmobile operation with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) (Reinf) conducting operations into the DA KRONG/K SHAU VALLEY areas to destroy enemy supply bases in forward logistical areas. The operation called for the 3rd Bde, 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) to conduct air-mobile assaults into the DA KRONG River/K SHAU VALLEY area, utilizing the air-mobile raid and fire support shelf technique, to destroy enemy supply in enemy Base An 129. The 3rd Bde employed similar techniques to achieve their objectives and destroy cache sites.

(b) Enemy losses inflicted by the division during Operation LAMSON 720 (14 April 1971 - continuing).

- Killed in Action: 130
- Detainees: 0
- Prisoners of War: 0
- Individual Weapons Captured: 6
- Individual Weapons Destroyed: 1
- Crew Served Weapons Captured: 1
- Crew Served Weapons Destroyed: 5

(8) C-3 Air Activities. During the period Nov 70 - Apr 71 the following air assets were expended in support of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl):

(a) FAC Directed Air Strikes (in sorties):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Strike Sorties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1794</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Combat Sky spots/Beacons (in sorties):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Sky spots/Beacons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2127</strong></td>
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CONFIDENTIAL
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, AGS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(a) USAF Gunships (in sorties):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>NOV 00</th>
<th>DEC 00</th>
<th>JAN 00</th>
<th>FEB 02</th>
<th>MAR 00</th>
<th>APR 12</th>
<th>TOTAL 14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(b) USMC Flareships (in sorties):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>NOV 00</th>
<th>DEC 00</th>
<th>JAN 00</th>
<th>FEB 00</th>
<th>MAR 00</th>
<th>APR 02</th>
<th>TOTAL 02</th>
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</thead>
</table>

(c) Ordnance Expended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>HE (TONS)</th>
<th>NAPALM (TONS)</th>
<th>20mm Cannon (rds)</th>
<th>CHEMICAL AGENT (lbs)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOV</td>
<td>2068.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>1886.13</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>17670</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>1152.75</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>18310</td>
<td>3500.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>1019.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>12490</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>1592.25</td>
<td>36.00</td>
<td>53670</td>
<td>1400.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>2533.75</td>
<td>161.00</td>
<td>76788</td>
<td>9600.0</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8752.63</td>
<td>213.25</td>
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<td>14500.0</td>
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7.62mm (rds) CBU Cannisters Air-ground Rockets

<table>
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<th>NOV 00</th>
<th>DEC 00</th>
<th>JAN 00</th>
<th>FEB 00</th>
<th>MAR 00</th>
<th>APR 00</th>
<th>TOTAL 00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(f) ARC LIGHT Strikes in the 101st Airborne Division (Airmbl) A.O.:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>NOV 00</th>
<th>DEC 00</th>
<th>JAN 02</th>
<th>FEB 00</th>
<th>MAR 01</th>
<th>APR 23</th>
<th>TOTAL 26</th>
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(g) Cumulative friendly casualties from 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>NDI</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC/DIV</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC/1BG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC/2BG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC/3BG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/187 INF</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/327 INF</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/327 INF</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/501 INF</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/501 INF</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/502 INF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502 INF</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/506 INF</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/506 INF</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>65</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>99</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/506 INF</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIV ARTY</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 AVN GP</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>134</td>
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<tr>
<td>3PT COMD</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/17 CAV</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>131</td>
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<tr>
<td>L/75 RANGERS</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>326 ENGR</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 MP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>1285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of 30 April 1971

(b) Training.

(1) Training for divisional and non-divisional personnel continued at the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS). Five courses of instruction were conducted, to include:

(a) Replacement training for all new in-country personnel assigned to division except for enlisted personnel in the grade E-9 and officers in the grade of O-4 and above.

(b) Combat Commanders Course (CCG). for all company grade and combat support officers assigned to the division. The FOG familiarizes the student with concepts and tactics used in the division.

(c) Combat Leaders Course for junior noncommissioned officers and potential noncommissioned officers. The FOG includes instruction in selected general subjects, as well as weapons, tactics, and fire support.
CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RG5 CSFOR-4 (A3) (U)

(d) Loss Luck 66 Program. This course trains scouts to work with infantry units within the division. Each trooper is selected as the scout's "buddy" and trains with the scout, assisting him in learning the duties of a scout.

(e) Advanced Marksmanship Program. Troops personnel from Infantry battalions are pre-trained in advanced marksmanship procedures with the M-16 Rifle.

(f) Salter School. This is an eighteen day course designed to provide commanders with highly skilled marksmen. Personnel train with the XM-21 weapon system to make kills consistently at ranges up to 500 meters during daylight hours and 400 meters during the hours of darkness.

(g) On 27 March 1971 the Division discontinued replacement training for infantry personnel. This action was taken because in-country transfer personnel are generally familiar with airborne operations and have already received mandatory in-country training.

(h) Battalion training continued with very few changes. The battalions modified their lesson plans to cover problems that might be experienced during the Southeast monsoon dry season. In addition, emphasis was placed on training in the following areas: mines and booby traps, field hygiene, small unit tactics, equipment maintenance, and prevention of heat injuries.

(i) Training assistance to ARVN units has been reduced to one mobile training team. This MTT, composed of men of the Screaming Eagle Det, offers training on location in support to the 5th AVN Det, 3rd and 5th ARVN Division units on a twice-a-week basis.

(c) Chemical. During the period 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971 the Division Chemical Section with the 16th Chemical Platoon (CC) and the 20th Chemical Detachment (under its operational control) continued to provide combat and combat service support to the units of the 101st Airborne Division (Airborne).

During the reporting period chemical personnel performed the following missions in support of LAMSON 719, LAMSON 720, and other operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE MISSION</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Personnel Detector (sniper)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>122 source locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PME Slurry, Retroreflective</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>260 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flame Drop</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>6268 55-gallon drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulk OS2 (Persistent)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(112 secondary explosions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>448 drums</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL 10
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

TYPE MISSION | MISSIONS | SORTIES | AMOUNT
-------------|----------|---------|------------------
Bunker Seeding Operations | 5 | NA | 25 JEEPVs
Tactical CS (Non-persistent) | 22 | 25 | 243 E-158 Cannisters
Defoliation: | | | |
Herbicide, Agent Blue | 3 | 4 | 300 gallons Agent Blue
E-3 CS Inchr Issued | NA | NA | 68
Teams Inspect/Install | 57 | NA | 806/23
Fougasse Issued | NA | NA | 586 Drums
Teams Inspect/Install | 40 | NA | 1573/231
Rushe Flares Inspect/Install | 16 | NA | 586/127
Maintenance Teams | 72 | NA | NA
Protective Masks Inspected | NA | NA | 8221 Masks
Repair/Evac | NA | NA | 1832/615 Masks
FFTo Inspect/Evac | 5 | NA | 13/12 Flame throwers

New Techniques. Paddling for Flare Nets. Flare drops are conducted by releasing 55-gallon drums of 43% thickened fuel from cargo nets slung beneath CH-47 helicopters. The metal clasps and rings of the cargo net are padded with fibre padding and tape to prevent aircraft skin damage when one end of the net is released. During LAMSON 719 the large number of flare drop missions created a shortage of fibre padding and tape due to deterioration after successive drops. In order to continue flare drop missions a technique was developed in which sections of rubber inner tubes were wrapped around the fibre padding and tied in place with rubber laces, also cut from inner tubes. This produced a more effective and permanent padding since the rubber covering is more durable and flexible than the tape, which tore easily.

d. Intelligence.

(1) Enemy Situation.

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period, enemy units were located as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ MTPH</td>
<td>BA 631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Regt HQ</td>
<td>YC9761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K4B Inf Bn</td>
<td>ZC1897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54C Inf Bn</td>
<td>ZC0193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Regt HQ</td>
<td>YC6382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>304th Inf Bn</td>
<td>YC9398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>810th Inf Bn</td>
<td>YD5715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K32 Hkt Arty Bn</td>
<td>YC7294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi Thua I Sapper Bn</td>
<td>YC8195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL

Bulk CS2 (Persistent) | | |
| 6 | 16 | 448 drums |
| 5 | 8 | 24 BLU-52 A/B Bombs |

CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

UNIT

Chi Thoa II Sapper Bn
439th Inf Bn
6th Regt HQ
800th Inf Bn
802nd Inf Bn
806th Inf Bn
K35 Rkt Arty Bn
K12 Sapper Bn
7th Front
808th Inf Bn
8 14th Inf Bn
K34 Rkt Arty Bn
K10 Sapper Bn
K11 Sapper Bn
K12 Trans Bn
324B Div HQ
803rd Regt HQ
1st Inf Bn
2nd Inf Bn
3rd Inf Bn
U1 Trans Bn
812th Regt HQ
4th Inf Bn
5th Inf Bn
6th Inf Bn
K19 Sapper Bn/304th Div
29th Regt HQ
7th Inf Bn
8th Inf Bn
9th Inf Bn
675th Arty Regt
K3 Sapper Bn
11A Recon Bn
HQ B5 Front
12th AT Bn
13th Arty Bn
24th AA Bn
15th Engr Bn
16th Sig Bn
17th Trans Bn
19th Med Bn
33rd Sapper Bn
75th AA Bn (12.7 mm)

LOCATION

YC7234
YD6279
YD2518
YD3925
YD2619
YD2224
YD3620
YD3918
YD2130
YD3339
YD2860
YD2636
YD353A
YD2546
YD1327
YD2717
YD3415
YD3212
YD3608
YD3310
YD3914
YD2035
YD2834
YD4021
YD2730
YD0520
YD3317
YD2823
YD3018
YD3319
RA 611
YD2913
YD3298
XD9982
DM2
DM2
DM2
DM2
DM2
XD9939
XD9561
UNIT                      LOCATION
304th Div HQ
F3 304th Div
  29th Sapper Bn
  9th Inf Regt HQ
    1st Inf Bn
    2nd Inf Bn
    3rd Inf Bn
  24B Inf Regt
  66th Inf Regt HQ
    7th Inf Bn
    8th Inf Bn
    9th Inf Bn
320th Div HQ
  48th Inf Regt
  52nd Inf Regt
  64th Inf Regt
308th Div HQ
  36th Inf Regt
  38th Inf Regt
  102nd Inf Regt
27th Inf Regt (Indep)
  1st Inf Bn
  2nd Inf Bn
  3rd Inf Bn
    27th Inf Bn
138th Inf Regt (Indep)
246th Inf Regt (Indep) HQ
  1st Inf Bn
  2nd Inf Bn
  3rd Inf Bn
270th Inf Regt (Indep)
126th Naval Sapper Regt
84th Rkt Arty Regt
164th Arty Regt
  2nd Arty Bn
240th Arty Regt

(b) November 1970.

In November, activity by MRTTH units was generally at a lower level than previous months. The 4th Regt directed attacks against the NDE-DAL NANG RR, traffic on QL-1, and bridges in AU LOG (D), their traditional AO. The 5th Regt activity was concentrated primarily in the Firebase BRICK (XG35994) and Firebase KATHYN (YD47611) areas.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1972, RG3 CSFOR-65 (R3) (Q)

The 6th Regt operations consisted mostly of attacks by fire in the vicinity of Camp Evans. The 7th Front was the one 81THU unit which was responsible for a higher level of activity in November than the previous month. Contacts were made with elements of the 314th Inf Bn, 308th Inf Bn, and the K10 Sapper Bn of the 7th Front as they were conducting the monsoon campaign at HAI LANG (D) and TRIEU PHONG (D). The 324B Division continued its logistical and security role in western QUANG TRI (F) and THUA THIEN (P), its traditional AO.

2 B5 Front. Activity in the B5 Front was light during November. Activity was characterized by attacks by fire, mining incidents, and ground contacts with small size enemy forces, primarily in the eastern and central DMZ areas. Activity in the western QUANG TRI area was limited to sensor indications and bunker and trail activity. The most significant incidents occurred in the eastern and central DMZ areas. On 8 November at XD5985, 3/3/2 ARVN received 105 x 82mm mortar rounds resulting in one KIA and one WIA. Of the 14 attacks by fire in the central DMZ area, Fire Base TAM LAN Bnk (TH019593) received seven.

2 VC/VOI. The number of VC/VOI incidents increased from 19 in October to 28 in November. Of the total incidents, 61 percent were acts of terrorism and 32 percent were rice/tax collections. A significant increase was noted in kidnapping and sabotage incidents; however, propaganda incidents decreased from October's total. The significant increase in activity in November can be attributed to the efforts of the 4th Regt in support of VC/VOI units in and around PHU LOC (D). The PHU LOC Special Action Unit (PASAU) in conjunction with the 304th Bn/5th Regt, increased activity in PHU LOC (D) to its highest level since the 101st Airborne Division began operating in THUA THIEN (P).

(c) December 1970.

1 81THU. OB analysis indicated that the 4th Regt disbanded the K44 Bn and used those personnel to reinforce the K43 Bn. The 5th Regt continued its relatively low level of activity in the Fire Base BRICK (XC359994) and Fire Base KATHRYN (XD476111) areas. Elements of the 6th Regt continued to infiltrate PHONG DIEN (D) to conduct harassment of Allied installations. A rally from the Medical Section of 81THU stated that the K11 Sapper Bn/7th Front had been disbanded and its personnel assigned to the K10 Sapper Bn/7th Front. The 324B Division continued to provide logistical support throughout the month.

2 B5 Front. Activity in the B5 Front was light during December. Activity was characterized by attacks by fire occurring primarily in the eastern DMZ area and ground contacts with small size enemy forces. Mining incidents were concentrated primarily in the central DMZ area.
The most significant incidents were in the eastern DMZ area where, on 16 December at YD1275, 1/4/2 ARVN contacted an unknown size and received 150 rounds of 82mm and 60mm mortar fire; on 27 December Popular Force Units 95, 98, 100, 164, and 170, with assistance from 3-17th Cav, engaged an enemy platoon with SAF resulting in 17 NVA KIA and one NVA W from the 126 Naval Sapper Regt.

3 VC/VCI. The number of VC/VCI related incidents increased from 28 in November to 38 in December. Of the total incidents, 64 percent were terror oriented; and 29 percent were rice/tax collections and propaganda incidents. HNU INC (D) again maintained its high level of VC/VCI activity with 47 percent of the total incidents. VC/VCI activity also increased in HUONG DIEN and HUONG TIA Districts. The month of December gave indications of efforts by the enemy to increase his activity in the lowlands.

(d) January 1971.

1 NWTH. During January the 4th Regt failed to mount any coordinated attacks against US/ARVN installations. The 5th Regt continued to be active in the Fire Base BRICK (VC835994) vicinity and was using the area between Fire Base BRICK (VC835994) and Fire Base IA SON (YD931068) to infiltrate into the lowlands. The 6th Regt continued its harassment of DIEN (D) and the CAMP EVANS area, working closely with the local VC in these areas. Activity in the 7th Front decreased sharply with all reported incidents being BBTs. Reports indicated that the 803rd and 29th Regts/324B Division were assuming logistical support and security roles for base areas, cache sites, and infiltration routes in the A SHAU VALLEY and eastern Base Area 611 areas.

2 B5 Front. Activity in the B5 Front during January increased considerably over that reported in December as witnessed by attacks by fire, mining incidents, and ground contacts. These occurred primarily in the eastern and central DMZ area. Activity in western QUANG 2RI was limited primarily to that detected by ground sensors and visual reconnaissance. The most significant incidents occurred in the western DMZ area, where on 2 January at YD253807, the 2-11th Cav and the 1/3/2 ARVN received three 122mm rockets, three 105mm arty rounds, and 694 x 82mm mortar rounds resulting in seven WIA. In addition, on 2 January at YD246774, a recon team from 1/3/2 ARVN received 130 x 82mm mortar rounds but suffered no casualties; and on 15 January at YD127728 B/1-61 engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic weapons fire resulting in 17 enemy KIA. Eight US personnel were wounded in this action.

3 VC/VCI. The number of VC/VCI related incidents decreased from 38 in December to 29 in January. There was a proportionate decrease in terror oriented incidents, and rice/tax collections were 50 percent
Operational Report -- Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSPOR-65 (R3) (U)

less than those in the previous month. However, sabotage and assassinations increased slightly during January. PHU LOC (D) maintained its high level of activity, while PHONG DUYEN (D) and MUONG THA (D) were second in total incidents for the month. A 525 MI Group agent report stated that VC cadre had been instructed to establish comm cells and to guide NVA regulars into the lowlands.

(a) February 1971.

1 MOTH. The enemy's activity in the 4th Regt AO consisted primarily of mining incidents on or near the HUE-DA NAM RR. The level of activity in the 5th Regt generally decreased, but continued to be moderate in the Fire Base BRICK (J6635994) area, while the Regt showed a renewed interest in Route 547. Contact with the 6th Regt decreased in February and activity continued to be of a harassing nature. Reported incidents from the 7th Front remained at a low level consisting of sporadic activity throughout the AO. Units of the 3243 Division continued their logistical support role, while the 822nd Regt/3243 Division left RVN to oppose Operation LAMSON 719.

2 B5 Front. Activity in the B5 Front increased to a high level during February; the increase being attributable to Operation LAMSON 719. Activity in the form of ground contacts and attacks by fire was reported in western QUAN TRI for the first time since October. Areas of concentrated activity were the eastern DMZ vicinity Fire Bases A-1 (D6270794) and A-2 (D6213794), the Rock Pile area, and central and eastern QUAN TRI, vicinity Route QU-9. Fire Base A-1 received 11 attacks by fire and Fire Base A-2 received 12 attacks by fire. Most of the activity in the ROCK PILE area was centered in the vicinity of Fire Base SCOTCH (X9912563). On 13 February at X9912565, a company sized enemy element was engaged with artillery fire resulting in 30 NVA KIA. On 3 February at X990225, gunships attacked an ammunition storage area resulting in a total of 44 secondary explosions. The bulk of activity in western QUAN TRI occurred along the JACTHAN border areas of QU-9 and was in the form of ambushes by indirect fire and SAF.

3 VC/VCI. The number of VC/VCI related incidents decreased from 29 in January to 27 in February. Decreases were noted in rice/tax collections and propaganda activity. Acts of terror increased slightly, while intelligence collections and kidnappings remained at the same level. There was a significant increase in sabotage incidents during the month of February, due primarily to the greater number of mining incidents along the HUE-DA NAM RR in PHU LOC (D). There were 14 mining incidents along the railroad in February compared to 7 in January.

(f) March 1971.

1 MOTH. March saw an increase of activity in the 4th Regt AO. Attacks were launched against RR bridges and there were incidents of
vehicles receiving fire in the HAI VAN PASS area. The 5th Regt activity increased sharply throughout the AO. The centers of activity were in the vicinity of Fire Base IA SON (YD931068), Fire Base EASTCONE (YD625095), and western Route 547. The 6th Regt decreased its level of activity to harassment and attacks by fire against CAMP EVANS. Two battalions of the 6th Regt were identified in the 5th Regt AO in the vicinity of Fire Base VELOCEL (YD549034). It is now believed that this represents a temporary extension of the 6th Regt’s AO, brought about by the continued commitment of 324B Division forces in LAOS. Operations by the 7th Front increased and consisted of harassment and rice collection operations in the lowlands of HA T LAM (D). FW reports indicated that the 203rd Regt and the 312th Regt of the 324B Division were operating in eastern LAOS during Operation LAMSON 719. An agent also indicated that the 29th Regt participated in that operation.

2 B5 Front. Activity in the B5 Front continued at a high level and increased significantly over that reported in February. Activity was characterized by ground contacts with small size enemy forces, numerous incidents of attacks by fire, and mine detonations throughout the AO of the B5 Front. Concentrations of activity took the form of ambushes along QL-9 from the ROCK PINE area to the LACHTAN border and large scale attacks by indirect fire centered on the KHE SANH Combat Base and its airfield. The central and western QUI NAM TRI areas were the scene of the most significant events during March. On 8 and 21 March, Fire Base VANDERGRIFF (YD002488) received sapper attacks that destroyed a total of 36,000 gallons of JP-4 fuel and 8,600 x 20mm rounds. There were 19 reported attacks by fire on KHE SANH (YD853418); KHE SANH received a sapper attack and 120-150 rounds of indirect fire on 23 March 1971. Results of the attack were 3 US KIA, 13 US WIA, one ARVN WIA, 14 NVA KIA, one NVA WIA, two aircraft destroyed, four aircraft damaged, and two rear points damaged. On 25 March at YD813435, 1/5/1-1 Cav received SAF and RPG rounds from an unknown size enemy force. Aerial rocket artillery and FACs were employed. Results of the contact were one US KIA, 4 US WIA, and 36 NVA KIA.

3 VC/VCI. The number of VC/VCI related incidents increased significantly from 27 in February to 62 in March. This was the highest total of VC/VCI incidents for a one month period since September of 1969. Sabotage incidents decreased slightly from 16 in February to 13 in March. Terrorism, kidnapping, rice/tax collections, and propaganda incidents all increased sharply during March. PHU LOC (D) accounted for 80 percent of the total incidents. Agent reports received during the month attributed the sudden rise in activity to the VC cadre's attempt to draw allied attention to the lowlands, and relieve pressure on NVA units engaged in Operation LAMSON 719. With the conclusion of LAMSON 719, activity began to decrease to its normal level.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (RJ) (U)

(g) April 1971.

1 MORTH. During April, reported activity remained constant in the 6th Regt AO. Incidents were spread throughout the area and consisted primarily of EBTs and rice/tax collection incidents. The reported incidents from the 6th Regt were concentrated to the north and east of Fire Base BRICK. There was heavy contact in the area where elements of the 6th Regt Bde were identified in late March. This is the second month that the 6th Regt has extended beyond its normal AO. The 6th Regt continued combat sporadic harassment throughout the AO. A general increase in activity was noticed in the 7th Front AO. Most of this increase is associated with rice collection operations. A captured document referred to a "7th Front Spring Campaign" scheduled to begin after 15 April. Little information was reported concerning units of the 324th Division during April. According to WIs taken in late March, the 803rd and 812th Regts are moving back into their traditional areas of operation after LAMSON 719. An agent report indicated the 29th Regt is also returning. Other intelligence sources confirm the eastward movement of the 29th and 812th Regts. However, recent analysis indicates that the 803rd Regt remains in IAGS south of QL-9. The continuing deployment of the 803rd Regt away from its normal AO is probably due in part to heavy casualties suffered by the unit during Operation LAMSON 719, and in part to the enemy's fear of additional Allied incursions into Base Areas 604 and 611.

2 B5 Front. The B5 Front AO experienced a sharp decrease in activity during April. Activity was characterized by sporadic contacts and attacks by fire. Mining incidents also decreased considerably. There were no significant events during the month. This lull in activity is attributed to the withdrawal of the ARVN troops from IAGS. The enemy is believed to be resting and recuperating from the heavy fighting during Operation LAMSON 719.

3 VC/VCI. VC/VCI related activity declined significantly during early weeks of April, then increased again to a high level of activity by the end of the month. This is in contrast to the sharp increase of the previous month. In April, there were 49 reported incidents as compared to 62 for March. THU LOC (D) continued to show the highest total of VC/VCI incidents with 28. Kidnapping, sabotage, and propaganda incidents declined during April, while terror-oriented and rice/tax collection incidents have shown a slight increase. This decrease in activity may be a result of logistical shortages caused by Operation LAMSON 719, but time will be required to confirm this.

(h) Comparison table of VC/VCI incidents for reporting period Nov 70 - Apr 71.

CONFIDENTIAL

18
### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

1. **November, December, and January.**

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<th>ASSAS</th>
<th>FIN/ECON</th>
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2. **February, March, and April**

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(1) At the end of the reporting period enemy units were relocated as follows:

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<th>OLD LOCATION</th>
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<td>800th Bn/6th Indep Regt</td>
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<td>4th Inf Bn</td>
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

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(j) Units not previously located.

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<td>Rallier, Mar 71</td>
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<tr>
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<td>XD5039</td>
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<td>102nd Inf Regt HQ</td>
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<td>6th BN</td>
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(k) Units no longer carried. All Sapper BN/7th Front disbanded; personnel used to reinforce K10 Sapper BN. K1C Inf BN/5th Indep Regt disbanded; personnel used to reinforce K4B Inf BN. 439th Inf BN/5th
Indep Regt disbanded; personnel sapper trained, reassigned to 5th Regt. K19 Sapper Bn/304th Div is no longer OROCON to 324B Division.

(1) Units not previously carried. The 70B Front, vicinity XD5762, is a corps level headquarters which directed NVA operations during IAMSON 719. As this was the first appearance of the 70B Front, it is not yet known whether this was a temporary task force HQ established to direct NVA operations during Operation IAMSON 719, or a permanent corps level HQ which will direct NVA operations in the northern VN-LAO border area.

(2) G2 Air Operations. During the period 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971, 152 hand held photo missions were conducted by the Imagery Interpretation Section and the 220th RAC. 206 photo targets and 147 infrared targets were completed by the 131st SAC. Ninety-seven infrared and photo targets were flown for the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) by the 7th AF.

(3) G2 Ground Surveillance Operations.

(a) During this period Phase I sensors have been gradually replaced by Phase II sensors. As of 30 April there were 357 sensors employed in 93 sensor strings in the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) area of operations. All strings in the division reconnaissance zone are being monitored by Air Force aircraft. Activations are relayed from QUANG TRI (DART) to CAMP EAGLE by means of a direct telephone line.

(b) Each brigade has a BASS (Battle Area Surveillance System) employed at brigade headquarters with sensor relay equipment on OP CHECKMATE, Fire Base TOMAHAWK, and Fire Base MATZYN. In addition, there are manual readout sites at OP PHANTOM, Fire Bases BRICK, TOMAHAWK, RAKASAN, CAMP EVANS, and PHU CUA.

(c) Sensor strings are classified in one of three roles: intelligence, security, and target acquisition. Current percentages by classification are: 30% intelligence, 44% security, and 26% target acquisition.

(d) There are currently 197 FSD (Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector) sets in use in the division. Personnel receive instruction in use and capabilities of FSDs during SERTS training at CAMP EVANS.

(4) Counterintelligence Section.

(a) During the period 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971, the CI Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company, 101st Airborne Division
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 30 April 1971, ROG C5FOR-65 (R3) (U)

(ambi) engaged in a variety of activities in support of its primary mission of safeguarding the 101st Airborne Division (ambi) from enemy sabotage, espionage and subversion.

(b) MI and CI inspections of unit's personnel, document and physical security programs were conducted to detect and eliminate security violations and vulnerable areas subject to enemy exploitation.

(c) Personnel security investigations, complaint type investigations, and limited investigations were conducted to insure the validity of security clearances within the division. Clearances for 3404 replacements were validated, 1124 33CMBT clearances were granted, local files checks for 3623 personnel were conducted, as were 1100 USAFR checks and 612 CRYPTO ACCESS clearances.

(d) In order to assist the CI in the hiring of Post Exchange, Open Mass, and Club Custodian personnel, this office initiates a USAFR check. In these cases, the individual's finance records and his 201 file are reviewed. Upon receipt of favorable results of the USAFR checks, USARV Form 235-R (Request For Investigative Repository Check) is forwarded to the ACofS, CI. When USAFR checks result in unfavorable information, USARV attaches an extract of the derogatory information to the Form 235-R. This is forwarded immediately to the ACofS, CI.

(e) Technical support in the form of fingerprinting, changing safe combination, recovery of lost combinations, and repair of security containers was continuously provided both from division and supporting CI teams.

(f) The CI Section maintained liaison with XXIV Corps Security Section, DA NAME; 525th MI Group, HUO BAI and QUANG TRI; The Pacification, Security, and Coordination Headquarters, HUE; Advisors for the National Police; National Police Field Force; Police Special Branch; Province Interrogation Center; Provincial Reconnaissance Unit; Chieu Hoi; and Revolutionary Cadre, HUE; the 517th MI Detachment, QUANG TRI; PHOC, CI000, and DIOCC in HUE; and the DIOCCs in THUA THIEM and QUANG TRI Provinces.

(5) Interrogation Section.

(a) During the period 1 January 1971 to 22 April 1971, the IPW Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company, 101st Airborne Division (ambi), processed twelve (12) prisoners of war (12 NVA/RW, 0 VC/RW), three (3) NVA Hoa Chainns, and one hundred and eighty-eight (188) batches of enemy documents captured by units of the 101st Airborne Division (ambi).
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1972, RG5 5SPOR-65 (R3) (U)

(b) In addition, twenty-two (22) prisoners of war (21 NVA/FW, 1 VC/FW), seven (7) civilians (7 NVA/HG, 0 VC/HG) and an unknown number of enemy document batches from ARVN units in the tactical area were processed.

(6) G2 Plans/Order of Battle Sections. The G2 Order of Battle Section continued to monitor, analyze, and report the enemy situation throughout Northern Military Region I. Continuing emphasis was placed on the timely analysis and dissemination of collected intelligence information to all consumers. During Operation IANSON 719, the Order of Battle Section provided intelligence personnel for the Tactical Command Post at CAMP ROBERTS thus facilitating on-the-spot intelligence analysis and at both CAMP EAGLE and CAMP ROBERTS.

(7) Weather.

(a) November 1970. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 29.5 inches, which is about 7 inches more than that expected. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 16 days. No thunderstorms were observed over the coastal plains. Fog occurred in significant amounts on 16 days and was normally associated with light drizzle and rain. Ceilings of less than 1000 feet and/or visibility less than 3 miles occurred for 7 hours or more on 16 days, which was approximately twice the number of days expected for those conditions for the month. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 5 days over the coastal plain. Maximum temperatures were 3 degrees lower than normal with average maximum temperatures of 75 degrees F. Average minimum temperatures were 1 degree lower than normal with an average minimum temperature of 68 degrees F.

(b) December 1970. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 16.5 inches which is about 5 inches above normal. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 21 days. No thunderstorms were observed over the coastal plains. Fog occurred in significant amounts on 19 days and was normally associated with light rain and drizzle. Ceilings of less than 1000 feet and/or visibility less than 3 miles occurred for 7 hours or more on 17 days, which was approximately twice the number of days expected for this month. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and/or visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 7 days over the coastal plain. Maximum temperatures were about normal at 75 degrees F along the coastal plain.

(c) January 1971. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 4.5 inches, which is almost two inches less than the mean monthly
precipitation for January. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 19 days. No thunderstorms were observed over the coastal plain. Fog was present in significant amounts on 13 days and was normally associated with light rain and drizzle. Ceilings less than 1000 feet and/or visibility less than 3 miles occurred for 7 hours or more on 9 days, which is one day less than the average for this month. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and/or visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 8 days. Maximum temperatures were 3 degrees lower than normal with an average maximum temperature on 78°F. Average minimum temperatures were 3 degrees lower than normal with an average minimum temperature of 68°F.

(d) February 1971. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 3.17 inches which is just about one inch over the normal for February. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 7 days. One day with thunderstorms occurred over the coastal plains and 2 days over the mountains. Fog occurred in significant amounts on 16 days and was normally associated with light rain and drizzle. Ceilings less than 1000 feet and visibility less than 3 miles occurred for 7 hours on 10 days which is near normal for this month. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 10 days over the coastal plain and on 8 days at KHE SANH. Maximum temperatures were near normal with an average maximum temperature of 74°F. Average minimum temperatures were 2 degrees below normal with an average minimum temperature of 62°F.

(e) March 1971. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 1.95 inches which is about one half an inch less than normal for this month. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 6 days. Thunderstorms occurred on two days along the coastal plain. Fog occurred in significant amounts on 20 days in QUANG TRI Province and on 7 days in THUA THIEN Province, and was associated with both showers and light rain and drizzle. Ceilings less than 1000 feet and/or visibility less than 3 miles occurred for 7 hours or more in QUANG TRI Province on 8 days and on 3 days in THUA THIEN Province. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 16 days over the coastal plain and on 5 days over the mountains. The average maximum temperatures were 3 degrees above normal at 83°F along the coastal plain. Average minimum temperatures were 1 degree above normal at 68°F.

(f) April 1971. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 0.31 inches which was over 2 inches below normal for this month. Significant amounts of precipitation occurred on 3 days. Thunderstorms
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGCS GFORD-65 (R3) (U)

occurred over the coastal plain on 3 days during the month. Ceilings less than 1000 feet and/or visibility less than 3 miles for 7 hours or more did not occur in April. Ceilings greater than or equal to 5000 feet and visibility greater than or equal to 5 miles occurred on 25 days over the coastal plain. The average maximum temperature was 90°F which was 3 degrees above normal for the month. Average minimum temperatures were near normal with an average minimum temperature of 73°F.

e. Personnel.

(1) During the reporting period, the division Adjutant General’s office undertook a study to enhance replacement operations, controls, and division personnel accounting procedures. As a result of the study, procedures were implemented to gain physical control of replacements from their point of arrival in the division area of operations, until they were delivered to and accounted for by battalions and separate companies of assignment. Replacement assignment procedures were revised to insure company level assignments were made without delay at the time of administrative in-processing. These procedures permit commanders of units to participate in this assignment process to improve sound personnel management and individual job satisfaction. The scope of the study included the continuing features of unit monthly muster, accounting reconciliations, and physical and accounting controls over personnel rotating to separation or assignments out of the division. These new procedures were implemented with no particular difficulties.

(2) Chaplain. During the reporting period, chaplains throughout the division provided continuous support to all units and provided area coverage as needed. Battalion Chaplains accompanied their units on extended operations. A total of 5,859 services were conducted with an attendance of 112,340. During this period, several distinguished visitors conferred with the Commanding General. On 20 December 1970, the division was visited by Dr. Oswald J. Hoffmann (Pastor from The Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod), The Lutheran Home Speaker, and Miss Suzanne Johnson (a former Miss Illinois). Dr. Hoffmann conducted services in the Division Memorial Chapel and on several fire bases. His visit to Vietnam was made at the invitation of General Creighton W. Abrams. On 22 December 1970, Cardinal Terence Cook, Military Vicar for The Armed Forces, visited the division. He met with all Catholic Chaplains, in the area. Cardinal Cook also visited troops on several fire bases. His visit to Vietnam was made at the invitation of General Creighton W. Abrams. The Chief of Chaplains, W Francis L. Sampson, visited the division on 6 January 1971. During his visit he conferred with all division and nondivision chaplains in the area. He also visited troops on several fire bases. On 26 January 1971, four (4) Churchmen visited the division to confer with the
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGCS GSCOR-65 (R3) (U)

Commanding General, and to discuss moral and morale problems of the division with chaplains, and their ministry to the troops. The Churchmen also visited several fire bases. The Churchmen were: Dr. Edward Brubaker - Chairman, The General Commission on Chaplains and Armed Forces Personnel; Dr. Robert James Marshall - President, Lutheran Church in America; Dr. Robert Verelle Moes, Jr. - President, United Church of Christ; Dr. William Phelps Thompson - Stated Clerk, The United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. On 11 April 1971 an Ecumenical Easter Sunrise Service was held in the grassy area between Eagle International and Division Headquarters. The Division Band and Chorus provided special music. The participants were: Chaplain (LTC) Joseph J. Smolinski, Division Chaplain; Chaplain (LTC) John W. Wakefield, Deputy XXIV Corps Chaplain (Guest Speaker); Chaplain (MAJ) Arthur N. Webb, DIVARTY Chaplain; Chaplain (MAJ) Alfred Delosa, Jr., 273 COM Chaplain; Chaplain (CPT) Monroe Osburn, 2/17th Cavalry Chaplain. There were 300 personnel in attendance.

(3) Key personnel roster as of 30 April 1971 and changes in command and staff during the reporting period:

CG MG T.M. Tarpent succeeded MG J.J. Hennessey, 1 Feb

ADG(S) BG S.B. Berry

ADG(S) BG O.E. Smith

CofS COL D.A. Seibert succeeded COL H.A. MacDonald, 1 Nov

CQ, 1st Bde COL P.F. Gorman

CQ, 2nd Bde COL J.E. Crescen succeeded COL H.A. MacDonald, 2 Jan

CQ, 3rd Bde COL D.E. Grange, Jr. succeeded COL B.L. Harrison, 23 Dec

CQ, JSCOM COL D.E. Rosenhauz

CQ, Div Arty COL L.E. Surutt

CQ, 101st Avn Gp COL Y.A. Davis

Acofs, G1 MAJ R.C. Kurtz succeeded COL C.H. Ferguson 3 Mar

Acofs, G2 MAJ D.S. Johnson

Acofs, G3 LTC J.C. Bard succeeded LTC R.J. Young 23 Nov

Acofs, G4 LTC C.M. Kicklighter

Acofs, G5 LTC J.H. Simpson, Jr., succeeded LTC H. Purcell 15 Dec

Cham Off LTC J.C. Jackson

Div Surg LTC R.E. Day

Fl LTC S.J. Lobodinski

IG LTC T. Marvez

SM LTC R.S. Hawley

Fin Off LTC J. Trahan succeeded LTC W.J. Falconer 16 Apr

Chap LTC J.F. Smolinski

AG LTC J.M. Byrne succeeded LTC T.E. Minix 19 Feb

CQ, 1st Bn (Ambl) LTC D.C. Hilbert succeeded LTC G.H. Neisoutsos 19 Dec

327th Inf LTC J.M. Hamilton succeeded LTC J.J. Gerda 25 Jan

327th Inf

26
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RG5 CSFR-65 (R3) (U)

Co, 2nd Bn (Ambt) LTC L.N. Cooby succeeded LTC G.J. Shay 12 Jan
502nd Inf
Co, 1st Bn (Ambt) LTC W. Hampton succeeded LTC A.C. Dieter 18 Mar
501st Inf
Co, 2nd Bn (Ambt) LTC M.A. Roos
501st Inf
Co, 1st Bn (Ambt) LTC H.N. Lang
502nd Inf
Co, 1st Bn (Ambt) LTC K.A. Burrow succeeded LTC R.B. Porter 17 Jan
506th Inf
Co, 2nd Bn (Ambt) LTC J.F. Belloschi succeeded LTC J.C. Bard 20 Nov
506th Inf
Co, 3rd Bn (Ambt) LTC J.R. Stevenson succeeded LTC R.J. Sutton 17 Mar
187th Inf
Co, 3rd Bn (Ambt) LTC O.J. Shalkashvili succeeded LTC J.F. Martling 17 Dec
506th Inf
Co, 2nd Bn (Ambt) LTC N.E. Qualtrough succeeded LTC R.J. Burke 14 Nov
11th Arty
Co, 2nd Bn (Ambt) LTC E.J. Koper
319th Arty
Co, 2nd Bn (Ambt) MAJ H.H. Brandt
320th Arty
Co, 1st Bn (Ambt) LTC J.J. Zorn
321st Arty
Co, 4th Bn (ARA) LTC W.L. Gallopper succeeded LTC C.L. Novak 23 Feb
77th Arty (Ambt)
Co, 2nd Sqdn (Ambt) LTC A.A. Rider succeeded LTC Molinelli 5 Mar
17th Cav
Co, 101st Avn Bn LTC E.B. Fernández succeeded LTC W.N. Peacley 18 Dec
(Ambt Hel) (Ambt)
Co, 158th Avn Bn LTC R.A. Philips succeeded LTC R.J. Gerard 21 Mar
(Ambt Hel) (Ambt)
Co, 159th Avn Bn LTC G.F. Newton
(Ambt Hel) (Ambt)
Co, 326th Med Bn LTC R.F. Day
(Ambt)
Co, 5th Trans Bn LTC R.A. Pearseley succeeded LTC H.I. Small 25 Nov
(Ambt)
Co, 226th S&S Bn LTC R.J. Cuthbertson succeeded LTC K.R. Jacobs 10 Feb
(Ambt)
Co, 801st Maint
Bn (Ambt)
Co, 502nd Sig Bn
(Ambt)

f. Logistics.

(1) 5th Transportation.

(a) As of 30 Apr 1971, the 5th Transportation Battalion (Actf Maint & Sup) (Ambt) had 32 officers, 23 warrant officers and 486 enlisted men
CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

assigned. On 25 November 1970 LTC Horace B. Beasley assumed command of the battalion from LTC Harold I. Small. During February and March the 335th Direct Support Maintenance Company was placed under operational control of the battalion for LAMSON 719. In addition, 86 civilian augmentation personnel were distributed between A and B Companies for the operation.

(b) From 1 November through 30 April 1971, 2,210 aircraft were work ordered (to the battalion) for repair. During LAMSON 719 (February and March), the 101st Airborne Division (Amp) was augmented by 336 aircraft. The battalion was responsible for providing overall direct maintenance for these and the 426 divisional aircraft. The 335th Direct Support Company assisted in performing this mission. During this 60 day period, 1,133 aircraft were processed through the three direct support companies and returned operationally ready to the customer units. In addition, 7,582 job orders for aircraft avionics components and 1,610 work orders for armament repairs were completed.

(2) 426th Supply & Service Battalion.

(a) During this six month period the battalion continued to support the division. Highlighting the period was the support of Operation LAMSON 719. The battalion continued its participation in the DISCOM Civic Assistance Program. Additional cement was provided to add a ward on the RHU HEP Dispensary. Continued support is being given to ARVN AM/BE LAC site in HHS. Company B externally jung in excess of 1,000 sorties of class I, II, III, IV and V to the division units and the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN).

(b) The following figures reflect the operations of the Truck Platoon of Headquarters, Headquarters Service Company.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Passengers</td>
<td>1,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Freight</td>
<td>1,768 short tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ice</td>
<td>1,080 short tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Water</td>
<td>1,171,800 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fuel</td>
<td>611,977 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Miles driven</td>
<td>91,025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The following figures reflect the operations of the battalion maintenance section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Man Hours</td>
<td>12,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Vehicles Repaired</td>
<td>1,439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) In support of Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/Monsoon Plan 70, Company A sent 26 green tag teams to fire bases to inspect ammunition for safety.
and serviceability prior to backhaul. There were 793 ammunition resupply missions rigged and transported to fires bases from Philadelphia Hook Pad. There were 591 sorties flown from Corregidor Pad, consisting of 860 tons of water, 32.13 tons of Class I, 335.58 tons of Class III, 76.6 tons of Class IV, 11 tons of Class V and 111.45 tons of miscellaneous items. Company continued to provide rigger support from five airlift pads within the three FS281s and Fire Base BAKKASAN. Rigger training classes were reduced during the period primarily due to Operation JASON 719, and the critical shortage of rigger personnel.

(e) Company A established and operated JP-4 refuel pads at DONG HA, MAI LOC, FSA 2 and IANG CON (in support of JASON 719). During the operation these refuel points issued an average daily total of 223,500 gallons of JP-4. Rearms points were established and operated by Company A at DONG HA, MAI LOC, FSA 2, and IANG CON. An average of 38 tons of Class I was issued daily. Company B rigged a total of 1,937 sorties with a total weight of 24,038,500 pounds. Company B riggers participated in the evacuation of 284 aircraft during the operation. Company provided air items valued at $182,000, to ARVN units.

(f) In Class I operations, the following has been accomplished:

1 ASP LOC (CAMP EVANS) now submits a daily status list of critical ammunition. This provides the DAO a ready reference as to status of critical ammunition stocks on hand. It also aids in providing adequate storage of those munitions most in demand.

2 Due to the shortage of transportation, aviation units were requested to order API ammunition in smaller quantities so that sufficient transportation can be provided.

3 An AN/ARC-25 radio set was installed at the DAO to monitor continuous communications with Philly Pad.

4 An ammunition material retrograde program was initiated to recover brass and critical ammunition packing materials required to retrograde Class V items.

3 801st Maintenance Battalion (Amh).

(a) During the reporting period, the 801st Maintenance Battalion (Amh) continued to maintain COMREL, armament and automotive equipment well above the USARV deadline goal. A recapitulation of support maintenance activity is as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, ROS GSROR-69 (R3) (U)

Jobs Completed During 1 Nov 70 to 30 Apr 71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Begin</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>11,941</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>3,545</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>1,222</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>1,668</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>1,264</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>21,441</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The following is the operational ready percentage during 1 November 70 to 30 April 71 in major commodity areas;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Begin</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>99.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>97.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>96.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) On 29 January 1971 the 80lst Maintenance Battalion (Amb) received notification to prepare mobile maintenance teams to move on order in support of combat operations within Military Region I. Mobile Maintenance Teams were formed in each of the companies and on 6 February Company A's team moved from CAMP EVANS by convoy to KHE SANH. The move was made with no problems and the team was fully operational upon closing at KHE SANH. During JANSON 719 maintenance teams were employed on all operational fire bases and within PHONG TRI. The operation terminated in early April with the 80lst sustaining no losses of either personnel or equipment.

g. Civil Affairs.

(1) Operations; Significant Activities.

(a) Pacification and development activities in THUA THIEN Province continued during the reporting period. During the past six months, 57 projects were completed, and at the end of the reporting period, 24 projects were currently in progress. The overall effort of the civil affairs section is directed toward the achievement of the national objectives outlined in the THUA THIEN Province Local Defense and Community Development Plan, 1971. Vietnamization of civil affairs programs has top priority. Increased coordination with Vietnamese officials is being affected to ensure that Vietnamization is progressing. New civic action projects are not accepted unless a complete Vietnamese requisition, including a detailed description of required materials, is processed through province officials to CORDS and from CORDS to the 101st Civil Affairs Section.
CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RG5 CPON-65 (R3) (U)

(b) After the October flooding, civic action initiated a survey to evaluate priorities, current status and estimated completion dates of civic action projects in progress. The survey indicated that continuous contact with district personnel was necessary for timely status reports to be accurately obtained. LTC Simpson, 101st Airborne Division (Ambt), C5, initiated a program of continuous liaison with district senior advisors. He visited each DSA explaining the program, followed by civil affairs officers who have continued weekly visits. Continuous liaison has contributed to the Vietnamization program through regular exchanges of ideas and immediate attention to problem areas. Personal contacts create improved working relationships with nondivisional organizations which increase the beneficial results of 101st civil-military activities.

(c) Community relations activities are being emphasized in THUA THAN Province. As the Vietnamese assume more of a role in the civil affairs operations, community relations are finding new methods of expression other than civic action. During the reporting period, four major efforts towards community information were developed.

1 A civil-military operations fact sheet, "Vietnamese Civilians and You", developed by the civil affairs section of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambt), C5 illustrated how Vietnamese civilians assist our military operations. The fact sheet reported what local Vietnamese civilians have done to hinder the enemy and aid US/NAVAF. Instances were described of NVA being turned away without food or information and of bunkers, weapons and booty traps being reported to US and ARVN units. The importance of treating the Vietnamese civilians respectfully was stressed; and it was pointed out that the resultant goodwill could further contribute significantly to US/GVN combat success. The fact sheet was distributed to the troops at platoon and squad level.

2 The 101st Airborne Division (Ambt) took positive action to reduce traffic accidents occurring on highway 551. The route is a major supply route and is traveled heavily by trucks supplying NPA 1. In coordination with the Province Chief and Province Senior Advisor, the 101st provided 15 bilingual traffic regulations and information signs which were posted by district personnel. A representative from the division provost marshal's office and the C5 traveled the route to check placement and determine the effect the signs had upon traffic patterns. Since the signs have been erected, there has been a noticeable reduction in speeding and accidents on Route 551. A concentrated effort by US military and province personnel in directing their attention towards reducing accidents has paid positive dividends in saving lives and building a better community relationship.

3 During the months of January, February, and March due to increased supply traffic for operation LAMSON 719 on Route 551 from TAN MY to HUE.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (O)

City, the THU THIEN District Chief again requested aid in preventing traffic accidents. A ground loudspeaker team was employed from the 4th Det, 7th FSOP Pl, to warn the civilian population of the increased traffic danger. The 101st Airborne Division (Ambl), G5 authorized broadcasts every morning, afternoon, and evening from 1-7 Feb 71. Coordination between district officials and the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) on this traffic safety problem substantially reduced the number of accidents and incidents on Route 551.

A. The Province Chief and Province Senior Advisor, THU THIEH Province, requested that the civilian population be informed of the dangers inherent in tapping the POL pipeline from TAN MY to CAMP EVANS. Tapping of the line resulted in the death of six Vietnamese civilians. The 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) ground and aerial broadcasts advising of the danger of tapping the pipeline were conducted daily from 17 Dec to 21 Dec 70. The messages were effective and the number of incidents of tapping decreased from approximately one per day to less than one per week. Many breaks in the pipeline were reported by the people to district officials resulting in safe operations and better community relations between the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) and the people of THU THIEN Province. The POL program was broadcast again in February by a ground loudspeaker team from the 4th Det, 7th FSOP Battalion.

5. A community relations regulation, Div Reg 360-2, was developed by the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl), G5. This program is designed to enhance the effectiveness of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) by developing mutual understanding and rapport through the active confrontation and participation of both US and VN personnel in as many mixed activities as possible. This program includes the organization of installation community relations councils including members from all battalions and separate companies on each installation and establishment of a friendship council in Vietnamese communities including members from the US community relations council and local Vietnamese offices. Other programs include a cultural exchange program, English language instruction, the reduction of traffic accidents and disciplinary incidents, joint sport programs, and an information program.

(d) The Montague resettlement hamlet, TA RAU 71 in XAM HOA District, has been progressing satisfactorily during the winter months. In November 100 Montagnards were escorted by the 32nd River Assault Group (ARVN) to cut bamboo for siding on the homes they are constructing. They obtained sufficient bamboo to build an additional 35 houses. The 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) is providing the lumber for house frames and the CVN has supplied all the necessary tin roofing for 100 houses. The 7th Platoon, 29th CA Company, in direct support of the 101st, delivered 1,378 bd ft of scrap lumber and ammo boxes this reporting period. There are presently none...
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

70 homes completed and 30 more houses with the frames and roofs complete, requiring only siding for completion. The houses were constructed in assembly line fashion. In addition, primary school classes are presently being taught to the children of TA RAU II in the hamlet chapel. The 5th Platoon, 29th CA Company, is teaching agriculture classes in vegetable cultivation, which resulted in several garden plots being planted during the spring months. The 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) G5 warehouse supplied 300 lbs of fertilizer for demonstration purposes and will provide additional fertilizer as needed.

(e) An investigation of the types and locations of national monuments in THUA THIEN Province was completed by the 7th Platoon, 29th CA Company. The monument list was coordinated with province officials and compared with the official SATMEN listing. The members of the 7th Platoon, 29th CA Company, made visual identification of each monument and verified its coordinates. District, village and hamlet officials were extremely cooperative and appreciated this interest taken in their culture. An overlay showing the locations of all the monuments in THUA THIEN Province was prepared and provided to major tactical commands. A listing of national monuments was distributed to company level.

(f) A combined program of civic action and psychological operations was employed in THU THU District. Civic action officers provided fertilizer to the district farmers while an HE (ground loudspeaker) team from the 4th Det., 7th FSBP Battalion, provided a recorded tape explaining the proper application of the fertilizer. The tape stressed the importance of proper storage of the fertilizer prior to its application to the crops. The HE team was able to disseminate the message to the hamlets on the eastern borders of the district. The loudspeaker team enabled the farmers to understand the best method of application of the nutrients without resorting to detailed instructions. The program was extremely successful and neighboring hamlets requested to participate in the program. The 101st Airborne Division (Ambl), G5 delivered 4,000 lbs of fertilizer to two more hamlets in THU THU District and 4,000 lbs to the Montagnard resettlement hamlet, TA RAU II, NAM HOA District. The instruction tape was also played at the supported hamlets.

(g) During the reporting period 570 MEDCAPs were held and 28,989 patients were examined.

(h) Major projects completed during the reporting period:

1. GIA LE CHANH school (YD807247), HUONG THUY.
2. The CHI DONG Hamlet road repair (YD604222), HUONG DIEN.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1972, RG5 GSPR-65 (R3) (U)

1. The CHI TAI Hamlet road repair (YD615433), HONG DIEN.
2. PHU THU District road repair (YD895185), PHU THU.
3. PHU THU Village market construction (YD900003), PHU THU.
4. PHU THU Village Headquarters renovation (YD768248), HUE II.
5. HUE III Headquarters bunkers (YD765221), HUE III.
6. VINH TRINH Hamlet market (YD945185), PHU THU.
7. VINH TRINH Hamlet school (YD945185), PHU THU.
8. LA CHU Hamlet market (YD695240), HUONG THU.
9. SMOSDC (Sector Management and Direct Support Logistics Center), HUE II.
10. HUE City Recreation Association equipment (YD759226), HUE I.
11. PHU LUONG Village hospital (YD861361), HOANG THUY.
12. The MY C Hamlet school (YD639452), HUONG DIEN.
13. KO LANG recreation equipment (YD529244), PHONG DIEN.
14. THUONG BANG Village meeting hall (YD763128), NAM HOA.

(i) During the reporting period 57 projects were completed. This number included three schools, three administrative projects, 29 wells, three washstands, three markets, three road repair projects, one hospital, and 12 miscellaneous projects.

(j) The civil affairs section currently has 24 civic action projects in progress. These include three wells, two dispensaries, three washstands, 11 schools, two road repairs, one pier, one water pipeline and one bridge.

(k) Commodities issued during the reporting period:

- Cement (bags) 491
- Tin (ea) 351
- Timber (bd ft) 56,737
- Nails (kilo) 3
- Paint (gals) 97
- BSP (ea) 70
- Ammo boxes (ea) 1,785
- Culvert (ea) 537
- Reinforcing wire (rolls) 1
- Barbed wire (rolls) 10
CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineer stakes (ea)</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebar 8&quot; (ea)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pier pilings (ea)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks oxygen (ea)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks acetylene (ea)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tar paper (rolls)</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dirt fill (cu yd)</td>
<td>2,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand (cu yd)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravel (cu yd)</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lime (bags)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrap GF medium tent (ea)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandbags</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chain link fence (rolls)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food (lbs)</td>
<td>6,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing (lbs)</td>
<td>1,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health items (lbs)</td>
<td>1,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nightstands (ea)</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk (ea)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer (lbs)</td>
<td>8,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical school kits (ea)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School kits (ea)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletic equipment (ea)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basketballs (ea)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand tools (ea)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing kits (ea)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Significant events:

1. During the holiday season, units of the 101st Airborne Division (Airborne) gave clothing, candy, and party favors to the Christian organizations which they regularly support. The 3/187th Infantry Battalion hosted approximately 50 children from TIN NIN Orphanage in QUANG TRI for a Christmas party. The 2/11th Artillery hosted 52 children and three Nuns from KIM LONG Orphanage in NINH for a party at CAMP EAGLE. The 101st Surgeon donated 200 lbs of clothing to the KIM LONG Orphanage. The 163rd Avn Bn brought 14 students from VINH LOC to their company area for Christmas dinner and entertainment. The 159th Avn Bn presented boxes of clothing, toys, candy, and perishable food to the VINH LOC Orphanage. The 326th Engr Bn took gifts to the TTHEN AN Orphanage and then brought the children back to CAMP EAGLE for lunch and a tour.

2. As a gesture of goodwill for the Christmas holidays the Province Chief of TCHA TTHEN Province presented a Vietnamese cultural song and dance program to the members of the 101st Airborne Division (Airborne) on 24 Dec 70 at CAMP EAGLE, CAMP EVANS, and the 85th Evacuation Hospital at PHU BAI. Transportation for the performers was provided by two OH-47
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RG 1356-55 (R3) (U)

Chinooks from A Company, 159th Avn bn, and sound equipment came from the 501st Sig Bn. The vocalists were from the DONG KHANH and QUOC High Schools in HCM City. Dancers from the National High School of Music and the Imperial Ballet performed traditional selections depicting the culture of Vietnam. Music was provided by a group of musicians from the Imperial Ballet. A highlight of the show was a dance commemorating the Trung Sisters. The performance afforded the members of the division an opportunity to observe customs and traditions of the Vietnamese people. A representative of the province council and the Chief of Internal Security presented traditional Vietnamese art to the senior US representative at the beginning of each show. The generosity of province officials was an example of good community relations between members of the division and the populace of THUA THIEN Province.

3 The Disaster Relief Coordination Center (DRCC) was activated twice during the reporting period. On 29 Oct 70 the DRCC was activated to assist the GVN emergency evacuation and resupply of approximately 20,000 flood victims in THUA THIEN Province. QUOC THI Province was provided airlift support from 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) assets. The 2nd and 3rd Brigades established DRCCs, and DISCOM and the division engineers reported assets available for relief operations. These assets were immediately put to use. The districts of PHONG DINH and QUOC DINH were hardest hit. Flood waters crested at approximately 16 feet above normal, completely inundating the northern lowland area. Division aircraft and boats evacuated 6,768 of the 20,000 evacuees, delivered 12 tons of supplies, flew 482 helicopter sorties employing 27 CH-47s and 39 UH-1Hs. In THUA THIEN Province 31 deaths were attributed to flooding conditions. By 5 Nov 70, the emergency had subsided and most of the evacuees had returned home. Only isolated villagers continued to receive aerial resupply. Following the close of the 29 Oct - 5 Nov 70 DRCC & an SOP for the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) was prepared and circulated among the divisions staff and subordinate 5's. The SOP was finalized and printed and a test run of the DRCC was conducted from 29 Nov 70 to 1 Dec 70. Overall effectiveness of control and reporting during the test operation was credited to the new SOP. The final draft was approved, published and distributed.

4 The men of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) contributed $3,381.85 to the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) Tet Fund of 1971. The total proceeds were exchanged, at the rate of 275$VN for each $1 US, for a total of 1,667,400$VN. The Board of Governors, composed of the S5's from divisional units, voted to present equal amounts to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and to THUA THIEN Sector military dependent children. BG Berry, acting CG, 101st Airborne Division (Ambl), presented 533,700$VN wrapped in red Tet paper to BG Pham Van Shu, CG, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), and a duplicate package to COL Le Van Tan, THUA THIEN Province Chief. Additional Tet support was given to the following
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS O35CR-65 (R3) (U)

Children's organizations in THUA THIEN Province. The 1/502 Infantry Battalion delivered food to TU MAI Orphanage in PHU THU District; the 3/506 Infantry Battalion delivered food and candy to the VAN BANG Orphanage in PHU LOU District; the 3/187 Infantry Battalion delivered food to the MAZARITH Orphanage in HUE; The 2/506 Infantry Battalion delivered food to VAN THINH child care center in PHONG DIEN District; and the 2/11 Artillery gave two parties at CAMP EAGLE for the THAN HANH and XTM LOI Orphanages of HUE.

5 On 17 March 1971, a 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) CH-47 picked up a delegation of 12 NAH HOA District and village officials and their donation of 15 baskets (2,000 lbs) of rice cakes, candy, cigarettes and other sundry items and flew them to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) headquarters at KHE SAMN where they presented their gifts to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) Chief of Staff. The gifts were distributed to ARVN troops working at KHE SAMH and in LAC0. The donation represents a significant effort by the people in NAH HOA to demonstrate their appreciation to the government and continuing support for the armed forces of Vietnam. NAH HOA District is one of the poorest districts in THUA THIEN Province and the gift represents a real sacrifice for the people of the district.

6 Assistance to the PHU LUONG Hospital, PHUONG THIEN District, was completed in March 1971 by the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl), O5. A total of 40 beds, 12 desks and benches, and 60 nightstands constructed by Vietnamese carpenters at the O5 warehouse were delivered to the hospital. Since the inception of this project, the hospital has improved its services. At the beginning of the project, the hospital was only a local dispensary. Presently, it has local inpatient services and rural nurse and midwife training programs. Training programs are from two to six months in duration, depending on the quality of the medical facilities at the trainee's hamlet. More intensive training is given nurses and midwives from the more rural hamlets since they are virtually on their own after the training program is completed.

h. Psychological Operations: Significant Activities.

(1) On 11 Nov 70 1st Brigade requested a quick reaction leaflet exploiting NVA KIA's. A leaflet naming Nguyen Dinh Tu killed in action was targeted against the K10 BN, 5th NVA Regt with the expressed intent of creating both a "fear of death" in the audience and a "loss of confidence" in the efforts of the NVA to win the war. The leaflet was received from Combined Psychological Operations Center on 13 Nov 70 and disseminated by the 1st Bde on 14 Nov. Text of the leaflet read:
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (D)

(front)

"Men of the NVA, do not wait for death. Run away and answer the Chieu Hoi program or become a prisoner and go home in a short time after the war is over. Friends of Nguyen Dinh Tu, Long, Dinh and Tu, understand that you will suffer many more hardships and danger as well as a useless death if you continue to fight. Lay down your weapons and rally, we are waiting for your return."

(back)

"Nguyen Dinh Tu was one of your best soldiers who died because he continued to fight. The great titles of "Heroic American Killer" and "hero" did not protect him from death, hunger, or hardships."

(2) Division PSYOP initiated a PSYOP Campaign Training Program designed to instruct the Brigade PSYOP officers and senior NCO's on the methods of planning and implementing PSYOP campaigns.

(a) The training program was conducted in three phases. During the first phase, initial campaign plans were developed for each brigade. Initial plans demonstrated how PSYOP campaign plans insure an organized and effective psychological operation.

(b) During phase two, division PSYOP and each brigade PSYOP section combined efforts to develop a brigade PSYOP campaign. Campaigns implemented by the brigades served as a training tool for the brigade PSYOP sections.

(3) On 8 Dec 70 an NVA Lieutenant of the CL4 Sapper Company, 4th NVA Regt rallied to the 224th Regional Force Company in Phu Loc District. The Ho Chanh was exploited by division PSYOP in conjunction with 2nd Bde PSYOP, Phu Loc District Chief and MACV District Senior Advisor. Combined Psychological Operations Center developed and printed three different leaflets of the Ho Chanh's statement utilizing hunger and monsoon hardships as themes. The Ho Chanh also produced a recorded message targeted against his former unit.

(4) On 12 Dec 70 2nd Bde PSYOP conducted a "quick reaction" aerial broadcast mission in support of a contact made in NAM HOA District. Second Brigade utilized a general Chieu Hoi/Bally Instruction theme to exploit a RF/RF victory against an unidentified VC unit. The contact resulted in 1 VC KIA, 1 VC PIK/PIA and a VC escape. Subsequently a Scout Dog and PSYOP ground loudspeaker team were employed during the search for the escaped VC.

38
CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSPOR-55 (R3) (C)

(5) A VC village security chief of the QUANG DINH Special Action Unit rallied to the 185th Popular Force Company in QUANG DINH District on 24 Dec 70 and was exploited by 3rd Bde PSYOP with both leaflets and aerial broadcasts. The tape explained his reasons for rallying, how he has been treated by the GVN since rallying and encouraged his comrades to join him.

(6) On 31 Dec 4th Detachment, 7th PSYOP bn moved from 2nd Bde and was headquartered at CAMP EAGLE in direct support of division PSYOP. The move resulted in improved coordination with division PSYOP and increased utilization of the audio visual and ground loudspeaker teams.

(7) Five AN/UDH-6 1000 watt aerial loudspeaker sets were received from XXIV Corps. A 1000 watt system was given to each brigade and one aerial loudspeaker set is being utilized by division PSYOP. The other AN/UDH-6 had to be turned into 30lst Maintenance as unserviceable.

(8) On 24 Jan a combined operation was conducted by division PSYOP in cooperation with 1st ARVN Division to exploit the GVN repatriation of PWS to North Vietnam. Aerial broadcasts and leaflet drops over HUE and QUANG TRI City resulted in 100,000 leaflets disseminated and 2:30 broadcast hours.

(9) Operation "Cypress Garden", targeting the C3 Company, 2nd LOC Special Action Unit located in the VINH PHONG Mountain Region, began 25 Jan 71. The concept of the operation was to employ tactical firepower in support of psychological operations. The tactical phase of this campaign combined the support of gunships, artillery, flame drops, and District Regional and Popular forces. Psychological operations to be employed exploiting the effects of allied firepower with fear and nostalgia tapes, leaflets, and scripts. The objective of the campaign was to force NVA and VC in the area of operation to either Chieu Hoi or move from their mountain sanctuary into GVN controlled territory.

(a) The techniques employing tactical operations in support of PSYOP was relatively new to the division where previously PSYOP was generally employed in support of tactical operations. The techniques involved in this campaign called for progressive use of PSYOP and tactical firepower on an alternating and progressively concentrated basis. In the first five days of the campaign only aerial broadcasts, leaflet drops, and waterborne broadcasts exploiting Chieu Hoi and allied firepower themes were used in conjunction with the intermittent firing of 105mm propaganda rounds. This phase was to be followed by 3 days of tactical firepower using 105mm HE and Fz VT rounds, thickened fuel drops, and aerial and waterborne broadcasts using harassment scripts. This
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Action was to be followed by more Chieu Bons and allied firepower, aerial broadcasts, and leaflet drops and an analysis of results obtained thus far in the campaign. If, by this time, there had been no reaction from the target audience, fully armed gunships were to arrive on station in the AO and expend their munitions on suspected enemy locations. A visual recon of suggested and possible rally points would be conducted continuously. By conducting PSYOP in this manner, it was believed that the objectives of the campaign would either be achieved or the credibility of employing tactical firepower with psychological operations would be established. However, as a result of both inclement weather and a higher tactical aircraft priority for MACVORN 719 and the cancellation of mission tasks, considerable scheduling problems were encountered.

(b) The campaign was initially structured under the command and control of the PHU LOC District Chief, who in turn would request support from US and ARVN assets. This concept was in keeping with supporting and encouraging increased Vietnameseization of psychological operations. However, it should be noted that his command and control, was not carried out, nor was any support requested by the district cadre. The following points probably account for the shortcomings of the campaign:

1. The district cadre did not feel that such a campaign would produce tangible results or benefit the overall political and tactical goals within their district.

2. The district cadre did not feel that the campaign was in keeping with their concepts of tactical psychological operations.

3. The coordination required between District and Province level agencies was not effected to the degree required for such an operation to be carried out successfully.

(10) At the request of CCNPS, division PSYOP conducted a loudspeaker broadcast along QL-1 and Route 551. This mission had two purposes: one, to warn indigenous personnel of the dangers of using volatile aviation fuel leaking from the piping parallel to QL-1 and two, to warn indigenous personnel of the heavy convoy traffic on Route 551 during the initial phases of LAMSON 719. Missions were conducted by 6th Detachment, 7th PSYOP Battalion in direct support of division PSYOP. The broadcasts relating to aviation fuel were conducted for 26:30 hours contacting 2,500 people. The highway safety broadcasts ran 18 hours contacting 18,000 people.

(11) To further Vietnameseze, division PSYOP conceived and conducted initial planning for a Riverine PSYOP/SEDCAP Campaign. Targets were villages and hamlets along the R and RNome Rivers, including their tributaries. The campaign was planned in three phases: Phase I
CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

To stress MEDCAPS while PSYOP exploits Pro-GVN themes; Phase II (Day 26 - 71) MEDCAPs to emphasize health/sanitation and preventive medicine and PSYOP to concentrate on VIP, Rewards, and PHUONG HOANG themes; Phase III (Day 72 - continuing) MEDCAPs to continue, while PSYOP emphasizes VIP, Rewards, and PHUONG HOANG themes. The Riverine PSYOP/MEDCAP Campaign was tentatively scheduled to begin 15 Mar 71 and continue for 3 to 4 months depending on the initial success of the operation. Division PSYOP effected coordination with 4th Det, 7th PSYOP Bn, a division MEDCAP team, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), Province/Sector, and 60th River Patrol Detachment (VMQV) located at TAM MY.

(a) On 1 Mar 71, the ACoS, O5, 101st Airborne Division (Airmbl), chaired a meeting attended by representatives providing support to the Riverine Campaign. The Vietnamese were enthusiastic and were willing to support the campaign. The conduct and control of this campaign was released to THU DIEN Province Chief and Sector headquarters who in turn developed and produced an operations order for the campaign. However, at the present time the Vietnamese have taken no further action on the campaign. It appears that even though US elements push further Viet-namization and offer their support for PSYOP/FOLMAR campaigns, the Vietnamese are hesitant to actively carry out such operations. A possible explanation for their reluctance to follow through on this operation may be due to the GVN active involvement in IAMBCH 719 during this same time period.

(12) Nguyen Son rallied to the 237th RF Company on 25 Feb 71. On 26 Feb 71, O5 PSYOP and 3rd Bde interviewed Nguyen Son and were able to complete a Rallier's Guide and photograph the Hoi Chanh. Utilizing the 101st airmobile assets, O5 PSYOP was able to process a quick reaction leaflet request with LRC, WR 1, that same day. On 27 Feb 71, 3rd Bde disseminated 100,000 quick reaction leaflets exploiting the rallier.

(13) On 9 March 1971, at 161CH, Dang Xuan Inan rallied to the 2nd Battalion, 510th Infantry, 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division (Airmbl) in the vic of FINE Base BACKONE. The Hoi Chanh was a leader of the 3rd Platoon, D3 Company, K10 BN, 5th WNA Regt. Initial PSYOP exploitation included a photograph and handwritten statement by the rallier. Combined efforts of 1st Bde, division PSYOP and the 7th PSYOP Battalion in DA NANG, produced a quick reaction leaflet. As a result of the combined effort, an initial 100,000 leaflets were delivered by air to 1st Bde at 0200H 10 Mar 71, and 300,000 additional leaflets were received by air at IAMBCH 10 Mar 71. This combined effort represents an exceptional reaction by 7th PSYOP Battalion.

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Operational Report: Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS GSPR-65 (R3) (U)

(14) On Monday, 15 Mar 71, during LANSON 719 division PSYOP requested a tactical PSYOP request from 1st Bn, 501st Infantry. An element of 1st Bn, 501st Infantry was in contact with an unknown size enemy force, located in several caves along QL-9, approximately 30 kilometers west of QUANG TRI Combat Base. A quick reaction aerial broadcast and leaflet drop was targeted against the enemy location using intense rally appeals and exploiting the laotian situation. Firepower from tanks covering the enemy location was also directed against the target from the PSYOP aircraft. Firepower was immediately followed by another aerial broadcast exhorting the enemy force to rally and escape further allied firepower and destruction. Even though no Hoi Chanh were received as a result of the operation, it served as an excellent example of combining PSYOP in support of tactical operations situations.

(15) On 31 Mar 71, QUANG DIEN District Headquarters reported to the Division Tactical Operations Center that a Hoi Chanh was received at approximately 1200H by the 22nd Popular Force Platoon. Division PSYOP was informed at 1230H and was able to acquire a helicopter to exploit Tran Dich Van, a member of the QUANG DIEN Special Action Unit. Tran Dich Van was collecting rice in DO DIEN Hamlet, QUANG DIEN District (YD612298), with other members of his unit, at the time of his escape. The Hoi Chanh traveled to the residence of his family QUANG DIEN District who persuaded him to return to the government of Vietnam. At 1230, 31 Mar C5 PSYOP scheduled an aerial leaflet drop in the reported location of the QUANG DIEN Special Action Unit.

(16) Division PSYOP continues to actively exploit the Volunteer Informant Program utilizing the direct support of 4th Det, 7th PSYOP Battalion and the division aircraft assets. To enhance the effectiveness of the program, C5 PSYOP and 4th Det used reward funds from 101st MI Det class A Agent. On 30 Mar and 31 Mar 71 Vietnamese civilians in the vicinity of the AN LO Bridge (YD633302) led a ground PSYOP team of 4th Det to caches containing: one - 175mm artillery round, one - 155mm artillery round, two - 105mm artillery rounds, one - Mark 15 white phosphorous grenade, one - 60mm Chi Com mortar round, one - 2.75mm HE rocket warhead, two - 82mm Chi Com mortar rounds, one - B3 aerial bomblet, and four Chi Com grenades. All munitions were destroyed in place by a division EOD team. Rewards paid on the scene by the team for materials recovered totaled 8,000$VN.

(17) Laotian Campaign: Operations in LACS were exploited in accordance with XXIV Corps TVX, PTG: 012052722 Feb 71. PSYOP officers within the division prepared organic assets to sustain the campaign in...
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RG5 CSFBU-65 (H) (H)

...their respective areas of operations. During the operation, the division radio transmitted 7:10 broadcast hours and distributed 2,080,000 leaflets by utilizing the division's organic air assets. The 4th Det., 7th BCT battalion also supported the Laotian Campaign with audio visual and ground loudspeaker missions. A detailed listing of the districts covered follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>BROADCAST HOURS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAR THU</td>
<td>4:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUANG VA</td>
<td>9:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUAY XAI</td>
<td>5:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARN VENG</td>
<td>5:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUANG DENG</td>
<td>3:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XAYENG THUY</td>
<td>0:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIENG BUN</td>
<td>27:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUANG WANG</td>
<td>6:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHU NGAM</td>
<td>17:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAL NGAM</td>
<td>2:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>39:30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Medical.

(a) Preventive Medicine.

(a) A marked increase in the number of admissions for diarrhoeal diseases was manifested in January primarily because of camp unit mess halls unknowingly used non-potable water for drinking purposes. The office of the division surgeon as well as the division food service inspector ordered surveillance of the mess facilities in order to reduce the possibility of future contamination. Greater command emphasis to enforce the use of individual water in the field was made during this period as a means to the prevention of diarrhoeal sickness.

(b) With the onset of the wet monsoon season in October, the number of patients with skin diseases became substantially greater and this trend continued in November, although to a lesser extent than October. Constant attention was devoted to this problem through dissemination of personal hygiene in charge to the lower echelon battalions, the units most commonly afflicted with this disease.

(c) The division experienced a reduction in malaria incidence commensurate with colder weather and greater command emphasis on malaria prophylaxis as directed in an order letter of 20 Sep 70 titled Prevention of Malaria. More than half of the malaria cases occurring were of the
vivax strain and as such were 97% preventable, pointing out the need for constant vigilance in the area of malaria prophylaxis with the Wilson-Eision test being the prime tool. This test was designed to reveal whether or not an individual had taken his required weekly chloroquine-primaquine tablet and was performed on selected individuals on a weekly basis by all battalion surgeons. Guidance to commanders on the use of this test was given in a command letter of January 70. As an adjunct to the malaria prevention program, aerial spray missions were undertaken to reduce the mosquito population. The efforts of the malaria prevention program were quite successful, as evidenced in the division malaria rate, lowest of all tactical units in Vietnam.

(a) The abundant availability of marijuana and hard narcotics with increasing troop free time due in part to Vietnamization greatly increased the drug abuse problem. During the report period, over one in ten admissions were due to drug abuse, principally involving heroin. The Drug Amnesty Program was reemphasized as a means to alleviate the impact of drugs on division troops. The drug amnesty program offers help to those patients who want to get off and stay off drugs. Their participation in the program is strictly voluntary as these are the patients most amenable to rehabilitation. The extent of drug use in the division can be measured only by subjective observation and therefore estimates are not statistically reliable. Those patients under the drug amnesty program have been quite successful in staying off drugs. A new Division Circular, 40-3, was written outlining the purpose and responsibilities under the Drug Amnesty Program.

(e) The division drug education team, under the supervision of the Division Psychiatrist, continued to give classes informing incoming personnel at SERTS of the inherent dangers of drug abuse.

(f) In the month of April a dog was diagnosed as a carrier of rabies, the first such case to be reported in a year. Further, an excessive number of dogs were being kept as pets by division personnel. The Provost Marshal began a campaign to apprehend all stray dogs and to more effectively enforce Division Regulation 40-17, which limits the number of dogs to one per company sized unit. Reducing the dog population and proper emphasis of other control measures are expected to abort a rabies outbreak.

(2) MEDCAP. During the reporting period division medical personnel entered a phase of the MEDCAP program during which they rendered technical guidance and supervision over their Vietnamese counterparts who performed
the actual treatment and administration. In this way, it was anticipated that the Vietnamese would develop their own supply system as well as become technically proficient in the care and treatment of the people. A problem encountered has been that Vietnamese health workers, at times, have failed to report at the appointed place and time.

(3) Visits of USARV Consultants.

(a) On 23 November 1970, LTC Gould, USARV Preventive Medicine Officer; LTC Foley, USARV Entomologist; and LTC Otis, USARV Sanitary Engineer visited the division to discuss various aspects of preventive medicine with the Division Surgeon, LTC Day; Division Preventive Medicine Officer, CPT Ellison; and Division Sanitarian, LT Chen.

(b) COL Baker, Psychiatric consultant to the Surgeon General; and COL Boren, Psychiatric consultant to the USARV Surgeon visited the division on 10 Mar 71 to receive an orientation on mental hygiene service capabilities within the division. LTC Day, Division Surgeon, and MAJ Cushman, Division Psychiatrist were the contact personnel.

(4) Reporting.

(a) A new drug abuse feeder report with RCS MCLV 6260.1 was initiated in December. From December through March, an average of 70 persons a month have been admitted with a drug abuse diagnosis. In over 90% of these cases, heroin was the principal drug abused.

(b) This office continues to monitor and report outpatient and morbidity statistics for the division. The use of Medical Company CO's as brigade surgeons has aided in obtaining more accurate and timely reporting.

(5) Aviation Medicine.

(a) During the reporting period 720 Class I, II and III flight physicals were accomplished, an average of 120 a month. The monthly rate ranged from a low of 78 in Feb to 153 in both Dec 70 and March 71.

(b) Although authorized eight aviation medical officers, the division was assigned only four in November. At the end of the reporting period seven were assigned thus allowing excellent medical coverage of division aviation personnel.

(c) Through January only a few cases were noted where aviators accumulated flight time in excess of 110 hours per 30 day period.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSPUR-65 (R3) (U)

However, in February, with the increased aviation requirements in support of IAMBON 719, a few aviators were examined who had approached 140 hours and large numbers exceeded 110 hours. During March, "pilot fatigue" appeared as a significant factor in the division's operations. An unknown number of crewmembers were examined 757 times for having exceeded 140 hours and fatigue resulted in 121 recommendations for grounding (16%). However, at no time during the reporting period was "pilot fatigue" considered a problem because, with rare exception, those crewmembers recommended for grounding were in fact grounded.

Admission Statistics (rate/1000 men/year):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hepatitis</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychiatric Disorders</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respiratory</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>127.5</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin Disease</td>
<td>144.0</td>
<td>180.7</td>
<td>139.4</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal Disease</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fever of undetermined origin (FUD)</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heat Injuries</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immersion Foot</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMR</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>31.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>IKA</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total patients seen at clearing station:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A CO</th>
<th>B CO</th>
<th>C CO</th>
<th>SPT CO</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4,150</td>
<td>4,067</td>
<td>3,689</td>
<td>5,267</td>
<td>17,173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total dental patients:

| 0 | 1,970 | 2,241 | 4,671 | 8,882 |

Total admissions:

| 375 | 280 | 527 | 511 | 1,623 |

Total transferred:

| 239 | 241 | 218 | 97 | 795 |

Recapitulation:

| IKA | 154 | 54 | 761 | 53 | 1,022 |
| NCO | 601 | 231 | 1,063 | 281 | 2,176 |

Medical Diseases:

| Malaria | 0 | 1 | 16 | 9 | 26 |
| FUD's | 153 | 79 | 107 | 171 | 570 |
| Diarrhea | 101 | 123 | 78 | 111 | 413 |
| Skin diseases | 281 | 781 | 641 | 738 | 2,591 |
| W/P | 22 | 28 | 22 | 2,013 | 2,110 |
| Gastroenteritis | 53 | 102 | 64 | 207 | 426 |
| Foot problems | 52 | 212 | 146 | 189 | 579 |
| Heat injuries | 41 | 6 | 52 | 28 | 137 |
| VD | 239 | 373 | 106 | 389 | 1,107 |

46
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFCR-55 (R3) (U)

j. Signal.

(1) The 501st Signal Battalion (Ambl) continued to provide communications for the division in operation JEFFERSON CHEN/HONSON PLAN 70 and LAKSON 719. Four channel VHF systems were installed from Fire Bases TUMASANK, LOC BANDS, EREK, ARSENAL, NORMANDY, EASTCONE, JAC, GLADIATOR, RAKKASAN, and CP CHEYENNE. Similar facilities were provided to units located at MAI LOC, ARVN, VANDEGRIFT and CARROLL to the respective brigades. On Thanksgiving Day, five radio operators and one radio repairman were processed and sent to LONG BINH for further deployment to PAKISTAN. These personnel participated in the flood relief operations.

(2) During the period 18-23 January, communications were established at EAGLE BEACH in support of a division tactical CP. All equipment and personnel were airlifted. Equipment and personnel from the 63rd Signal Battalion were utilized to provide a 12 channel system to CAMP EAGLE. No problems were encountered in effecting close coordination with nondivisional units. The exercise was beneficial in that it provided realistic training for new personnel in the battalion.

(3) During the period 26 January-8 April the battalion provided communications support for a division forward CP at QUANG TRI and a division advance CP at MAE SAKH. Additionally, secure relay stations were established for XXIV Corps and I Corps (ARVN) at Fire Base SHEEPHERD and for MACV at LANG VAI. Equipment and personnel for the QUANG TRI CP moved by road from CAMP EAGLE on 25 January. Secure FM voice stations were established in the Command, Intelligence and Forward Operations nets. Three ground relay stations were established at Fire Base RAKKASAN. A four channel VHF system to CAMP EAGLE was installed until circuits could be engineered over the area system. Radioteletype was employed until conventional communications circuits could be established and then used to backup the primary means of communication. Equipment and personnel for the MAE SAKH CP moved by road to MAI LOC and were airlifted to HAII SAKH on 2 February. Secure FM voice stations were established in the Corps, Command, Intelligence and Forward Operations nets. Radioteletype was used as at QUANG TRI. A four channel VHF system was installed at QUANG TRI and was utilized during the entire operation because of difficulties on the area system.

(4) As a result of the long delays in obtaining critical circuits over the area system, the Division Signal Officer obtained three teams of equipment and personnel from USARV for two 12 channel systems. Two teams were attached to the signal battalion. The third team was used to establish a 12 channel system from CAMP ROBERTS, QUANG TRI, to CAMP SWANS when the forward CP moved on 1 March. The other two teams were employed in establishing 12 channel systems from Fire Base CARROLL to CAMP SWANS in support of the 3rd Brigade Forward CP and from CAMP SWANS to CAMP EAGLE to provide circuit routing to CAMP EAGLE. These systems and their associated circuits were estab-
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Operational Report- Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) {U}

Installed within 24 hours as opposed to the 3-5 days required to get circuits on the area systems (14 days from KHE SANH to QUANG TRI). In addition to the 12 channel system provided for the 3rd Brigade, four channel VHF systems were established from brigade to battalions located at MAT LOC, and Fire Bases ANNE and VANDEGRIFT.

(5) When the Division Signal Officer was alerted that the tactical CP at IA VANH would be required, two teams were again obtained to establish 12 channel systems. Personnel and equipment for the CP at IA VANH moved by road from CAMP EAGLE on 18 April. A 12 channel system was established to CAMP EAGLE. Secure FM voice stations were established in the Command, Operations and Intelligence nets utilizing 2 relay stations established at Fire Base PAKKASAN. A station in the General Purpose RTT net was also established. Minimum delay was experienced in establishing all communications facilities since all personnel and equipment were under control of the signal battalion. On 30 April, the TTY facility in the DTCC was deactivated. It was replaced by a RRT van outside the DTCC. RRT stations were also established at each brigade TCC. The purpose of this RRT net is to provide quick response for TCC operational traffic.

k. Aviation.

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 101st Aviation Group (CHT) (Amb) continued to perform its mission to provide aviation support to the division and aviation staff personnel to the division special staff. During this reporting period this support was provided for Operations JEFFERSON GEAR/MONSOON PLAN 70, IANSON 719, and IANSON 720. The Pathfinder Platoon under the operational control of the 101st Aviation Group 3-3, successfully completed the following missions:

| 
| US and ARVN LZ's/PZ's | 32 |
| US Arty moves | 15 |
| Opening FSB's | 8 |
| Closing FSB's | 5 |
| US Arty raids | 3 |
| ARVN CA's | 8 |

The Pathfinder Platoon continued to furnish air traffic control on the division's fire bases. Daylight weather reports were furnished by these Pathfinder teams hourly, conserving aircraft flight time and contributing to the area intelligence base. The Pathfinder Platoon conducted two Pathfinder technique classes for IAF Infantry Division (ARVN) soldiers. Each class was four days in length and contributed greatly to ARVN 1st Infantry Division airmobile self-sufficiency for IANSON 719.

CONFIDENTIAL

48
CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, ROS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(2) During the past six months NMC, 101st Aviation Group, was responsible for conducting 2 MEDCAPs per week, one at VINH LOC District. These were conducted to the maximum extent consistent with the weather and aircraft availability. During Operation LAXSON 719 (Feb - Mar), MEDCAPs were not held because the operation had first priority on aircraft. In 1971 there is increased emphasis on Vietnamization of civic action. The Group 3-5 conducts the civil action program with this goal in mind. MEDCAPs are run with the aim of making the Vietnamese medics totally independent of US assistance. However, they still rely to a large extent on the US Army medical supply channels. While LAXSON 719 was in progress, the MACV Team, formerly located at VINH LOC, was relocated to PHU LOC District. The Group 3-5 will make periodic visits to that team prior to resuming MEDCAPs in VINH LOC.

(3) Aviation Safety recorded the following breakdown of accident/ incident experience in the 101st Aviation Group for the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accidents</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced Landings</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precautionary Landings</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochit Damaged Aircraft</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) The Airmobility School was conducted as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ATTENDANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 2 Nov</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 22 Dec</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 - 23 Jan</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 - 27 Apr</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Engineers.

(1) During November 1970, A Company (-) was in direct support of the 1st Brigade at Fire Base CASTICONE, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, and DP CHECKMATE in addition to carrying out special missions in their area of operations. At Fire Base CASTICONE, the rehabilitation program continued with the fireproofing of two mess bunkers and the continuous upgrading of interior and access roads. Extensive drainage work was accomplished by cutting ditches and placing culverts. At Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, five 10' x 24' and forty-one 8' x 12' bunkers and two observation towers were
completed. The interior and access roads were upgraded to a minimum all-weather standard. At CP CHECKER, two one-ship LLS were cut. Minesweeps were conducted from Fire Base BIRKINGHAM to Fire Base BASTOGNE daily and west of Fire Base BIRKINGHAM to Fire Base VENNESEL with negative findings. B Company (--) was in direct support of the 3rd Brigade at Fire Base RAKKASAN and at Fire Base JACK in addition to carrying out special missions in their area of operations. At Fire Base RAKKASAN, the mess bunker was fireproofed with asbestos and tin, the drainage system was continuously improved and two observation towers, a gate and a guard house on the RAKKASAN Road were constructed. Daily minesweeps, in conjunction with 2/16th Engineers, were conducted on the RAKKASAN Road with negative findings. In general support of the division, approximately 1,200 meters of the interior roads were upgraded and penscoped. In addition, six SEA huts were reconstructed for the 2/319th Artillery and for the 3/187th Infantry at CAMP EVANS. B Company (--) was in direct support of the 2nd Brigade at Fire Base BIRK, Fire Base ARSENAL, Fire Base TOMAHAWK, Fire Base LOS BANGS, and Fire Base ANZIO. At Fire Base BIRK, the fireproofing of the kitchen bunker, the excavation for three ASP bunkers, the rehabilitation of two 8' x 12' bunkers, the installation of drainage in the mess bunker, the construction of two latrines and a shower facility, and the construction of revetment walls was accomplished. At Fire Base ARSENAL, excavation for one 16' x 16' kitchen bunker, one 20' x 16' mess bunker, and one 10' x 16' radar bunker was completed, and work commenced on the above mentioned bunkers. One 8' x 12' bunker was completed at Fire Base TOMAHAWK, a personnel bunker in the CP area was rehabilitated, fireproofing of the kitchen and mess bunkers was accomplished, and a blast wall in the CP area was constructed. At Fire Base LOS BANGS, construction began on a 30' x 32' mess and 16' x 16' kitchen bunker. At Fire Base JACK, rehabilitation of an 8' x 18' personnel bunker was accomplished. Projects in general support of the division included the rehabilitation of an observation tower in SHU BAI at "B" sector, and the construction of an observation tower in the 2/177th Cav area. A daily minesweep was conducted from QL-1 to the CIA 15 gate at CAMP EAGLE with negative findings. During the period 1 November through 30 November, Headquarters Company provided equipment support to engineer units at CAMP EVANS, CAMP CAMBELL, Fire Bases JACK, BIRK, ARSENAL, BASTOGNE, BIRKINGHAM, TOMAHAWK, and LOS BANGS. Additionally, the best platoon supported infantry operations at LANG CO BAY, Fire Base BIRKINGHAM, and PCXL Bridge. On the CAMP EAGLE Roads during November, 900 cubic meters of fill were hauled, emplaced, and graded and 4,300 meters of ditches were improved. Various projects were accomplished by HHC in support of units stationed at CAMP EAGLE. The
majority of these projects consisted of either hauling, filling, ditching, or grading. Headquarters Company continued to work on perimeter defenses in the F II sector by installing lights and clearing fields of fire. The upgrading of interior roads at Fire Base BIRMINGHAM was accomplished by the emplacing and grading of 500 cubic yards of fill and the emplacement of one 25' x 36' culvert. From 1 to 4 November 1970, flood rescue/resupply missions were conducted in PHU THU and PHUE DINH Districts. Four Boston whalers and eight rafts were utilized in these operations. A total of 732 Vietnamese were rescued in PHUE DINH District, and tons of supplies were distributed by these water craft.

(2) During December, A Company (-) was in direct support of the 1st Bde at Fire Base BASTOGNE, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, and OP CHECKMAT in addition to carrying out special missions in their area of operations. At Fire Base BASTOGNE, six 8' x 12' and one 10' x 24' bunkers were completed. In addition, seven flying buttresses were emplaced for support of the 20' x 10' mess hall. At Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, a total of nineteen 8' x 12' and one 10' x 24' bunkers were completed. A combat assault and minesweep of Fire Base HAUKSAN was accomplished on 19 December with negative findings. At OP CHECKMAT, two one-ship L2's were cut, a radar/pathfinder tower was built, and two blivet racks were constructed. At CAMP EAGLE, a 25' x 32' SEA hut was constructed for use as a psychiatric ward for the 326th Medical Battalion. Also, extensive rehabilitation of EAGLE Bowl in preparation for the Bob Hope Show was completed. B Company (-) continued in direct support of the 3rd Brigade at Fire Base RAKKASAN and Fire Base JACK in addition to carrying out special missions in their area of operations. At Fire Base RAKKASAN, seven of eleven blivet racks were completed, 500 meters of defensive wire were placed around the perimeter, and extensive bunker rehabilitation was accomplished. At Fire Base JACK, two observation pathfinder towers and an 8' x 12' shower were built. Roads and drainage systems were continuously maintained at both Fire Base JACK and CAMP EVANS. Two 16' x 14' SEA huts were constructed and three 20' towers were erected for the AFVd Television relay station. During December, C Company (-) was in direct support of the 2nd Brigade at Fire Base FRICK, ARSENAL, TOMAHAWK, and IOS EANGOS. At Fire Base EANG, the rehabilitation of bunkers 4 through 15 on the perimeter and the CC was accomplished, and the construction of one 8' x 12' and one 12' x 12' bunker was completed. At Fire Base ARSENAL, the construction of one 20' x 64' mess bunker, one 16' x 16' kitchen bunker, and one 10' x 16' radar bunker was completed. At Fire Base TOMAHAWK, work consisted of tearing down the old mess hall for a proposed stand-down area. At Fire Base IOS EANGOS, one 30' x 32' mess bunker and one 16' x 16' kitchen bunker were completed and rehabilitation of the drainage system on the hill was completed. At Fire Base PISTOL on 28 December, a minesweep operation of Route 545 for three kilometers was conducted in conjunction with an artillery raid and positions for two 8' howitzers were constructed. On PHU THU Road, 1,500 cubic yards of select fill were placed on the road and the elevation was raised one foot for approximately 2,000 meters. A daily minesweep from
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS OSFCR-65 (R3) (U)

Quad to GTA DE was conducted with negative findings. During December, Headquarters Company provided equipment support to units at CAMP EVANS, CAMP CARRUTHERS, Fire Base JACK, BRICK, ARSENAL, PASCAGO, BIRMINGHAM, TOMAHAWK, and LOS BANCOS. Additionally, the boat platoon supported the infantry operations at TAN 60 BAY, 2/327th Infantry at Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, and at FORT BRAGG. During the reporting period, on the CAMP EAGLE interior roads, 550 cubic yards of borrowed material and 600 cubic yards of rock were hauled, emplaced, and graded, and 4,200 meters of ditches were repaired, bringing the roads to a minimum all-weather condition. Also, work began on the BIRMINGHAM airfield; four road mixes were applied on the airfield and shaped and compacted, and 24,000 gallons of mixtures were applied.

(3) During January 1971, A Company (--) was in direct support of the 1st Brigade at Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, Fire Base PASCAGO, OP CHECKMATE, Fire Base VEGHEL, and CAMP EAGLE Combat Base. At Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, one 16' x 16' bunker was constructed and fireproofed with asbestos and tin and a 10' x 16' concrete garbage rack pad was placed. A tri-line strand concertina fence was placed around Fire Base PASCAGO. At Fire Base PASCAGO, a blivet rack was constructed, and the fireproofing of the 20' x 104' mess hall was completed. At OP CHECKMATE, 1,801 of RFC screen were emplaced and the VIP log pads were enlarged. Daily minesweeps were conducted on Route 347 from Fire Base PASCAGO to Fire Base VEGHEL and from Fire Base BIRMINGHAM to Fire Base PASCAGO. In addition, minesweeps were conducted at Fire Base 23B with negative findings. During January 1971, B Company (--) was in direct support of the 3rd Brigade at Fire Base RAKKASAN, Fire Base JACK, CAMP EVANS Combat Base, KHE SANH, and other missions in the area of operations. At Fire Base RAKKASAN, the construction of eleven blivet racks, the improvement of shower facilities, and placing and repairing of defensive wire was accomplished. In addition, a daily minesweep in conjunction with elements of D/14th Engineers was conducted with negative findings. At Fire Base JACK, the construction of a temporary ice house, a 10' x 16' wash shed, and two latrines was completed. At CAMP EVANS Combat Base, a total of seven SED huts were reconstructed or relocated, and upgrading and drainage repair of the interior roads continued. C Company (--) was in direct support of the 2nd Brigade at Fire Bases ARSENAL, BRICK, TOMAHAWK, LOS BANCOS, and in general support in the area of operations. At Fire Base ARSENAL, two 8' x 12' bunkers were completed, and a 10' x 12' wash shed was constructed. At Fire Base BRICK, four 8' x 12' bunkers and one 16' x 16' PDC bunker were constructed, the TOC was rehabilitated, a 61' x 30' bunker was constructed for use as a MARS station, and 700 meters of defensive wire was emplaced. At Fire Base TOMAHAWK, control upgrading of the fire base was accomplished. At Fire Base LOS BANCOS, a 12' x 16' wash shed was completed. On the PHU RAI perimeter roads, 1,960 cubic yards of select fill were placed and compacted; on a sector and six culverts were installed. On PHU RAI Road, 630 cubic yards of select fill were placed and twelve culverts and six wing walls were constructed. At the HUE-Phu RAI airfield, runway lights were installed on the east end.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

of the runway. During January 1971, HHC provided equipment support at CAMP EAGLE, Fire Bases JACK, ZOR, LOS BANDOS, BARTOOGEE, BIRMINGHAM, TOMAHAWK, BRICK, and ARSENAL, and at PHU THU Road, CAMP EVANS, and KHE SANH. HHC continued interior road maintenance at CAMP EAGLE. During January, 1,950 meters of ditch were improved, and 70 cubic yards of rock were placed, graded, and compacted. 23,000 gallons of pentaprime were placed on the interior roads as a dust palliative. Additionally, the fly ways of the 2/17th Cav, 4/77th ARA, Convair Fad, Eagle Dustoff, and the 163rd Aviation were pentaprime.

(4) On 27 January 1971, Task Force 326 was formed and assigned the mission of moving by air to KHE SANH to construct a C-130 assault airfield and repair the existing AM-2 airfield damaged during the January - March 1968 KHE SANH siege. Additionally, TF 326 was given the mission of opening a 16 kilometer section of Routes 9L-9 and 608 from the vicinity of the RIVERHE DE QUAH to the KHE SANH airfield. To perform these missions, the task force was configured from elements of a line company and a supervisory section of the SF Battalion. The 45th Engineer Group reinforced this task force with a combat engineer platoon, aluminum cutting and welding equipment, and a survey section. Convoy movement to the staging area at MAI LOC was conducted from 27-29 January. Seven convoy serials were required due to limited transportation assets and the wide variety of engineer equipment making the move. On 30 January, simultaneous combat assaults were conducted by TF 326 via Bridge 34 (XD908395) and KHE SANH. Two engineer platoons, two dozers, four 3/4-ton trucks and a radio jeep were lifted into via Bridge 34 to affect the opening of Route 9L-9. The bypass at Bridge 33 (XD921419) was prepared for an Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB) while the abutments at Bridge 34 were prepared for a 38-foot M-4 dry span bridge lifted in by CH-54 and CH-47s. To decrease the time required to span the section of road from Bridge 36 to KHE SANH, a third engineer platoon conducted minesweep operations from KHE SANH to Bridge 36. Additionally, a D-5 bulldozer removed the upper four inches of the old road surface, to increase the rate of mine clearing. Upon arrival at Bridge 36, it became apparent that the amount of earth work necessary to provide fill for the bridge abutments was beyond the capability of the airmobile bulldozers. Shaped and cratering charges were used throughout the night to blast rocky fill from the cliffs overhanging the bridge site. Due to the inaccessibility of the site to AVLBs, additional fill was required to build up the abutments for a 38-foot M-4 dry span. Traffic was passed at 1230 hours 31 January 1971. During the first two days of the engineer airmobile operations, a combination of 97 medium and heavy helicopter sorties were flown to KHE SANH in support of Task Force 326 by Army and Marine helicopters operating out of the forward staging area at MAI LOC. This impressive helicopter lift, which moved 125 tons of engineer equipment and supplies, may have been the most ambitious airlift of engineer equipment ever undertaken in Vietnam. It was accomplished without damage to a single item of equipment. From the
time the first item of equipment was air landed at KHE SANH, combat
engineer effort continued around the clock to construct a 3,200-foot
C-130 airstrip. Dense fog, limiting ground visibility to a maximum
of 20 feet, had a serious impact upon the ability to conduct the air-
field survey, essential to efficient equipment utilization. Additionally,
low-lying clouds increased the moisture content in the highly expansive
clay soil surrounding compaction and stabilization problems. In spite of
numerous impediments, the assault airfield was completed by 1500 hours
on 6 February 1971 and subsequently was accepted by the US Air Force
Airfield Inspection Team. At 1555 hours, 5 February 1971, the first
C-130 aircraft successfully landed and took off from the KHE SANH
assault airfield, thus opening the facility to cargo aircraft for the
first time in three years. During the entire construction period, the
326th Engineer Battalion (Ambt) experienced no major equipment deadlines.
Additionally, no engineer equipment, vehicles or communication equipment
failed during this period, an effective tribute to the care and main-
tenance prior, during, and subsequent to this airmobile operation.
Additionally, TF 326 received excellent supplemental equipment support
from the 27th Engineer Battalion (Combat), a non-divisional engineer
unit. Construction continued around-the-clock to provide a 36-point
(260,000-gallons) helicopter POL refuel/storage facility. The construc-
tion of this 56-acre facility was impeded by the heavy cloud banks and
by extensive underground bunkers and defensive positions which were
partially destroyed by the US Marines in 1968. As large numbers of
Allied troops began arriving at the KHE SANH area, the base, once occupied
and defended by Task Force 326 and one infantry company, was expanded.
Large areas of unrecorded minefields were encountered. The mines had to
be found and neutralized because of their proximity to friendly troops
and to satisfy the requirement for additional area. Employing a com-
bination of burning, visual sweeping, probing, blasting, and bulldozing,
approximately thirteen acres of EBT minefields were cleared by the
TF 326 combat engineers. Four D7E bulldozers were destroyed during the
clearing, confirming the presence and hazards of mine-clearing operations.
Subsequent to the completion of the C-130 assault airfield, XM-19
matting was placed on the airfield to improve the runway bearing capacity
and to insure sustained airfield operations over an extended period.
Approximately 60 C-130 sorties were received daily. The completion of
the aluminum mat overlay, provided a forward heavy cargo tactical
facility in support of combined US-ARVN operations in northwestern
South Vietnam and in Ia Drac. On 16 February 1971, a platoon from R Company
was placed under operational control of the 27th Engineer Battalion
(Combat) and continued construction of a 20' x 32' bunker for 2/17th Cav
and a 40m x 100m helped for the 101st Airborne Division Advance at
KHE SANH. These tasks were completed without incident and the platoon

CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CORR-65 (3) (U)

was extracted on 22 February, During February, A Company (-) was in
direct support of the 1st Brigade at Fire Bases BARTHOLOME, BATTAGLIA,
VEGHEL, CANTON, ZON, NORMANDY, RENDEZVOUS, and CAMPAIGN Combat Base.
The newly arrived, the command helped the interior roads by the
map; sall were paragraphed in support of the 2/327th Infantry at Fire
Base BARTHOLOME. Improvements were also made on the sanitary fill and
drainage ditches. Daily mine sweeps were conducted on Route 307 from
Fire Base BARTHOLOME to Fire Base VEGHEL and from Fire Base BARTHOLOME
to Fire Base BATTAGLIA with negative findings. An M-450 was employed
on Fire Base ZON to cut gun pits and ammunition slots. An M-450 was
employed on Fire Base RENDEZVOUS to cut defile positions and ammunition
bunkers in support of 1/327th Infantry. Company A received the mission
on 10 February 1971 of reconstructing Route 31-547 from Fire Base BLADE
to Fire Base RENDEZVOUS, a distance of 19 kilometers, in support of
Operation WARLOCK. The task force organization for this mission
included Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion, and a platoon of Company B,
27th Engineer Battalion (Coh). On 12 February a portion of the task
force moved by road to Fire Base BLADE and began working west along
31-547. The equipment with this element included a scoop loader, two
425S bulldozers, and several 5-ton dump trucks. On 13 February, another
element air-assaulted into abandoned Fire Base RENDEZVOUS on the floor of
the A MIA VALLEY with two M-450 dozers and two 2/4-ton dump trucks.
This element began working to the east. On 13 February two additional
elements air-assaulted to intermediate road locations. One element
received three M-450 dozers plus two 3/4-ton dump trucks while the
other element received a 455 bulldozer and two 3/4-ton dump trucks.
These two elements began working toward each other as this portion of
the road was considered the most critical. By the evening of 14 February,
the entire 19 kilometers of road was passable to all classes of wheeled
and tracked vehicles. Improvement of the road continued from 17
February through 21 February. The entire road is now 15 feet wide.
Forty-six culverts are now operational in the road system. 125,000
cubic yards of earth and rock were moved while dozing out slides and
side hill cuts. Five ford sites were improved in the section of road
from Fire Base BLADE to Fire Base RENDEZVOUS. Turnouts were constructed
every kilometer to facilitate passing and pullout of non-operational
vehicles. Seven landing zones were constructed along the road to be used
in future operations. Two L2s will accept CM-56 traffic, and five will
accept two UH-1Hs simultaneously. There are four points of particular
significance along this route. 1) At point 31 (V0449974) two streams
converge on the road bed and had washed it out. Also the slope of the
road approaching the streams, exceeded 50 degrees. Culverts were
installed to divert the streams, the area was filled and compacted, and
the slope was cut to less than 30 degrees. 2) At point 32 (V0454987) the
slope of the road exceeded 60 degrees, and a stream crossed the road
at the base of the slope. A ford was constructed across the stream.
CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RG5 CSPOR-65 (R3) (U)

The entire hill mass was shaped into a turnaround. Both western approaches to the stream were cut to less than 30 degrees. This is the only portion of the road where lengthy convoys can pass each other or halt without blocking traffic. 3) At point 2 (TG457999) a stream and waterfall intersected the road. The configuration of the road was such that it was not possible to install a regular culvert. By use of demolitions, a "French culvert" was formed which has proven to be very satisfactory. 4) At point 1 (TD527022) a river crosses the road. A massive amount of rock was necessary to construct a ford capable of passing all traffic.

During February 1971, B Company (--) was in direct support of the 3rd Brigade at Fire Base RAKKASAN, Fire Base JACK, Fire Base A-2, CAMP CARROLL, MAI LOC and CAMP EVANS Combat Base. Daily minesweeps were performed on access roads from CAMP CARROLL, MAI LOC, Fire Base A-2, and Fire Base RAKKASAN with negative findings. C Company (--) was in direct support of the 2nd Brigade at Fire Bases ARSENAL, BRICK, TOMAHAWK, and LOS BANOS. C Company also continued improving the RU PAIL Combat Base perimeter roads. On Fire Base BRICK the defensive wire was installed, a 10' x 24' TOC bunker was rehabilitated and three 8' x 12' personnel bunkers were completed, numerous dug outs were destroyed, earthwork was completed on the 155mm howitzer positions, and a trash sump was cut. On Fire Base ARSENAL, an 8' x 12' personnel bunker and a 16' x 16' mess personnel bunker were completed. On Fire Base TOMAHAWK, a 20' x 48' stand-down bunker and a 10' x 16' grease trap were completed; a helipad was graded and paved; a billet rack was constructed; a D-7 dozer cut and shaped the access road to 2L-1, cleared 25 meters of firing range, policed a trash sump, and cut a 25' x 75' slot for CONEX storage. On the RU PAIL "A" Sector Road 3,888 cubic yards of sand fill were hauled and spread on the road and two 24' culverts were installed. On 17 February a platoon of C Company began rehabilitation of Eagle Beach by repairing five guard towers, the helipad, the tennis court and retaining wall, the PX floor, constructing a dressing room, a floor for the EM club, and extending the basketball court playing surface. D Company (Provisional) was activated under the provisions of 101st Airborne Division General Order 1681 on 27 February 1971 with the mission of providing combat support to the engineer battalion, airmobile division, by accomplishing general and special engineer tasks and to undertake and carry out infantry combat missions when required. On 28 February 1971, 3rd Platoon, Company B moved by air to NHE SAIN to begin construction of a 20' x 32' combined corps TOC at the old NHE SAIN POST.

(5) On 1 March 1971, the remaining elements of Company B, augmented by a platoon from Company D (Prov), convoyed to NHE SAIN. Second Platoon, Company D began construction of a 20' x 64' TOC for 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Advance Headquarters. Upon completion of the 20' x 64' TOC, 3rd Platoon, Company B constructed a 20' x 32' briefing room adjacent to the TOC. During the entire period, 1st Platoon, Company D provided

CONFIDENTIAL

56
equipment support to 101st Forward units by cutting trenches for tentage, fighting positions, and bunkers. On 24 March, 1st Platoon, Company D moved by "red" convoy to CAMP EAGLE and the remaining elements (3rd and 3rd Platoon, Company B) convoyed to CAMP TAWAN on 26 March. During March 1971, HQC continued equipment support of the battalion and road maintenance within the 4103 EAGLE Combat Base. Approximately 37,000 gallons of gasoline were applied to various portions of the CAMP EAGLE road network as a dust palliative. During March, a Company (-) was in direct support of the 1st Brigade at Fire Base BASTOGNE, BRUMINGHAM, SPAR and "ORATORY" Observation Post (OP) Destroyer, CAMP EAGLE Combat Base and supported the division forward at QUANG TRI. At Fire Base BASTOGNE, daily mine-sweeps were conducted east and west along Route 547 with negative findings. A four-man team from A Company supported A Company, 2/301st Infantry, in its operations to the north of Fire Base BASTOGNE by conducting sweeps of the area with the infantry. While in support of the 1/327th Infantry and the 1st Brigade Aerial Rifle Platoon, a reinforced engineer squad combat assaulted into several fire bases in the AO. These fire bases included NAPACK, HAMBOUR, MERKOSANGEN and LAMOE. At Fire Base LANCASTER, the element received an undetermined amount of small arms fire from a nearby hill. At MERKOSANGEN and LAMOE, numerous hoover traps were found, but only one was disturbed due to the short period of time to be spent in the area. At QUANG TRI, in support of division forward, general engineer maintenance was performed, "SEA" huts were repaired, two showers were constructed and the commanding general's briefing room was rehabilitated. At Fire Base BASTOGNE, in direct support of the 1/327th Infantry, daily mine-sweeps of Route 547 were conducted with negative findings. In direct support of the 1/502nd Infantry at Fire Base SIEAR, a combat assault and sweep of the hill was conducted, and shortly thereafter, an M-450 dozer was airlifted onto the hill. A sanitary fill, two ASF slots, and two TOC slots were excavated. In direct support of the 1/327th Infantry at JP DESTROYER, the original LZ was expanded, fields of fire were cleared, five 8 x 12 slots were excavated, five 8 x 12 native timber bunkers were constructed and triple concertina was placed around the JP. At Fire Base SPRINGBOK, a shower was constructed and numerous sleeping positions were sandbagged. On 10 March 1971, Company A received the mission of constructing a road network from Fire Base BASTOGNE to Fire Base MERKOSANGEN. The purpose of constructing this road network was threefold: to deny the NVA the use of the base area southwest of Hill 246, to provide the ARVN with ready access to Fire Base BASTOGNE and BRUMINGHAM, and to open vast hardwood areas to the woodcutters of the CHIEN Province. On 28 March 1971, the 3rd Platoon, Company A air-assaulted to Hill 246 with three M-450 bulldozers, two D-5 bulldozers, and a 3/4-ton truck. They immediately began construction working to the south. Simultaneously, Company B, 27th Engineer Battalion, began work from Route 547 in the vicinity of Fire Base BASTOGNE to the north. They employed four D-7 dozers and a scoop loader. This first
phase of the road construction encompassed clearing 8 kilometers of double-canopy jungle, installing numerous culverts, and clearing wide fields of fire on both sides of the road. Work from Hill 246 proceeded more slowly than estimated. The combat engineers quickly found that the hill was a solid mass of high density rock and the slope of the hill was excessive. On 2 April the two construction forces met, thus completing the pineroad to Hill 246. Company A then began constructing OP KING in Hill 246. A 10' x 24' bunker and nine 8' x 12' bunkers were airlifted from Fire Base BIRKINHAM to OP KING and emplaced in slots cut into the hill. On 20 April, the OP was turned over to ARVN and the Company A element returned to CAMP EAGLE. Company 3, 277th Engineer Battalion continued construction of the road which will eventually link Fire Base LION, Fire Base GERONIMO, OP KING and Fire Base BASTOGNE. During March, B Company continued engineer operations in the northern sector of Military Region I. B Company minus was in direct support of the 3rd Brigade at Fire Base THUNDERBIRD II, Fire Base VANDERGRIFF, CAMP CARROLL, 121 LOC, Fire Base JACK, Fire Base RAHAKAH and CAMP EVANS and supported the Division Advance at KHA SAN. A daily minesweep was conducted from Fire Base RAHAKAH to the TEXAS COR with negative findings. General engineer support continued at Fire Base JACK until the fire base was closed on 17 March 1971. Revetments were constructed for the 227th AHB and general engineer road maintenance continued at CAMP EVANS. At Fire Base VANDERGRIFF, daily minesweeps were conducted with one anti-personnel mine located and destroyed in place. The squad at Fire Base VANDERGRIFF also cleared one log pad, constructed an ammo storage bunker, an aid station, FOB bunker and other facilities. At KAI LOC, daily minesweeps were conducted to QL-9. On 14 March 1971, the minesweep vehicle detonated a mine resulting in three ARVN KIA, one US KIA and four US WIA. Construction at KAI LOC consisted of billet racks and a grease pit. Daily minesweeps were conducted from CAMP CARROLL with negative findings. Work at CAMP CARROLL consisted of construction of billet racks, repairing roads and preparing areas for CONEX placement. At Fire Base THUNDERBIRD II, daily minesweeps were conducted with one anti-personnel mine found and destroyed in place. During March, C Company (-) was engaged in combat engineer support of Fire Bases ARSENAL, BRICK, TOMAHAWK, ANZIO: upgrading of RHU BAI Roads, RHU THU Road, THUY THU Road, Christie Memorial Baseball Field, and in general engineer support in the RHU BAI/CAMP EAGLE Combat Bases. On Fire Base BRICK, an old 10' x 24' TOC bunker was dismantled, the slot widened with an M-450 and a new 20' x 32' TOC constructed in its place. Numerous dud rounds and trees were blown around the hill, two billet racks were completed and fields of fire around the 155mm howitzer area were cleared. In RHU BAI, 3,800 meters of interior roads were upgraded and 8,000 gallons of pentazine were applied as a dust palliative. At Fire Base BALITZ, a minesweep was conducted with negative findings. A minesweep was conducted on Fire Base KATHRYN with one booby trap discovered and blown in place. On Fire Base ARSENAL, a 16' x 16' sleeping bunker was completed and 108 cubic yards of fill were hauled and spread with an M-450 dozer around
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFCT-65 (R3) (U)

existing bunkers. All work on the fire base ceased when it was closed on 25 Mar 71. At the PHU BAI Service Club, all carpenter work in the music room, work room, and kitchen was completed, old wiring replaced and two COMEXs replaced to be used as sewage tanks. On HUONG THUY Road, 1,360 cubic yards of fill were hauled extending the road 200 meters. On the PHU THU Road, 90 cubic yards of fill were hauled and placed on bridges approaches, one culvert was repaired and one 15' long, 24" diameter culvert was replaced. Within the CAMP EAGLE Combat Base, the Division softball field, Christie Field, was completed and at Eagle International, shields were placed around the landing lights on the edges of the rapipad. On Fire Base TOHINH, an M-150 dozer leveled and cleared positions for six 105mm howitzers, dug a slot for a 6' x 20' ASP and ice house, and covered a trash dump. Additionally, a blast wall was completed around the stand-down bunker, an ice house and wash rack were completed, and culvert drainage structures around the mess hall were repaired. A 10' x 30' bunker on the barge at IHAC G0 BAY was dismantled and the materials flown to Fire Base ARSENAL and Fire Base BIRKHOLT for use in new construction. An 8' x 12' sleeping bunker at NUOC MONT was dismantled and the materials taken to Fire Base TOHINH and the water point at that location was moved to PHU LOC. Two mine sweeps were conducted along the railroad tracks from IHAC 20 to Fire Base LGS RANGOS with negative findings. During March, D Company rendered equipment and personnel support to KHE SANH, Fire Base SHEAR, Fire Base BASTONE, Fire Base BIRKHOLM, Fire Base ARSENAL, CAMP CARRILL and QUANG TRI, CAMP EAGLE, and PHU BAI Combat Bases. On 2 March 1971, a reinforced platoon from D Company was attached to B Company and moved to KHE SANH to furnish engineer support to XXIV Corps and 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) (Advance). Upon returning to CAMP EAGLE, the first platoon constructed a new 60,000 gallon vehicle fuel point and began improving the EAGLE water point and F II sector of the CAMP EAGLE bunkers line. Equipment from D Company supported operations at Fire Base SHEAR, Fire Base BASTONE, Fire Base BIRKHOLM, Hill 246 (CP KING), and Fire Base ARSENAL by clearing fields of fire, filling trash dumps, digging bunker slots, and building roads. An improved drainage system was installed in the G0's mess. D Company supplied two Boston Whalers to work for the 2/502nd Infantry at QUANG TRI and CAMP CARROLL. An air boat was sent to LAX 20BAY to aid in moving scout dog teams investigating suspected enemy movement along the HUE-DI NAM Railroad.

(6) During April 1971, HHC continued to furnish equipment support to the line companies of the battalion. HHC also continued maintenance of EAGLE roads by continuous scarifying and grading. 39,000 gallons of peneprime were applied to the roads and heliports in the CAMP EAGLE area as a dust palliative. HHC constructed a motor park and applied 16,000 gallons of peneprime as a dust palliative for the 1/1 Cav at PHU BAI. An APA return point was constructed at Fire Base BIRKHOLM and 16,000 gallons of peneprime were applied as a dust palliative. The mortar craters in the BIRKHOLM airstrip were repaired. HHC also assumed responsibility for the HUONG THUY Road project and hauled and
placed 2,100 cubic yards of select fill. A Company (-) was in direct support of the 1st Brigade at Fire Base BASTOGNE, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, OF CHECKHANE and OF KING in addition to performing combat and combat support missions in support of Operation LAMSON 720. At Fire Base BASTOGNE, daily minesweeps were conducted east toward Fire Base BIRMINGHAM and west toward Fire Base VEGHEL with negative findings.

General engineers support of the fire base continued until 16 April 1971 when the engineer responsibility for the fire base was turned over to D Company. At Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, daily minesweeps were conducted east toward Fire Base BASTOGNE with negative findings. A total of 36 81 x 40' bunkers and three 10' x 24' bunkers were excavated and prepared as airstrips to other locations. Five bunkers were moved and emplaced on the top of the hill and the sanitary fill was improved. On 16 April, engineer responsibility for the fire base was turned over to D Company. On 22 - 25 April, A Company supported the 1/327th Infantry staging area at the foot of Fire Base BIRMINGHAM by applying 4,800 gallons of pene-prime to the access roads leading into their stand-down area. On 14 April, a squad of A Company conducted a combat assault and sweep of Fire Base FURY. During the sweep, 16 Chicco grenades, 7 bazooka-type grenades and one 82mm mortar round body trunks were discovered, disarmed and destroyed. On 17 April, A Company sent a reinforced squad to LA VANG to construct a TOC/area for the 101st Airborne Division (Amph) forward operations during LAMSON 720. They completed this high priority task in less than 24 hours from the initial warning order. A Company constructed several LZs in the 1st Brigade AO during April and participated in several combat patrols in support of the 1/327th Infantry and 2/502nd Infantry. On these patrols in the a SHAU VALLEY anti-tank mines were emplaced at selected sites in an effort to harass the NVA using Route 548 as a resupply route. A Company supported the 1st Brigade headquarters at CAM EAGLE by maintaining portions of the bunkers, 155mm mortars and constructing revetments. During the first week of April, B Company continued in support of the 3rd Brigade at KI LZ, CAM CARRALT, Fire Base WESTBIRD II and Fire Base MANG C'ITM. Fortifications were constantly improved until all forces withdrew on 10 April. On 10 April, two squads were airlifted to Fire Base CLAULIAI to provide engineer support for 1/506th Infantry operations and fire base maintenance. An M-450 and backhoe were employed to excavate four culvert bunkers and to clear a lower hill for a 155mm artillery battery. Also, on 10 April, B Company dispatched a squad to Fire Base KATTAWI to provide engineer support for 2/506th Infantry operations and fire base maintenance. An M-450 was employed to level an area for a 155mm artillery battery and the engineers assisted in bunker repair and installation of perimeter wire. B Company supported GCI SWALE units with general engineer support and by maintaining the interior road network. B Company also supported 2/502nd Infantry operations.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RG5 GSNOE-65 (R3) (T)

out of Fire Base JACk by performing fire base maintenance and combat operations during LA'MACH 720. During April, C Company (-) was in direct support of the 2nd Brigade at Fire Base BRICK TOHAWK, ANZIO, ROMMAD, BRICK, RIFLE, and conducted combat support missions in the AO. In early April, the decision was reached to construct Fire Base RIFLE and abandon Fire Base BRICK. While support continued at Fire Base BRICK, plans were made to open Route QL-19 to Fire Base RIFLE and conduct deliberate construction of the fire base. On 10 April, Route QL-19 was opened and a platoon was inserted on Fire Base RIFLE. Simultaneously, these two construction forces began operations to clear and level the fire base and upgrade Route QL-19. Twenty-five culverts were installed, the road widened utilizing D-7 bulldozer blade and Rome plow dozers and grades lowered utilizing HS-100 scrapers. At Fire Base RIFLE, the hill was leveled, artillery positions and bunker positions staked out and excavated. During April, C Company continued to improve the PHU THU Road by hauling fill to improve bridge approaches. Prior to being relieved of responsibility for constructing the ATONG THU Road on 10 April, C Company hauled 1,100 cubic yards of select fill to extend the road 80 meters. Upon change of units on Fire Base ROMMAD, new requirements were received and C Company employed an X-450 and a squad to excavate for ammunition dumps, trash swamps, for an alternate TOC bunker and for sleeping bunkers. The PHU BAI interior and perimeter roads were continuously upgraded by C Company. Additionally, 11,000 gallons of peaprimo/diesel mixture were applied to these roads as a dust palliative. Several LZ's were constructed in the 2nd Brigade AO and one LZ (LZ TALON) was expanded to accommodate a battery of 105mm howitzers. On 5 April 1971 as KHE SANH was being vacated by American and ARVN units, a platoon (-) from Company C augmented with four X-450 dozers was airlifted into KHE SANH to assist in closing the base. Upon arriving at KHE SANH, the platoon began operations under the direction of Division Support Command. Non-salvageable equipment was buried, bunkers and munitions were destroyed. The entire force was extracted on 6 April 1971, thus terminating all 326th Engineer Battalion support at KHE SANH. During April, D Company (Provisional) furnished equipment support to the battalion and executed assigned projects at Fire Base BASTOGNE, Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, LANG CO BAY, CAMP EAGLE, PHU BAI and LA VIANG. D Company improved the CAMP EAGLE bunker line by grading and shaping the perimeter road and constructing fighting positions. Extensive repairs were accomplished at the CAMP EAGLE water point by improving drainage and reshaping the entire truck park. The VIP quarters at PHU BAI were extensively renovated during April. D Company supplied air boats and Boston whalers to LANG CO BAY to support the scout dog teams utilized to secure the railroad in that area. A Boston whaler was employed at the PHNL Bridge to patrol the Perfume River. On 15 April, D Company assumed fire base maintenance responsibility of Fire Base BASTOGNE and Fire Base BIRMINGHAM from A Company. D Company supported the
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air-mobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RG3 CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

division forward at LA VANG during LAKSON 720 by constructing showers, latrines, mess facilities and conducting general engineering support. D Company was also responsible for supplying power to CAMP WILKINSON within CAMP TAGEL Combat Base by operating and maintaining the electric generators.

m. Air Cavalry Operations.

(1) A Troop.

(a) The mission of Troop A during November and December was to provide visual reconnaissance in the 2/17th Cavalry reconnaissance zone. It also provided reconnaissance and security for the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (Air-mobile) and its subordinate elements in the form of first and last light reconnaissance and reaction to contact missions. The Aero Rifle Platoon secured downed aircraft in the 101st Airborne Division's northern area of operations. On 6 November 1970, Troop A was given the mission to conduct a visual reconnaissance in the vicinity of fire bases KATY, RIFCORD, and BRADLEY. During the morning, the AFRPs were inserted to secure a downed aircraft at coordinates XD928433. During a visual recon of area 7 a Mi-24 chase aircraft received 3-10 rounds of .51 caliber fire with negative hits. While engaging this area a total of 110-130 rounds of AK fire was received with negative hits. Numerous trails were spotted in the vicinity of coordinates XD241132 with recent activity in the past 24-48 hours. Footprints of 2 to 3 personnel at coordinates XD241144 were observed with recent activity in the last 24 hours. In a 2 grid square area around XD230020 three hooches and 16 bunkers with signs of recent activity in the past 12-24 hours were observed. On 14 November the missions for Troop A began with visual recons in recon zone 7. Two .51 caliber hits, 10 bunkers, 3 trails, and several hooches were observed at coordinates YD118063. At coordinates XD150070, 25 hooches were observed in a 100 meter square. While conducting reconnaissance of the area at coordinates XD151055 a light observation helicopter took 20 to 30 rounds of AK-47 fire. The pilot was hit in the hand and the aircraft was flown back to QUANG TRI. At coordinates XD962287 two bigger, reinforced bunkers, and numerous footprints were spotted. At coordinates XD151055 a gunship was fired at by both AK-47 and .51 caliber weapons. A FAC was on station to engage the target where the aircraft was fired on. Air strikes were placed on the target with unknown results. On 15 November a team from Troop A observed a 3/4-ton truck at coordinates XD305074. The truck was engaged and destroyed, and the aircraft received 10 rounds of .51 caliber fire with negative hits. Also at this location 5 to 7 bunkers were destroyed. An 8' x 8' bunker at coordinates XD923235 was observed and engaged with unknown results. AK-47 fire was received at coordinates XD25107 and XD923235 by light observation helicopter. On 26 November Troop A began
a five day stand-down. During the stand-down period, time was allocated for proficiency check rides and instrument training. Major emphasis was placed on aircraft maintenance to insure maximum combat-ready aircraft at the termination of the stand-down. Final emphasis was placed on the maintenance of aircraft, the concluding of proficiency check rides, and police of the area.

(b) During December, A Troop provided visual reconnaissance in the 2/17th Cavalry reconnaissance zones. It also provided reconnaissance and security for the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) and its subordinate elements in the form of first and last light reconnaissance and reaction to contact missions. Due to high winds and heavy rains, operations in the recon zones declined during the reporting period. Teams for L Company (Ranger) were sent to Troop A to be placed in the recon zones. Troop A supplied overflights, insertions, reaction forces, and extractions for the 101st Airborne Division's northern area of operations. Missions in support of ARVN located in the vicinity of Fire Base BAMBABA were also performed by Troop A.

(c) During January Troop A participated in the JETZY SCN TBEN operations in general support of the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl). 1-2 January, inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AO. On 3 January, VR of RT 616 showed signs of heavy truck traffic. Gunship received 12.7mm antiaircraft fire at XD910243. One aircraft was hit and suffered minor damage. On 4-5 January, inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AO. On 9-10 January, Troop A performed visual reconnaissance in the AO with emphasis on Route 616. Active 12.7mm pits were observed and engaged. TAC AIR and artillery were called in on bunkers. On 18-21 January, Troop A worked in close support with TAC AIR, ARA and Artillery to destroy bunkers, cache sites, tunnels and spider holes along Route 616. On 22-23 January, inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AO. On 25 January, several sensor strings were activated and were visually checked for activity. On 26-28 January, inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AO. On 30 January, Troop A performed mission of flank security for 1/5th Mech in KIE SANH area of operations. A doomed LOH from F Troop 8th Cavalry was secured and rigged for extraction. On 31 January, Troop A provided security for units in KIE SANH and SHPRAUD areas of operations. 50% of Arc Lights were completed with satisfactory results noted.

(d) On 2-3 February, Troop A conducted VR of Route 616, extracted two Ranger teams and inserted two others. Troop D was inserted to accomplish ground reconnaissance of Route 616. On 4 February, Troop A ARF was inserted into KIE SANH Combat Base, to secure the arrival of Troop D and Squadron R. On 4-7 February bad weather precluded normal operations. On 8 February, Troop C crossed the LAC'TAN border. Aircraft reported taking fire with three aircraft reporting hits (The aircraft were reported flyable). On 9 February, the troop worked the area west of KIE SANH utilizing TAC and ARA. A LOH and AH-1G were shot down. The crews were extracted. Seven MFA were KIA on that date. On 12-17 February, the troop supported ARVN ground elements operating in IAC. Troop A worked with FAC controlled TAC AIR, ARA and its organic gunships to suppress enemy antiaircraft fire, while team com-
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS OSPOT-65 (R3) (U)

time: their missions for the ground forces. Approximately 16 NVA were KIA. On 13-22 February, Troop A was engaged in its assigned missions of VA and close screen to the ground forces. Weather during this period frequently delayed missions until 1100-1200 hours. On 26 February, Troop A had visual sightings of enemy contact. Two active tanks were sighted, and an AH-1G received 15 hits in the process of flying VA in the vicinity of LZ 31. On 27-28 February, Troop A alternated with Troop C and the Squadron Headquarters Company as C&C to recover an LOR that had been shot down VIC XD6223. Three 12.7mm anti-aircraft weapons were located in the area.

(a) On 1 March the Troop employed airstrikes against known and suspected enemy locations. On 2-3 March, inclement weather prevented combat operations. On 4-5 March, A Troop supported ARVN bases at LZ SOPHTA and LZ VICTORY, and employed FAC AIR and Artillery on known positions. On 6 March, the Nac Bao was inserted to secure a downed crew at XD478409. On 7 March, the Nac Bao and the downed crew were extracted under heavy LZ and antiaircraft fire from three weapons. One AH-1G received 4 hits and returned to base where it was determined to be non-flyable. A truck (5 ton) was destroyed and a bulldozer was spotted. The area was marked for a FAC. On 8-10 March inclement weather prevented combat operations. On 11 March, Troop A conducted a strike of LZ ALOVA, LZ TANO, LZ ALAMA, and LZ 40705 to determine condition. Five 2 1/2 ton trucks were sighted and marked for a FAC. On 12-13 March, Troop A's mission was to conduct VA and screen VIC XD80000. On 14-15 March, inclement weather prevented combat operations. On 16-22 March, Troop A supported the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) in the vicinity of LZ BICHA with heavy teams. Air strikes were employed and remaining targets were turned over to the FAC on station. During this period an AH-1G was shot down by small arms fire near XD479405. The crew was extracted. Tanks were sighted on 18 March and were marked for the FAC. On 21 March, A Troop continued support to 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) with heavy Cavalry teams. Marginal weather on 25 March prevented work in the AO until 1300 hours. Route recon of 616 revealed no significant spots and no traffic during the past three days. On 26-28 March, Troop A performed its visual recon role in the Laotian and Vietnamese Salient areas to spot possible targets of opportunity. Heavy small arms fire was received throughout the area of interest. On 29-30 March, Troop A supported insertions of ARVN near XD4802 and performed VA in Laotian Salient.

(b) On 1-5 April, Troop A conducted visual reconnaissance in the Vietnamese and Laotian Salient areas. Emphasis was placed on Route 616 and bypasses. On 5 April, Troop A spent the early day in visual reconnaissances of routes of approach, departure, and planned LZ's for the insertion of the Nac Bao. FAC AIR was employed. Troop A prepared ahead
of the advancing ground forces after insertion. On 7-9 April, Troop A supported the 3rd Brigade in the Vic of VANDERGRAFT and MAI LOC. On 10-13 April, inclement weather caused mission delays. Troop A, however, worked in the Vic of Fire Base GLADIATOR, observing light trail traffic. In the Vic of Fire Base O'BRIEN, Troop A observed light foot traffic. Gunships received heavy small arms fire. One AH-1C was downed, crashed, and landed in a field. On 12 April inclement weather prevented combat operations in the AC. On 13-15 April, Troop A worked the recon zones with emphasis on Route 616 from Fire Base LEATHERNECK to Fire Base SHILOH. Small amounts of traffic were observed and teams continued to receive 12.7mm and small arms fire. On 16 April, Teams observed old-bunkers and trails but no recent activity Vic YD123209. On 17-18 April, Teams were given the priority mission of screening the HUE Rocket Belt. On 19 April, Troop A supported the 258th Vietnamese Marines in their insertion near HOLCOMB. Throughout the area 12.7mm fire was received. On 22-23 April, Teams worked in support of the 258th VMAC in the Vic of Fire Base 3: SHILOH and TUN TAVERN. Support was also rendered to the 54th ARVN Regiment Vic Fire Base BARRETT. A team observed 50-55 bunkers, two NVA, light foot traffic. On 24 April, Teams observed 3 bunkers under construction at YD005297 and 1 NVA was KBI. Bulldozers had been working on Route 616 by-passing bomb craters. Bunkers observed had a spacing of approximately 50 meters. On 25-26 April, Troop A worked with PAC and TAC AIR to support the NAC Bao raid. On 27-28 April, Teams returned to visual reconnaissance in the Division Recon Zone. TAC AIR was employed in the Vic YD0954204 against a bunker complex. On 29-30 April, Troop A supported the NAC Bao raid and continued its visual reconnaissance responsibilities.

(2) B Troop.

(a) During November, B Troop was used in general support of the 101st Airborne Division (Air) and worked closely with the 1st Brigade. Their primary mission was to gather intelligence through visual reconnaissance missions. Secondary missions included downed aircraft security in the division's area of operation, bomb damage assessments for B-52 strikes, sky spots, and artillery. On 1-7 November B Troop worked with elements of the 1st Brigade around the THREE FORES area (YD5012). Their specific mission was to determine the size, location, and movement of enemy forces that made contact with friendly infantry units. On 8-14 November the poor flying weather hampered B Troop's attempts to support the Rangers. On the 13th, the weather lifted enough to insert team Bills. On 16 November Bills had contact with an unknown size enemy force. Two members of the team were wounded in the action. B Troop tried to extract the men but were driven off by enemy fire. In the action three UH-1H helicopters of B Troop received combat damage. From that time B Troop
has worked directly with the 1st Brigade in an effort to destroy any logistical build-up in the area and to limit the THREE FORKS area as an enemy avenue of advance to the lowlands.

(b) On 1-11 December 1970, poor flying weather did not permit extensive reconnaissance. On 12-17 December 1970, Troop B worked with the 1st Brigade around THREE FORKS YD5012 to conduct bomb damage assessments and locate targets for artillery and airstrikes. On 17 December 1970, Troop B ARP was inserted in a downed aircraft YD69615. The aircraft was down for 31 days prior to the recovery attempt. The aircraft was recovered without incident. On 18-22 December, Troop B was worked around YD536's West YD4107. A WA base camp was found by a Troop B pink team. The mission was to determine size, location, and disposition of the enemy force. Secondary missions included CS drops, bomb damage assessments, and relief for Brigade Command and Control personnel. Also on 18 December 1970, a pink team from Troop B, while working in the southern part of the A SHAU VALLEY, was engaged by two 12.7mm anti-aircraft machineguns and an undetermined number of small arms. The team leader contacted FAC and marked the area for an airstrike. The bomb damage assessment revealed both active 12.7's and undetermined number of small arms and fighting positions destroyed by Air Force. On 19-31 December, Troop B worked the Squadron reconnaissance zones and screened CAMP EAGLE on 22 December for Operation HOLLY (Bob Hope).

(c) During January and February Troop B participated in the JEFFERSON HOUSE operations in general support of the 101st Airborne Division (Amph). With a primary mission of intelligence gathering through visual reconnaissance. On 1-11 January 1971, Troop B was able to accomplish only limited visual reconnaissance due to low ceilings and inclement weather. On 6 January a detailed search was made for a missing AH-10 from Troop C 2/17th Cavalry. During this search an AH-10, listed as missing since 1969, was found near Firebase YG301. The Aero Rifle Platoon of Troop B was later inserted in exactly site to recover the remains of the crew. On 11 January, an LOH was shot down at YD350001 Vic ALOUI airdrop. The aircraft and crew were secured. On 16 January, the Troop B ARP secured a downed aircraft Vic YG830889. Additionally, an LOH was shot down by 12.7mm anti-aircraft fire Vic YG558793. The crew was recovered, but the aircraft was lost due to fire. On 11 January, the Troop B ARP was again inserted to secure a downed FLIR aircraft YC870965. On 19 January, Troop B ARP was inserted on a suspected enemy location in the Vic of Fierce Race MARKET. From 23-27 January, Troop B worked in the area of the RUONG RUONG VALLEY YC3584 supporting Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry. On 31 January, Troop B operations moved to VIENG TRÍ to support Operation MOUNTAIN CANYON II vicinity 23 CANH.

(d) On 9 February, Troop B inserted five Ranger teams. On 10 February, Troop B lost 2 LOH aircrafts while on convoy cover in the PAI VAN PASS.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Troop B ARP was inserted on the site and the aircraft and crew were extracted. The second was shot down in the A SHAU VALLEY by 12.7mm antiaircraft fire. The aircraft was destroyed, and the crew are listed as MIA. From 11-14 February, Troop B worked the division reconnaissance zone detecting enemy truck traffic and destroying a truck and bulldozer. On 15 February, a UH-1H on a night Ranger extraction crashed resulting in seven US KIA. From 19-20 February, Troop B supported Ranger teams, and continued visual reconnaissance in the reconnaissance zone. On 21 February, an AH-1G in direct support of a Ranger contact fired too close to friendly troops, resulting in one KIA and two WIA. On 25 February, Troop B extracted a Ranger team with a PAVN VC young YD719901. From 26-27 February, Troop B secured the extraction of two aircraft in the vicinity of YD719901 and YD531132. On 28 February, Troop B conducted visual reconnaissance in the Division reconnaissance zone mapping enemy infiltration routes and directing air strikes in the A SHAU VALLEY.

(e) On 1-31 March, Troop B worked in the Division reconnaissance zone conducting visual reconnaissance, checking sensor activations and IRS reports. During 5-6 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed AH-1G at YD865212 and a UH-1H at YD391361. On 13 March, an LH received an unknown amount of 12.7mm antiaircraft and SAF in the Vic of YD199129. The aircraft crashed and burned resulting in two US KIA. During the period 14-17 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed UH-1H at YC727143, and an AH-1G at YD357472. On 22 March, Troop B ARP secured a downed AH-1G at YD961162. On 24 March, Troop B extracted Ranger teams 19s and 19w when the teams made contact. On 30 March, Troop B ARP was inserted at YD513031 to reinforce Ranger team 19h in the capture of 2 NVA FWDs. During the entire reporting period, additional missions included RDA of airstrikes and ARC Lights and limited ground reconnaissance.

(f). On 1 April, B Troop ARP was inserted on Fire Base VACHEN to secure and recover an AH-1G. Both the aircraft and the crew were recovered. On 2 April, B Troop extracted a Ranger team in contact. The team was then used to secure a 3 Troop LOH on Fire Base RENDEZVOUS. Both the aircraft and the crew were recovered. On 4 April, a B Troop UH-1H on medevac mission vicinity YD552017 received intense SAF resulting in one US WIA. On 6 April, a B Troop UH-1H carrying Rangers to attempt a body snatch vicinity YC451950 received intense SA and MG fire resulting in 1 US KIA and 3 WIA. On 10 April the ARP secured a B Troop UH-1H (CCK) on Fire Base RENDEZVOUS where it landed after receiving one 37mm hit west of Fire Base EAGYNE, resulting in one US KIA. On 13 April, the ARP secured and recovered a B Troop LOH shot down vicinity of AT537978. For the remainder of the month, B Troop operated in the reconnaissance zones and provided support for Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry. On 23 April, a B Troop UH-1H was shot down in the vicinity of YC479327 while attempting to reinforce a Ranger team in contact, resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. The aircraft was not recovered.
 Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (R) (U)

(3) C Troop.

(a) During November, Troop C staged from Phi MAI Army Airfield in general support of the Division. This included aerial FRs, EDA's, ground reconnaissance and Ranger support. In addition, the ARP was on standby for downed aircraft in the Division AC. Due to the northeast monsoon season, there was little air and reconnaissance activity during the first portion of the reporting period. On 13 and 14 November, the ARP and a team of engineers were inserted to clear Fire Base KELLY, AURESEN and KARETM. A number of 105mm rounds, fragmentation grenades and blasting caps were discovered and were destroyed. The ARP and elements of Delta Troop were inserted just south of Fire Base KARETM. The ARP, in an attempt to recover the Ranger KIA, received RRG and AK-47 fire resulting in six wounded and another Ranger KIA. Due to extremely poor weather conditions, the wounded were unable to be extracted that day. On the following day, 17 November, extraction of the critically wounded was made by an LCH under heavy AK and 50 caliber fire. On 18 November, an unsuccessful attempt, due to weather restrictions, was made to extract the ground elements. In the rescue attempt one C&C, one Cobra, and one LCH received heavy AK fire, 50 caliber, and five RRG rounds. The next day, 19 November, the ARP and other ground elements started to move by foot towards Fire Base CANNON. In an attempt to make radio contact with the ground elements, one C&C took two RRG rounds and one LCH with pilot and crew member crashed into a mountain side killing both of them. On 20 November the element was able to be extracted, along with the remains of the LCH crew.

(b) During December, operations involving C Troop were significantly hampered by the northeast monsoon weather conditions. A short break in the weather allowed them to work in the northern end of the A SHAH VALLEY in the vicinity of Tiger Mountain. On 11 December, the ARP stood by on Fire Base 73 HEL while D Troop was inserted by UN-H helicopters in the vicinity of ALOUI airstrip. D Troop destroyed bridges that had been spotted earlier by LCH working in that area. During the next few days increasing enemy activity was noted in the northern valley and the surrounding areas. On frequent occasions observation aircraft came under enemy small arms fire, however, PPU teams worked the area with considerable success. Enemy bunkers, fighting positions, bridges, and huts were destroyed. A number of the enemy were KIA. On 16 December, a LCH on an AAR mission was shot down by enemy 50 caliber fire. The crew was uninjured and immediately picked up by the UN-H, chase aircraft. On the night of 19 December this same general area was worked by FLIR. Sightings of a number of the enemy in the open, FLIR engaged and was credited with 10 enemy KIA. During this period FLIR was also utilized in the daylight hours, accompanying the regular WR missions. In the reporting period, FLIR accounted for a large percentage of the enemy KIA credited to the Troop.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, ROE CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(c) During the 1-31 January reporting period, Troop C staged from PHU BAI Army Airfield, in general support of the 101st Airborne Division (Amph), with a primary mission of intelligence gathering through visual reconnaissance. From 1-10 January, monsoon weather prohibited extensive reconnaissance of the Division reconnaissance zone. The period from 11-30 January, was marked by improving weather which enabled Troop C to continue the visual reconnaissance of the Division reconnaissance zone. A heavy increase in enemy activity was noted during this period around the ALOUI airstrip and west of Tiger Mountain. An estimated NVA Company was pinpointed. A "Cavalry Cobra" raid was launched and a BDA is the fifteen foot high elephant grass revealed 3 NVA KIA. It is felt better results were obtained than those indicated by the BDA, as the team was able to silence rather intense fire in the area. During this period Troop C reacted with its ARO Rifle Platoon to five downed aircraft. Additionally Troop C supported three Ranger Teams in contact.

(d) From 1-4 February Troop C staged from PHU BAI Airfield. From 5-28 February, it staged from KHE SANH Combat Base. On 8 February, 0743 hours the Troop C commander, MAJ James T. Newman led the first heavy Cavalry team into IAJS in support of the Vietnamese Rangers. On 12 February, Troop C lost two AH-1Gs to hostile fire on the LAOTIAN border. One crew was listed as KIA. The second crew was extracted. The area of the contact was engaged by Artillery, TAC AIR, and one B-52 strike. The remainder of the month of February was devoted screening for extraction of Vietnamese Ranger fire bases and working fire bases 30 and 31.

(e) From 1-31 March, Troop C staged out of KHE SANH Combat Base in general support of LAMSON 719. During this period Troop C ARF scanned a portion of the KHE SANH perimeter. The movement of ARVN forces enabled the Troop to resume its full time job of reconnaissance. Troop C was assigned a reconnaissance zone that extended westward to TONG PONG and to the north of Highway 9. After the ground objectives had been reached and withdrawal began, Troop C began close support by screening PZs and reconnaissance of flight routes. The Troop also acted in a resupply capacity on occasion during this period.

(f) April saw the end of LAMSON 719, with Troop C performing missions in support of the final phases of the operation. Returning to PHU BAI, all efforts were again concentrated on the SHAU VALLEY and the infiltration routes along the LAOTIAN border. Heavy pink teams once again employed their organic fire power along with artillery and air support against suspected enemy locations in and around Base Area 611. Often forced to work without a LOJ because of hostile fire, the effectiveness of the visual reconnaissance was greatly reduced. Support of Delta Troop operations in the Valley raised morale and gave the troops
a sense of accomplishment. Other daily missions included reconnaissance of the HUE-MIU BAI Rocket Belt, convoy escorts, and support of the 2nd Brigade.

(4) D Troop.

(a) During the last two months of 1970, Delta Troop provided ground reconnaissance, downed aircraft security, and reaction force for units in contact. Additionally, the troop provided ambushes and sweeps outside CAMP EAGLE and served as the base defense reaction force. During the period 1-28 January, Troop D performed its assigned missions of EAGLE Reaction Force, Perimeter Defense and acted as immediate reaction force with Troop (--) for all insertions of any Squadron Aero Rifle Platoon. From 1-4 January, overflights of the perimeter defenses were made to discover possible enemy routes of infiltration and possible ambush sites. Reports submitted covering this activity indicated areas of requiring improvement. On 28 January, a warning order for movement to MACV TRR was issued. On 2 February, Troop D made a combat assault in the vicinity of XD854238, to conduct a ground bomb damage assessment (PDA) and a ground reconnaissance of the surrounding area that had been tentatively identified as a NVA headquarters complex. The Troop was extracted at 031500 hours at XD854238 and XD848236, with the PZs were green. On 4 February, Troop D moved to XEB SAMH Combat Base in support of LAMSON 719; Headquarters (--) by convoy and two platoons by air. From 5-14 February, Troop D hardened the perimeter defenses. Bunkers, fighting positions and overhead cover were given priority. On 15 February, Troop D was given the responsibility of security for the rearmed/refueled point at LAM CON, XD814368, and at this time assumed control of the aero rifle platoons of the assigned and OICOMB air cavalry troops. Ambush and sweep operations in the squadron AO were accomplished as part of the perimeter defense plan through 14 March.

(b) On 15 March, the XEB SAMH Combat Base began to receive daily artillery attacks by NVA 122mm field guns. On 23 March, at 0230 hours, Troop D repulsed a Supper attack by the 2nd Company 15th NVA Engineer Battalion. The 40 men attack, supported by indirect fire, 60mm mortars and RPGs, penetrated the 3rd Platoon position in an attempt to reach the airfield PIZ and rearm points. The enemy broke contact at 0645 hours. A first light check revealed 14 NVA KIA, 1 PZM, 9 AK-47s, 3 RPG launchers and one 9mm pistol captured along with numerous small arms ammunition and demolition equipment. US losses were 3 KIA, 5 WIA major, 13 WIA minor.

(c) During the month of April 1971, Delta Troop provided ground reconnaissance, downed aircraft security, reaction force for the division and a reaction force for units in contact. Additionally, Delta Troop
providing base security for a sector on the CAMP EAGLE perimeter. Delta Troop secured two downed aircraft in a SHAU VALLEY, reinforced a Ranger team in contact in a SHAU VALLEY, inserted and provided diversion for two Ranger platoon size ambushes in a SHAU VALLEY, conducted three days of ground reconnaissance in a SHAU VALLEY, twenty-nine days of base defense reaction force for CAMP EAGLE, and 5 sweeps of the EAGLE perimeter.

After returning from the SHAU on 2 April, Delta Troop began a week of stand-down training from 4-10 April. On 15 April the troop was inserted in the SHAU VALLEY at coordinates YC451920. Delta Troops mission was to provide security and diversion for a Ranger Platoon to remain behind ambush of Route 548. The troop also performed ground reconnaissance of 24 kilometers of Route 548. D Troop found signs of recent vehicular traffic on the road as well as six 6 x 8 ft. bunkers which faced the road. The troop was extracted late on the afternoon of the 15th at grid YC447938.

On 20 April the troop was again inserted in the SHAU VALLEY at grid YC456903. The mission of the troop was to insert a Ranger platoon stay behind ambush, provide a diversion for the Ranger platoon's movement to their ambush site and to make ground reconnaissance of the western side of the SHAU VALLEY between YC445903 and YC457906. The troop found very few signs of recent activity. There were 5 trails in the area which had been used within 48 to 72 hours, but they revealed no clues as to what might have passed on them. A quantity of communication wire was found, but it had been previously cut in frequent intervals and showed no signs of repair. The troop was extracted from one ship ZZ at YC457906. On 21 April the troop was once again inserted in the SHAU VALLEY at YC454924 in response to a Ranger team in contact and two downed helicopters, one of which was a medivac. The troop was inserted north of the downed aircraft and moved south to make the pickup. Approximately 150 to 200 meters from the aircraft the lead element of the troop was under heavy RPG, small arms fire and chlorine grenades. The platoons maneuvered to react to the threat and to pick up survivors of the Ranger team. The contact on the 24th lasted approximately six hours and resulted in 5 friendly KIA, 12 WIA, one unknown enemy KIA by small arms fire, 11 enemy KIA by aircraft and an unknown number of enemy KIA. After the extraction of three US from the downed medivac helicopters, the troops withdrew approximately 400 meters north to establish an IOP, medivac wounded, and be reinforced by another company. The reinforcement was accomplished by night and in the morning the elements moved back to the contact point to attempt to extract the remaining 23 personnel. The WIA had withdrawn the majority of their forces during the night. The next morning fire was received from only one location. The enemy fire was eliminated but no WIA were found in the vicinity. The extraction of the troop was made at YC4586924.

(5) Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry.

(a) During the month of November a total of thirteen Ranger teams were deployed in the 101st Airborne Division (Amph) Area of Operations. Emphasis was on reconnaissance around Fire Bases RINGBIRD and HATHAWAY. Two enemy contacts were initiated. The contact initiated on 16 November by Ranger Team "Bills" provided the needed intelligence for establishing the location of the 1st Battalion, 803rd NVA Regiment. Due to inclement
weather, Ranger teams were shifted from the ATICORD/KHE THUYN area to the RUONG RUONG VALLEY, to locate infiltration routes used by the NVA from Laos into the lowlands of THUA THIEN Province. No significant sightings were observed.

(b) During the month of December, Ranger operations were hampered by poor weather conditions caused by the northeast monsoon. Company I deployed a total of ten operational teams. Six teams were deployed in the KHE S. H. Plains and Vietnamese Salient regions, with the remaining four teams deployed in the general area along the eastern side of the A SHAU VALLEY. Deployment of operational teams to the KHE S. H. and Vietnamese Salient area made it necessary for this company to locate a forward operating base at QUANG RI, plus deploy a three man radio relay element at Signal Mountain to insure adequate communications with the operational elements. The only problem that arose was that of resupplying the forward operating base and the radio relay team.

(c) Poor weather conditions caused by the northeast monsoon continued to hamper Ranger operations during the month of January. Enemy sightings, however, increased during this period. Sightings occurred in the BACH MA, SHEAR VALLEY, and RUONG RUONG VALLEY regions. Rangers accomplished a false extraction in the SHEAR VALLEY, after the ranger team was compromised. Future false extractions are planned, to allow the ranger teams to continue their assigned mission.

(d) During the month of February, this unit deployed a total of seventeen Ranger teams. Poor weather hampered deployment until February 9th, at which time seven operational teams were deployed in the RUONG RUONG VALLEY region. The mission of the teams were to replace one US infantry battalion that deployed to the KHE S. H. region. Emphasis during this time was placed on ambush techniques. Two minor enemy contacts were initiated during this period. After being relieved by a US infantry unit from the RUONG RUONG VALLEY region, Ranger teams began operating south and west of abandoned Fire Base RICORD, the remainder of the month. Emphasis was placed on reconnaissance of roads and trails through the area. Four enemy contacts were initiated in that region.

(e) During the month of March, this unit deployed a total of twenty-one Ranger teams. Initially continuing to concentrate on reconnaissance of the area surrounding abandoned Fire Base RICORD, this unit shifted to the mission of monitoring and ambushing along Route 567 from Fire Base MONOCREOS to Fire Base BIATE and along Route 548 in the A SHAU VALLEY floor. Six contacts were initiated in these areas resulting in eight NVA KIA and two NVA POW. The information passed on by these POWs resulted in large troop movements by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) to counter a serious enemy threat to their fire bases. At the request of 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Ambl), three Ranger teams were deployed to the SHEAR VALLEY area to determine similar enemy concentrations in their AO.
(f) During the month of April, the Rangers deployed a total of twenty-nine Ranger teams. From 1 April to 10 April, eight Ranger teams were employed in the SHER VALLEY region with the mission of reconnaissance. One minor enemy contact was initiated. From 10-23 April emphasis was placed on the A SHAV VALLEY region in the form of platoon and company raids to include platoon size stay-behind ambushes. During the company raid Route 548 was interdicted by blowing a well-used bridge.

n. Artillery.

(1) The 101st Airborne Division Artillery (Amb) provided close and continuous fire support to division maneuver units participating in Operations JEFFERSON CLAY/MOSON PLAN 70, JAXON 719, and JAXON 720. The 2nd Battalion (Amb), 310th Artillery (105mm) provided direct support to the 3rd Brigade; the 2nd Battalion (Amb), 320th Artillery (105mm) provided direct support to the 1st Brigade; the 1st Battalion (Amb) 321st Artillery (105mm) provided direct support to the 2nd Brigade. In addition, the 3rd Battalion (Amb), 11th Artillery (155mm) and the 4th Battalion (Aerial Artillery), 77th Artillery provided general support to the division.

(2) During the months of November and December, Division Artillery units were positioned to support the JEFFERSON CLAY/MOSON PLAN 70. The majority of the fire bases were accessible by road which insured an adequate stockage of ammunition regardless of the weather. During November one unit move was conducted. One raid was conducted by moving to a forward fire base, expending on predetermned targets and extracting before dark. A total of 82,049 artillery rounds and 10,910 aerial artillery rockets were expended during the month of November. In November the 1 millionth round was fired supporting division forces since their arrival in Vietnam. During December two artillery raids were conducted and 93,965 artillery rounds and 13,145 rockets were expended.

(3) During January flying conditions improved and maneuver units operated deeper into the jungle canopy. To support these operations six artillery units were repositioned and 85,221 artillery rounds and 21,260 rockets were expended.

(4) During February and March the Division Artillery supported all phases of Operation JAXON 719 while continuing to support Operation JEFFERSON CLAY/MOSON PLAN 70. In addition, the Division Artillery was responsible for fire support coordination in the defense of KHE SAI and WADDERKIFT areas. The Division Artillery established a forward operations center at CAMP ROBERTS, 7TH AR CAN; an Air Warning Control Center at DON HA Combat Base to assume the testing of artillery and air strike warning data for Eastern 7TH AR Province, and Battery A, 4th Battalion (A&A), 77th Artillery established a forward location at KHE SAI. On 6 February 1971 the 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery deployed a headquarters element to a position near the eastern DMZ area. An artillery battalion radio net was established as part of a deception operation. The element re-
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RG3 CSFR-65 (R3) (U)

deployed to CAMP EAGLE on 13 February. On 25 February the 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery deployed to QUANG TRI Province to provide direct support to the 3rd Brigade. In addition, Battery G (-), 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery was placed OCON to 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery to provide 155mm artillery support. On 3 March the Division Artillery assumed operational control of the 5th Infantry Division (Mech); the 6th Battalion (-), 11th Artillery (two 105mm howitzer batteries), direct support artillery for the 11th Brigade, 23rd Infantry Division; and the 1st Battalion, 82nd Artillery (155mm), 23rd Division, general support artillery. Division Artillery units made seventeen moves during February and expended 104,716 artillery rounds. A total of fifteen unit moves were completed during March and 112,386 artillery rounds were expended in support of division maneuver units.

(5) The 6th Battalion (ARA), 77th Artillery provided extensive support to ARVN forces participating in LAMSON 729 while continuing to support all 101st Airborne Division (Ambt) operations. During the months of February and March the unit flew 7,365 sorties, expended 69,975 rockets and were credited with 1,147 enemy KIA. The vast majority of the expenditures and enemy KIA's were as a result of direct support to ARVN forces operating in FACS.

(6) On 7 April the 6th Battalion (-), 11th Artillery and 1st Battalion, 82nd Artillery were released from their OCON status and redeployed to the 101st Airborne Division (Ambt) area. The 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery returned to its parent organization on 8 April and at that time assumed responsibility for artillery fires in QUANG TRI Province. All 101st Airborne Division Artillery elements departed QUANG TRI Province and were repositioned in the division area of operations by 10 April. During the remainder of the month Division Artillery forces supported operation LAMSON 720 and continued to support operation JEFFERSON G1/ MONSOON PLAN 70. During April, twenty-six artillery moves were completed and 105,756 artillery rounds and 21,837 rockets were expended.

(7) During the entire period the 1st Battalion, 83rd Artillery, 108th Artillery Group provided the division with 3 inch howitzer and 175mm gun artillery support. The battalion had a mission of general support - reinforcing the 101st Airborne Division Artillery.

(8) Division Artillery units were repositioned during the reporting period as listed below:

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

March 3,609 34,611
April 2,930 21,837
TOTAL 17,732 137,447

o. Information.

(1) Public Information:

(a) Number of hometown news releases forwarded: 2,313

(b) Number of individual news/feature stories released to public and military media: 374

(c) Number of individual photographic releases prepared for release to public and military media: 159

(d) Number of correspondents provided support by the information office: 77

(e) Coverage was prepared for 16 distinguished visitors to the division, including: Senator Ted Stevens, R-Alaska; LTG William J. McCaffrey, DCG, USARM; LTG Charles Corcoran, CC, USAFRAC; Mr. James Hammond, Associate Director of Defense Systems, GAO; LTG Bong, CC, 1st ARVN Division; Miss U.S. Savings Bonds; and Stephanie Clark, Miss Black America.

(f) Special projects included command and public information support to the Miss Black America Show and a Department of the Army Special Photographic Team which visited the division to film a sequence using the 101st Airborne Division (Airbl) Band as part of the film "The Army's Music Man".

(2) Command Information:

(a) During the reporting period, six (6) issues of the division newspaper, "The Screaming Eagle", were published and distributed.

(b) The initial issue of the Orientation Edition of "The Screaming Eagle" newspaper, a new yearly division command information publication, was distributed on 3-4 March.

(c) An updated edition of the 101 History was distributed on 12 February.

(d) Copy was prepared for the Winter-Spring 1971 issue of the "Randevous With Destiny" magazine.
(e) Twelve taped reports were produced and release to APVN, SALCON, for use over APVN radio.

(f) Color slides were taken of Infantry ROTC officers in the division and were forwarded to the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga.

(g) Division input to "The Army Greenbook" was forwarded on 30 April 1971.

(h) The Information Office presented the Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) with the 1st place award in the USARY Special Journalistic Achievement Awards, and the 2nd place award in the Department of the Army "Keith L. Ware Award" for special journalistic achievement. Both of these awards were for the "1969 Pictorial Review" prepared by the Information Office.

(i) Two command information fact sheets were published and distributed to division personnel:

"Heat Injuries Are Preventable" -- March 1971

"The GI Bill" -- April 1971
2. (c) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluation and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. Intelligence.

(1) Air Cavalry as Intelligence Source.

(a) Observation: During operations in LAMC, the intelligence of most value was "where the enemy was not" rather than where they were. Flight routes, approach and departure lanes, flight altitudes, aircraft spacing, utilization of TAC Air and other supporting fires were determined primarily based on intelligence pertaining to antiaircraft locations rather than strictly on troop concentrations.

(b) Evaluation: Antiaircraft fire was likely to be encountered in almost any location after crossing the Laotian border. Consequently, the AMC had to plan supporting fire neutralization and suppression along the entire flight route, concentrating on the area where the lift aircraft were most vulnerable to the antiaircraft fire. The utilization of air cavalry to conduct reconnaissance of the FZ/LZ areas and approach/departure lanes to determine enemy troop concentrations proved extremely valuable in selecting the best avenues of approach. The timely information provided the most useful data in planning to avoid enemy concentrations during critical phases of flight.

(c) Recommendations: Employment of air cavalry for gathering current intelligence on specific areas in addition to screening of FZ/LZ sites is imperative during operations in a mid-intensity environment.

(2) Sensor Implant Techniques.

(a) Observation: Helicopter implant of sensors is a fast yet accurate method of sensor implantation.

(b) Evaluation: For maximum effective use of sensors, implant points must be accurately plotted. The use of two spotters, one in the implant helicopter and one in a trail helicopter have provided greater accuracy as to the actual sensor implant point.

(c) Recommendation: That two spotters be used whenever sensors are implanted by helicopter.

c. Operations.

(1) FADAC vs Manual Computations.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1972, RCS: CSFOR-65(B3)(U)

(a) Observation: When FADAC becomes non-operational, a great deal of difficulty has been experienced in checking FADAC data with manual equipment.

(b) Evaluation: In a "danger close" situation there is a requirement to check firing data for every round between the battery and battalion FDC, at the minimum and maximum range for a given charge. The FADAC will produce a more accurate solution than a manual solution can offer, especially when the ranges are not listed on the graphical equipment. When this situation occurs in a manual FDC, range K is determined and applied to yield the solution. The FADAC will still compute the ballistic trajectory and apply all factors in determining its solution. This is impossible with the same accuracy in a manual FDC.

(c) Recommendations: When a firing element's FADAC is not operational, both the battery and battalion FDC should employ the manual solution, using all available corrections. The slight loss in accuracy is offset by elimination of delays.

(2) Detailed Planning for Future Operations.

(a) Observations: All operations, from resupply missions to multi-unit assaults, required thorough, detailed planning to be successful in the mid-intensity environment of LAMSON 719.

(b) Evaluation: With the high density and accuracy of heavy anti-aircraft fire encountered in the Lantian Operation it became imperative that all flights over enemy territory be executed swiftly, precisely, and efficiently. Thorough consideration had to be given to all aspects including flight routes, approach/departure lanes, and LZ and PZ locations. All available assets were employed throughout each operation to provide adequate cover and suppression to the flight during the execute portion, the approach and departure portion, and the loading/off-loading portion of their mission. The high risk of loss made of orbiting an LZ until it could be properly prepared was unacceptable. S-turns and other methods of delaying PZ or LZ times were unacceptable due to the increased exposure time they entailed. The Air Mission Commander in all cases assessed the situation and made the final decision to go or not to go before the flight could enter the operational area. No hesitation in execution could be tolerated. Only through precise and timely execution could a mission be successfully accomplished. Detailed planning was the key to all success. All resources available were programmed and employed through each phase of all airmobile operations.

(c) Recommendation: Stress should be placed on the planning and utilization of all available assets on each and every operation in a mid-intensity environment. Tac Air, artillery, gunships and Air Force delivered screening smoke should be included and coordinated along all flight routes, PZ's and LZ's whenever possible. Thorough preparation must be demanded prior to initiating any operation in an environment such as that encountered during LAMSON 719.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CEPOR-65(R3)(U)

3) Planning for POL/Rearm Points.

(a) Observation: The number of "hit-and-run" incidents occurring at POL and Rearm areas increased considerably.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the increased tactical activity during the latter part of the reporting period, many new POL/Rearm sites had to be constructed. Although having the correct point to point distance for aircraft clearance, they lacked suitable hover areas for maneuverability. The approach and departure panels and lanes were also inadequate. The POL/Rearm points were unable to accommodate the large number of aircraft during peak periods.

(c) Recommendation: That POL/Rearm points be given priority planning before tactical operations begin to ensure adequate size and traffic control.

4) Combat Assaults Conducted in Marginal Weather.

(a) Observation: Combat assaults conducted in marginal weather as opposed to fair weather require a far greater degree of flexibility plus considerable additional planning.

(b) Evaluation: To insure successful mission accomplishment of operations conducted in marginal weather conditions, the following areas must be emphasized:

(1) A thorough map and ground reconnaissance by the ANC, flight leads and other planning personnel is essential.

(2) Personnel and supplies should be transported by surface means as close to the LZ as possible. Maximum utilization of the aircraft can be effected with weather improvement for a short span of time.

(3) A complete, detailed air movement table will reduce briefing time and provide maximum flexibility.

(4) Continuous weather checks will insure prompt reaction to weather changes.

(c) Recommendation: Since complete planning in each of the above areas enhances the chances of a successful mission, sufficient time should be allowed to insure that detailed planning be properly formulated.

CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air mobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, ROS: CSFOR-65(R3)(U)

(5) Recovery of Downed Crews.

(a) Observation: Recovery of downed crews and aircraft must be
accomplished in the most expeditious manner if they are to survive.

(b) Evaluation: It was found that the recovery of downed crews and
aircraft became proportionally more difficult the longer they were on
the ground. In several cases, what started as a "simple" extraction of a
downed crew soon evolved into a large scale operation involving Army and
Air Force assets. On large moves a separate HQ, capable of controlling
the tactical situation itself, was designated as the Air Mission Commander
of Recovery Assets. The rapidly developing and ever-changing nature of
operations in the mid-intensity environment required an individual who
possessed experience, knowledge, and the ability to control a large scale
operation to be in charge of the recovery forces.

(c) Recommendations: Recovery plans for downed crews and aircraft
must be formulated and disseminated prior to initiating airborne operat-
ions in a mid-intensity environment. All operations, whether single or
multi-ship, should have chase or recovery assets available under the
control of a qualified individual. These assets should include all the
equipment necessary to extract crews and aircraft from a hostile environ-
ment.

d. Organization. None

e. Training.

(1) Aircraft Damage Training for Pilots.

(a) Observation: In certain instances, aviators indicated that they
did not realize the seriousness of damage done to their aircraft by
enemy fire.

(b) Evaluation: On one occasion an aircraft was hit by enemy fire
and experienced a partial tail rotor failure over hostile territory. The
aircraft commander elected to turn back toward a secure area rather than
make a precautionary landing. It is felt that the loss of tail rotor
control set up a vibration pattern which eventually shook the tail boom
loose and caused the aircraft to invert and crash with a tragic loss of
lives. Had the pilot landed, even in a hostile area, rather than attempt-
ing to fly a severely disabled aircraft to a secure area, tragedy probably
would have been averted. After this incident it became SOP to put air-
craft on the ground as soon as possible after any major difficulties arose.
Grenade thrower's fears of setting down in hostile territory were alleviated by
insuring they were knowledgeable in survival, escape, and evasion as well
as the most expeditious methods of crew recovery.

CONFIDENTIAL
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(c) Recommendation: Training of aviators should at some point include:
an orientation of the handling characteristics and altered flight envelope
of an aircraft resulting from various types of combat damage. Fear of set-
ting down in hostile territory must be alleviated through proper training.

(2) Indirect Fire Adjustment.

(a) Observation: All infantrymen should be qualified to adjust mortar
and artillery fires.

(b) Evaluation: It has been found that allowing all members of an in-
fantry platoon to adjust defensive fires on a rotating basis teaches the men
skills of adjusting indirect fires.

(c) Recommendation: The procedure of allowing members of a rifle pla-
toon (with proper supervision) to adjust fires during slack periods should
be introduced and adopted as a standard training policy.

f. Logistics.

(1) Hydraulic Failures on the ARLG and UHIL Aircraft.

(a) Observation: During the reporting period there have been hydraulic
failures on ARLG and UHIL aircraft. A number were caused as a result of
chaffing lines. Others were caused as a result of a hydraulic servo and a
lateral servo failure.

(b) Evaluation: The hydraulic systems on both the ARLG and UHIL re-
quire frequent detailed inspections and chaffing lines separated or rerouted.
Servos that are found to be seeping excessively or leaking should be replaced.

(c) Recommendation:

1. That more detailed inspections of the hydraulic system be performed
daily to detect trouble spots and prevent chaffing lines.

2. That crew chiefs keep servos wiped clean and promptly report any ab-
normal seeping or leaks to maintenance for replacement.

(2) Aircraft Engine Failures.

(a) Observation: There have been a number of engine failures in the
division. One of these resulted in incident damage to an ARLG on a FMP test
flight with the weapons systems armed.

(b) Evaluation: The fourth stage compressor continues to be a factor in
engine failures and this should be alleviated with the engines being replaced
with T53L13B engines.
Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(o) Recommendations:

(1) That a continued emphasis be placed on FOD (Foreign Object Damage)
checks and adherence to policies concerning DER (Daily Engine Recording)
checks.

(2) That a form be placed in the log book keeping a daily record of the
DER checks so that pilots can compare current engine performance with past
performances.

(3) That functional test flights be completed prior to the arming of
AH1G Aircraft.

(3) Augmentation of Maintenance Facilities.

(a) Observation: Sustained aircraft operational readiness requires a
full scale 24 hours maintenance effort during extended periods of heavy com-
batt engagements.

(b) Evaluation: During periods of increased tactical activity such as
experienced during LAMSON 719, unscheduled maintenance demands for sheet metal,
prop and rotor, electronics and avionics repair significantly increased. To
preclude any aircraft from being grounded for extensive periods of time, work
must be initiated immediately. This must be forecast in advance and necessary
augmentation programmed for the allied shops.

(c) Recommendation: OJT and/or augmentation from back-up DSU elements be
programmed for units anticipating prolonged combat engagement.

(4) Quick Change Assemblies:

(a) Observation: A sharp increase in damage to major components was ob-
served with increased operations in a higher intensity environment.

(b) Evaluation: Serviceable components on retrograde aircraft were re-
moved and increased use of previously prepared quick change assemblies for
placement on aircraft with like damaged items was employed. This was, in part,
controlled cannibalization and considerably reduced the in-country demands on
the supply system. It further conserved on skilled labor consumption by re-
ducing component buildup time.

(c) Recommendation: That direct support units stock quick change assem-
bly units such as transmissions, masts, rotor head assemblies, tail booms, and
engines. This would permit a marked decrease in the turn around time for airc-
raft at the direct support level.

CONFIDENTIAL
g. Communications.

(1) Secure Communications in Aircraft.

(a) Observation: Secure radio capabilities are inadequate in the current aircraft inventory.

(b) Evaluation: In many cases during this reporting period, AMC's and flight leaders have had to pass valuable information over non-secure radio because of the rapidly changing, intensely hostile situation and because their gunship escorts did not have a secure capability. Information passed in this manner almost certainly was monitored by the enemy and enabled him to engage our flights by direct and indirect fire. In an environment such as encountered in LAKSON 719, secure voice communication is considered essential to operational success.

(c) Recommendations: The AN/ARC-45 communication system should be modified to include a secure capability. Every effort must be made to insure all secure radios are functional prior to launching on a mission. If possible, secure capabilities should be expanded to include UHF and VHF radios.

(2) Maintenance of Commo Equipment.

(a) Observation: During artillery raids, communications over extended distances were a continuous problem. Many locations required the use of AN/FRG-46 radios to provide the necessary range.

(b) Evaluation: The problem of range was alleviated to a certain extent by placing emphasis on properly adjusted radios prior to a move. Antennas were checked to insure that the proper elements were used, thus insuring an increase in range. Adjustments were made only by qualified radio mechanics. As a result even AN/FRG-25 and AN/FRG-77 radios yielded reliable long range communications.

(c) Recommendation: That all radios be checked, and the appropriate adjustments made prior to any move. That care be taken to check all antennas for completeness and that maximum use of AN/FRG-25 and AN/FRG-77 radios be made to reduce leads during moves.

(3) SOI implementation.

(a) Observation: With few exceptions, the implementation of a new SOI occurs at 2400 hours.

(b) Evaluation: Elements in the field must observe strict light and noise discipline during the hours of darkness. To implement an SOI change during the hours of darkness requires this discipline to be broken to some
extent. Difficulties were encountered which made it impossible to communicate until the following morning when the problem could be solved. Loss of communication during the hours of darkness causes justifiable concern.

(c) Recommendations: The SOI change should occur during daylight hours. This would facilitate the change by providing enough natural light to actually make the change. Also, if difficulties arise, solutions may more easily be implemented without regard to noise or light discipline. The preferable time would be at first light, prior to planned operations.

h. Material.

1) M202 Howitzer Recoil Mechanisms.

(a) Observation: Recoil mechanism failure in the M202 howitzer is one of the principal causes of equipment breakdown.

(b) Evaluation: Recoil leaks have developed due to overfull recoil reservoirs. The reservoir indicator will show that recoil oil is required when, in fact, a sufficient amount is already in the reservoir. During the heat of the afternoon, the indicator will reflect a more accurate reading.

(c) Recommendation: That the recoil oil reservoir indicator be checked during the afternoon when the recoil oil is at maximum expansion.

2) Reinforced 16 ton Airmobile Trailers.

(a) Observation: 16-ton airmobile trailers Model OT-32A are damaged with prolonged hauling of D-5A dozers on unpaved roads.

(b) Evaluation: The 16-ton airmobile trailer is insufficiently reinforced for heavy hauls over rough roads. The frame in front of the dual tires has bent and cracked following repetitive hauling of a D-5A dozer over rough roads.

(c) Recommendation: The 16-ton airmobile trailer should be reinforced by welding angle steel to the frame assembly in front of the dual tires.

3) Proper Mounting of Machinegun Mounts on 2½-ton Trucks.

(a) Observation: Back floors and rear frames were being damaged from vibrations of machinegun mounts.

(b) Evaluation: Anchoring an M-60 machinegun mount to the floor results in body and frame damage due to the excessive vibration on rough roads. The 326th Engineer Battalion began welding the base plate to a ½-inch steel plate cut to fit the back floor of the 2½-ton truck. The steel plate holds the machinegun rigid without being attached to the vehicle and thus prevents
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air-mobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RQR: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

damages to the vehicle.

(4) Recommended fender support brackets for 5-ton dump trucks.

(a) Observation: The 326th Engineer Battalion presently is assigned 21 5-ton dump trucks. These trucks are utilized transporting engineer material, chiefly rock and laterite fill. The front fenders, particularly the right front fenders, have been bending and breaking on all of these trucks. The fenders are sturdily constructed of 18-gauge sheet metal and are properly mounted.

(b) Evaluation: The dump truck fenders are failing despite proper installation and durable construction. The weight of the air cleaner on the right fender of the truck contributes in part to the failure, but the main cause of fender failure appears to be excessive vibration on haul roads. This unit has fabricated brackets from flat steel stock, \( \frac{3}{8} \)" thick by 1" wide. The brackets are welded or bolted from the front and rear of the fender to the cab. This modification of the fenders on new trucks has prevented the failure.

(c) Recommendations: 5-ton dump trucks should be equipped with fender supporting brackets either at general or direct support unit level.

(5) Field Expedient Covers for Hydraulic Couplings.

(a) Observation: Blowing dust and dirt presents a maintenance hazard to break-down engine equipment during air-mobile operations.

(b) Evaluation: Exposed hydraulic couplings are extremely susceptible to intrusion by blown dirt and dust caused by rotor wash during airlifts.

(c) Recommendations: Each hydraulic coupling should be covered with a plastic bag (M-16 magazine plastic bags are an ideal covering) and sealed with tape immediately upon disconnection prior to airlift.

i. Other. None.
Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, ROC: CSFOR 65 (R3) (U).

1. (G) On 1 November 1970, the 101st Abn Div (Amlb) continued Operation JEFFERSON GREEN/MONSOON PLAN 70. In coordination with 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and GWN officials of THUA THIEN Province, the division conducted operations designed to locate and destroy enemy forces, staging areas and forward cache sites, to protect vital lines of communication and to assist GWN officials in meeting their pacification goals for 1970. Persisting low clouds, high winds and an extreme amount of rainfall prevailed during the last seven days of October resulting in widespread flood conditions in the populated lowlands of the division area of operations. The division reacted to this natural disaster by establishing a disaster relief control center to assist GWN officials in evacuating and providing relief for victims. During the height of the flood disaster on 31 October and 1 November, 9,462 people from the ten districts of THUA THIEN Province and 4,000 people from a city were displaced from their homes. On 2 November, the flood waters began to subside and 3,300 people returned to their homes. Division UH-1H aircraft flew 255 sorties delivering 7,000 loaves of bread and 3,500 meals. Total cargo transported in support of the disaster was 18.5 tons. All flood victims returned to their homes by 5 November and were assisted by GWN officials in re-establishing their homes. The 326th Engr Bn (Amlb) commenced assistance in rehabilitation of roads, bridges and culverts throughout the lowland area. Division aircraft assets also were provided to XV Corps civil affairs units to evacuate flood victims and distribute foodstuffs in the DA NANG area.

2. (G) 1 November - 30 November 1970.

a. Operations summary. On 1 November the 1st Bde, with its CP at CAMP EAGLE, maintained liaison with the 3d Bn (ARVN). The 1st Bn (Amlb), 327th Inf continued to conduct search and attack operations in the Firebase WEGHEL area with the battalion CP located at CP CHECKMate. The 1st Bn (Amlb), 501st Inf moved by vehicle from Firebase BASTogne to Firebase HIRLINGHAM; while the 2d Bn (Amlb), 502d Inf completed refresher training and moved from CAMP EAGLE to Firebase BASTogne. Both battalions commenced search and attack operations in their respective areas of operation. The 3d Bn (Amlb), 506th Inf moved by air, vehicle and overland from the Firebase HIRLINGHAM area to the Firebase ARSENAL area and returned to the operational control of the 2d Bde. The 2d Bde CP remained at PHU BAI Combat Base and maintained liaison with the 54th Bn (ARVN), GWN officials of THUA THIEN Province and the six districts southeast of the Perfume River. The 2d Bn (Amlb), 327th Inf secured Firebase TOMAHAWK and LOS BANOS and conducted patrol and ambush operations in the area. The 3d Bn (Amlb), 502d Inf remained at Firebase ERICK and conducted search and attack, and patrol and ambush operations, in the vicinity of the firebase. The 1st Bn (Amlb), 502d Inf moved by air from the Firebase ARSENAL area to PHU BAI Combat Base to conduct battalion refresher training and assume the mission of division ready force. The 3d Bde CP continued to direct operations from CAMP EVANS and maintain liaison with GWN officials in the four districts north of the Perfume River. The 3d Bn (Amlb),...
187th Inf. secured FIRE BASE RAKKASAN and conducted three company size search and attack operations south of the fire base. The 2d BN (Ambt), 506th Inf., with its CP at CAMP EVANS, conducted search and attack operations northwest of MEXICO.

On 4 November, Co C, 1st BN (Ambt), 501st Inf. moved by air from the vicinity of BIRMINGHAM to FIRE BASE VIEGHEL and passed to the operational control of the 1st BN (Ambt), 327th Inf. The company moved overland from VIEGHEL to YD 5504 to conduct surveillance and ambush operations along Route 547 and the KBE A TO River.

On 5 November, Trp C, 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav inserted the HAC BAO Company, three kilometers south of BLITZ to conduct reconnaissance in force operations. The 2d Plt, Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav was inserted on FIRE Base BLITZ as a radio relay team for the HAC BAO Company. The company had no contact with the enemy and both elements were extracted the following day.

The 1st BN (Ambt), 502d Inf. completed refresher training on 7 November, moved by air and vehicle to FIRE Base JACK and passed to the operational control of the 3d Ede. Co A secured the fire base while the remaining companies commenced search and attack operations in the area. The 3d BN (Ambt), 187th Inf. moved by vehicle and by air from the JACK area to CAMP EVANS, assumed the mission of division ready force and commenced refresher training.

On 13 November, the 2d BN (Ambt), 506th Inf. was extracted from the MEXICO area and redeployed by air to the FIRE Base RAKKASAN area. The 3d BN (Ambt), 187th Inf. completed refresher training and prepared for deployment to the MEXICO area. Co B air assaulted from CAMP EVANS to YD 4018 (six kilometers south of MEXICO) and commenced ambush and surveillance operations in the vicinity of the landing zone. The 1st BN (Ambt), 506th Inf. moved by air from FIRE Base RAKKASAN to CAMP EVANS, assumed the mission of division ready force and prepared for refresher training.

Co C, 1st BN (Ambt), 327th Inf. closed FIRE Base VIEGHEL on 14 November, moved by air to FIRE Base EASTCOVE and then moved 1,000 meters northwest of the fire base to conduct ambush and surveillance operations. Elements from Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav, reinforced by a five man demolition team from the 326th Engr BN (Ambt), were inserted into the A SHAU Valley to conduct road interdiction operations. The elements interdicted Route 548 from A LOUI Airstrip, southwest to YC 474890, destroying one large bridge and causing extensive damage to four smaller bridges. There was no contact during the mission and the team was extracted and returned to CAMP EAGLE.

On 15 November, elements of Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav were inserted to interdict Route 922, vicinity YD 232072, and to recover a 37mm antiaircraft gun. The elements destroyed one log bridge covered with pierced steel plank, three 6'x10' bunkers, 20 to 30 37mm rounds, cratered Route 922, and recovered and evacuated the 37mm barrel and breach assembly to CAMP EAGLE. The element leader indicated that the area showed signs of recent enemy activity.

On 16 November, Ranger Team HILLS made contact with four enemy in the
CONFIDENTIAL


KATHRYN-CANNON area (YD 464085). The ranger team reported that there was evidence of more enemy elements in the area. Trp C, 2d Sqdn (Amb1), 17th Cav inserted their Mortar Rifle Platoon (ARP) to reinforce the ranger team. Later in the day, Trp D also was inserted into the area. The following day, attempts to resupply or extract the elements had to be aborted due to extremely poor weather conditions and heavy enemy fire in the area.

On 18 November, heavy rains and a low cloud ceiling again prohibited the use of division aircraft. Trp C ARP, Trp D and Ranger Team HILLS moved overland towards a pickup zone, four kilometers southeast of the contact site.

On 19 November, the 1st Bn (Amb1), 506th Inf completed refresher training and deployed to the Fire Base JACK area. Company C secured the fire base while the remainder of the battalion commenced search and attack operations in the area. The 1st Bn (Amb1), 502d Inf moved by air from the JACK area to RAKKASAN, secured the fire base and commenced search and attack operations in the area, while the 2d Bn (Amb1), 506th Inf moved by air from RAKKASAN to CAMP EVANS, prepared for refresher training and assumed the mission of division ready force. An CH6A from Trp C, 2d Sqdn (Amb1), 17th Cav, while on armed aerial reconnaissance, received a heavy volume of unknown type ground fire six kilometers south of KATHRYN. The aircraft crashed and was completely destroyed, resulting in two US missing in action. Trp D and Trp C ARP were resupplied and shuttled by UH-1H from their field location (YD 4805) to within 1,800 meters of the downed aircraft (YD 470046).

On 20 November, Trp D and Trp C ARP, 2d Sqdn (Amb1), 17th Cav moved overland to the site of the downed CH6A. The elements recovered the two US bodies from the wreckage and were extracted from the area at 1125 hours. In support of this operation, Co A, 1st Bn (Amb1), 327th Inf moved overland to VEGHEL and secured the fire base. Btry D, 2d Bn (Amb1), 320th Arty was airlifted to Fire Base VEGHEL to conduct an artillery raid, commencing at 1113 hours. The battery fired seven observed missions, expending 307 105mm rounds, and was returned to CAMP EAGLE at 1810 hours. Additionally, the 155mm howitzer battery at Fire Base BASTONCE fired two observed missions, expending 199 rounds, while eight inch howitzers 175mm guns fired a total of 80 rounds on 13 unobserved targets. There were eleven Skyplot sorties and four Beacon sorties flown against active 12.7mm machine gun positions and suspected enemy locations. Thirteen of these sorties were targeted in the KATHRYN-CANNON area around the downed CH6A. Also, one USAF C-130 aircraft dropped a BLU 82 device clearing a two ship landing zone for the 1st Bde, seven kilometers east of KATHRYN.

On 25 November, the 2d Bn (Amb1), 506th Inf completed battalion refresher training and moved by air from CAMP EVANS to Fire Base RAKKASAN, secured the fire base and commenced search and attack operations in the area. The 1st Bn (Amb1), 502d Inf moved by air from the Fire Base RAKKASAN area to Fire Base ARSENAL, passed to operational control of the 2d Bde from the 3d Bde, secured the fire base and commenced company and platoon search and attack operations. The 3d Bn (Amb1), 506th Inf moved by air and vehicle from Fire Base ARSENAL to HHU BAI Combat Base where

CONFIDENTIAL
they assumed the mission of division ready force and prepared to conduct refresher training.

On 26 November, the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav extracted three ranger teams of Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf from separate pickup zones southwest of RIPCORD. The teams had conducted reconnaissance missions for a five-day period. Ranger Team BOILERMAKERS reported the area in the vicinity of the KHE QUAN River (YD 3816) as a possible infiltration route and had observed moderate enemy activity. The remaining teams reported no major activity. The Cavalry also inserted ranger teams GATORS and GAMECOCKS to conduct reconnaissance of suspected infiltration routes in the RONG RONG Valley area. On 27 November, two Skyspot missions were targeted against bunker complexes in the RIPCORD area, based on information obtained from Ranger Team BOILERMAKERS.

During the period 25 to 27 November, all units operating in the field were shuttled by air and vehicle or moved overland to a fire base or combat base for a full-course turkey dinner to celebrate Thanksgiving and then returned to their respective field locations.

Ranger Teams GATORS and GAMECOCKS were extracted from the RONG RONG Valley area on 30 November and returned to CAMP EAGLE. Both teams reported there were no signs of recent enemy activity in the area.

Airmobile operations were restricted by prevailing northeast monsoon conditions throughout the month of November. The division took full advantage of short periods of acceptable flying weather to resupply units operating in the canopy regions and to conduct aerial reconnaissance in the western area of operation. Enemy contact was light throughout the period with 30% of US casualties (four KIA and 30 WIA) being caused by enemy booby traps. Ground troops discovered and destroyed 26 enemy booby traps during November, while division CH-47 aircraft flew 58 flame sorties, dropping 34,595 gallons of thickened fuel against 17 suspected booby trapped areas.

3. (C) 1 December - 31 December 1970.

During December the 1st Brigade continued operations in close cooperation with the 3d ARVN Regiment. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf CP was located at Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf CP was at Fire Base BASTOGNE and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf CP was at CP CHECKMAZE. On 13 December the 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf passed OP COP to the 1st Brigade and assumed responsibility for Fire Base BIRMINGHAM.

The brigade conducted extensive search and attack operations with emphasis along the SONG BO River and artillery raids into the RIO LAO Valley.

The 2d Brigade conducted search and attack patrols and surveillance and security operations in cooperation with the 54th Inf Regt (ARVN). The brigade was responsible for the security of EAGLE BEACH, the Pohl Bridge FABE pumping station and the navigational beacon site (YD 959143).

The 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf conducted search and attack operations in the canopy areas of PHU LOC District south of QL-1 and provided security for Fire Bases LOS BANGS and TOMAHAWK. On 7 December the 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf was relieved of responsibility for the TOMAHAWK/LOC
CONFIDENTIAL


BANCO area and conducted battalion refresher training. On 14 December the battalion passed OPCON to the 1st Brigade and redeployed to Fire Base BIRMINGHAM. From 1-7 December the 2d Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf conducted battalion refresher training. On the morning of the 7th the battalion deployed to the Fire Base TOMAHAWK/LOD BANCO area and assumed responsibility for the fire bases and the surrounding area.

On 1 December the 3d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf moved by air to Fire Base BRICK area and relieved the 2d Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf. The battalion conducted search and attack operations in the vicinity of BRICK. On 30 December the 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf passed OPCON to the 2d Bde at PHU RAI Combat Base and conducted battalion refresher training.

The 3d Bde continued to employ along the fringe of the canopy and maintained liaison with HUONG DIEN, PHONG DIEN, QUANG DIEN, and HUONG TRAI District officials. The 3d Bn (Ambt), 187th Inf conducted patrol, surveillance and ambush operations in the Fire Base MEXICO/GLADIATOR area. The battalion CP was located at Fire Base RAKKASAN, moving to CAMP EVANS toward the end of the month.

The 1st Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf conducted operations in the Fire Base JACK area and provided liaison and assistance to PHONG DIEN District. The 2d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf conducted operations in the vicinity of Fire Base RAKKASAN. The 1-77th Armor, OPCON to the brigade, conducted operations west of CAMP EVANS in the vicinity of Fire Base SWORD until 12 December when they passed OPCON to the 3d Bde. The 1-77th Armor Trains moved by vehicle from QUANG TRI to CAMP EVANS. The element passed OPCON to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) on 15 December and moved to QUANG TRI.

At 011230 December in the vicinity of YD 390244 (one and one-half kilometers northwest of Fire Base MEXICO) Company A, 3d Bn (Ambt), 187th Inf was engaged by an estimated six enemy. The enemy fired three RPG rounds and small arms. The US element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy broke contact, withdrawing to the southeast. A search of the area revealed one US claymore mine and one RPG booster. The action resulted in one US wounded in action. At 1530 hours, A Company, 3d Bn (Ambt), 187th Inf discovered in the vicinity of YD 393243 (one kilometer northwest of Fire Base MEXICO) two bunkers 3'x5'x4' with 12' of overhead cover. An additional bunker 12'x4'x4' with the same type overhead cover was discovered containing one 8th canister, one RPG booster, one NVA canteen, and miscellaneous LRE. The unit indicated that enemy activity was present within the last 72 hours. Three quarters of an hour later, as A Company, 3d Bn (Ambt), 187th Inf continued its search of the area where the bunkers were discovered, two enemy soldiers in a 3'x4' bunker to the west of their position fired two RPG rounds and small arms at a range of 10 meters. One US soldier was wounded. The US element employed ARA and held their location for the night.

On 2 December, four kilometers northwest of CAMP EAGLE C Company, 1st Bn (Ambt), 502d Inf discovered two booby traps at 1520 hours. One consisted of a 105mm round, and the other was a 60mm mortar round. Both booby traps had had a pressure type firing device. The US element reported evidence of enemy activity in the last 12 hours. The US unit destroyed both devices. At 1625 hours in the vicinity of coordinates
YD 390244 (one kilometer northeast of Fire Base MEXICO) A Company, 3d Bn (Ambt), 187th Inf discovered a bunker 4'x4'x4' with 1'1' of overhead cover. The bunker contained four RPG rounds, two US claymores, six rucksacks, six hammocks, and one Chicom grenade, six blasting caps, one US entrenching tool, and miscellaneous medical supplies and documents. All of the items were evacuated. At 1415 hours A Company, 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf, operating in the vicinity of YD 630932 (six kilometers south of Fire Base BASTOGNE), discovered one 60mm mortar tube and bipod, thirty-seven 60mm mortar rounds, and two M-72 laws. There were indications of recent enemy activity. The weapons were evacuated and the munitions were destroyed. Five kilometers north of Fire Base BASTOGNE, HHC, 1st Bn, 3d Inf (ARVN) engaged five enemy soldiers to their northeast with small arms fire and artillery. The element reported four enemy KIA and two weapons captured; one ARVN soldier was wounded.

On 4 December at 1512 hours the 1st Plt, D Company, 3d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf was three kilometers to the northeast of Fire Base BRICK when it received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy soldiers. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed ARA. A sweep of the area produced three rucksacks, one enemy hillfold, one hammock, eight to ten lbs of rice, one set of green fatigues, three B-40 rounds and a bag of AK-47 ammunition.

On 6 December two bunkers 7'x7'x7' were found by D Company, 3d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf in the vicinity of YD 859017 (two and one-half kilometers northeast of Fire Base BRICK) at 1115 hours. The bunkers contained three RPG rounds, two RPG launchers, eight RPG fuses, fifty 1 lb blocks of explosive, 50 lbs of rice and 25 lbs of salt.

On 7 December at 1500 hours in the vicinity of YD 563122 an element of B Company, 2d Bn (Ambt), 502d Inf discovered three unfinished bunkers. The SKS rifle and some miscellaneous cooking equipment were found. The weapon was evacuated.

On 8 December at 1745 hours in the vicinity of YD 863017 (three kilometers northeast of Fire Base BRICK) the 1st Plt, C Company, 3d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf discovered an enemy rice cache totaling 370 lbs. The rice was found in two 8'x10'x8' bunkers. The US element destroyed the bunkers and evacuated the rice. In the vicinity of YD 447240 (one kilometer west of Fire Base STELLA) at 1000 hours B Company, 3d Bn (Ambt), 187th Inf found five 5'x8'x4' fighting positions containing seven submachine guns, one RPG launcher, thirteen RPG rounds, two Chicom grenades, thirty-seven 1 lb satchel charges, two AK-47 magazines, four pair of NVA binoculars, one NVA compass, one NVA protective mask, and one NVA poncho. The cache was evacuated.

On 11 December at 0945 hours in the vicinity of YD 784066 (three kilometers southeast of Fire Base ARSENAL) the 3d Plt, B Company, 1st Bn (Ambt), 502d Inf discovered eight RPG rounds, eight 60mm mortar rounds, one M-61 grenade, two loaded AK-47 magazines, twelve non-electrical blasting caps, one map, 51 lbs of rice, and miscellaneous cooking utensils and C-rations. There were signs of recent enemy activity. The mortar and RPG rounds were destroyed and the remainder of the equipment was evacuated.
On 12 December in the vicinity of YD 644144 (five kilometers northeast of Fire Base Bac:COBN) the 3/1-3 Inf (ARVN) engaged enemy bunkers with organic weapons. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew to the southeast. Artillery and a Pink Team were employed. A search of the area revealed six 4'x2'x4' bunkers and fifteen huts. The ARVN reported ten NVA KIA, three AK-47s, one RPG launcher, fifty RPG rounds, one M-72 LAW, thirty stick grenades, ten 1/2 lb blocks of TNT, thirty sets of knaps, and miscellaneous documents.

On 131200 December in the vicinity of YD 786065 (three kilometers southwest of Fire Base ARSNAAL) B Company, 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf discovered one AK-47, one Chicom 9mm pistol, two AK-47 magazines, eight blocks of an unknown type explosive, two 60mm mortar rounds, three RPG boosters, one NVA rucksack, one flashlight, and one NVA poncho. The cache was evacuated.

On 161310 December in the vicinity of YD 879007 (five kilometers east of Fire Base BRICK) the 1st Plt, D Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf employed organic weapons fire engaging one enemy soldier to the north of their position. The enemy soldier was killed and his AK-47 was captured and evacuated. In three separate actions, the 2d Sqdn, 17th Cav engaged enemy soldiers in their area of operations with good results. The Cavalry reported a total of nine NVA KIA in the actions with no US casualties.

On 18 December a mechanical ambush, placed by Recon Plt, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf, killed five NVA soldiers in the vicinity of YD 545111 (three kilometers southeast of Fire Base ZULU). A search of the area revealed two AK-47s, three rucksacks, and miscellaneous documents. D Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf, while operating in the vicinity of YD 554109 (five kilometers southeast of Fire Base ZULU) discovered sixty-six 82mm mortar primers, eight 82mm rounds, nine hundred powder charges and six hundred and fifty AK-47 rounds. There was no evidence of recent enemy activity. 2d Bn conducted an artillery raid into the Rung Rung Valley from Fire Base PISTOL. A total of one hundred and twenty-five 8" rounds, one hundred 175mm rounds, two hundred and ninety-six 155mm rounds, one thousand three hundred and fifty-eight 105mm rounds were expended in this operation.

On 19 December (three kilometers east of Fire Base BRICK) D Company, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf received blast and fragments from three command detonated claymore mines at 1430 hours. The blasts were followed by small arms fire and automatic weapons fire from four enemy 30 meters to the north of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. The enemy fusillade produced four US wounded. At 1815 hours the Fire Base LCS BAIVOS area received thirty-five 82mm mortar rounds. Fifteen rounds impacted inside the fire base. Artillery, ARA, and a Pink Team were employed on suspected enemy locations. Two US casualties were reported. The 1st Bn conducted an artillery raid from Fire Base MAUREEN expending 320 HE rounds into the RAO Lao River Valley.

On 211400 December one US soldier was wounded in the vicinity of YD 875995 (one kilometer northeast on Fire Base RIPLE) when four enemy
CONFIDENTIAL


soldiers were engaged by D Company, 3d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf. The US element employed organic weapons fire and artillery. A search of the area revealed bandages and a pair of enemy sandals.

On 240300 December, Thua Thien Province, Regional Forces conducted Operation SATURDAY (Le Loi) No 2, processing 2,576 persons. There were 13 detainees for fratricidal civil status and one VCS detainee. At 1445 hours, a Hoi Chant, who had rallied at 0700 hours, led a FF Eagle Flight to four bunkers located 3 kilometers southwest of Fire Base OMAHA. The platoon discovered four NVA ponchos, two AK-47 magazines, three small bags of rice, and detainees four VCS. In pre-truce deterrent operations, there were 112 55-gallon drums of persistent CS dropped to neutralize a bunker complex southwest of the RAN LAO Valley area. There were also 16 FAC sorties flown in the division area of operations.

On 251500 December, 4 kilometers southeast of ZULU, elements of A Company, 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf discovered a grave containing one enemy soldier killed by artillery approximately 7 days earlier. Surrounding the grave were six bunkers and three huts. The huts contained miscellaneous cooking equipment, two RPG rounds, one AK-47 magazine, and miscellaneous documents.

On 260923 December, 4 kilometers northeast of Fire Base BRICK, elements of D Company, 3d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf were engaged by small arms fire and one hand grenade 15 meters from their position, wounding three US soldiers. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed artillery on the enemy as they fled. A search of the area revealed no enemy assessment. At 1457 hours, elements of D Company, 3d Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf engaged an unknown size enemy force with small arms fire and artillery in the same area. A search of the area revealed one NVA KIA and one AK-47 captured. At 1530 hours, elements of A Company, 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf discover one NVA body wrapped in a poncho 5 kilometers west southwest of BITONG. Time and cause of death were undetermined.

4. (C) Operation JEFFERSON CIDE/COMY CILW 70 continued into '71 continuing the support of GVN programs and protection of the populated lowlands of THUA THIEN Province. The weather began to improve as the flow from the northeast monsoon began to lose force. January was marked periodically with periods of improved weather that continued into February, March and April. The 101st Abn Div (Ambt) capitalized on the good weather to conduct operations in the concumde jungle areas of PH-1. Toward the end of January the division initiated operation Dewey Canyon II conducting artillery raids into the A SHAU Valley. This operation was Phase I of the XXIV Corps/I Corps operation LAHSON 719. The combined Corps operation supported an ARVN drive thru western QUANG TRI Province and into LACG striking the NVA base area 604 along the western HC CHI MINH Trail. Combined US forces secured Route 9 to the LAI THAN Border and constructed a forward support base and air strip at SIE SANG. The ARVN continued into LACG, with massive US air assistance, to accomplish their mission. With success during LAHSON 719 complete, the 101st Abn Div (Ambt) joined with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) to conduct operation LAHSON 720 in April. The operation is designed to strike into the DK KONG and
and A SHAH Valley areas to destroy enemy supplies in forward logistical areas. This operation is a continuation of JEFFERSON CREEK/ONIONSON PLAN 70 and is continuing into May.

5. (G) 1 January - 31 January 1971.

During January the 1st Brigade CP remained at CAMP EAGLE and continued to coordinate operations with the 3d Regt (ARVN) and GVN officials in HAM HOA District. On 16 January the brigade conducted an artillery raid from Fire Base BASTOGNE to Fire Base NORMANDY. Elements of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf secured the fire base while 155mm howitzers from the 2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty fired 536 HE rounds on pre-designated targets in the Fire Base SPEAR area. The artillery raid ended the same day. On 23 January the brigade deployed artillery to Fire Base WEGHEL and ZON on the 29th. These actions were in support of Operation Dewey Canyon II. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf CP moved from CAMP EAGLE on 1 January to CINCINNATI. The battalion conducted search and attack operations throughout January in the surrounding AO. During the early days of January the 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf conducted search and attack operations in the surrounding AO. On 5 January the battalion deployed elements in the Fire Base NORMANDY area in preparation for the artillery raid later in the month. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf conducted operations in the Fire Base BASTOGNE area until 27 January. On 28 January the battalion deployed to Fire Base WEGHEL and ZON. The area around ZON was secured and prepared for the receipt of artillery to conduct the brigade artillery raid in support of Dewey Canyon II.

The 2d Bde CP continued to direct operations from PHU BAI Combat Base and maintained liaison with 54th Inf Regt (ARVN) and GVN officials. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf conducted refresher training and provided troops for the Division Ready Force until 5 January. On 6 January the battalion passed OPCON to the 3d Bde. It remained in the 3d Bde area of operation around Fire Base RAKKASAN until 26 January. On 27 January the battalion returned to OPCON of the 2d Bde and moved to the Fire Base ARSENAL area. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf CP remained at Fire Base TOMAHAWK with one platoon on Fire Base LOC BANG until 9 January when the CP and elements deployed to Fire Base BRICK. On 15 January the battalion CP moved off the fire base to a field location to the west leaving one company to secure BRICK. The remainder of January was spent in similar operations in the BRICK AO. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf maintained its CP on Fire Base ARSENAL until 27 January when it moved to PHU BAI Combat Base. The battalion conducted refresher training and assumed the mission of Division Ready Force. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf CP remained at Fire Base JACK until 12 January when they moved to CAMP EVANS and assumed the mission of Division Ready Force and conducted refresher training. On 20 January elements moved by air southwest of SWORD with the CP moving to GLADIATOR. On 24 January the CP returned to CAMP EVANS. Elements continued to move north operating west of the GLADIATOR/MEXICO area. On 29 January the CP moved to Fire Base RAKKASAN with companies operating to the west.

The 3d Bde continued its operations at CAMP EVANS with the 3d Bn

CONFIDENTIAL

(Asbl), 187th Inf operating in the GLADIUS/MEXICO area working west toward the Fire Base OREILLY area. On 20 January the battalion moved by air to CAMP EVANS to assume the mission of Division Ready Force and conducted refresher training. On 30 January the battalion went OPCON to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) in support of LAKSHMI 779. The 1st Bn (Asbl), 506th Inf continued operations in the Fire Base JACK/CAMP EVANS area until 12 January. The battalion moved to CAMP EVANS on the 12th and assumed the mission of Division Ready Force and conducted refresher training. On 20 January the CF moved to a field location southeast of Fire Base SWORD with elements working farther south into the MEXICO/GLADIUS area. The battalion continued south conducting search and attack operations. On 25 January the CF moved to CAMP EVANS. On 29 January the CF moved to Fire Base RAKKASAN. The maneuver companies were now operating in the RAKKASAN area of operation. The 2d Bn (Asbl), 506th Inf CF remained at Fire Base RAKKASAN until 6 January when it moved to CAMP EVANS and assumed the mission of Division Ready Force and conducted refresher training. On 12 January the battalion CF moved to Fire Base JACK and conducted operations until 19 January. The next day the battalion moved to a location southwest of Fire Base SWORD while one company continued to secure JACK. The CF returned to JACK on 23 January. On 25 January one company conducted joint operations with the 1st Inf Bde (ARVN). The battalion continued to operate in the JACK area throughout January.

On 031330 January, vicinity YD 615033 (five kilometers southwest of Fire Base BASTOGNE) C Company, 1st Bn (Asbl), 327th Inf discovered 30 6'x4'x5' bunkers with 1' of overhead cover and a 1'x2' tunnel running between two of the bunkers. There were no indications of recent enemy activity. The bunkers were destroyed.

On 041315 January, vicinity YD 613039 (six kilometers northeast of Fire Base BASTOGNE) C Company, 1st Bn (Asbl), 327th Inf discovered 65 10'x10'x5' bunkers with 1' of overhead cover. There were no indications of recent enemy activity. The bunkers were destroyed. At 1330 hours, vicinity YD 871011 (four kilometers northeast of Fire Base BRICK) B Company, 3d Bn (Asbl), 506th Inf employed organic weapons fire, engaging one enemy 10 meters to the east of their position. The enemy returned small arms fire. A search of the area revealed one NVA KIA, one AK-47, 1/2 lb of rice, one 8'x15'x5' hut and five 2'x3'x2' fighting positions containing four RPG rounds. The hut and fighting positions were destroyed.

On 051625 January, vicinity YD 862010 (two kilometers northeast of Fire Base BRICK) A Company, 3d Bn (Asbl), 506th Inf employed organic weapons fire, engaging five enemy 15 meters to the west of their position. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew in an unknown direction. Artillery was employed on a suspected enemy position and a search of the area was conducted with one NVA KIA, one AK-47, and one rucksack found. At 1855 hours, vicinity YD 167980 (seven kilometers east of Fire Base TAMAHOKE) D Company, 3d Bn (Asbl), 501st Inf observed their mechanical ambush detonate 80 meters to the south of their position. A search under artillery illumination revealed one NVA KIA, one AK-47, and two rucksacks. The NVA KIAs were wearing green uniforms and rucksacks. Enemy
were moving north to south.

On 07 January, vicinity YO 514239 (two kilometers north of Fire Base Rodeo) Recon Team C, 1st Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf employed organic weapons fire engaging an estimated two enemy 100 meters to the northwest of their position. The enemy did not return but withdrew in an unknown direction. A search of the area revealed one NVA KIA and one blood trail.

On 08 January, vicinity YO 366276 (five kilometers east of Fire Base O'Neilley) C Company, 3rd Bn (Ambt), 187th Inf received small arms fire from five enemy 30 meters to the north of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew to the northwest. A search of the area was conducted revealing one NVA KIA, one AK-47, one AK-47 magazine, one cigarette lighter, one pouch of tobacco and a cut up newspaper.

On 11 January at 0935 hours, vicinity YO 357234 (four kilometers west of Fire Base LKUDD) Company B, 3rd Bn (Ambt), 187th Inf engaged organic weapons fire on one enemy 25 meters to the east of their position. The enemy did not return fire. A search of the area was conducted revealing one NVA KIA, one AK-47 and a trail two feet wide oriented northeast - southwest.

On 13 January at 1128 hours, vicinity YO 916230, Company A, 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cavalry had an OH-6A receive 12.7mm machine gun and small arms fire. The aircraft was hit four times and two US were wounded. The area was engaged by gunships resulting in one NVA KIA. There were two US WIA and one NVA KIA.

On 15 January A Troop, 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cavalry, while on armed aerial reconnaissance, again engaged the enemy at 1700 hours in the vicinity of YO 927236. The assault killed three NVA soldiers and destroyed a 12.7mm crew served weapon. A L01 from A Troop, 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cavalry spotted an active 12.7mm machine gun position at 1840 hours in the vicinity of YO 922234. An airstrike was immediately employed on the target, destroying the position.

On 16 January the 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cavalry experienced a heavy day along the AO reconnaissance zone. The day produced 12 contacts for a total of 22 NVA KIA.

On 17 January at 1540 hours in the vicinity of YO 355236 (four kilometers northwest of Fire Base Whiskey) C Company, 3rd Bn (Ambt), 187th Inf received small arms fire from three to five enemy in bunkers 50 meters to the west of their position. The unit returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. While conducting a search of the area the element engaged nineteen enemy to the west of their position. The unit employed a Pink Team, KIA, and artillery. A search of the area revealed nine NVA KIA, and numerous blood trails. At 1306 hours in the vicinity of YO 436996, an OH-6A from B Troop 3d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cavalry while on armed aerial reconnaissance received 20 rounds of small arms fire. Gunships were employed resulting in one NVA KIA. At 1605 hours a Pink Team from A Troop 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cavalry, while conducting bomb damage assessment of an airstrike, observed and engaged and killed one NVA.

On 20 January a Pink Team from B Troop 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cavalry, while on armed reconnaissance, at 1330 hours in the vicinity of YO 926777
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observed and engaged one NVA. An aerial search of the area revealed one NVA KIA. One half-hour later in the vicinity of VC 787766 a Pink Team from B Troop 2d Sqn (Ambl), 17th Cavalry observed, engaged and killed two NVA. Again at 1625 hours a B Troop Pink Team, while on armed aerial reconnaissance, observed, engaged and killed one NVA.

On 22 January D Company, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf working in the vicinity of VC 566910 (four kilometers south of Fire Base RIFLE) observed their mechanical ambush detain 600 meters to the north of their position at 0700 hours. While searching the ambush area the element received small arms fire from 4-6 enemy 200 meters to the west of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew to the west. A Pink Team was employed and successfully engaged three enemy soldiers, killing three, capturing three AK-47s, two rucksacks and containing miscellaneous documents. An OH6A from C Troop, 2d Sqn (Ambl), 17th Cavalry received small arms fire in the vicinity of VC 413963 at 1630 hours. The area was engaged by Cav resulting in three NVA KIA.

On 23 January, 1515 hours, the 3d Plt. Company A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf observed and engaged three enemy soldiers resulting in two NVA KIA and one AK-47 captured. At 1700 hours, YD 507215, the 2d Plt., Co A, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf discovered a weapons cache containing 93 SKS rifles, 12 AK-47s, 2 M-2 carbines, 1 M-1 carbine, 3 unknown type submachine guns, and 4 unknown type rifles. At 1347 hours, YD 518205, Co C, 2d Sqn (Ambl), 17th Cav received small arms fire from two enemy 100 to 500 meters from their position. The element returned organic weapons fire resulting in two enemy KIA and one AK-47. At 1315 hours, YD 422936, Co C, 2d Sqn (Ambl), 17th Cav OH6A, while conducting visual reconnaissance, received small arms fire. The area was engaged by gunships and ARVN resulting in three NVA KIA and five NVA KIA.

6. (C) Chronology of 101st Abn Div (Ambl) units in QUANG TRI Province from LAM SON 719.

a. 30 Jan - 31 Jan. On 30 Jan 71 the 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf passed OPCON to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) (see 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) significant activities summary). On 20 February the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) committed infantry units into QUANG TRI Province when the 3d Bde forward CP passed OPCON to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), moving to CAMP CARROLL. On 24 February, the brigade CP returned OPCON to the 101st Abn Div (Ambl), Ist Plt, 501st Inf moved to Strong Point A-2; and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved to MAI LOC passing OPCON to the 3d Bde CP. On 28 February the 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf moved north into QUANG TRI in the vicinity of Fire Base SARGE and KHE CIO. On 2 March the 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf CP moved to KHE CIO. On 2 March the 11th Bde, 23d Inf Div passed OPCON to the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) continuing its mission of operating along the eastern edge of the DMZ. The following day the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) was placed OPCON to the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) continuing its mission of security of lines of communication and QL-9 in QUANG TRI Province. On 5 March the CP of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved from DONG HA to Fire Base VANDELGRIFT. On 7 March Task Force 1-77 passed OPCON to the 3d Bde of the 101st with its CP at Fire Base VANDELGRIFT. On the 8th the Task Force moved to

b. 1-9 Apr (withdrawal). On 7 April the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved north into QUANG TRI Province to Fire Base SARGE passing OPCON to the 3d Bde, 101st. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf passed their A Company OPCON to the 3d Bde (Ambl), 327th Inf in preparation of commitment of the battalion north. On 21 March the 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf CP and its B Company moved from Fire Base RAKKASAN to Fire Base VANDERGRIFT. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf had moved from Fire Base SARGE to KHE GIO replacing the 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf that returned south to CAMP EVANS on 20 March. Also on 20 March Task Force 1-77 returned OPCON to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech).

c. Significant Activities east of the NS 02 grid line (which defined the AO of LAKSON 719).

(1) 031405 March in the vicinity of YD 160733 A/TF 1-61 received small arms fire and RPG fire from an estimated enemy squad resulting in 7 US WIA (E), and 1 NVA KIA.

(2) 051415 March the Recon/2-327th, in vicinity of YD 040195, discovered a grave with one NVA.

(3) 101635 March 1/C/1-11 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 736687, discovered 7 graves containing NVA killed by artillery resulting in 7 NVA KIA.

(4) 090900 March B/4-8 Cav, in the vicinity of YD 286461, forced a sampan ashore resulting in one detaine.

(5) 120750 March 2/B/2-1 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 280760, engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured.

(6) 191745 March the security platoon 1-61 Mech, in the vicinity of YD 075641 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 VC KIA and misc documents.

(7) 201420 March 3/D/2-502 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 051426, received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured.

(8) 211412 March 3/1/2-502 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 050424, received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force and returned fire resulting in 1 US KIA (E) and 1 enemy FW.

(9) 221805 March Recon and security platoon from 3d Bde, in the vicinity of YD 068435 discovered 3 bodies, reporting 3 enemy KIA.

(10) 251915 March Recon/2-1 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 277747, engaged 3 NVA with organic weapons fire resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured.

(11) 281300 March the Recon and security platoon from the 3d Bde, in the vicinity of YD 078573, engaged 5 or 6 enemy resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 3 AK-47 captured.

(12) 021240 April 3/0/2-502 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 079603, received small arms fire from 2 or 3 enemy soldiers. The element returned organic weapons fire resulting in 1 NVA KIA, 1 NVA FW, 1 AK-47 captured and one rucksack.

(13) 052930 April Recon/2-502 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 323429, engaged suspected enemy positions resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 2 AK-47s captured.

d. Significant Activities west of the JS 02 grid line.

(1) 101100 March 2/3/1/1-501 Inf received small arms fire and engaged organic weapons fire and engaged 3 enemy in the vicinity of YD 932887 resulting in 1 NVA KIA.

(2) 131100 March 3/0/1-501 Inf received small arms fire from an estimated enemy platoon 200 meters to their northeast resulting in 1 US KIA, 1 NVA KIA, 1 AK-47 and misc equipment captured.

(3) 131720 March 3/8/1-501 Inf observed their mechanical ambush detonate 800 meters north of their position resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured.

(4) 140917 March 1/C/1-501 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 945603, engaged an enemy element 50 meters west of their position resulting in 3 NVA KIA.

(5) 141500 March 1/C/1-501 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 945603, engaged an enemy element 100 meters west of their position resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47.

(6) 141715 March 1/V/2-327 Inf, in the vicinity of YD 935580, engaged 5 enemy 25 meters east of their position resulting in 2 NVA KIA.

(7) 141920 March 2/C/1-501 Inf observed their mechanical ambush detonate in the vicinity of YD 949604 resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47.
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captured. There were several blood trails leading from the area.

(8) 161435 March 1/0/1-501 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 947605, received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force 100 meters from their position resulting in 1 US WIA (K), 2 NVA KIA, 1 RPD, 1 RPG and 1 AK-47 captured.

(9) 161710 March 1/0/2-327 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 000582, discovered twenty-three 82mm mortar rounds and 3 cases of 12.7 mm machine gun ammunition.

(10) 190845 March on GI-9, in the vicinity of XD 992485, 2 vehicles received 2 RPG rounds, small arms fire, and fragmentation grenades from an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 US 5-ton truck moderately damaged, 1 ARVN 4 1/2 ton truck lightly damaged, 2 US WIA (M) and 2 ARVN WIA (M). D/1-77 engaged NVA fleeing west resulting in 1 NVA KIA.

(11) 210425 March sappers attacked the rear/resupply point at Fire Base VANDARCRIFT resulting in two 10,000 gallon JP-4 blisters destroyed and 1 NVA KIA.

(12) 240925 March 1/0/2-501 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 001556, engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 9 NVA KIA and 5 AK-47s captured.

(13) 240925 March 2/0/2-506 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 007571, engaged 3 to 4 enemy 100 meters north of their position resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured.

(14) 241430 March 1/0/1-501 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 945597, engaged 8 NVA north of their position with ARA and mortars resulting in 2 NVA KIA.

(15) 250919 March 2/0/2-506 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 006574, engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic weapons fire 100 meters north of their position resulting in 1 NVA KIA, and discovered 20 bunkers made of wood and earth which were later destroyed.

(16) 251819 March 2/A/1-506 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 958583, engaged 4 to 6 enemy with organic weapons fire resulting in 2 NVA KIA.

(17) 261055 March 2/B/1-501 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 946553, discovered 3 graves containing 3 NVA KIA.

(18) 272230 March 2/A/2-506 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 005568, engaged an unknown size enemy force with hand grenades resulting in 6 NVA KIA, 1 NVA NW, 14 rucksacks, 1 K54 pistol, 6 AK-47s and 1 RPG launcher captured.

(19) 282155 March Fire Base VANDARCRIFT was attacked by sappers resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 2 AK-47s captured.
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(20) 291340 March 2/0/1-501 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 951537, discovered a cave containing a total of eighty-two 82mm mortar rounds; forty-seven 82mm rounds, six 60mm mortar rounds, six hundred AK-47 rounds, twenty-five chicom grenades, three shovels, six boxes of assorted ammo, nine 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, eight pull type firing devices and twenty-nine sleeping positions.

(21) 291000 March 3/A/3-4 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 934455, engaged 3 enemy resulting in 3 NVA KIA, 1 pair of binoculars, 1 field radio and an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds.

(22) 291010 March 3/0/2-1 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 885445, engaged 2 enemy resulting in 2 NVA KIA, 1 RPG launcher, 4 chicom grenades and misc documents.

(23) 311830 March B/2-506 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 995585, discovered 1 body trapped NVA body approximately 2 days old.

(24) 011645 April 1/5/6 Inf employed air strikes and artillery on suspected enemy locations in the vicinity of XD 892622 resulting in 5 NVA KIA and 3 secondary fires.

(25) 010925 April 2/G/1-506 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 909537, heard their mechanical ambush detonate and engaged the location with organic weapons resulting in 2 NVA KIA, 2 AK-47s, 1 rucksack, 1 lb of rice captured and several blood trails.

(26) 020945 April 3/3/2-506 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 977518, engaged 2 enemy resulting in 2 NVA KIA, 1 RPG launcher and 1 AK-47 captured.

(27) 050836 April 6/G/2-506 Inf heard their mechanical ambush detonate. A search of the area produced 3 NVA KIA, 2 AK-47s, 6 AK-47 magazines, 1 field radio, and 3 ruckseacks and a map.

(28) 061155 April 3/3/1-501 Inf, in the vicinity of XD 983589 received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. The unit returned organic weapons fire resulting in 2 US KIA (B) and 4 NVA KIA.


1. Attack to LACNI and Consolidation.

2-10 Feb. The attack into LAOCS was initiated on 8 February from bases established on the KIP E CHI Plain. The 1st Armoried Bde Task Force crossed the border at 1000 hours and 9 kilometers westward along Route 9 the first day. Three battalions of the 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div (ARVN) air assaulted into LZs south of Route 9 (LZ CENT and BLUE). North of Route 9, two battalions of the 1st Abn Bde air assaulted to objectives 30 and 31, and the Ranger Battalion landed in the vicinity of RANGER SOUTH LZ. Additionally, 105mm howitzer batteries were air landed on LZ HOTEL, objectives 30

and 31 on 8 February. On 9 February all air moves were cancelled due to adverse weather. The armored task force moved forward 2 kilometers. On the 10th of February, the ARVN Abn Div assaulted a battalion into objective ALOUI, the armored task force linked up with the battalion at 1555 hours and the 1st Inf Div landed a battalion on LZ DELTA. The initial objective had been seized.

11-13 Feb. During the period the Armored Task Force consolidated its position around objective ALOUI. The 1st Regt, 1st Inf Div (ARVN) inserted two battalions on LZ DON and one on LZ DELTA I. A ranger battalion was air assaulted to RANGER NORTH LZ. Additional forces, artillery and supplies were air lifted into objective ALOUI and other established LZs. An airborne battalion was inserted north of objective 31 on 13 February as the forces flanking the armor drive moved abreast of objective ALOUI.

14-16 Feb. With the armor column making no further progress to the west, the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) turned south expanding its search for enemy supplies and facilities. Elements of the 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and accompanying artillery moved to HOTEL II and LZ GRASS. Attempts to insert a battalion on LZ GREEN were broken off because of intense enemy fire. Forces in the vicinity of LZ GRASS made increasing contacts with the enemy.

19-22 Feb. The northern flank of the penetration came under heavy attack with the enemy successively concentrating their forces on the RANGER LZs and airborne objectives. Resupply to these locations was limited by intense enemy fire on the LZs. On 20 February the 39th Ranger Battalion positions of RANGER NORTH were penetrated by the NVA. Elements of the battalion were able to reach RANGER SOUTH the next day. RANGER SOUTH and objective 31 came under increasing enemy pressure.

23 Feb - 2 Mar. During this period, preparations were made to regain the initiative and continue the drive west. 1st Inf Div elements were repositioned north and west. 3d Regt forces were moved from HOTEL II to DELTA I and from LZ GREEN to LZ BROWN. On 25 February, the ranger battalions were extracted. Objective 31 came under heavy attack which included the use of tanks by the enemy. The 1st Armored Task Force attacked North to relieve the airborne positions on Objective 31. 1st Inf Div (ARVN) forces on the extreme southern flank continued to be under heavy pressure until withdrawal on 1 March. An airborne battalion was inserted at LZ ALPHA to secure Route 9 and hold open the I Corps penetration into Laos.

b. Attack to TCHEPONE and Consolidation.

3-6 Mar. The drive to TCHEPONE was accomplished in a series of airmobile assaults by the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) westward along the escarpment which overlooks Route 9. Division forces were released for this operation by inserting two brigades of the 1st Marine Div (ARVN); one in the vicinity of Fire Base HOTEL and the other around Fire Base DELTA. Additionally, the 3d Regt with 5 battalions was made available from eastern QUANG TRI Province (relieved by the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Amer) and the 11th Bde, 23d Inf Div). The 1st Inf Div (ARVN) units air assaulted successively into LZs LOLO, LZB and SOPHIA WEST. By 5 March, the 3d Regt had occupied DELTA I and LZ BROWN, and the 1st Regt was conducting operations in the vicinity of LZs LZB and LOLO. The 2d Regt was conducting
landings at SOPHIA WEST and was moving westward along the escarpment. On 6 March two battalions air assaulted into LZ HOPE, north of TCHEPONE. These units then attacked south and west occupying the town. During this period the airborne division and the armored task force operated north and east of Objective ALOUI, and Fire Base BRAVO was closed by the airborne division.

7-10 Mar. During this period the forces which had been operating from LZ HOPE into TCHEPONE, linked up with elements to the south on the escarpment. Adverse weather precluded several planned insertions. An enemy pressure began to build in the TCHEPONE area, all friendly elements withdrew south of QL-9 and began moving toward SOPHIA WEST. At this point major additional forces would have been required to proceed with the original plan of seizing the TCHEPONE airfield and operating for an extended period in that area. In the face of the build up of numerically superior enemy forces in the objective area, the decision was made by the Commanding General of I Corps to withdraw toward Objective ALOUI.

c. Extraction.

11-14 Mar. The withdrawal from forward positions in the vicinity of TCHEPONE and SOPHIA WEST was accomplished overland to the vicinity of LZ LIZ. On 11 March, two battalions and the 2d Regt CP, 1st Inf Div were extracted to SOPHIA EAST and subsequently to DELTA I with two additional battalions moving the next day to the vicinity of LZ BROWN. The 1st Regt continued operations south and west of Fire Base IODO and the 3d Regt continued southwest of Fire Base DELTA I and LZ BROWN. The Marine Division conducted operations with two brigades in the areas of LZ DON, Fire Base DELTA, and Fire Base HOTEL. Resupply to all units was curtailed because of indirect and small arms fire on the LZs.

15-18 Mar. Increased enemy pressure and unsuccessful attempts to resupply or conduct medical evacuation at Fire Base IODO forced the defenders to abandon the base and move overland to the east. By the end of the 16th, the 3d Regt, less one battalion, had been extracted from multiple LZs around Fire Base DELTA I and SOPHIA EAST. The battalions had been in continuous contact for several days and were forced to move to new pick-up zones on several occasions in order to break contact with the enemy. Extractions were completed only after intensive tactical air, artillery, and aerial rocket artillery preparation.

19-22 March. With the majority of the friendly forces off the escarpment west of Objective ALOUI, the evacuation of Objective ALOUI and elements of the Airborne Division commenced. By the end of the 21st, the 1st Inf Div had been completely withdrawn from LAC with the extraction by air of the 2d Regt. As before, the units were forced to move overland, often at night, in order to break contact and make the extraction feasible. Elements of the Airborne Division were lifted out of LAC under similar circumstances. Meanwhile, the armor column had run into resistance on its push toward TAN TAT. It initially moved to Fire Base ALPHA on 19 March with no difficulty, but ran into enemy resistance and road blocks east of Fire Base BRAVO. At this point the Commanding General of I Corps wanted the Marine Brigade to hold and act as a pivot for a drive across the Vietnamese and Laotian salients to the east. This drive did not materialize.
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23 Mar - 6 Apr. On 23 Mar the armor column crossed the border and one marine brigade was extracted from the vicinity of Fire Base NEIMA. The following day the last two reconnaissance teams were subsequently inserted on Fire Base HOCUS for two additional days. With the drive across the VIETNAMESE and LAOTIAN Salients cancelled, two raids into CHIG and BAC NAO were planned. The first was scheduled for 28 March, but was postponed and relocated because of enemy ground fire in the objective areas. On 31 March, 300 men of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) Bao Bao (Black Panther) and Division Reconnaissance companies were inserted deep in base area 611. They were extracted the next day with virtually no casualties. A second raid was conducted on 6 April with 150 men successfully inserted and extracted on the same day in the LAOTIAN Salient.

8. (C) On 8 April 1971, Operations LAMSON 719 ended and US and ARVN units began to reposition into QUINH THI and PHUA THIEN Provinces. To exploit the successes of LAMSON 719, the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) and the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) initiated Operation LAMSON 720 as a continuation of Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/HOOSICOM PLAN 70. The objective is to destroy forward enemy logistical areas in the DA KRONG and A SHAH Valley areas thus striking another crippling blow to the NVA efforts to continue operations in SOUTH VIETNAM. Successes gained during LAMSON 719 and these being obtained during LAMSON 720 have contributed to the continuing drawdown of US forces in SOUTHEAST ASIA.

On 14 April the 1st Bde moved an advance CP to Fire Base FURY along with the CP from 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf. Two companies of the battalion were left at Fire Base BIRMINGHAM to provide a quick reaction force. C Battery (-) from the 2-320th Artillery moved three 105mm howitzers to Fire Base FURY. The 326th Engineers conducted a mine sweep of FURY prior to the air moves. The 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cavalry inserted the ARVN MAC BAO and Team 21 from Company L (Rangers), 75th Infantry south of Fire Base FURY to conduct BDA of ARC LIGHTS before the assault. The MAC BAO reported 9 NVA killed by ARC LIGHT in the vicinity of YC 554501. The teams were extracted before dark. On 15 April the 1st Bde placed a forward CP on CP CHECKMATE.

On 16 April the 1st Bde continued operations in the Fire Base FURY area. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf moved all elements, except those securing FURY, back to the Fire Base BIRMINGHAM area to prepare for future operations. The 3d Bde maintained liaison with 1st Inf Regt (ARVN). The 3d Bn (Ambl), 177th Inf conducted operations in the Fire Base SWORD and JACK area. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf conducted search and attack operations in the vicinity of Fire Base OLADIATOR. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 505th Inf secured Fire Bases RAKKASAN and KATHRIN with the recon platoon on CP PHANTOM. At 1630 hours, while an aircraft was landing at Fire Base FURY, it received small arms fire resulting in two US WIA. No enemy assessment was made. On 21 April an A-4C from B Troop, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cavalry received 12.7mm fire five kilometers southwest of Fire Base CARRABEE. The area was engaged with gunships resulting in one crew served weapon destroyed. On CONFIDENTIAL
Inclosure (Operation Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U).

210307 April C Company, 1st Bn (Amb), 327th Inf, operating in the vicinity of YC 473900 ambushed an unknown size enemy force with organic weapons and mortar fire. A search of the area revealed 5 NVA KIA, one 82mm mortar, 3 rucksacks and medical supplies. At 1300 hours, again on the 21st, a platoon from B Company, 3d Bn (Amb), 187th Inf observed their M-1s detonate north-west of their position (TD 412292). A search of the area revealed 4 VC KIA, 2 AK-47s, and 30 lbs of rice and rock salt. On 22 April the 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf completed refresher training and moved by air to Fire Base GLADIATOR in the 3d Bde area of operations with companies operating to the south and east. The 2d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf moved to CAMP EVANS to conduct refresher training. On 230850 April C Troop, 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cavalry while conducting armed aerial reconnaissance engaged 4 NVA killing 2 by helicopter. At 0355 hours the Recon Team from 2d Bn (Amb), 187th Inf engaged one enemy north of their location (TD 557210) resulting in 1 VC killed and equipment wrecked. At 0915 hours, in the vicinity of XD 170229, C Troop, 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cavalry engaged and killed 1 NVA. At 1540 hours, in the vicinity of YC 454325, a ranger team from Company L (Ranger), 75th Inf was engaged by an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 US WIA. While attempting to extract the team a UH-1H was shot down resulting in 1 US WIA and 3 US KIA. Later, an individual ranger from the team attempted to locate the downed aircraft and failed to return. B Company, 2d Bn (Amb), 502d Inf was inserted into the area to assist in locating the downed UH-1H. The company met with heavy enemy resistance and fire. The total results for the action on 23 and 24 April were 2 US KIA, 16 US WIA (E), 1 US WIA. On 25 April the 2d Bn (Amb), 502d Inf reinforced and A Co, 1st Bn (Amb), 327th Inf were air assaulted to YC 4389 to provide support. The aircraft was located and extracted. All elements were extracted with the totals for the engagements 10 US KIA, 20 US WIA (E), and 3 US KIA.

In the 1st Bde area of operation for LAMSON 720, the 1st Bn (Amb), 327th Inf continued operations in the vicinity of Fire Base BIRMINGHAM. The 2d Bn (Amb), 502d Inf continued operations in the Fire Base JACK area, with elements also on OP CHECKMATE. In the 3d Bde area of operation for LAMSON 720, TF 3-157 maintained its CP at CAMP EVANS, A Company, 360th Inf Company and 3d Flakboat, A Company, 1-1 Cavalry conducted operations west of CAMP EVANS. Company B had the security mission for MAI LOC, Company C and the 956th Inf Company conducted search and attack operations southwest of Fire Base JACK. D Company conducted operations in the vicinity of XD 3329. Team A, 1-1 Cavalry and elements of A Company, 3d Bn (Amb), 187th Inf conducted search and attack operations south of JACK. The 2d Bn (Amb), 327th Inf continued operations at Fire Base RAKASAN with elements securing KATHRYN, NEILSEN, and OP PHANTOM. The 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf continued operations in the Fire Base GLADIATOR.

The 2d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf continued refresher training. At 1049 hours on the 26th, C Company, TF 3-157 Inf engaged and killed 1 VC. On 29 April the 2d Bn (Amb), 506th Inf completed refresher training and returned to Fire Base RAKASAN with elements moving to MAI LOC, KATHRYN, and MAURER. Operation LAMSON 720 continued into May as an operation of the continuing JEFFERSON CHEN/NEILSEN PLAN.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, "C"; CSR-45 (E7) (11)

Commanding General
XIII Corps
G-3: A-1-CCG
A-10 20-349

(U) The enclosed Operational Report - Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with 21.7.7c, paragraph 1 to all 505-15 and III Corps Regulation 5"5-1.

FOR THE Command:

[Signature]

[CPT G. C. etc.]

Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

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[Cover Page]
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Table of Contents

1. Operations: Significant Activities
   a. Operations ........................................ 1
   b. Training ........................................... 2
   c. Chemical .......................................... 9
   d. Intelligence ....................................... 17
   e. Personnel .......................................... 4
   f. Logistics .......................................... 5
   g. Civil Affairs ...................................... 8
   h. Psychological Operations ......................... 71
   i. Chemical .......................................... 79
   j. Signal ............................................. 17
   k. Army Aviation ..................................... 23
   l. Engineer ............................................ 28
   m. Air Cavalry Operations ............................. 72
   n. Rangers ........................................... 76
   o. Artillery .......................................... 79
   p. Information ........................................ 9

2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

   a. Personnel ........................................... 57
   b. Intelligence ........................................ 67
   c. Operations ........................................ 68
   d. Organization ....................................... 55
   e. Training ........................................... 56
   f. Logistics .......................................... 77
   g. Communications .................................... 61
   h. Material ........................................... 77
   i. Other ............................................... 77

Conclusion

1. Operations Narrative/Significant Activities

CONFIDENTIAL
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971. RCS 0270-65 (R3)(U)

1. (C) Operational Report.

a. Operations.

(1) During the reporting period, the division continued close coordination and cooperation with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and THUA THIEN Province and District officials. This close coordination has contributed greatly to the progress of Vietnamization. During this period, several combined operations were conducted with the ARVN. The largest operation combining ARVN and division assets was LAMSON 720 in THUA THIEN Province. Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON Phase 70 ended on 8 October 1971. Operation OCONED 11-71 was initiated on 3 October and was continuing at the end of this report.

(2) The primary objective of JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON Phase 70 was to provide a protective shield for the populated lowlands of THUA THIEN Province, to locate and destroy enemy forces, staging areas and forward cache sites, to protect vital lines of communications and to assist CVR officials to meet their pacification and development goals. The objectives of Operation OCONED 11-71 are essentially the same with the exception that emphasis is being placed on a more rapid turnover of the responsibility for providing the protective shield and the conduct of operations to the ARVN Commander. The operation continues the concept of a complete integration of efforts of all agencies within the division area of operation to improve territorial security, protect the people against terrorism, improve the People's Self Defense Force (PSDF), develop local self-management in administrative, economic and financial affairs, develop a greater national unity, improve the life of war victims, establish an information system to educate and motivate the people to participate in local development, and continue to build toward prosperity for all.

(3) To accomplish this mission, division units were first positioned in thecamped areas to take advantage of the dry season. Later, as the northeast monsoon season approached, units were repositioned in the piedmont and eastern mountain regions. This repositioning permitted resupply operations by road, which were necessary during extended periods of inclement weather.

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1. (C) In the 1st Bde area of operation for JAXON 72O, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf continued operations in the vicinity of Fire Base BIRMINGHAM. The 2nd Bn (Ambl), 502nd Inf continued operations in the Fire Base JACK area, with elements also on OP CHECKMATE. In the 3rd Bde area of operation for JAXON 72O, TF 3-187 maintained its CP at CAMP EVANS. A Co, 360 RF Co and 3rd Plt, A Co, 1-1 Cav conducted operations west of CAMP EVANS. D Co conducted operations in the vicinity of YD3329. Team A, 1-1 Cav and elements of A Co, 3rd Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf conducted search and attack operations southwest of Fire Base JACK. D Co conducted operations in the vicinity of YD3329. Team A, 1-1 Cav and elements of A Co, 3rd Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf conducted search and attack operations south of JACK. The 2nd Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf continued operations at Fire Base RAKKASAN with elements securing KATHRYN, HELEN, and OP PHANTOM. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf continued operations in the Fire Base GLADIATOR area.

   The 2nd Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf continued refresher training. At 0419 hrs on the 26th, C Co, TF 3-187 Inf engaged and killed 1 VC. On 29 April the 2nd Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf completed refresher training and returned to Fire Base RAKKASAN with elements moving to MAI LOC, KATHRYN, and MAUREEN.

2. (C) 1 May - 31 May 1971.

During the month of May, the 1st Bde CP continued to direct operations from CAMP EAGLE and maintained liaison with the 3rd Reig (ARVN) and GVN officials in NAM HOA District. The Bde conducted airmobile, security, and search and attack operations in its assigned area of operations to interdict enemy avenues of approach and to destroy enemy units. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf, occupied Fire Base BASTOGNE and conducted operations around Fire Base BASTOGNE throughout May. The 2nd Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf, returned ORCON to the 1st Bde from the 2nd Bde on 9 May. The Bn then moved to Fire Base BIRMINGHAM to conduct operations in that area for the rest of May. The 2nd Bn (Ambl), 502nd Inf, occupied Fire Base VEGHEL and conducted search and attack operations in the surrounding area.

The 3rd Bde, with the Bde CP located at CAMP EVANS, continued operation JEFFERSON CLINN and JAXON 72O employing search and attack patrols, ambush and security operations in its assigned area of operations. The 3rd Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf, with its CP located at CAMP EVANS, conducted search and attack, surveillance, ambush and security operations in the CAMP EVANS - Fire Base JACK area in combined operations with GVN RF forces to prevent enemy infiltration of the populated lowlands. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf occupied Fire Base GLADIATOR and conducted operations in the surrounding area. The 2nd Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, with its CP located at Fire Base RAKKASAN, conducted operations in the Fire Base RAKKASAN - EAGLE'S NEST area.

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Enclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS: CSPR-64 (R3) (U)

On 1 May in the vicinity of YD566830 (2 kilometers southwest of CAMP EVANS) at 2025 hrs, Sniper Team 1, 3rd Bn (Amb), 187th Inf, engaged two enemy 200 meters east of their position with organic weapons. A search of the area revealed one NVA NIA wearing an OD uniform, one NVA WIA, one AK-47, and two unknown type pistols.

On 2 May at 1630 hrs in the vicinity of YD335107 (1 kilometer southwest of Fire Base CHARLOT), the 2nd Bn (Amb), 502nd Inf, received 12 50mm mortar rounds impacting south of their position. Artillery was employed on a suspected enemy location vicinity of YD334105 with unknown results. At 0815 hrs in the vicinity of YD563306 (2 kilometers south of CAMP EVANS), Sniper Team 1, 3rd Bn (Amb), 187th Inf, received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force 400 meters south of their position. The element did not engage the enemy due to the proximity of a friendly hamlet.

On 4 May, in the vicinity of YD335106 (4 kilometers northwest of Fire Base AIRBORNE), at 0745 hrs and 1740 hrs, elements of the 2nd Bn (Amb), 502nd Inf, received three mortar rounds impacting 300 meters south of their position. Artillery was employed on suspected enemy locations with unknown results.

On 5 May at 1125 hours in the vicinity of YD494325 (3 kilometers west of CAMP EVANS), a UH-IH from Co C, 101st Avn Bn (Asslt Hel) (Amb), while flying a support mission for RF Co 21L, detonated a booby trap consisting of 1 lb of TNT with a trip wire firing device located on an IZ. One RF was WIA and was later evacuated.

On 6 May at 1005 hrs in the vicinity of YD572215 (1½ kilometers west of Fire Base LONG), the 3rd Plt, Co C, 2nd Bn (Amb), 506th Inf, received small arms fire from an estimated 2-3 enemy 25 meters northwest of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew to the west. A search of the area revealed one NVA NIA, one AK-47, and miscellaneous cooking utensils. Later at 1615 hrs, an individual from the element detonated a booby trap consisting of ½ lb of C-4 with a trip wire firing device resulting in one US WIA. At 1510 hrs in the vicinity of YD111347 (4½ kilometers east of CAMP CARROLL), three vehicles from 426 S&G Bn (Amb), received RPG and small arms fire. The convoy did not return fire but continued on to CAMP EAGLE. One 2½ ton truck was destroyed and one US was WIA.

On 7 May at 1807 hrs in the vicinity of YD595235 (vicinity of Fire Base BAKER), Recon Team 3, 3rd Bn (Amb), 187th Inf, observed a sampen 900 meters east of their position. A Nighthawk was employed and at 1920 hrs engaged the sampen resulting in one sampen believed sunk.

CONFIDENTIAL
On 9 May at 1140 hrs in the vicinity of YD491286 (5 kilometers northwest of Fire Base PINK), an aerial recon patrol of Troop B, 2nd Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav, received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. The element returned fire and the 3rd Plt, Troop D, 2nd Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav was inserted at 1237 hrs. Contact was broken at 1310 hrs. One US was KIA, four US WIA, and one NVA WIA.

On 11 May at 1220 hrs in the vicinity of YD404224 (11 kilometers northwest of Fire Base GLADIATOR), Btry C, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambt), encountered ARA for 12 preparation resulting in two VC killed by ARA.

On 13 May at 1500 hrs in the vicinity of YD658317, a Pink Team from Troop A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav, observed one 2½ ton truck, one flat bed truck and one possible bulldozer. They were engaged with gunships resulting in two NVA KIA and one 2½ ton truck destroyed.

On 14 May at 0800 hrs in the vicinity of YD502266 (road between Camp PULL and Fire Base JACK), a five ton truck of Co. C, 25th Engr Bn, while conducting minesweep operations, detonated a mine consisting of an estimated 15 lbs of TNT with a pressure type firing device. Three US were WIA and the truck received moderate damage. At 0955 hrs, 200 meters to the south, personnel of the Recon Plt of the 3rd Bn (Ambt), 187th Inf, while providing security for the "minesweep" detonated a mine consisting of an estimated 50 lbs of TNT resulting in 3 US WIA.

On 15 May at 1118 hrs in the vicinity of YD502926 (one kilometer northwest of Camp EWAISE), an individual from the 1st Plt, Co A, 3rd Bn (Ambt), 187th Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of an estimated 1 lb of TNT with a pressure type firing device resulting in one US WIA and two RF WIA (RF Co 214 working with the element). There were no indications of recent enemy activity.

At 1730 hrs in the vicinity of YD545138 (5 kilometers south of Fire Base PITCH) and element of Co C, 2nd Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf, discovered a 5'x10'x20' cave with two sleeping positions and a cache containing 22 RPK rds, two 82mm mortar fuses and other miscellaneous equipment. There were indications of enemy activity within the last two weeks.

On 17 May at 1215 hrs in the vicinity of YD559208 (2 kilometers northeast of Fire Base RICORD), an element of Co D, 1st Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf, engaged two enemy 10 meters south of their position with organic weapons fire. A search of the area revealed one NVA KIA and miscellaneous documents. At 1300 hrs in the vicinity of YD583267, the 3rd Plt, Co C, 2nd Bn (Ambt), 187th Inf, engaged four enemy 20 meters south of their position with small arms fire. The enemy returned small arms fire and one grenade and withdrew in an unknown direction. Aerial Rocket Arty, a White Team, a Flareskin and a Nighthawk were then employed. A search of the area revealed one VC WIA. Four US were wounded in this encounter.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RGS: CSFDR-65 (R3) (O)

On 20 May at 0830 hrs in the vicinity of XG458299 (3 kilometers northwest of Fire Base JACK), Co A, 3rd Bn (Ambt), 187th Inf, discovered their mechanical ambush had detonated. A search of the area revealed two VC KIA, one VC WIA (evacuated as a FV), one AK-47 magazine, one US pistol belt and one poncho.

On 21 May at 1435 hrs in the vicinity of XD358201 (1½ kilometers northeast of Fire Base RIFCOLD), an individual from Co D, 1st Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of ½ lb of TNT with a pressure type firing device resulting in one US WIA. A search of the area revealed three additional booby traps of the same type. They were destroyed. At 0745 hrs in the vicinity of XD49906, an AH-1C aircraft from C Tro, 2nd Sqn (Ambt), 17th Cav, received 70 rds of small arms fire with negative hits or casualties. The area was engaged with gunships resulting in two NVA KIA. At 0810 hrs at the same location, an OH-6A received 50 rds of small arms fire without hits or casualties. The area was engaged with gunships resulting in one additional NVA KIA and three bunkers destroyed.

3. (C) 1 May - 31 May 1971.

In the JEFFERSON GLEN area of operations, the 2nd Bde continued operations in coordination with the 54th Regt (Army) and Territorial Forces. The 2nd Bde was tasked with conducting numerous search and attack patrols, surveillance and security operations in its assigned area of operations; to locate and destroy enemy forces, staging areas and cache sites; to interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands in order to provide maximum security for the population.

During May the 2nd Bde CP continued to direct operations from PHU BAI Combat Base and maintained liaison with 54th Inf Regt (Army) and SVN officials. The 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf remained at Fire Base TOMAHAWK until 14 May when the CP and elements moved to PHU BAI Combat Base. The Bn conducted refresher training until 20 May. The Bn then moved to Fire Base BRIECK to conduct operations for the remainder of May. The 2nd Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf maintained its CP on Fire Base BASTOGNE until 6 May when it moved to PHU BAI Combat Base. The Bn conducted refresher training until 14 May when it moved to Fire Base TOMAHAWK and assumed responsibility for the area of operations for the remainder of May. The 1st Bn (Ambt), 502nd Inf moved from Fire Base BRIECK to PHU BAI Combat Base on 20 May to conduct refresher training. The Bn moved to vicinity of Fire Base QUICK on 26 May to conduct search and attack operations. The 3rd Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf was placed OPCOM to USARV to conduct standoff operations. The Bn left GAMP EAGLE on 14 May and stoodown on 17 May.

On 7 May, the ground recon Plt of the 2nd Bde was released OPCOM from the 1st Bde and moved to PHU BAI Combat Base to prepare for future operations.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS: CSFR-65 (R3) (U)

At 1449 hrs, in the vicinity of YU844905, Team 21 (TIGRS), Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf, received small arms fire from an estimated 2 or 3 enemy 25 to 50 meters north of its position. The team returned organic weapons fire and was extracted. One member of the team was wounded.

On 11 May, an element of B Co, 1st En (Amb), 502nd Inf discovered a booby trap consisting of a 60mm mortar round with a pressure type firing device in the vicinity of YD893025 (14 kilometers west of Fire Base QUICK). There were indications of enemy activity in the last 7 days. The booby trap was destroyed.

On 12 May, 4 Co, 2nd En (Amb), 501st Inf was placed OCON to DA HNAG Support Command to conduct security mission in DA HNAG. At 1924 hrs, in the vicinity of YG992596, an element of B Co, 1st En (Amb), 502nd Inf, had one of its mechanical ambushes detonate 300 meters north of its position. A search of the area revealed one enemy killed, one AK-47, one rucksack with 100 lbs of rice and one pistol belt. The enemy equipment was evacuated.

On 14 May, at 1330 hrs in the vicinity of YC001301, an CH-6A from 1 Trp, 2nd Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav, received 40 to 60 rounds of small arms fire. The area was engaged with gunships resulting in one NVA killed by helicopter, two bunkers destroyed and two bunkers damaged. There was no damage to the CH-6A. At 0745 hrs, a Recon Team from the 1st En (Amb), 502nd Inf had a mechanical ambush detonated in the vicinity of YD836095 (4 kilometers north of Fire Base BRICK). A search of the area revealed one NVA killed, two AK-47 magazines, two lbs of rice, miscellaneous documents and indications of two or three enemy withdrawing to the south. The documents were evacuated.

On 18 May at 0821 hrs in the vicinity of YC787791 (6 kilometers southeast of Fire Base NUNS), a Pink Team from Trp C, 2nd Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav, observed and engaged 25 NVA resulting in seven NVA KIA.

On 19 May at 1601 hrs in the vicinity of YC672987 (1 kilometer southeast of Fire Base RFLX) an element of B Co, 1st En (Amb), 502nd Inf and C Co, 326th Engr Bn, received two RKG rounds from a position 50 to 75 meters north of their position. Mortars were employed and the enemy withdrew to the northeast.

On 20 May at 1225 hrs in the vicinity of YD081261, Trp B, 2nd Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav observed four NVA running into bunkers. They engaged the enemy with gunships resulting in one NVA killed by helicopter and one bunker destroyed. At 1500 hrs in the vicinity of YC077296, a Pink Team from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn

CONFIDENTIAL
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Inclusion (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, (CS): CSFR-65 (R3) (U)

(17th Cav), 17th Cav, observed 25 to 20 NVA in a bunker complex. The enemy was engaged by gunships and airstrikes, resulting in three NVA KIA and two NVA killed by the Air Force.

On 21 May at 0750 hrs in the vicinity of YC834944 (7 kilometers southeast of Fire Base BRICK), an element of C Co, 1st Bn (Amb), 501st Inf, engaged one enemy with organic weapons fire. A search of the area revealed one NVA, wounded and captured, one AK-47 and 21 RPK rounds. The POF and equipment were evacuated. At 1200 hrs in the vicinity of YN046268, an Air-16 from Trp 1, 2nd Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav, received 10 to 15 rounds of small arms fire with no hits or casualties. The area was engaged by gunships and AFA resulting in three NVA killed by helicopter. On the night of 21-22 May at Fire Base RPEE (being constructed), elements of the 336th Engr Bn and the 1st Bn (Amb), 501st Inf, received 30 to 40 mortar rounds followed by a snapper attack. Organic weapons fire, AFA, a Nightfighter and artillery were employed. The fighting continued until dawn when the enemy discouraged. The action resulted in 7 NVA KIA, 1 US KIA, and 11 US WIA.

On 24 May at 1350 hrs in the vicinity of YD826035 (5 kilometers southeast of Fire Base ARTHI), a Recon Team from the 1st Bn (Amb), 501st Inf, engaged 5 enemy 150 meters south of its position resulting in one NVA KIA.

On 26 May at 1730 hrs in the vicinity of ZC077961 (31/2 kilometers north of Fire Base SIEDOE), a Recon Team from the 1st Bn (Amb), 501st Inf, observed its mechanical ambush detonate 75 meters southwest of their position. A search of the area revealed one NVA KIA, one AK-47, one backpack with miscellaneous documents and a bag of rice. At 0950 hrs, the element received small arms fire. They returned fire and the enemy withdrew to the west.

On 30 May at 0910 hrs in the vicinity of YD854405 (3 kilometers northeast of Fire Base BRICK), the 1st Plt of C Co, 1st Bn (Amb), 501st Inf, engaged the enemy 50 meters west of their position with organic weapons fire resulting in one NVA KIA. Between 1330 hrs and 1537 hrs in the vicinity of ZD976304, and YD800298, two WIA Teams from Trp 1, 2nd Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav, engaged 12 enemy with gunships resulting in 9 enemy KIA.

4. (C) 1 June - 30 June 1971.

The 1st Bde continued to conduct airmobile, security, and armor attack operations in its assigned AO to interdict enemy avenues of approach into the populated lowlands, to destroy forward echelon sites and to locate and destroy enemy units. The 1st Bn (Amb), 327th Inf, conducted operations around Fire Base BASTOGNE until the 6th of June when it passed OPGW to the 1st Arty. The Bn moved to Fire Base BARBARA and conducted operations until the 28 of June when the Bn passed OPGW back to the 1st Bde. The Bn CP moved to Fire Base

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS: CSFG-65 (R3) (U)

BASTOGNE and conducted operations in the Fire Base BASTOGNE and Fire Base BURMESE area. The 2nd Bn (Amb), 327th Inf, conducted operations throughout the month of June in Fire Base VEGHEL and Fire Base KIM QUY area. The 2nd Bn (Amb), 506th Inf, remained at Fire Base BASTOGNE and OP CHECKMATE.

The 3rd Bde continued to conduct extensive patrols, surveillance, security and search and attack operations in assigned area of operations to locate and destroy enemy forces, base and cache sites; interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands in order to provide maximum security for the population. The 3rd Bn (Amb), 187th Inf, operated in the CAMP EVANS - Fire Base JACK lowlands with the Bn CP located initially at CAMP EVANS then later Fire Base JACK. The 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf, operated with its CP at Fire Base GIADAFO until 28 June when it moved to Fire Base BARBARA. The 2nd Bn (Amb), 506th Inf, with its main CP at Fire Base RAKKASAN, conducted operations in the Fire Base RAKKASAN - Fire Base GIADAFO fire base FISTPISTONE area of operations. The 1st Bn (Amb), 327th Inf was OPCON to the 3rd Bde for the period 6-28 June and operated in Fire Base BARBARA AO.

On 1 June, between 1056 hrs and 1120 hrs, in the vicinities of YD053100, YD048073, YD042080 and YD051089, a Pink Team from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav, engaged a total of eight NVA resulting in eight NVA KIA. At 1655 hrs in the vicinity of YC565948 (2 kilometers southeast of Fire Base TENNESSEE), the 1st Plt, Co B, 2nd Bn (Amb), 327th Inf, employing organic weapons fire, engaged one enemy 10 meters from their position resulting in one NVA KIA. At 1700 hrs, the element received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force 30 meters west of its position. The element returned fire and the enemy withdrew to the southwest. A search of the area revealed a blood trail and one AK-47.

On 2 June at 0855 hrs in the vicinity of YC566949 (14 kilometers southeast of Fire Base TENNESSEE), the 2nd Plt, Co B, 2nd Bn (Amb), 327th Inf, received small arms fire from an estimated enemy squad 20 meters south of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and airstrikes were employed. The enemy withdrew to the south. One US was KIA, two US were WIA and one scout dog was KIA in the action.

On 3 June at 2015 hrs in the vicinity of YD510360 (4 kilometers southeast of Fire Base JACK), Recon Team 3, 3rd Bn (Amb), 187th Inf, engaged an estimated 25 VC 600 meters north of their position. The enemy returned small arms fire resulting in one US KIA. A Nighthawk and Flareship were employed and a search of the area revealed one VC KIA and one AK-47.

On 4 June at 0511 hrs in the vicinity of YD516260 (4 kilometers north of Fire Base HELEN), Sniper Team 2, 3rd Bn (Amb), 187th Inf, employing organic

CONFIDENTIAL
weapons fire. Engaged an estimated five enemy 25 meters east of their position. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew to the north and detonated a mine. A search of the area revealed three NVA KIA and three AK-47s. At 1600 hrs in the vicinity of 1513986, the 2nd Bn, 3rd RCT (ARVN), was engaged by an unknown size enemy force. At 1730 hrs, 4th Bn (Aeriel Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl), was engaged. Engaged in nine KIA killed by ARVN.

On 6 June at 1400 hrs in the vicinity of 15122069, an element from Co A, 2nd Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, observed and engaged two enemy 200 meters from its position. A search revealed one AK-47 and one blood trail. At 1700 hrs in the vicinity of 15174289, a Pink Team from 3rd C, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, observed and engaged an unknown type vehicle on Route 52B resulting in two NVA KIA and one AK-47. Later, at 1705 hrs in the vicinity of 15173986, a Recon Team from 2nd Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf, made a search of the area where its chemical munition had detonated and found one NVA KIA in one AK-47.

On 7 June at 0635 hrs, CAMP EVA'S received six 122mm rockets impacting inside the perimeter resulting in 12 US KIA and two buildings damaged. Artillery was employed on suspected enemy locations.

On 8 June at 1040 hrs in the vicinity of YD292155 (3 kilometers south of Fire Base PATTON), an element from Co E, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, engaged 2 to 4 enemy with organic weapons fire. The enemy did not return fire and withdrew to the south. A search of the area revealed one NVA KIA and one AK-47. Later at 1130 hrs, the element received three 82mm mortar rounds impacting around their position resulting in one US KIA.

On 9 June at 1007 hrs in the vicinity of YD448273, a Pink Team from 3rd C, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, observed and engaged two enemy resulting in one NVA KIA. At 1030 hrs in the vicinity of YD302666 (8 kilometers east of Fire Base STELLA), an individual from an element of Co D, 3rd Bn (Ambl), 17th Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of an 82mm mortar round with a trip wire firing device located inside a hut, resulting in two US KIA and three US WIA. At 1820 hrs at Fire Base TROPIC, the CP of the 2nd Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf received seven 122mm rockets impacting inside and around the perimeter. One FRS-5 radar set was damaged.

On 11 June at 1009 hrs in the vicinity of YD509579, an NVA from HHT, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, received one hit from small arms fire resulting in one US WIA. The area was engaged by gunfire resulting in one NVA killed by helicopter. Later at 1645 hrs in the vicinity of YD 083999, a Pink Team engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in two NVA KIA.
On 12 June at 0942 hrs in the vicinity of XD573793, a Pink Team from Trp B, 2nd Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav, observed and engaged one 2½ ton truck resulting in one truck destroyed and one NVA KIA. At 0945 hrs in the vicinity of XD936386, a Pink Team from Trp A, observed and engaged one NVA resulting in one NVA KIA.

On 13 June at 1005 hrs in the vicinity of XD424087, Ranger Team OHIO was engaged by an unknown size enemy force with small arms fire and grenades. The team returned small arms fire and employed ARA and airstrikes. The action resulted in one US KIA and six US WIA.

On 14 June at 1310 hrs in the vicinity of XD316269 (1 kilometer northwest of Fire Base O'THELLO), Recon Team 2, 1st Bn (Ambt), 327th Inf, received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force 10 meters southwest of their position. The element returned organic fire and employed ARA, the enemy withdrew to the west. Two US were wounded and a search of the area revealed two AK-47s, one rucksack and one blood trail. At 1504 hrs in the vicinity of XD299358 (4 kilometers northwest of Fire Base BARBARA), an element from Co B, 1st Bn (Ambt), 327th Inf, engaged two enemy 25 meters west of their position with organic weapons fire. A search of the area revealed two NVA KIA, two AK-47s and two rucksacks.

On 16 June at 1230 hrs in the vicinity of XD445088 (3½ kilometers southwest of Fire Base KATHERYN), the 3rd Plt, Co C, 2nd Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf, discovered a partially destroyed bunker containing one 7.62mm MG with two extra barrels and one tripod, five AK-47s, 62 RRG rounds, and one RRG booster. There was no indication of recent enemy activity.

On 17 June at 1535 hrs in the vicinity of XD052354, a Pink Team from Trp B, 2nd Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav, engaged one NVA resulting in one NVA KIA. At 1345 hrs in the vicinity of XD621182, an individual from Co A, 2nd Bn (Ambt), 502nd Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of a fragmentation grenade resulting in two US WIA.

On 19 June at 0910 hrs in the vicinity of XD571952, an element from Co D, 2nd Bn (Ambt), 327th Inf received small arms fire from one NVA 50 to 75 meters south of its position resulting in one US KIA. The element returned fire and the enemy fled.

On 20 June at 0500 hrs in the vicinity of XD820452, a Pink Team from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav, observed and engaged two NVA resulting in one NVA KIA. At 1200 hrs in the vicinity of XD949503, another Pink Team from Trp A engaged three NVA resulting in one NVA KIA.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RG 36205 (R) (3) (U)

On 21 June at 0930 hrs in the vicinity of XD651147, a Sniper Team from the 2nd Bn (Ambt), 502nd Inf, engaged four NVA northwest of its position and one NVA 30 meters west of its position with organic weapons fire. A search revealed one NVA WIA and one AK-47. At 1645 hrs in the vicinity of XD224293, an element from Co C, 1st Bn (Ambt), 327th Inf, engaged one NVA 20 meters southwest of its position resulting in one NVA WIA and one ruck sack containing miscellaneous equipment and documents and one .30 caliber Mauser pistol captured. At 1555 hrs in the vicinity of XD033573, a Pink Team from Trp B, 2nd Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav observed and engaged in one NVA KEH.

On 24 June at 0830 hrs in the vicinity of XD223292, an element from Co C, 1st Bn (Ambt), 327th Inf, observed and engaged one NVA with small arms fire. A search of the area revealed one NVA WIA and one AK-47. At 0900 hrs in the vicinity of XD005531, a Pink Team from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav, observed and engaged an active 12.7mm position resulting in two NVA-KEH and one 12.7mm MG destroyed. Later, at 1220 hrs, in the vicinity of XD005511, the Pink Team observed and engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in one NVA KEH.

On 25 June at 0915 hrs in the vicinity of XD655145, a Recon Team from 2nd Bn (Ambt), 502nd Inf, engaged one NVA with organic weapons fire resulting in one NVA WIA and one AK-47 captured. At 1535 hrs in the vicinity of XD028643, a Pink Team from Trp C, 2nd Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav, observed and engaged one NVA resulting in one NVA KEH.

On 26 June at 1015 hrs in the vicinity of XD003645, a Pink Team from Trp C, 2nd Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav, observed eight NVA and received ground fire. The team employed airstrikes resulting in two NVA KIA. At 1530 hrs in the vicinity of XD943493, a Pink Team from Trp A received ground fire. The team employed airstrikes resulting in two NVA killed by Navy, one 12.7mm antiaircraft gun, and one .50 caliber MG destroyed.

On 27 June at 1227 hrs in the vicinity of XD662245 (3 kilometers west of Fire Base BAKER), Co G, 326th Engr Bn, received one RPK round and small arms fire from 1-2 enemy 100 meters south of its position resulting in six US WIA. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed mortars and Arty with negative results.

On 29 June at 0900 hrs, Co C, 327th Engr Bn, detected a Pink Team from Trp C, 2nd Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav, observed and engaged 15-20 bunkers resulting in one NVA KEH and two bunkers destroyed.

CONFIDENTIAL
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On 30 June at 1145 hrs in the vicinity of YD055668, a Pink Team from Trip A, 2nd Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav, observed and engaged two MIA carrying AK-47s resulting in two MIA KIA. At 1627 hrs in the vicinity of YD243284, an element of Co D, 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf, was engaged by two enemy 20 meters northeast of its position resulting in two US WIA. The element returned fire with negative results.

5. (C) 1 June - 30 June 1971.

In June, the 2nd Bde continued to direct operations in its assigned AO from PHU BAIC Combat Base in support of Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSON PLAN 70 and provided one BN (-) as a security force in the DA NANG area. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf occupied the Fire Base ARSENAL/BRICK AO and conducted operations in assigned AO to deny enemy infiltration into the populated lowlands and further deny the enemy occupation of the CAMP EAGLE/PHU BAIC Rocket Belt (YD7605 to YD8504). Fire Base BRICK was closed 9 June 1971 and the BN personnel were transported by air and vehicle to DA NANG with the mission of providing security for CAMP BUCKS and ASFB 2/107 and conducting combined ambush operations with local RFs. Co D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf passed OEFCON to 1st BN (Ambl), 502nd Inf and conducted search and attack operations in the Fire Base RIFLE AO. The 2/501 Inf conducted detailed search and attack operations in assigned AO to locate and destroy enemy units, base camps and cache sites, and interdict enemy movement into the lowlands, and conducted many combined operations with 5th RF Group, in and around Fire Base TOHAWK AO. The 1/502 Inf conducted search and attack operations in 54th Inf Regt (AVN) and Fire Base RIFLE AO to deny enemy access to the populated lowlands and CAMP EAGLE and PHU BAIC Rocket Belt.

On 1 June at 0937 hrs in the vicinity of ZD008002 (3½ kilometers east of Fire Base POWESE), the 2nd Plt, A Co, 2nd BN (Ambl), 501st Inf and RF Co 206, on a combined operation, received small arms fire and two Chicom grenades from an estimated enemy squad 20 meters north of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed artillery. The enemy withdrew to the west. Two US soldiers were KIA, one US WIA, and one RF WIA. At 1117 hrs in the vicinity of YD041013 (4½ kilometers north of Fire Base BOESE) an individual from 3rd Plt, Co D, 2nd BN (Ambl), 501st Inf detonated a booby trap consisting of an RFG round with a trip wire firing device. One US was KIA and one US was WIA.

On 2 June at 1051 hrs in the vicinity of YD024006 (3 kilometers southeast of Fire Base QUICK), D Co, 1st BN (Ambl), 502nd Inf engaged two enemy with organic weapons fire, the enemy withdrew to the northwest without returning fire. A search revealed one MIA KIA and one AK-47 and a blood trail.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to "Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS: GSFOO-65 (R3) (0)

On 3 June at 1032 hrs in the vicinity of YDG9003 (34 kilometers west of Fire Base POWDER), an individual detonated an unknown type mine resulting in two US WIA and one scout dog killed. The element also received small arms fire and fragmentation grenades from two to four enemy 50- meter southeast of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and employe artillery. A search of the area revealed one AK-47.

On 4 June at 1100 hrs in the vicinity of YDG938095 (3 kilometers southeast of Fire Base ZUJK), the 1st Plt, Co C, 1st Bn (Amphl), 502nd Inf, employing organic weapons fire engaged one enemy 10 to 15 meters southwest of its position. The enemy returned small arms fire wounding one US soldier. A search of the area revealed one enemy KIA, one AK-47 with 30 rounds of ammunition, and two satchel charges.

On 5 June at 1225 hrs in the vicinity of YDG90002 (3 kilometers east of Fire Base POWDER), an element of B Co, 2nd Bn (Amphl), 501st Inf, received small arms fire and an unknown number of RPG rounds from 8 to 10 enemy 75 meters south of its position. The element returned fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. The action resulted in one US soldier "W" and eight US WIA. At 1430 hrs in the vicinity of YDG8428 and YDG8428, Co B, 8th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Amphl), engaged enemy positions resulting in 60 WIA killed by ARA.

On 6 June at 1055 hrs in the vicinity of YDG575873 Btry, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Amphl), employed ARA in support of 4-2 Regt (ARVN) elements which were in contact with an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 12 WIA killed by ARA.

On 8 June at 0825 hrs in the vicinity of YDG939018, an element from Co D, 1st Bn (Amphl), 502nd Inf, while receiving a resupply mission, received 2 RPG rounds and small arms fire from a position 150 meters southwest of its position. The element returned organic weapons fire. The results of the action were one US KIA and two US WIA.

On 12 June at 0945 hrs in the vicinity of YDG90035 (3 kilometers north of Fire Base BRICK), an individual from Co A, 1st Bn (Amphl), 502nd Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of a fragmentation grenade with a proximity type firing device resulting in three US WIA. The element also discovered a grave containing one WIA killed by Arty approximately two weeks earlier.

On 19 June at 0930 hrs in the vicinity of YDG908901, a Pink Team from Trp C, 2nd Sqdn (Amphl), 17th Cav, engaged the enemy after receiving small arms fire. A visual reconnaissance revealed one WIA KIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

12
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Inclosure {Operations Narrative/Significant Activities} to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 31 October 1971, ECS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

On 25 June at 1015 hrs in the vicinity of 521092, an individual from Co D, 2nd Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, detonated an unknown type booby trap resulting in two US WIA. At 1840 hrs in the vicinity of 941545, an AK-47 from Co D, 158th Avn Bn (Salt Hel) (Ambl), sustained one round of small arms fire in the front canopy resulting in one US KIA.

On 27 June at 1058 hrs in the vicinity of 9939001 (2 kilometers west of Fire Base FREEWAY), an element of Co C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, engaged an enemy 50 meters northeast of its position with organic weapons fire. A search of the area revealed one NVA KIA, one ChiCom pistol and one rucksack with miscellaneous documents which were evacuated.

On 28 June at 1054 hrs in the vicinity of 3175946 (8 kilometers southeast of Fire Basearkin), Co C, 2nd Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, engaged an enemy 50 meters from its position with small arms fire. A search of the area revealed one NVA KIA and one AK-47.

On 29 June at 1935 hrs in the vicinity of 3847017 (2 kilometers northeast of Fire Base BRICK), Co D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, received two RRG rounds and 20 to 30 rounds of small arms fire from two enemy 75 meters southeast of its position resulting in five US WIA. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy fled in an unknown direction.

6. (C) 1 July - 31 July 1971.

The 1st Bde continued operations under OCPD 13-70 and LAMSON 720 in conjunction with 3rd Regt, 1st Inf Div (ARTY). The 1-27 Inf, with CP at Fire Base BASTOGNE, conducted operations in the Fire Base BASTOGNE, Fire Base WECHSEL and Fire Base TENNESSEE areas. The 2-327 Inf, with CP at Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, operated in the Fire Base WECHSEL, Fire Base KIM QUY, and OF KIM AO. The 2-502 Inf, with CP at Fire Base NORMANDY, conducted operations in the Fire Base TENNESSEE, Fire Base SHEAR, and Fire Base NORMANDY areas. The Bde conducted airborne, security, and search and attack operations to interdict enemy avenues of approach and to destroy enemy logistics capabilities.

During the reporting period, the 3rd Bde, with the CP located at CAMP EVANS, continued operations of OCPD 13-70 and LAMSON 720 employing search and attack, patrol, surveillance, ambush, and security operations in assigned area of operations with the 3-137 Inf CP at Fire Base JACO from 1-7 July, Fire Base RAKKASAN 8-28 July, and CAMP EVANS 29-31 July. The 2-503 Inf CP at Fire Base RAKKASAN 1-7 July and Fire Base JACO 8-31 July. The 1-506 Inf CP at Fire Base BARBARA 1-24 July, CAMP EVANS 25-27 July, and Fire Base RAKKASAN 28-31 July.

CONFIDENTIAL
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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RG5: GSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

On 1 July at 1525 hrs in the vicinity of YD051330, a Pink Team from Troop A, 2nd Sqn (Amb), 17th Cav, engaged one NVA resulting in one NVA KIA. At 1540 hrs in the vicinity of YD028319, another Pink Team observed and engaged one NVA resulting in one NVA KIA.

On 2 July at 1930 hrs in the vicinity of YD534275 (3 kilometers northwest of Firebase STSIIA), Recon Team 1, 3rd Bn (Amb), 187th Inf, engaged three NVA 300 meters north of their position with organic weapons fire. The enemy did not return fire but fled to the east. A Nightstall was employed and a search of the area revealed one NVA KIA. At 0835 hrs in the vicinity of YD528921 (2 kilometers southwest of Firebase STSIIA), an element of Co. A, 2nd Bn (Amb), 502nd Inf, engaged an estimated enemy platoon with organic weapons fire. The enemy returned one RPG round resulting in one US KIA and three US WIA. The element then employed Arty, A&A and airstrikes on a suspected enemy location in the vicinity of YD523930 with unknown results.

On 4 July at 1100 hrs in the vicinity of YC476243, an OH-6A from Troop C, 2nd Sqn (Amb), 17th Cav, received an unknown number of small arms rounds. The area was engaged by gunships and a visual recon revealed two NVA KIA. Then at 1103 hrs in the vicinity of YC492855, an AH-10 received an unknown number of small arms fire resulting in two US WIA.

On 7 July at 1545 hrs in the vicinity of YD416164, the area was engaged with gunships after an OH-6A from Troop C, 2nd Sqn (Amb), 17th Cav, received 100 rounds of small arms fire. A visual recon revealed one NVA KIA.

On 11 July at 0915 hrs in the vicinity of YD528177 (2 kilometers north of OP PHANTOM), Recon Team 1, 3rd Bn (Amb), 187th Inf, received two rounds of small arms fire from 2-3 enemy 10 meters northwest of their position resulting in one US WIA. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. At 1200 hrs, the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), passed ORCON to the 101st Abn Div (Amb).

On 14 July at 1515 hrs in the vicinity of YC707637, a Pink Team from Troop C, 2nd Sqn (Amb), 17th Cav, observed 50 NVA with AK-47s. The area was engaged with Arty and airstrikes resulting in five NVA killed.

On 15 July at 2205 hrs in the vicinity of YD541391 (3 kilometers southwest of CAMP EVANS), the 3rd Plt, 113th Regional Forces Co, ORCON to 2nd Bn (Amb), 506th Inf, received small arms fire from 3-5 enemy 600 meters southwest of their position and from two enemy 10 meters southwest of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and a Nightstall received 11-25 rounds of small arms fire from an estimated 10 enemy 600 meters east of the ground element sustaining no hits. A search of the area was made with negative results.

CONFIDENTIAL
On 16 July at 0125 hrs, QUAN TRI Combat Base received small arms fire on the perimeter resulting in one US WIA. Bunkerline weapons were employed resulting in one NVA KIA.

On 18 July at 0815 hrs in the vicinity of YC588352, an OH-6A from Trp G, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, received small arms fire with no hits. The area was engaged with gunships resulting in one enemy KIA.

On 19 July, between the hrs of 1100 to 1632 hrs, gunships from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, in the vicinities WDG2466, YD012340, YD052328, YD093304, and YD042929, engaged the enemy after receiving small arms fire without taking hits. Visual recon of the areas revealed a total of 25 enemy KPB and one .50 caliber MG destroyed. At 1020 hrs in the vicinity of YC493856, gunships from Trp B, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, engaged five NVA resulting in one NVA KPB. Between the hrs of 0810 to 1700 hrs, in the vicinities of YG873774, YC765385, YC773898, and YC778899, gunships from Trp G, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, engaged the areas after receiving small arms fire without taking any hits. Visual recon of the areas revealed a total of nine NVA KPB.

On 20 July at 1115 hrs in the vicinity of YC422944, a Pink Team from Trp B, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, observed and engaged four NVA resulting in one NVA KVB.

On 24 July at 1100 hrs in the vicinity of XD910418, an OH-6A from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, received small arms fire with no hits. Gunships engaged the area resulting in seven NVA KPB. At 1427 hrs in the vicinity of XD924492, another OH-6A received small arms fire with no hits. The area was engaged with gunships resulting in three NVA KPB and one .30 caliber MG destroyed. At 1300 hrs the Aerial Rifle Pit was inserted and engaged one NVA with grenades resulting in one NVA KIA and one .30 caliber MG captured.

On 28 July at 1605 hrs in the vicinity of XD413303, an individual from Co C, 2nd Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of a 105mm Arty round resulting in one US KIA.

On 29 July at 1628 hrs in the vicinity of XD266083, a Pink Team from Trp B, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, observed and engaged four NVA resulting in four NVA KPB.

On 30 July, between the hrs of 0935 and 1345 hrs, a Pink Team from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, observed and engaged the enemy at XD934504, XD947502, XD948356, and XD941497, resulting in nine NVA KPB.
In July the 2nd Bde continued operations in support of OPORD 13-70 and provided 166 man security force to secure ASP 2/107 in the DA NANG area. The 1-501 Inf conducted search and attack operations in assigned area of operations. During the period of 1-4 July the Bn secured CAMP BOOKS and ASP 2/107 in DA NANG and on 4 July the Bn moved by air to FIRE Base RIFLE AO. The Bn (-) occupied FIRE Base RIFLE (YD963987) on 4 July and assumed responsibility for the RIFLE AO. The 1st Plt, A Co and the 1st Plt, C Co provided security for OP DROPS 23-31 July. The 2nd Plt, A Co secured FIRE Base BRICK for 326th Engr Bn element 23-31 July. Co E mortars provided limited support for the Bn from FIRE Base RIFLE. Companies B and C, 1-502 Inf, were OPCON to 1-501 Inf, for the period 1-11 July. Throughout the reporting period, the 2nd Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, conducted search and attack operations within the FIRE Base TOMAHAWK AO with one Co defending the FIRE base and the remaining company conducting search and attack operations. Co A, 2-501 Inf, was OPCON to 1-501 Inf from 21-31 July. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 502nd Inf, was deployed within 2nd Bde Bde AO with the mission of conducting numerous search and attack operations, small unit ambushes, patrols and reconnaissance missions. Operations were conducted to accomplish the Bn's mission of patrolling the perimeter and canal areas of the "Rocket Belt", to deny the enemy the opportunity to launch rockets and mortars against RVN Air and CAMP EAGLE Combat Bases, and to deny enemy use of staging area, resupply and infiltration routes within the Bn AO. During the period of 4-10 July 71 the 1-502 Inf assumed security of CAMP BOOK and ASP 2/107 in DA NANG.

On 2 July at 1205 hrs in the vicinity of YD849023 (3 kilometers northeast of FIRE Base BRICK), an element of Co D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, received one RPG round and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force 35 meters north of its position resulting in two US WIA. The element returned organic weapons fire and Arty, mortars, and ARA were employed with negative results. At 1431 hrs the element received additional RPG and small arms fire resulting in one US KIA. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy filed in an unknown direction.

On 5 July at 1900 hrs in the vicinity of YD894004 (3 kilometers northeast of FIRE Base RIFLE), the 3rd Plt, Co D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 502nd Inf, engaged ten enemy in the open 400 meters northeast of their position with organic weapons fire. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew to the north and south. Results of the action were one WIA KIA and one Chicom pistol captured.

On 7 July at 1615 hrs in the vicinity of 20163975 (5 kilometers southeast of FIRE Base TOMAHAWK), an individual from the 1st Plt, Co C, 2nd Bn
CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS: OPR-65 (R3) (U)

(Ambt), 501st Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of an 82mm mortar round with a trip wire firing device resulting in one US WIA. At 1212 hrs, the element discovered and destroyed another booby trap of the same type.

On 9 July at 0845 hrs in the vicinity of XD893983 (Fire Base BARRACUDA) an element of the 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf discovered two NVA KIA 4 or 5 days earlier. They were believed to have been killed by mechanical ambush.

On 10 July at 2200 hrs in the vicinity of XD88973 (one kilometer southwest of Fire Base BARRACUDA), an element from Co A, 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf received one round of small arms fire from an enemy 25 meters south of its position resulting in one US WIA. The element returned fragmentation grenades and employed claymore mines with negative results.

On 19 July at 1230 hrs in the vicinity of ZC006995 (3 kilometers southwest of Fire Base POWDER), an individual from the 3rd Plt, Co A, 2nd Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf detonated a booby trap consisting of one lb of C-4 with a trip wire firing device on a two feet wide trail resulting in one US WIA.

On 20 July at 0830 hrs in the vicinity of ZC011001 (2 kilometers southwest of Fire Base GREENER), a UR-1H from Co A, 101st Avn Bn (Ass't Hel) (Ambt), supporting Co A, 2nd Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf on an extraction mission, detonated a booby trap consisting of an unknown amount of C-4 with a pressure type firing device employed on an LZ. Three US soldiers from the ground element were wounded and one US of the aircraft crew was wounded. Damage to the aircraft rendered it non-flyable and it was later extracted.

8. (C) 1 August - 31 August 1971

During August, the 1st and 3rd Bdes continued operations in accordance with OPRD 13-70 and in support of IAMSON 720. IAMSON 720 was officially ended as of 31 August.

The 1st Bde continued operations in coordination with the 3rd Regt (ARVN) within its assigned AO. Two major accomplishments of the Bde during this period were the establishment of OP APOLLO on hill 326 at XD74045 to provide a base for the monsoon season to cover the southern flank of the Bde and a deception plan. The deception plan reached to the western corner of the Bde's AO to convince the enemy the 1st Bde was attempting a major offensive action in the DOMINION RENDEZVOUS area. The deception plan was based on intelligence gathered from a NVA FW reconnaissance plt leader captured by the Co, 1st Bn (Ambt), 327th Inf on 18 August. The intelligence indicated that an NVA Bn of the 6th Regt was poised to strike at American units to prevent their being committed to the contact along the DMZ; the probable target was IAMSON 720.
Fire Base KIM QUY. Reacting to this intelligence, the 5th Air Base initially established a patrol screen around the fire base. On 19 August, a 327th Air Assaulted and screened to the west. On 20 August, a company from the 3rd Regt (Ayun) air assaulted into an AAD extension to the north-northwest of the fire base. The same day, D/1-327 and recon of 2-502 and 1-327 Inf, conducted air assaults to screen to the south and southwest. A/1-327 Inf was already screening the west. This screen proved so effective that enemy attacks were limited to two small mortar barrage-directed against field units, both of which were 300-400 meters off-target. Devastating fire was returned by the 2-370 Artillery and supporting arty units, utilizing Time on Target (TOT) fire. The 1st Bde went on the offensive with its deception plan on 21 August. Massive fires on different landing zones and hitting probable enemy locations with aircrafts, the 1-327 Inf false-inserted onto the LAs vicinity of Fire Base NAMBIK and DONG A TAY. Intelligence indicated the enemy subsequently planned an attack against DONG A TAY although no troops were within 7000 meters of the hill. The patrol screen was reduced on 26 August as the 5th Artillery redeployed to provide security for the local elements. On 29 August, additional intelligence indicated the 6th NVA Regt was again moving into the recently vacated area. A second deception plan was initiated to simulate movement into the SHAUVIET area and subsequently the SHAU Valley. This plan was completed in September.

The 1-327th Inf remained in the Fire Base FASTOOGS - KIM QUY area for the entire reporting period conducting patrols, search and attack, surveillance and ambush operations. The 2-327th Inf occupied Fire Base BERTH 44 until 26 August and occupied and assumed responsibility for Fire Base NORMANDY and OPs APOLLO and CHECKMATE. The 2-502 Inf began construction of OP APOLLO on 4 August. The 5th Artillery occupied Fire Base NORMALBY until 26 August when it assumed security of Fire Base BERNDHOM and OP NTER.

During the reporting period, the 3rd Bde, with OP located at CAMP TANAR, continued operations in accordance with OORD 13-70 and in support of LAKSON 720, employing search and attack, patrol, surveillance, ambush, and security operations in assigned area of operations. The 1-506 Inf was headquartered at Fire Base RAKKASAN from 13-12 August, and at Fire Base JACK from 13-31 August. On 13 August the 1-506 Inf reorganized as TF 1-506 (reinforced). The 2-506 Inf was headquartered at Fire Base JACK from 13-12 August, and at Fire Base RAKKASAN from 13-31 August. The 3-187 Inf was at CAMP EVANS from 1-3 August, then passed OPCON CAN RANG BAY Support Command from 3-31 August.

On 1 August, the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) was released OPCON from the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) and was attached to USAVC to began standdown operations.

On 2 August at 0935 hrs in the vicinity of D378250 (vicinity of Fire Base FASTOOGS), an individual from the 2nd Plt, Co A, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, detonated an unknown type booby trap with a pressure type firing device.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS: CSFOA-65 (R3) (V)

resulting in three US WIA. At 0942 hrs and 1412 hrs, in the vicinities of XD98532 and YD068348, two Pink Teams from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, observed and engaged four NVA resulting in four NVA KIA.

On 3 August at 1005 hrs in the vicinity of YD744016 (6 kilometers east of Fire Base NORMANDY), a sniper team from 2nd Bn (Ambl), 502nd Inf, engaged five NVA with organic weapons fire, Arty and ARA resulting in one NVA KIA. At 2105 hrs in the vicinity of YD550290 (1 kilometer south of CAMP EVANS), a sniper team from SERTS, employing organic weapons fire, Arty and a Nighthawk, engaged 20 to 25 enemy. The enemy did not return fire but fled to the southwest. A search of the area revealed two VC KIA, one AK-47 and miscellaneous documents.

On 4 August at 1345 hrs in the vicinity of YD533258 (4 kilometers south of CAMP EVANS), two 2½ ton trucks carrying troops from Co B, 2nd Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, were engaged by a suspected command detonated mine resulting in five US WIA and two trucks destroyed.

On 5 August at 1345 hrs in the vicinity of YD064665, a Pink Team from Trp D, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav, observed and engaged four NVA resulting in two NVA KIA. At 1455 hrs in the vicinity of YD063435, an OH-6A from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, observed and engaged two NVA resulting in two NVA killed by helicopter. Later at 1655 hrs in the vicinity of YD56345, an OH-6A received 10 rounds of 12.7mm MG fire with three hits resulting in one US WIA. At 1930 hrs in the vicinity of YD567295 (1 kilometer south of CAMP EVANS), a sniper team from 2nd Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, engaged an estimated seven enemy 300 meters from their position with organic weapons. The enemy was observed dragging away an unknown number of suspected enemy bodies. A Nighthawk and gunship were employed. A search revealed one VC KIA and miscellaneous documents.

On 6 August at 1600 hrs in the vicinity of YD041346, a Pink Team from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, engaged one NVA resulting in one NVA KIA.

On 7 August at 0755 hrs in the vicinity of XD994645, a Pink Team from Trp B, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav, observed and engaged six NVA resulting in one NVA KIA.

On 8 August at 1040 hrs in the vicinity of YD276449, an M113 armored personnel carrier from Trp B, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav detonated an unknown type mine resulting in five US WIA and one Inc Wounded 66 WIA.

On 9 August at 1545 hrs in the vicinity of YD34379, an M113 armored personnel carrier from Trp A, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav, detonated a mine resulting in three US WIA. At 0845 hrs in the vicinity of XD945332, a Pink
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Team from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Amb1), 17th Cav, engaged 5-10 NVA resulting in three NVA KIA.

On 10 August at 0715 hrs in the vicinity of XG906940, a Pink Team from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Amb1), 17th Cav, engaged four NVA resulting in four NVA KIA. At 0712 hrs in the vicinity of XG910940, the area was suppressed by puncheons after an OH-6A received small arms fire, resulting in one NVA KIA.

On 11 August at 0850 hrs in the vicinity of YD633153 (2 kilometer north-east of OP KING) the 2nd Plt, Co A, 2nd Bn (Amb1), 327th Inf, discovered seven 2.5x4x4 firing positions and five huts. While searching the area, a Luc Long 66 detonated a booby trap consisting of a 60mm mortar round with a trip wire firing device resulting in one Luc Long 66 WIA and two US WIA.

On 12 August at 1700 hrs in the vicinity of YD073672, a OH-1H from Trp D, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav, exploded from an unknown cause resulting in seven US KIA.

On 14 August at 0700 hrs in the vicinity of XD946437, an OH-6A from Trp D, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav, received 12.7mm XD fire with no hits. The area was engaged by gunships and Arty resulting in six NVA KIA, one NVA killed by Arty and two 12.7mm MGs destroyed.

On 16 August at 1645 hrs in the vicinity of YD432317 (6 kilometers west of CAMP EVANS), a K551 tank from 2nd Plt, Trp A, 4th Bn, 12th Armored Cav, ORCON to 3rd Bde, 101st Abn Div (Amb1), detonated a mine consisting of an unknown type explosive with a pressure type firing device resulting in two US WIA and minor damage to vehicle.

On 17 August at 1000 hrs in the vicinity of YD674136 (4 kilometers north-west of Fire Base BIRMINGHAM), an individual from 1st Plt, Co C, 2nd Bn (Amb1), 327th Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of a suspected 60mm mortar round with a pressure type firing device resulting in one US WIA. Also at 1000 hrs, 100 meters from the first booby trap, another individual detonated a second booby trap consisting of a suspected 60mm mortar round resulting in two US WIA. The booby traps were located on a one foot wide trail. There were no indications of recent enemy activity.

On 18 August at 1520 hrs in the vicinity of YD185742, an OH-6A from Trp B, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav, received 16 hits of unknown type rounds resulting in one US WIA.

On 19 August at 1605 hrs in the vicinity of YD805525, an OH-6A from Trp D, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav, sustained six hits of small arms fire and 12.7mm XD fire resulting in one US WIA.

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RG5; CSFR-65 (R3) (U)

On 22 August at 1025 hrs in the vicinity of XD942508, a Pink Team from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, observed and engaged two NVA resulting in two NVA KIA. At 1030 hrs in the vicinity of XD948517, gunships engaged two NVA resulting in two NVA KIA. Later, at 1225 hrs in the vicinity of SE916286, an OH-6A sustained an unknown number of 12.7mm MG hits resulting in one US WIA.

On 23 August at 0825 hrs in the vicinity of XD439948, an OH-6A from Trp C, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, received small arms fire with no hits. The area was engaged by gunships resulting in two NVA KIA.

On 24 August at 1210 hrs in the vicinity of XD579275, an M113 armored personnel carrier from Trp A, 4th Sqdn, 12th Cav, detonated a booby trap resulting in one US WIA. At 1431 hrs in the vicinity of XD896669, a Pink Team from Trp D, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav, engaged an NVA resulting in one NVA KIA.

On 25 August at 0820 hrs in the vicinity of XD778638, a Pink Team from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, engaged two NVA resulting in two NVA KIA. Later, at 0850 hrs in the vicinity of XD786555, the same Pink Team engaged four NVA resulting in four NVA KIA. At 1445 hrs in the vicinity of XD97505, another Pink Team observed and engaged 50 NVA seeking cover. The area was engaged by gunships resulting in six NVA KIA.

On 27 August at 1145 hrs in the vicinity of XD826613, an OH-6A from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, received small arms fire with no hits. The area was engaged by gunships resulting in one NVA KIA.

On 28 August at 1515 hrs in the vicinity of XD64303 (2½ kilometers southeast of CAMP EVAES), Co D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf received one round of small arms fire from southwest of its position resulting in one US WIA. Later, at 2015 hrs in the vicinity of XD66300, the element was again engaged by small arms fire resulting in two US WIA. The element returned fire and a search revealed one NVA KIA and one AK-47. At 1050 hrs in the vicinity of XD978575, a Pink Team from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, observed and engaged six NVA resulting in four NVA KIA and one NVA captured. Later, at 1220 hrs, the area was again engaged by gunships after an OH-6A received small arms fire. A visual search of the area revealed two NVA KIA.

On 29 August at 1352 hrs in the vicinity of XD520252 (4 kilometers south of CAMP EVAES), an individual from the 2nd Plt, Co C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of 1 lb of an unknown type explosive with a pressure type firing device resulting in one US WIA. Another individual then detonated a second similar booby trap resulting in two US WIA. There were no indications of recent enemy activity. At 1140...
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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

hrs in the vicinity of XD804508, a Pink Team from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav, observed and engaged seven NVA resulting in seven NVA KIA.

On 30 August at 0855 hrs in the vicinity of XD828612, an OH-6A from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav, received small arms fire with no hits. The area was engaged by gunships resulting in one NVA KIA. At 1215 hrs in the same area, a Pink Team engaged one NVA resulting in one NVA KIA.

On 31 August at 1512 hrs in the vicinity of XD078258, a Pink Team from Trp B, 2nd Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav, engaged two NVA resulting in two NVA KIA. Airstrikes were also employed resulting in an additional two NVA killed by airstrikes.

9. (C) 1 August - 31 August 1971.

The 2nd Bde continued operations under OPORD 13-70 in its assigned AO in coordination with THUA THIBN Sector and the 54th Regt (ARVN). The Bde conducted detail small unit search and attack patrols, surveillance and ambush operations, and provided a 166 man security force to secure ASP 2/107 at CAMP HASKINS, BA NAM. The L-501st Inf occupied Fire Base RIPPER with the responsibility of the Fire Base AO, from 1-28 August. On 28 August the En (...) moved by air to field locations around Fire Base TOMAHAWK and assumed responsibility for Fire Base TOMAHAWK and its AO on 31 August. On 30 August, Co C, L-501st Inf, moved to BA NAM to assume responsibility for securing ASP 2/107. The 2-501st Inf occupied Fire Base TOMAHAWK and was responsible for security of ASP 2/107 until 28 August when it moved to Fire Base RIPPER. It assumed responsibility for RIPPER and its AO on 31 August. The L-502 Inf occupied and conducted operations on and around Fire Base ARSENAL. Operations were conducted in the "Rocket Belt" to deny the enemy the opportunity to launch rockets and mortars against PHU RAI and CAMP EAGLE Combat Bases.

On 4 August at 1105 hrs in the vicinity of XD872996 (14 kilometers northeast of Fire Base RIPPER), an individual from Recon Team 2, 1st En (Ambt), 501st Inf, detonated an unknown type booby trap with a pressure type firing device employed on a trail resulting in two US WIA. There were no indications of recent enemy activity.

On 5 August at 1010 hrs in the vicinity of XD65026 (4 kilometers northeast of Fire Base RIPPER), Co A, 1st En (Ambt), 501st Inf, observed and engaged two enemy with organic weapons fire resulting in two enemy KIA, one AK-47 and one 9mm pistol captured.

On 7 August at 0245 hrs in the vicinity of YC95947 (5 kilometers northeast of Fire Base PISTOL), the 2nd Bde's OH-6A crashed and burned resulting in two US KIA.

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On 10 August at 1003 hrs in the vicinity of YD852017 (2 kilometers north of Fire Base RIFLE), the 3rd Plt, Co A, 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf, discovered a hut with overhead cover containing three AK-47s, three full AK-47 magazines, and a poncho. Nearby, the element also discovered miscellaneous documents, one RPG round and miscellaneous equipment. The equipment was evacuated.

On 11 August at 1520 hrs in the vicinity of XG860022 (3 kilometers north of Fire Base RIFLE), 2nd Plt, Co A, 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf, received small arms fire from L-2 enemy 25 meters south of their position resulting in one US WIA. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy fled east. Later an individual detonated an unknown booby trap with a pressure type firing device resulting in three US WIA.

On 20 August at 1000 hrs in the vicinity of YD841026 (3½ kilometers north of Fire Base BRICK), Ranger Team STELLA received small arms fire from an estimated one to three enemy west of their position resulting in one US WIA. The element returned fire and the enemy fled. At 1030 hrs, a medevac aircraft, while attempting to evac the US WIA, received small arms fire sustaining 25 hits resulting in one US WIA. The wounded Ranger was later evacuated but died of his wounds.

On 27 August at 1016 hrs in the vicinity of YD830046 (5½ kilometers southeast of Fire Base ARSENAL), an individual from Co G, 1st Bn (Ambt), 502nd Inf, detonated an unknown type booby trap resulting in one US WIA.

On 28 August at 1110 hrs in the vicinity of ZC107977 (3 kilometers south of Fire Base TOMAHAWK), an individual from Co B, 2nd Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of an RPG round with a trip wire firing device resulting in one US WIA. There were no indications of recent enemy activity.

On 30 August at 1645 hrs in the vicinity of YD843029 (6 kilometers southeast of Fire Base ARSENAL), an individual from Co B, 1st Bn (Ambt), 502nd Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of a suspected 60mm mortar round with a pressure type firing device resulting in one US WIA.

On 31 August at 1125 hrs in the vicinity of YD855020 (8 kilometers southeast of Fire Base ARSENAL), an element of Co D, 2nd Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf, discovered bunkers which were burned containing one enemy body. The element found five graves nearby with five bodies and two AK-47s.

10. (C) 1 September - 30 September 1971.

The 1st Bde continued operations under OPORD 13-70 during the period 1 September to 30 September 1971. Significant operations during this period
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS: OSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Included a deception plan against the 6th NVA Regt. a counteroffensive against attacks by fire by elements of the 5th NVA Regt. and a historic passing of control of Fire Base BASTOGNE, OP CHECKMATE, and terrain west to the 3rd Regt., 1st Inf Div (ARVN). In all operations the 1st Bde accomplished its mission of inflicting maximum casualties on the enemy without becoming decisively engaged, and in promoting Vietnamization by assisting the ARVN in their desire to assume responsibility for additional fire bases and a larger area of operations.

The deception plan during 1-4 September was targeted against elements of the 6th NVA Regt., and was a continuation of the deception plan of 14-18 August. The intent of the 1-4 September plan was to prevent the 6th NVA Regt from establishing a command area in the TENNESSEE/VECHEL area, and to siphon off much-needed enemy supplies going to the BUSH area. The plan was successful in accomplishing both missions. Elements of all three battalions were engaged in the operation. The deception plan was to air assault one company from each battalion to the DOM A TAY area (YOA 9498), simulate that the company was a battalion, and conduct dummy traffic and movement to an objective in the Fire Base RENDEZVOUS area. L-327 Inf air assaulted C Co on 1 September, 2-327 Inf air assaulted C Co on 2 September, and 2-502 Inf air assaulted D Co on 3 September. Each Co carried two 60mm mortar boxes and ammunition. Each Co also was extracted at 1500H the same day of insertion but continued dummy radio traffic until 7 September. The operation was a success as the enemy did divert much-needed personnel and supplies from the north to the Fire Base RENDEZVOUS area. Moreover, special intelligence revealed that the enemy suffered heavy casualties from the deadly night-time air and artillery fire targeted against him. Analysts agree that the enemy suffered, at a minimum, 75 casualties during the operation. In contrast not one US casualty resulted. The operation was a classic example of an enemy unit which was beaten before it was ready to fight.

The 2nd Bde conducted detailed small unit search and attack patrols, surveillance and ambush operations in assigned AO in support of COMFOR 13-70 and provided a 166-man security force for ASP 2/107 at CAMP BASKING DA NANG. The L-501 Inf Bn occupied and improved Fire Base TOMAHAWK and conducted search and attack operations in the Fire Base TOMAHAWK AO. The Bn was also responsible for securing ASP 2/107 in DA NANG. This was accomplished by rotating companies at two week intervals through refresher training, field operations, and securing ASP 2/107. The 2-501 Inf Bn conducted economy of force operations to interdict enemy movement into and influence upon the populated lowlands, provided security for Fire Base MIFNE and from 4 September to 24 September provided security for Fire Base ARSENAL and conducted operations in the "Rocket Belt" to deny the enemy the opportunity.
to launch rockets and mortars against PHU BAI and CAMP EAGLE Combat Basas. The 1-502 Inf Bn conducted interdiction and ambush operations in the Fire Base ARSENAL AO. The Bn also provided security for Fire Base ARSENAL. From 6-22 September the Bn was OPCON to the 3rd Bde. During this period it occupied Fire Bases BARBARA and ANNE.

The 3rd Bde, with its CP located at CAMP EVANS, continued operations employing search and attack, patrol, surveillance, ambush, and security operations in assigned area of operations. The 1-506 Inf occupied Fire Base JACO during this reporting period. The 2-506 Inf occupied Fire Base RAKKASAN and conducted operations in its AO.

On 1 September at 1004 hrs in the vicinity of XD270012 (2 kilometers north of Fire Base RIFER), an individual from the 2nd Plt, Co C, 2nd Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of a 60mm mortar round employed on a IZ resulting in one US WIA. There was no indication of recent enemy activity.

On 2 September at 0340 hrs in the vicinity of XD833451, an OH-6A from 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav, received ground fire with no hits. The area was engaged by gunships resulting in six NVA KIA and two NVA WIA. Later an airstrike was employed resulting in one additional NVA KIA.

On 3 September at 1910 hrs in the vicinity of XD420312 (1 kilometer north of Fire Base SWORD), the 2nd Plt, Trp A, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav, OPCON to the 3rd Bde, engaged an unknown size enemy force five meters south of their position with organic weapons fire. The enemy did not return fire but fled to the south. Artillery was employed and a search revealed one NVA KIA, one AK-47 and one rucksack. Later, at 1935 hrs, an HMM amoured personnel carrier from the same unit, detonated a booby trap consisting of a suspected 155mm round. Results were one US WIA and minor damage to the vehicle.

On 4 September at 0915 hrs in the vicinity of XD873353, a Pink Team from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, observed and engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in six NVA KIA. At 0940 hrs, in the vicinity of XD288761, an OH-6A from Trp D, 2nd Sqdn, 5th Cav, was struck by a suspected RPG round resulting in two US KIA and one US WIA.

On 6 September between the hrs of 1100 and 1530 hrs, a Pink Team from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, observed and engaged the enemy on four different occasions in the vicinities of XD885328, XD855970, XD83603, and XD881605 resulting in a total of 13 NVA KIA.

On 7 September at 1100 hrs in the vicinity of XD39531, a Pink Team from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, observed and engaged one NVA resulting in
CONFIDENTIAL

Disclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 31 October 1971, KOS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

One NVA KIA. Later, the Pink Team engaged another NVA in the same area resulting in one NVA KIA.

On 3 September at 1303 hrs in the vicinity of YC806844, an OH-6A from Trp C, 2nd Sqdn (Amb1), 17th Cav, received small arms fire. The area was engaged by gunships resulting in one NVA KIA.

On 9 September at 1630 hrs in the vicinity of YD296443 (6 kilometers south of QUANG TRI Combat Base), an M113 from Trp C, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav, detonated a booby trap consisting of two TM 41 antitank mines with a pressure type firing device resulting in two US WIA. A search of the area revealed a second similar booby trap three feet from the first. At 1715 hrs in the vicinity of YD296072 (4 1/2 kilometers south of CAMP SAGLE), an element from Co A, 2nd Bn (Amb1), 501st Inf, observed an unknown size enemy force 500 meters east of their position. Artillery and White Team were employed. The White Team engaged three NVA resulting in one NVA KIA.

On 10 September at 0938 hrs in the vicinity of XD293224, a Pink Team from Trp C, 2nd Sqdn (Amb1), 17th Cav, observed and engaged one NVA resulting in one NVA KIA. At 1400 hrs in the vicinity of YG604992 (5 kilometers southwest of Fire Base Vochen), a Recon Team from 1st Bn (Amb1), 327th Inf, employing organic weapons, engaged an estimated enemy platoon resulting in one NVA KIA. The enemy returned fire and fled in an unknown direction. The element then employed gunships, artillery and airstrikes resulting in four secondary explosions.

On 11 September at 0730 hrs in the vicinity of XD345255, a VH-1H from Trp D, 2nd Sqdn (Amb1), 17th Cav, was engaged by two command detonated mines while making an insertion, resulting in one US KIA, five US WIA and one Loc Luong W6 WIA. At 1204 hrs in the vicinity of YG323417, an individual from Co C, 1st Bn (Amb1), 502nd Inf, detonated a booby trap with a pressure type firing device resulting in three US WIA.

On 13 September at 1435 hrs in the vicinity of YG523889, an OH-6A from Trp C, 2nd Sqdn (Amb1), 17th Cav, received an estimated 100 rounds of 17.7mm fire and crashed resulting in two US WIA. Airstrikes employed on the VC position resulted in one 12.7mm VC destroyed.

On 14 September at 0845 hrs in the vicinity of YD509250 (4 kilometers south of CAMP EVANS), an element from Co C, 2nd Bn (Amb1), 506th Inf, discovered one box of miscellaneous medical supplies and one AK-47. While continuing to search the area, an individual detonated a booby trap consisting of an unknown type explosive resulting in two US WIA.

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Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

On 16 September at 1445 hrs in the vicinity of YD130500, an M113 from Trp A, 4th Sqdn, 12th Cav, detonated an M16 mine resulting in one US WIA.

On 17 September at 1843 hrs in the vicinity of YD516233 (5 kilometers south of CAMP EVANS), an element from Co A, 2nd Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf, ambushed two NVA five meters north of their position. One NVA fled west and one NVA was killed. The NVA killed was wearing boxer shorts and had one AK-47, one pistol belt and two AK-47 magazines.

On 18 September at 1005 hrs in the vicinity of YD335474 (3 kilometers southwest of IA VANG), an M531 from Trp B, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav, detonated a TM-41 antitank mine with a pressure type firing device resulting in one US WIA and moderate damage to the vehicle. At 1445 hrs in the vicinity of YD262409 (3 kilometers west of Fire Base ANNA), a member of Ranger Team CLARKS detonated a booby trap resulting in two US WIA. The booby trap consisted of one Chicom grenade with a trip wire firing device.

On 19 September at 1600 hrs in the vicinity of YD100485 (4 kilometers south of VAI LOC), an M113 from Trp A, 4th Sqdn, 12th Cav, detonated a booby trap consisting of an 8 inch Arty round with a pressure type firing device, resulting in five US WIA and heavy damage to the vehicle. At 1930 hrs in the vicinity of YD496269 (3 kilometers south of Fire Base JACK), an element from Co C, 1st Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf, received small arms fire with no hits. The element then learned its mechanical ambush had detonated and a search of the area revealed one NVA KIA and two AK-47s.

On 23 September at 0645 hrs in the vicinity of YD185490 (2 kilometers northwest of Fire Base ANGEL), the 3rd Plt, Trp A, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav, received one fragmentation grenade from one enemy wounding one US. The element employed organic weapons and gunships with negative results.

On 24 September at 1615 hrs in the vicinity of YD201155, an aircraft from Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav, received 15 rounds of small arms fire. The aircraft made a forced landing. One US was WIA.

On 25 September at 1015 hrs in the vicinity of YD850017, an individual from the 2nd Plt, Co B, 2nd Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf, detonated a booby trap resulting in one US KIA and four US WIA. At 1437 hrs in the vicinity of YD433312, an M113 from Trp C, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav, detonated two antitank mines resulting in three US WIA and moderate damage to the vehicle.

CONFIDENTIAL

27
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RKS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (O)

On 27 September at 0930 hrs in the vicinity of YD710017 (2 kilometers east of Fire Base KOROMANDY), an individual from Co B, 2nd Bn (Amb1), 502nd Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of 1/2 lb of C-4 in a coke can with a trip wire firing device resulting in one US WIA.

On 28 September at 1405 hrs in the vicinity of YD544219 (5 kilometers southwest of Fire Base CATHY), the 2nd Plt, Co B, 2nd Bn (Amb1), 506th Inf, received small arms fire and two RPG rounds from an unknown size enemy force resulting in two US WIA. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed gunships resulting in one but destroyed. Later, at 1620 hrs in the vicinity of YD544224 (4 kilometers west of Fire Base CATHY), the 1st Plt detonated two booby traps consisting of Chico grenades with trip wire firing devices resulting in four US WIA. At 1740 hrs in the vicinity of YD185516, an H13 from Tpr A, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav, was destroyed by an unknown type explosive in a C-ration can with a pressure type firing device resulting in five US KIA and five US WIA.

On 29 September at 1720 hrs in the vicinity of YD545026 (3 kilometers north of Fire Base BRICK), an individual from the 2nd Plt, Co B, 2nd Bn (Amb1), 501st Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of an unknown type explosive in a C-ration can with a pressure type firing device resulting in four US WIA.

On 30 September at 1300 hrs in the vicinity of YD559294 (4 kilometers southeast of CAMP EVANS), a Recon Team from the 1st Bn (Amb1), 506th Inf, received small arms fire from an estimated six enemy resulting in one US WIA. Co A was inserted to support the Recon Team and gunships and Artillery were employed. A search of the area was made and one AK-47 plus miscellaneous equipment were found. At 1350 hrs in the vicinity of YD709019 (2 kilometers east of Fire Base KOROMANDY), an element of Co B, 2nd Bn (Amb1), 502nd Inf, heard noises in the area and reconed by fire. An unknown size enemy force returned small arms and automatic weapons fire resulting in one US WIA. Artillery and a Bunk Team were employed with negative results.

II. (C) 1 October - 31 October 1971.

During the month of October, the 1st Plt continued to direct operations with its CP located at CAMP EAGLE. The Bde conducted operations in the central area of NAM HAO District in conjunction with the 3rd and 54th ARVN Rpts, and territorial forces of NAM HAO District to interdict enemy movement into the pendum. The Bde also maintained surveillance of the HUE CITY - CAMP EAGLE Rocket Belt. The 1st Bn (Amb1), 327th Inf, occupied Fire Base EAG.
and conducted operations in that AO until 14 October. The Bn then moved to CP APOLLO until 21 October when it moved its CP to CAMP EAGLE. The Bn was placed OPCON to the 196th Inf Bde in CHU L\Ai. The 2nd Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf, at first occupied CP APOLLO and conducted operations in that AO until 7 October when the Bn CP was moved to CAMP EAGLE. The Bn then moved its CP to Fire Base BIRMINGHAM on 14 October and conducted operations around the fire base for the rest of October. The 2nd Bn (Ambl), 502nd Inf, began the month with its CP initially located on Fire Base BASTOGNE. The Bn remained on Fire Base BASTOGNE until 7 October when its CP was moved to CP APOLLO. The Bn continued to conduct operations around CP APOLLO for the remainder of the month.

The 2nd Bde, with its CP located at PHU BAI Combat Base, continued its mission of conducting a dynamic defense, screening, surveillance and security operations in its assigned AO. The Bde maintained close coordination with ARVN, GVN Territorial and Local forces, with the purpose of intercepting enemy movement into the populated lowlands. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, occupied Fire Base TOMAHAWK and conducted operations in the fire base AO for the entire month of October. The Bn also furnished a 160 man security force for the ASP in DA NANG. The 2nd Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, operated with its CP located at PHU BAI Combat Base until 5 October when the Bn passed OPCON to USASARCOM-CRE. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 502nd Inf, occupied Fire Base ARSENAL and conducted operations in the fire base AO for the entire month.

The 3rd Bde, with its CP located at CAMP EVANS, conducted screening and mobile defense operations designed to protect CAMP EVANS and occupied fire bases from ground and indirect fire attacks. The Bde also had Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf and D Trp, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav, attached to the Bde during October. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, occupied and conducted operations in Fire Base JACK area of operations for the month of October. The 2nd Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, occupied Fire Base RAKKASAN and conducted operations in the fire base AO. The 3rd Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf, was released OPCON from USASARCOM- CRE on 5 October and returned OPCON to the 3rd Bde. The Bn CP was located at CAMP EVANS for the rest of the month and the Bn conducted operations in the surrounding AO.

One October was another active day for the 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav. Gunships of the Cav engaged fire enemy between the hours of 0940 to 1200 hrs, resulting in fire enemy KIA.

On 2 October at 1102 hrs in the vicinity of XD253&54 (4 kilometers northwest of Fire Base SUSIE), Ranger Team FORREST discovered signs of 25 to 30 individuals moving southeast. At 1120 hrs, the element heard voices to their front and around their position. The element set up a perimeter and at
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1210 hrs, an unknown type explosive device detonated resulting in one US WIA. The element then engaged two enemy with organic weapons fire and claymore mines. ARA and gunships were also employed resulting in one NVA KIA. The team was then extracted.

On 3 October at 2130 hrs in the vicinity of YD517157 (vicinity of CAMP EAGLE), an ambush element from "D" Sector, CEA Base Defense, engaged a total of eight enemy around their position. A Nightstark and flareship were employed and the element was reinforced by a 12 man patrol. A search of the area under illumination revealed several drag marks made by dragging bodies away. The element was then withdrawn to the bunkerline.

On 4 October at 1500 hrs in the vicinity of YD535448 (4 kilometers north-west of Fire Base AIME) Trp A, 4th Sqdn, 12th Cav, conducted a ground search of a bunker complex and cache site discovered by D Trp, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav. The element discovered one aid station bunker and some storage and service bunkers. The bunkers contained 20 cases of AK-47 ammunition, 20 cases of 7.62 ammunition, 65 rounds of 57mm RRG ammunition, 100 China fragmentation grenades and two blood trails leading to the north. Selected items were evacuated and the rest was destroyed.

On 8 October, ORD 13-70 (JEFFERSON GLEN/HORSEH愿 PLAN 70) draw to a close. ORD 11-71 became effective at 1200 hrs. At 1625 hrs in the vicinity of YD533358 (3 kilometers north of CAMP EVA-13), four M113s and one M551 Sheridan tank from B Trp, 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav, while traveling west in a column formation, received small arms fire, two RGC rounds and one unknown type command detonated mine. Results of the action were four US WIA (E), three US WIA (D) and three road wheels destroyed on one M113. The element returned organic weapons fire and one 152mm Sheridan tank round. Arty and ARA were also employed with unknown results.

On 11 October at 1855 hrs in the vicinity of YD079393, A Trp, 2nd Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, observed and engaged one NVA with gunships resulting in one NVA KIA.

On 13 October at 2246 hrs in the vicinity of YD566734 (4 kilometers north of CP LION), Recon Team 1, 3rd Bn (Ambl), 187th LIE, received small arms fire and two RGC rounds from an unknown size enemy force 100 meters west of their position. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed Arty. The team was extracted by medevac helicopter at 2335 hrs. The encounter resulted in one US KIA, one US WIA(E) and one US WIA (D).

CONFIDENTIAL

30
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure (Operations Narrative/Significant Activities) to Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RGS: C5FR-65 (R3) (D)

At 1220 hrs on 14 October in the vicinity of YD715015 (2½ kilometers east of Fire Base NORMANDY), an individual from the 3rd Plt, Co D, 1st Bn (Amb), 327th Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of a claymore mine with a trip wire firing device resulting in three US WIA (E). The C-4 explosive in the claymore had been replaced by a 60mm mortar round.

On 15 October at 0647 hrs in the vicinity of YD422122 (10 kilometers west of CAMP EVANG), an individual from the 3rd Plt, Co A, 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of an unknown amount of plastic explosive in a C-ration can with a pressure type firing device. One US was WIA (E). Another booby trap was detonated by an individual from Recon Team 4, 3rd Bn (Amb), 187th Inf, at 1150 hrs in the vicinity of YD605225 (4 kilometers north of CP LION). Three US were WIA (E).

On 16 October at 1015 hrs in the vicinity of YD945255, Trp A, 2nd Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav, observed one tent and one hut. They were engaged by gunfire resulting in two NVA KIA.

At 1712 hrs on 17 October in the vicinity of YD510245 (5 kilometers southeast of Fire Base JACK), an individual from Co B, 3rd Bn (Amb), 187th Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of an 81 mm mortar round with a pressure type firing device resulting in one US KIA.

On 20 October at 1425 hrs in the vicinity of YD801138 (2 kilometers southwest of CAMP EAGLE), the 3rd Plt, Co A, 2nd Bn (Amb), 502nd Inf, while on a sweep of "H" Sector, received small arms fire from the enemy in a bunker. The element returned organic weapons fire and employed AFA. A search of the area revealed one VC KIA, one VC KIA (one male and one female), three AK-47s, 50 lbs of rice, one RPG round, miscellaneous clothing and documents.

On 21 October at 1541 hrs in the vicinity of YD466317 (5 kilometers west of CAMP EVANG), an individual from Co B, 1st Bn (Amb), 506th Inf, detonated a booby trap consisting of a 105mm round with a pressure type firing device resulting in three US WIA.

On 22 October at 1300 hrs in the vicinity of YD801138 (2 kilometers south of CAMP EAGLE), Co A, 1st Bn (Amb), 327th Inf, while on a sweep of "H" Sector OEA, discovered one VC KIA, one AK-47, five RPG rounds, miscellaneous equipment and documents in a bunker. The enemy was estimated to have been killed two days before, possibly by the 3rd Plt, Co A, 2nd Bn (Amb), 502nd Inf.
On 25 October at 1315 hrs in the vicinity of XD584904, 6 Trp, 2nd Sqn (Ambl), 17th Cav, observed and engaged 10 enemy with gunships and Arty resulting in four enemy KIA and one enemy killed by Arty.

On 28 October at 1353 hrs in the vicinity of XD075033 (3 kilometers southeast of OP APOLO), an element from Co A, 2nd Bn (Ambl), 502nd Inf, observed three enemy with weapons 500 meters south of their position. Arty and mortars were employed. At 1500 hrs the element observed the enemy moving toward their position and employed machinegun and M203 fire. The element observed two enemy fall but were unable to conduct a search of the area due to bad weather. At 2024 hrs in the vicinity of XD745098 (4 kilometers east of Fire Base BIRMINGHAM), Reccon Team 3, 2nd Bn (Ambl), 502nd Inf, observed a stationary sampan at XD745104 and three stationary lights at XD751101. Arty was employed resulting in one direct hit on the sampan and one suspected secondary explosion. A search of the area was conducted with negative results.

On 31 October at 1300 hrs in the vicinity of XD749099 (4½ kilometers east of Fire Base BIRMINGHAM), Reccon GP and Teams 1 and 3, 2nd Bn (Ambl), 502nd Inf, received two unknown type explosives near their MPF resulting in one US WIA.
CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1971, RGCS GSPQ-65 (R3) (U)

5 Jul - 7 Jul 71 (Typhoon Harriet)
12 Jul 71 (Heavy rain storm)
5 Oct - 7 Oct 71 (Typhoon Elaine)
23 Oct - 31 Oct 71 (Typhoon Hester)

For the first three typhoons, there were no requests received by the DCC
dand were subsequently closed. During the activation of the DCC for the pe-
iod 23-31 October 1971, aircraft and boats were provided from the division
resources to assist in evacuating stranded Vietnamese and to transport food
for dislocated personnel. The aircraft flew 1,053 sorties, moving 70.8 tons
of relief supplies to relocation centers throughout THUAN THIEN and QUANG TRI
Provinces; and in conjunction with boats, furnished by the 326th Engr Bn,
relocated 1,950 Vietnamese refugees from flooded areas. In addition, the 37th
Engr Bn supplied a 20 ton crane that was utilized to remove debris that had
accumulated and was endangering the AH LO Bridge on QL-1.

(f) Due to an increase in traffic incidents along QL-1, it became
apparent that drastic corrective measures were necessary to curtail this
growing problem. The ACoFS, G5, was instrumental in the formation of a
Joint Incident Committee in August 1971. The mission for this joint committee
is to promote a better understanding of traffic safety for both local nation-
als and US military personnel. As a direct result of a meeting of the Joint
Committee the following projects were initiated:

1 Joint US/VN police patrols.
2 Placement of traffic regulatory signs throughout HUE.
3 Aerial observation along convoy routes monitoring speed of vehicles.
4 Formation of all US military vehicles into convoys at installations
   and also at all routes entering the city of HUE.
5 A joint US/VN educational program to include radio, television, and
   newspaper articles about traffic safety.

Since the initiation of these programs there has been a major decrease in
the number of traffic incidents throughout Northern Military Region I,
thereby helping to improve US/VN relationships.

(g) On 18 September 1971, an incident occurred that could have greatly
affected US/VN relationships in THUAN THIEN Province. The incident was the
disturbance of approximately 20 Vietnamese graves by personnel repairing a
portion of the PHU BAI Combat Base berm. The disturbance of the graves was
reported to NHONG THUY District and in turn to the ACoFS, G5. Due to quick
reaction to this incident, the possibility of a civil disturbance was nulli-
tied by allowing Vietnamese civilians to enter Phu Pai Combat Base and
remove the remains of 466 Vietnamese from the installation. The Vietnамese
were furnished with 466 ammunition boxes to transport the remains to new
burial sites.

(i) On 2 October 1971, the Mid-Autumn Festival (Children's Festival)
was celebrated. The personnel of the 101st Abn Div (Amlb) contributed
70L, 290,000 ARVN and approximately 160 lbs of candy to the children of the 1st
Inf Div (ARVN). In addition, toys and candy, valued at approximately
100,000 ARVN were donated to the children of RF/FF soldiers in THUA THIEN
Province. This program was well received by the Vietnamese and has greatly
enhanced the joint military relationship of the 101st Abn Div (Amlb), 1st
Inf Div (ARVN) and RF/FF soldiers of THUA THIEN Province.

(j) Since 1 May 1971, there have been 378 MEDCAPs conducted by units
within the 101st Abn Div (Amlb), treating 15,133 patients.

During the reporting period, the following commodities were issued:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medical supplies</th>
<th>320 lbs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>2,000 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>29,897 bd ft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>100 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pallets</td>
<td>375 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amlb boxes</td>
<td>2,348 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engr Stakes</td>
<td>100 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipes 3&quot;</td>
<td>165 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desks</td>
<td>165 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benches</td>
<td>165 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barred wire</td>
<td>25% rolls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health items</td>
<td>636 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dirt, fill</td>
<td>8,963 cu yds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin</td>
<td>1,915 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothes</td>
<td>17% sections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culvert</td>
<td>2,000 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandbags</td>
<td>8,000 ft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone poles</td>
<td>525 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebar</td>
<td>8,000 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toys</td>
<td>51 sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td>8 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOP</td>
<td>1 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halls</td>
<td>2 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackboard</td>
<td>400 gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swing sets</td>
<td>Penprime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned; 101st Airborne Division (Airborne),
Period Ending 31 October 1971, ROCAF SFGR-65 (U3) (U)

h. Operations: Significant Activities.

(1) On 7 May 71, Division PSYOP in conjunction with 9th Special Operations Squadron (9th SOS) targeted the local populace in PHONQ DEAN (D) utilizing Volunteer Informant and Rewards themes. On 8 May 71, Vietnamese civilians informed the local FF unit of the location of two VC in a nearby hamlet in KHNQ DEAN (D), resulting in two VC and two AK-47s captured. The provincial S2 and S5 rewarded the civilians for their valuable information.

(2) On 12 May 1971, Division PSYOP Officer attended the MR I PSYOP Conference at CORDS Headquarters in DANANG. The principal topic discussed was the draw-down of US forces and its effect on the security of populated areas. After the discussion, USARV and MACV unit representatives determined that a continuous PSYOP campaign at regional and province level, supported by US PSYOP agencies, must be conducted to increase the Vietnamese people's confidence in the RF, FF, and PSDF. XXIV Corps subordinate commands pledged their continued support of MR I POLWAR and psychological operations until such time that XXIV Corps and its subordinate commands were redeployed from Vietnam.

(3) Division PSYOP conducted psychological operations supporting the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and the Provincial CHIEU NOI Directorate. The 1st Inf Div (ARVN) support included aerial broadcasts and leaflet drops exploiting operation LAMSON 720. A ground loudspeaker team from 4th Det, 7th PSYOP Bn worked with 101st POLWAR Co (DS to 1st Inf Div, ARVN) broadcasting Rice Denial and recruiting themes. The ground loudspeaker team supported the Chieu NOI Directorate by assisting the Cultural Drama and MEDCAP teams. This assistance consisted of broadcasting Reward and VIP themes.

(4) Several MEDCAP/PSYOP operations were conducted in Jun 71 in PHU LCC (D). During the MEDCAP, a ground loudspeaker team broadcasted VIP and Rewards themes while members of the 101st POLWAR Co (ARVN) were explaining the benefits of joining the 1st Inf Div (ARVN). Simultaneously, Division PSYOP conducted aerial broadcasts, consisting of VIP and Reward themes throughout the targeted hamlets.

(5) On 12 Jun 71, a Vietnamese farmer discovered a cache site containing 30 x 82m rounds and 100 fuses in his rice field in HUONG TRA (D). The civilian informed the local FF platoon of his discovery. The district Chief ordered an RF company to destroy the munitions. The farmer was rewarded 6,000VND for discovering the cache and informing the district authorities.

(6) On 29 Jun 71, MAJ Hoag, Commanding Officer of 9th SOS, visited Division PSYOP to receive an orientation briefing and coordinate future 9th SOS support for the division. From this interaction, Division PSYOP was
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National Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1971, RG5 CSSGR-65 (R3) (U)

Not able to determine the number of targets that 9th SOS could exploit
ing their flight time in the Division's AO.

(7) During Jul 71, the Division PSYOP officer met with the 9th SOS
District Senior Advisor (DSA) to discuss current PSYOP activities in his
District. The DSA advised the Division PSYOP officer of three areas in the
district which are considered sanctuaries of NV-VC cadre. The DSA requested
3rd Abn Div (Amph) PSYOP support in these areas. Three were four aerial
broadcast and leaflet drop missions conducted in these areas resulting in
76,000 leaflets distributed and 2,955 broadcast hours.

(8) On 3 and 11 August, 65 PSYOP supported 3rd Inf Div (ARVN) by
inserting an ARVN ground loudspeaker team on Fire Base WHB. On each occasion,
the team remained on the fire base for seven days broadcasting Chieu Hoi
appeals to elements of the 5th NVA East.

(9) As prescribed in XV Corps PSYOP PEO 4-71, 65 PSYOP affected
cooperation with the Province PSYOP Advisor (F'V) and Sector 35 for the
implementation of US Forces Repatriation PSYOP Campaign. The Province PSYOP
Advisor requested 65 PSYOP to direct its efforts only toward the Vietnamese
labors working at CAMP EAGLE, RVN-80, and ARVN 241 Combat Base. The remainder
of the population in THUA THIEN will be targeted by Vietnamese agencies.

(10) As elements of the division began to draw down their operations,
base camps were released to the control of ARVN forces. Vietnamese civilians
began extracting perimeter fixtures such as barbed wire and engineer stakes.
They also began cultivating fields and tending grave sites closer to the
perimeter of CAMP EAGLE. To preclude these operations, CAMP EAGLE Base
Defence requested PSYOP missions to admonish the people against taking
perimeter fixtures and inform them of artillery rounds impacting within one
kilometer of the perimeter wire. There were seven PSYOP missions conducted
resulting in 845 broadcast hours.

(11) During the 1st three months of the reporting period, 6th Det,
7th PSYOP Bn, in direct support of the 101st Abn Div (Amph) was successful
in maintaining the support of indigenous personnel for the VIP program in
THUA THIEN and THUA THIEN Provinces. The response of the people resulted in
the turnover of the following ordnance:

- 34 x 82mm mortar rounds
- 3 x 81mm mortar rounds
- 1 x French bazooka
- 16 x 75mm Chicol NB rounds
- 4 x 75mm Chicol HE rounds

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12 x 60mm mortar rounds
3 x B41 Rockets
6 x B40 Rockets
6 x M79 rounds
1 x TM 46 Anti-Vehicle mine
1 x Anti-Personnel mine
2 x Chico claymores
23 x Soviet and Chico grenades
13 x 82mm mortar fuses
6 x 60mm mortar fuses
3 x Recoilless rifle rounds
13 x Satchel charges
2 x Artillery VT fuses

The 4th Det, 7th PSYOP BN paid a sum of 21,656 VVN to the Vietnamese, who turned in the munitions, as a reward for their efforts.

(12) During the month of September 1971, 05 PSYOP supported 1st Inf Div (ARVN) during LAM SON 939 in QUANG TRI Province. The ARVN division requested and received 65 PSYOP aerial broadcast support. In addition, support was received from the 9th SOS in the form of aerial broadcasts and leaflet drops.

(13) On 10 Sep 71, Division PSYOP received a request from the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORS) for handouts and notebooks in support of the Traffic Safety Program in MIE. The themes of the handouts and notebooks were centered around the reduction of traffic accidents and the protection of pedestrians. Ten thousand handouts and 30,000 notebooks were printed by the Psychological Operations Center (POC) at I, DA NANG, and forwarded to CORS for distribution.

(14) On 26 Sep 71, 05 PSYOP implemented the XIA/PCW campaign targeted at the local populace of THUA THIEM Province. Eight aerial broadcasts and five leaflet droo missions have been conducted by Division PSYOP in support of this campaign, resulting in 7,05 broadcast hours and 326,000 leaflets disseminated. The purpose of this campaign is to influence indigenous personnel to give information pertaining to the status of persons XIA or PCW.

(15) During the reporting period, there were two NVA Hoi Chams (recliners) and two VC Hoi Chams. The most significant Hoi Cham was Do Duc Cuong of the K4A BN, 5th NVA Regt. His hard intelligence precipitated the annihilation of 14 NVA soldiers of his former unit. The most meaningful result of the 14 NVA KIA was the death of a battalion commander and a VC village chief.

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38
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 134th Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS GFCR-65 (R3) (U)

1. Medical.

(1) Preventive Medicine.

(a) Diarrheal disease is an ever-present threat to the health of the troops. One major outbreak occurred during early September at QLX C TPI. Investigation by this office disclosed that the probable cause was improperly chlorinated water. Steps were immediately taken to prevent further problems of this sort. A significant amount of diarrheal disease is felt to result from failure of troops in the field to properly treat their drinking water with chlorine tablets. Education in this area was conducted during routine visits to fire bases by the Preventive Medicine staff.

(b) The number of dogs kept as pets within the division far exceeds that authorized by Div Reg 40-17. Increased command emphasis was placed in this area in an attempt to reduce the dog population and assure the owner's vaccinations were being kept up to date.

(c) The malaria rate for the division continues to be very low in relation to other units in Vietnam. Command emphasis placed on prophylactic measures is believed to play a significant role in this low rate. Aerial insecticide spray missions were also carried out to supplement personal measures taken to protect against malaria.

(d) Monthly inspections of unit areas and mess halls are conducted to assure that high levels of sanitary vigilance are maintained in the division.

(e) A survey of all water sources and production points within the division was conducted in July with the cooperation of the 9th Med Lab (USARV). The quality of water being delivered was found to be very good.

(f) The apparent increase in the hepatitis rate in August was the result of an improved method of data collection to accurately assess the number of cases occurring in the division.

(2) TDCA.

During the reporting period the division continued a supportive role acting as supervisors and instructors to indigenous medical and paramedical personnel. Travel restrictions due to the turbulent political situation have somewhat impaired the conduct of TDCA operations during the period.

(3) Visits of TRAV Consultants.

During the period the following distinguished visitors came to the division to view medical facilities and discuss medical operations.
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSPR-65 (23) (C)

HC Hughes, USAFR Surgeon
COL R. Ross, USAFR Surgeon
COL Bruce Haymond, Surgical Consultant to USAFR
COL Fred Sommer, Preventive Medicine Consultant to USAFR
COL Castellote, Medical Consultant
COL Miller, USAFR Dental Surgeon
N.J. Fordham, USAFR Social Worker Consultant

(4) Reporting,

(a) No new reports were initiated during the reporting period.

(b) Two reports were deleted: Weekly Telegraphic Morbidity Report RCS-Med 78 (R2), and the Daily Exemption/Rehabilitation Report. The weekly Exemption/Rehabilitation Report remains in effect.

(5) Aviation Medicine,

(a) During the period 699 flight physicals of various types were accomplished, for an average of 117 per month.

(b) The number of aviation medical officers assigned continues below authorized level. At the end of the reporting period six aviation medical officers were assigned against an authorized eight positions. During the period one aviation medical officer received a compassionate reassignment to CONUS and was replaced by an officer attached from the 1st Arm Bde.

(c) The Division Surgeon has become a member of the aviation safety and maintenance management team headed by the ADC. This team makes periodic visits to aviation units to assess their overall operations from the viewpoint of safety and maintenance management. The Division Surgeon also contributes to the program of the newly established monthly Senior Commander's Aviation Safety and Maintenance Seminar.

(d) The Division experienced several aircraft accidents during the period which were attributable to or suspected of being caused by social disorientation.

(6) Admission Statistics (rates/1000 man/year):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hepatitis</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychiatric Disorders</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>114.7</td>
<td>106.1</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Operational Report - Issues Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS OSFGR-65 (R3) (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respiratory Disease</strong></td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skin Disease</strong></td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pneumonia of Undetermined Origin</strong></td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Heat Injuries</strong></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Immersion Foot</strong></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Battle Injuries</strong></td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Battle Injuries</strong></td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non-Effective Rate (rate/1000 men/day)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
j. Signal.

(1) The 501st Signal Battalion (Airborne) provided Communications-Electronics support for the 101st Abn Div (Airbl) Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MORGAN MAMAN 70. Four channel radio carrier teams supported the three Brigade Headquarters by providing telephone communications to the Infantry Bn CP’s. Radio teletype (RATT) continuously supported the division, the three Brigades and DISCOM. Secure FM radio nets supported the division by providing communications from the Division Tactical Operation Center to the Brigade Tactical Operation Centers, Division Forward Operations and Division Advance Operations. The 501st Sig Bn was augmented by personnel and equipment from the 1st Sig Bde to provide additional multichannel radio support to the division.

(2) The Bn established a communication complex at Fire Base T-BONE in May, supporting a joint 101st Abn/1st Infantry Div (ARVN) operation (LAMSON 720). A 12 channel system was installed at CAMP EAGLE. The personnel and equipment utilized were assets of the 1st Sig Bde.

(3) In June the division was supported by communications on two division forward relocations. The move from T-BONE to IA VANC was supported by FM secure, RATT, and 12 channel communication (1st Sig Bde). These communications were again provided in support of the move from IA VANC to DONG HA. The two FM secure automatic retransmit stations were again established at Fire Base RAKASAN to insure reliable communications in the division operation and the intelligence nets.

(4) Division Forward CP at DONG HA continued to be supported by communications in the month of July. Additional communication support was established for the 101st Abn Div Liaison Cp collocated with 1st ARVN Div ‘n Hue. The Sig Bn provided two FM secure radio stations in support of the Liaison Cp. The division General Purpose RATT net increased in size with the addition of 1st Bde, 5th Inf (Mech) and 3/5 Cav Sqn stations. The Sig Bn provided FM secure, communications center, RATT, switchboard and local telephone service to the now division forward at QUANG TRI Forward Operational Base (QFOB). The Division Forward relocation occurred in August, at which time the 1st Bde, 5th Inf (Mech) was redeployed and deleted from the CP RATT net. Multichannel communications were provided by a element of the 1st Sig Bde in direct coordination with the Division Signal Office. The secure telephone (AUTOSEVCOM) located in the Forward TOC was maintained as required by XXIV Corps to support the OCBG.

(5) During the month of September the Bn maintained communications support for division forward at QFOS. A FM station was installed and operated by personnel from the Sig Bn, connecting 426th SPS Bn (CAMP EAGLE) and a multipoint Refuel/Re-Arm facility (NAM LOC). This net was automatically retrans-
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (u)

mitted at Fire Base RAKKASAN. Additional communications assets were installed
for DISCOM in support of an ARVN operation (JASON 810). A PATT station was
established at MAI LOC which was part of the DISCOM FSSE net. A change in the
FM net configuration occurred to provide a terminal at CAMP EAGLE in support of
DISCOM operations with an additional station at QTFT (Movement Control Center).
In late September the requirement terminated for PATT at MAI LOC. The PATT
van was then installed in the DISCOM FSSE net in support of 3/5 Cav S-6n's
preparation for redeployment.

(6) During the month of October the F6 continued to support the 101st AIN
Div elements with FM, PATT, communications center and switchboard operations.
During Typhoons Elaine and Hester, the F6 activated and operated an FM radio
net between division, the three brigades and HUM sector in support of disaster
relief operations. A 4 channel VHF system was installed from 3rd F6 to 7th F6
in support of 3/5 Cav S-6n's redeployment.

k. Aviation.

(1) Headquarters, 101st AIN Gp (Cbt) (Ambl) provided aviation support to
the division and aviation staff personnel, and to the division special staff.
During this reporting period support was provided for Operation JEFFERSONIAN,
Disaster Relief. The pathfinder platoon under the operational control of the
101st AIN Gp 53, successfully completed the following missions:

US Combat Assaults
ARVN Combat Assaults
US Artillery Moves
ARVN Artillery Moves
Opening/Closing of FSB's

(2) The pathfinder platoon continued to furnish air traffic control on
the division FSB. Daylight weather reports were provided on an hourly basis
which conserved aircraft flight time and contributed to the area intelligence
picture. The pathfinder platoon also provided training to infantry units
that facilitated air mobile operations within the division.

(3) During the reporting period, the 101st AIN Gp (Cbt) continued to
render utility, medium and heavy lift aviation support to the 101st AIN
Div (Ambl) and other allied forces in the area of operations. The support
consisted of logistical resupply, artillery movement, tactical and logistical
troop movement and civilian disaster relief.

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43
(4) The Group provided aviation support for Operation LAMSON 720 until the operation terminated on 31 August 1971 and Operation LAMSON 810 from 6-18 September 1971. Concurrently, the Group provided aviation support for Operation JEFFERSON GLEN until it terminated on 8 October 1971. Reports concerning these operations were forwarded to 101st Abn Div (Air) on 11 October 1971.

(5) During the month of October, the Northeast monsoon began and the weather conditions in the area of operations were characterized by increasing thunderstorms activity and low ceilings. The Group provided aviation support for US and ARVN units in repositioning from forward EB's to establish the realignment required by the Monsoon Dynamic Defense Plan 11-71. Throughout October numerous tactical and logistical missions were delayed or canceled due to the prevailing weather conditions. The monsoon activity persisted throughout October with only intermittent days of good flying weather.

(6) On 23 October 1971, Typhoon Hector became the focal point of concern to all units in Military Region I. The typhoon hit the 101st Abn Div area of operations at approximately 1900 hrs. Timely preparation assisted in minimizing material damage and personnel injuries in the group area. Accompanying the high winds of the typhoon were torrential rains which, after a few days, caused flooding in a large area of Military Region I. In addition to providing aviation assets for seven days in support of civilian disaster plans in Northern MAI, the Group launched 5 CH-47s for a three day period to assist the 11th CAG in relief operations for storm damaged areas around CHU LAI and DA NANG. Statistical data on aviation support provided in relief of civil disaster is as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TONS</th>
<th>PAY</th>
<th>SCR TISS</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
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<tr>
<td>24 Oct 71</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>50.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Oct 71</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Oct 71</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>513</td>
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<td>28 Oct 71</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>85.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Oct 71</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>69.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Oct 71</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>37.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct 71</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>30.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>184.8</td>
<td>2289</td>
<td>1186</td>
<td>300.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) Maximum use of ARRT3 school quotas greatly assisted in upgrading quality of some of the more critical MOS's. Aviator contact and instrument proficiency has been emphasized through an internal program at company level.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS C3FOR-65 (R3) (U)

Additionally, the following format training has been conducted for personnel
outside of the aviation group.

(a) An Airmobility School was conducted for commanders and selected
staff officers from battalions, brigades and the division staff during the
past semiannual period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ATTENDANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-3 Jun 71</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-27 Jun 71</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7 Aug 71</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Oct 71</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) On 19 October 1971 the 101st Avn Gp was tasked with the responsibility
for training 26 officers and 342 noncommissioned officers from the 1st ARV Inf
Div. The training covered Pathfinder operations, Aircraft Familiarization,
Rigging and operation of Rear and Refueling points. The first class began
on 25 October 1971 with 22 personnel completing training in October 71. A
total of 168 students are scheduled to complete the training by 25 November
1971.

(3) Safety. The 101st Avn Gp experienced 15 accidents and 21 incidents
during the reporting period. Additionally sixty precautionary and no forced
landings were recorded. The Group flew a total of 92,948 hrs with a total of
15 accidents for an overall accident rate of 13.9%.

(9) Aircraft Maintenance. During the reporting period the Group main-
tained an exceptionally high availability rate. A beneficial by product of the
announced USARV flying hour program is that aircraft maintenance and
group operations are coordinating daily to insure that the program objectives
are achieved. The aircraft availability rate during the period has been:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>TOTAL HOURS</th>
<th>AVG AVAILABILITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UH-2H</td>
<td>62,232</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1C</td>
<td>10,078</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47</td>
<td>13,957</td>
<td>82%</td>
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<tr>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>6,308</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (83) (V)

1. Engineers.

(1) During May 1971, Co constructed three fire bases in support of combined US/ARVN operations. Following a combat assault on Co PFC Mountain (YD335108), work began immediately clearing several landing zones. By 4 May the required pioneer work was complete: a 155mm howitzer battery position, a 105mm howitzer battery position, and five log vads were completed. Work was hampered by continued sporadic rocket and mortar attacks. In early May work began on the construction of Fire Base "TAN VAN" (YD588935). A road network was constructed to provide access to Route 567. In the western table, jungle was cleared and areas leveled for two artillery batteries, one 155mm and one 155mm battery. An 8x24 PFC bunker was constructed in defilade between the two batteries. Two log pads were constructed for C-130 aircraft. The eastern hill was prepared for a 155mm battery with two additional log vads constructed on the hill. A total of 150,000 pounds of demolition were expended in the construction of the fire base and clearing of fields of fire. All work was completed on 31 May 1971. On 8 May a Co air assaulted to Hill 642 (YD588038) and began work on the construction of Fire Base "TAN". Work completed on the fire base was the construction of two 105mm howitzer battery areas, leveling of two log pads, construction of one 10x10 and two 8x12 bunkers, preparation of mortar positions and clearing fields of fire. An interior road net was constructed, a communications trench dug completely around the perimeter, and an "anti-snapper" fence constructed. On 13 May a second element from A Co moved from Co PFC to KM QUY to begin construction of a pioneer road from Fire Base KM QUY to Route 567. Utilizing two D-7 dozers and demolition teams the six kilometers of road were pioneered by the end of the month. Co B completed the construction of 12 on 8x12 bunkers, the leveling and construction of a 105mm and 155mm battery position, and the construction of defensive positions. At Fire Base CHAATU, the lower log pad was expanded to accommodate a 155mm howitzer battery and construction began on a 20x24 mess bunker. Support was rendered to the infantry for short duration operations at Fire Base KATHRYN, Fire Base EAGLE'S NEST, CCC Ball Mountain, and CP PHATOK. On 20 May work began on the reopened of Route 598 along the base of the foothills from Fire Base JACO south to the Song Bo River to provide an access to the area for resettlement. Co C continued the construction of Fire Base RFI/2 and the upgrade of Route 1-H-19. In Route 1-L-19, 7,250 cubic yards of fill were spread, shaped, and compacted. Five culverts were emplaced along the roadway. 130 cubic yards of rock were emplaced on Route 545. On Fire Base RFI five 8x12, ten 12x16, and one 20x12 PFC bunker were completed. At Fire Base DMZ a 10x6 sleeping bunker was constructed for the 2-11th Arty personnel. At PHN BAI, a rear area firing position was constructed for the 1-321st Arty which involved the relocation of four 22A butts from the 63rd Sig En area to the 1-721st area. At CAMP Eagle scarifying, shaping, ditching, and upgrading of interior roads was continued, with 22,800 gallons of tank prime being applied.
(2) During June, A Co continued to concentrate efforts in the completion of Fire Bases Binh Dinh and Kim Quy and the pioneer road connecting the two. At Fire Base Kim Quy the battery was extracted from the hill and work begun to upgrade the position. All existing structures were taken off the battery position allowing it to be lowered and enlarged. Interior roads were cut to include two turnarounds and the access road upgraded. Upon completion of the new pad and artillery pads were constructed. One 10' x 24' bunker was airlifted to the fire base to serve as an infantry TOC. On 5 June a combat assault was conducted into Fire Base Tennessee. After the initial sweep of the hill, work was begun preparing the hill for receipt of six 105mm and three 155mm howitzers. Three 8' x 12' bunkers were airlifted to the fire base. Work was then initiated in constructing a second 105mm position on the hill to the east of the existing fire base. The hill was leveled and slots dug for the placement of CONEX containers to be utilized as an FDC, TOC, and ASP bunkers. At Fire Base Vechel two slots were cut and two 8' x 12' bunkers airlifted into position where they were utilized as an FDC and XO's post for a composite 2-inch and 175mm battery. A quadruple culvert 100 meters east of the intersection of Route 547 and the Vechel access road was replaced after being washed out by heavy unseasonal rains. At Fire Base Birmingham six slots were cut and placed into the bunkers of the 1st ARVN Armored Cav in defilade. Additionally, triple strands of concertina tape were placed around the perimeter. At Fire Base Gladiator, B Co completed the construction of the mess and the bunkers and the road center. On Fire Base Minnehaha nine ASP slots and command pad were completed. Defensive wire was emplaced to protect the perimeter defense. Eight additional 8' x 12' bunkers were airlifted to the hill bringing the total number to eighteen. Operations were completed and the fire base was closed on 22 June. On Route 598 culverts were emplaced at seven locations to provide for cross drainage. Upgrades of the roadbed continued with the placing, shaping, and compacting of 4,600 cubic yards of fill. On 20 June a combat assault was conducted to Dang Chuo to begin construction of Fire Base Firestone. On 24 June a D3A was inserted and work began on construction of a log pad and artillery positions. Clearing of the hill was continued for a mortar position and C&C pad. C Co continued the upgrade of Route ML-19 with the placement of 550 cubic yards of rock on the surface and the construction of culvert headwalls. On Fire Base Rifle bunker construction was completed on 9 June. Extensive mopping was done to clear the area of operations in the Ruong Valley. At Camp Eagle, A Co dismantled two SBA huts in the 39th Trans BN area and transported them to the 501st Sig BN and 394th 101st Abn Div areas for reconstruction on a self-help basis. Headquarters Company continued construction of the Ruong Thuy District farm to market road, hauling and spreading 1,580 cubic yards of fill. On Route ML-19, 730 cubic yards of rock were hauled and
spread, bringing the road up to minimum fair-weather standards. At CAMP EVANS, B Co continued construction of SEA huts for the 326th Med Bn, work was begun on extending the length of aircraft revetments at the 158th Amn Bn. An ASP was constructed for the 4/77th ADA. At NOU FAI, C Co repaired towers on the bunkerline and installed runway lights on the NOU FAI Airport.

(3) During July, A Co completed reconstruction of two bunkers on OP LUM which had been destroyed by the explosion of the ASP. At FIRE BASE BANGUN a train yard area for the 1st ERE was constructed. This area included a rifle range with pop-up targets and a 1,000 inch range for towing weapons. On 25 July, work began restoring FIRE BASE JEMENDAL for the monsoon season. U.S. non-standard bunkers were torn down; the material being salvaged for bracing existing bunkers and constructing new perimeter bunkers. On 1 July work commenced on the construction of facilities for the 2-94th Artillery positions at FIRE BASE BASTIAN. Work accomplished was the clearing of all non-standard structures from the site, landscaping the area, excavating slots, and constructing six of twenty-one 12x16' bunkers. After the initial combat assault of FIRE BASE WINCHEL, a position was prepared which would accommodate a full 155 battery. Slots were dug for an FDC, ASP, and TCC, an M-450 dozer and backhoe were utilized to cut a shelf and trench for defensive positions around the hill. On 24 July an element began construction on FIRE BASE SHEAR. One 8x12x24' bunker was airlifted from FIRE BASE JEMENDAL to FIRE BASE SHEAR to serve as a TCC. Equipment was utilized to dig a communications trench and to level both US and ARVN command and logistics pads. B Co completed operations at FIRE BASE GLADIATOR and the fire base was closed on 7 July. On 19 July, infantry and engineer elements combat assaulted to FIRE BASE MAUREN to begin bunker extraction operations. Ten bunkers were extracted from the hill and flown to CAMP SHAVE for later placement on the QUAO TRC Defense Perimeter. The construction of FIRE 9 at FIRESTONE continued with construction of two blivet racks, excavation for the placement of command and control facilities, and the airlifting of five 8x16' bunkers to the fire base. On Route 598 6,530 cubic yards of fill were placed to raise the road level through low areas. Nine additional culverts were emplaced to accommodate cross road drainage. Following Typhoon Harriet during the second week of July, many additional drainage structures were necessary at FIRE BASE RIPPLE. C Co constructed seven major culvert/cement swale and catch basin drainage systems. Seven fighting positions were reconstructed, sandbagged, and provided with drainage structures. Remaining was placed on the upper edge and sides of the hill. At FIRE BASE TOWHEAD a 12x16' and a 10x16' sloping bunker, a 16x16' infantry OP bunker, and a generator shed were constructed. In support of the 2-94th ARty a minisweep was conducted on FIRE BASE QUICK and trenches constructed to allow for the positioning of a battery of 8" howitzers. On 27 July a combat assault was made to FIRE BASE JEMENDAL to
recover eight 8'x12' bunkers, seven of which were flown to the UHANG TRI perimeter and one to the PHU BAI perimeter. At CAMP TACUE, Headquarters Company continued maintenance of interior roadways, with the application of 27,820 gallons of presprine. Backhoes were used at 501st Sig Bn for the excavation of six fighting positions, a 100-foot trench, and a 75 meter ditch. At UHANG TRI, a Headquarters Company 1-450 cleared sites for twenty bunkers on the base camp perimeter. A Co provided technical assistance to the 501st Sig Bn in the construction of two foundations for SFA huts at CAMP EAGLE. In the 1st Bde area at CAMP EAGLE, A Co dug 100' of fighting trench, cut drainage ditches, and constructed three billet pads for FIEB. One platoon of A Co, sent to EAGLE BEACH to repair typhoon damage, rebuilt the bath house and replaced 100 meters of board fence. At CAMP USAS a D-7 dozer was used to clear an area adjacent to the ASP to facilitate erection of a security fence, and to push up berms along the bunker line. A backhoe was utilized to dig trenches on the bunker line for the emplacement of sensors. C Co completed the reconstruction of the mess hall for B Trp, 2-17th Cav at CAMP EAGLE, and reconstructed the fences adjacent to Eagle International helipad. At PHU BAI, C Co relocated a 25'x40' helipad along the flight refueling line for 159th Avn Bn and dismantled a second pad. In addition, three PHU BAI perimeter guard towers were repaired.

(4) In August 1971, operations were begun on the fire bases throughout the AO to prepare them for the approaching monsoon season. A Co continued operations at Fire Base NORTHERN cutting two extraction LZs in the vicinity of the fire base. Additionally, T02 and clearing trenches were excavated, and a logistics pad was leveled and secprimed. Construction of OP APOLLO was begun on 6 August. Utilizing two M-450 dozers and demolitions, the hill was cleared, a T02 had been constructed, mortar positions built, a command pad and emergency log pad constructed and fighting trenches and sleeping trenches excavated. At Fire Base PAGOOG, construction of bunkers for the 2-34th Arty was completed with the construction of sixteen 105mm bunkers. The mess hall entrance was expanded and backfilling of the bunker completed. The renovation of Fire Base POCOGSHAM continued with the construction of new bunkers along the contracted perimeter and interior bunkers in the 700 and 105mm howitzer areas. At OP VIPER work commenced on the clearing of a 30 meter wide strip through a friendly minefield encircling the CP. This work was cleared to facilitate the emplacement of defensive wire and foxholes. C Co discontinued operations at Fire Base PAGOOG on 6 August with the closing of the fire base. Phase II of the project on Route 598 was completed on 13 August. The final work completed on Route 598 was the installation of four 24' culverts, sandpapering and cementing of four culvert headwalls and the reditching of three kilometers of road. At UHANG TRI, a thirty-foot observation tower was constructed on the eastern portion of the defense perimeter. Maintenance operations continued at Fire Base JACK with the presprining of one 105mm battery area, interior and access roads, and the VIP pad. Work on bunker drainage, emplacement of tanglefoot wire, and rifle range construction were continued. At Fire Base
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CORP-65 (R3) (U)

TOKHARAK, C Co cut a new 600 meter access road to the fire base. Three sections of 36" culvert were emplaced and 200 cubic yards of rock spread on the road. On the perimeter, three bunkers were dismantled and replaced with 8'x12' bunkers utilizing 72" culvert as overhead cover in a new design. On Fire Base ARGAL, three 8'x12' bunkers were airlifted and emplaced and one 12'x16' bunker constructed for artillery sleeping positions. A six-man demolitions team was airlifted to YB350OLZ and destroyed four NVA bunkers at that location. In the Alpha Sector perimeter road at PHU BAI, 3,450 cubic yards of fill were hauled and spread to provide a laterite cap for the road. On 18 August a second material recovery operation was initiated at Fire Base BEREAKS. The operation was completed on 21 August with the backhaul of the following materials: 192 sections of 72" culvert, 3,000 BF of 3'x1'" lumber, 1,300 BF of 4'x10'" lumber, ten 8'x12' bunkers, and one 16'x16' bunker. At Camp EAGLE, Headquarters Company continued scarifying, shaping, ditching, and upgrading of interior roads, with 6,700 gallons of water being applied. A D-5 dozer was used to construct 50 meters of berm along the bunkline. A Co placed 72" culvert at three washout areas on the perimeter road, constructed fuel blivet pads and berm for 1st FSB, and began construction of a new staircase at Eagle Aircraft Control Tower. At Camp TAMAN, a building site was prepared with the pouring of sixteen footers, and reconstruction of the building was begun. At PHU BAI, C Co emplaced 344 cubic yards of fill in preparation of bunker site on the perimeter, and the bunker was airlifted into position. On the perimeter road 3,456 cubic yards were hauled and spread to provide a laterite cap for the road, and a D-5 dozer was used to construct 400 meters of perimeter berm. At Camp EAGLE, C Co emplaced a 300-foot culvert and built a ration storage shed at the class I yard. In addition, the FSB walls were rebuilt.

(5) During September 1971, the construction of CP APOLLO was completed by A Co. Two 8'x12' bunkers were airlifted onto the hill on 5 September. A passageway was constructed linking the two bunkers. A CP complex was constructed utilizing two CMEX containers. At Fire Base BASTION, work was completed on the construction of four perimeter bunkers; 520 cubic yards of rock were placed on the access and interior roads. At Fire Base BIRMINGHAM, three 8'x12' perimeter bunkers were constructed. The TCC briefing room was enlarged. 230 cubic yards of rock were placed on the interior roads. After the initial sweep of OP SABAN work was commenced on the hill clearing fields of fire and leveling berm. Two 8'x12' bunkers were airlifted to the CP and one 8'x12' bunker constructed on site to house the CP, radar, and senior readout facilities. On 6 September A Co began the upgrading of pioneer trace between Fire Base BARTOKA and Fire Base AMHE. The road was widened, ditched and shaped. Culverts along the route were cleaned and upgraded. One ford was constructed and a double 72" culvert was airlifted into place at a second location. At Fire Base AMHE a road was constructed from the log pad to the ASP. Upon completion of work at Fire Base AMHE the road from AMHE to CP LA WAS was upgraded. The clearing operations were continued.
at OP VIFER until an explosion on 11 September resulted in 3 KIA. On 24 September an additional KIA resulted when an explosion occurred while personnel were marking the previously cleared lane. On 28 September work was initiated on the construction of OP ELLE. An 86-450 dozer and demolitions were utilized to clear fields of fire, level areas for helipads, and construct a shelf around the OP. On 29 September, two 8"x4" bunkers and two 8"x12" bunkers were backhauled from OP CHECKMAK. At Fire Base JACK, B Co installed two 24" culverts, constructed a tower to support a 5,000-gallon water tank, and began pouring a concrete cap on the TOC. At Fire Base RAKKASAN a portable overhead cover was constructed for the fighting positions and two new fighting positions were built. The perimeter and interior defensive wire were improved with replacement of sections and patching as necessary. At CAMP EBRA, the construction of a 30"x100" Butler building for use as the 3rd Sde Avn Plt maintenance facility was completed. Work was initiated on the upgrade of the road surface and the drainage structures on the perimeter road. At Fire Base EBRA, construction was completed on one 8"x16" ASP bunker and one 8"x24" sleeping bunker. 5,500 gallons of perversine were spread on facilities on the hill and drainage structures were improved. One 8"x12" and four 3"x16" bunkers were constructed on Fire Base ASSEM by C Co. The third and final material extraction mission was conducted at Fire Base BRICK with the backhaul of two 8"x24" and eight 8"x12" bunkers. At Fire Base TOBAHAWK two 8"x12" sleeping bunkers were airlifted into position and seven perimeter bunkers were reconstructed. On the upgrade of the perimeter road at HUN DAI, 1,500 cubic yards of fill was hauled and spread. At CAMP EBRA, Headquarters Co continued the scarifying, shaping, ditching, and upgrading of interior roads, with 18,950 gallons of perversine being applied. Aircraft revetments were filled for 5th 75mm and L-77th ARA. 86-450 dozers were used to level areas at the 426th 365 BN and to upgrade 9 sector of the bunkerline. At CAMP EBRA, Headquarters Co applied 43,430 gallons of perversine to the airstrip, log pad, and access roads in 6 days while supporting operation LAYSON ESO. At CAMP EBRA, three 24" culverts were removed from their location on the 1/326th 365 BN access road and repositioned after the stream bed had been raised three feet. On the 1-327th Infantry access road, three 24" culverts were encased. Various sized culverts were encased on the F and G sectors of the bunkerline. The stairway to the top of Eagle Tower was completed. An 8"x8" access shaft was constructed in vicinity of division headquarters. Fosters were constructed for a Ground Control Approach Facility at Eagle International Heliport and a fence surrounding it was constructed following placement of the equipment. The rehabilitation of the GCA IE firing position was completed in support of the 2-94th Arty at CAMP EBRA. The project scope was the construction of drainage facilities for four gun pads, redocking of two pads, the reconstruction of three ASP bunkers, and the rebracing of two personnel bunkers. At CAMP
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Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

ETANS, B Co completed work on the rehabilitation of the Admissions and Disposition Facility for C/326th Med Bn. Headwalls were constructed on all existing culverts in A and B sectors of the perimeter road. Construction of the 3rd Bde Aviation Pit Butler building was completed. Much effort was expended in minesweeps. In addition to daily minesweeps from CAMP ETANS to Fire Base JACK, minesweeps were conducted on the roads from Fire Base JACK to Fire Base RAKKASAN, Fire Base BARBARA to Fire Base NANCY, and Fire Base ANN to Combat Base LA VANG. On the NHU HAI Perimeter Road, C Co spread 1,896 cubic yards of fill. C Co also replaced the floor of the Division AG Classified Message Center at CAMP EAGLE, and repaired a sixty-foot revetment at 85th Evacuation Hospital.

(6) During October, A Co spread 25 cubic yards of gravel on the roads at Fire Base BOSTON before it was turned over to the ARVN. At Fire Base BIRMINGHAM the briefing room was completed, a 12'x12' sleeping bunker, and a 16'x16' mess bunker were constructed, and work was begun on capping the TDC, mess bunker, and commander's bunker with concrete. Fields of fire were cleared and technical assistance was provided for laying defensive wire. At OP HUI KE a log pad was cleared. At OP ELLIS dozers were used to cut a shelf around the hill and to prepare bunker sites. Two bunkers were built at CAMP EAGLE and flown to OP ELLIS but were extracted when the OP closed. At OP APOLLO a billet rack and trash dump were constructed. At CAMP EAGLE, a Butler building at 159th Aviation Bn was dismantled. At the 501st Sig Bn, three sites were graded and tent frames were erected on them. In support of 2/34th Arty, two gun pads were rebuilt and six bunkers were rebuilt or braced. In support of 1/327th Infantry a backhoe and grader were used in the construction of three culverts. Wing-walls were built for the culverts on the A/326th Med Bn access road. The rifle range on G sector of the perimeter was completed. Roofing was replaced on the 4/77th APA hangar. The Drug Amnesty building at 326th Med Bn was rehabilitated. At the 426 SARS area of the perimeter road three 60-inch culverts were emplaced. Two 16'x16' above ground FDC bunkers were constructed, one at 2/11th Arty, the other at 2/320th Arty. At E sector of the Eagle perimeter, work was begun constructing 75 meters of a wire barrier trace in a stream bed. One Pit of A Co participated in a civic actions project, placing decking on the NHU Railroad bridge to make it passable to vehicular as well as rail traffic. B Co completed the concrete cap for the TDC bunker and a 5,000 gallon water tower at Fire Base JACK. Rock and pansprine were spread on the JACK interior roads. The mess hall was improved by building a porch with overhead cover for the serving line and building an area for a refrigeration unit. At Fire Base RAKKASAN, a backhoe was used on drainage projects. Twenty-one loads of rock were spread on the interior roads. Work was completed on a storage shed for the artillery mess hall and the overhead covers for six fighting positions and two billet racks were repaired. EOD missions were conducted to dispose of forty-six 105mm rounds and six 81mm rounds. Daily
minesweeps continued, and on 22 October a 10-pound mine was discovered and blown in place. At CAMP EVANG, the C/4/77 ABA "hot spot" area was enlarged. Two rocket shelters were dug for 3/187th Inf Bn and repair of the 3rd Pde Briefing Room bunker was completed. Twenty-four loads of sand, 18 loads of gravel, and 17 loads of Laterite were hauled to various units on CAMP EVANG. At CAMP SAGLE, a 20'x28' Butler building was erected for use in the Drug Amnesty program. B Co conducted two combat support missions in support of the 3/187th Inf Bn. On 18 October one engineer squad was inserted into an LZ to search for booby traps. Six were located and blown in place. On 21 October a squad of engineers was inserted on Hill 51, and an M-450 dozer was inserted the following day. The M-450 was used to clear fields of fire, dig trash dumps and an ammo pit, and to construct a trench. 500 meters of four-strand wire fence was constructed. The squad and dozer were withdrawn on 22 October. At Fire Base PIPLE, Co C crossstraddled and backfilled two bunkers, and repaired two blivist racks. At Fire Base ABSPOL the blast wall in front of the TCC and the ASP bunker were finished. Fighting trenches were dug. Extensive drainage work was done in the area of the mess hall. A blivist rack was constructed, and the pathfinder bunker was repaired. At Fire Base TANAIK, the retaining walls of the blivet storage area were finished, the TCC roof was repaired, and drainage was improved around the standdown bunker. Twenty cubic yards of rock were placed on the TANAIK access road. On the HU 261 perimeter road, 1289 cubic yards of fill and 426 cubic yards of rock were hauled and spread; one culvert was replaced, and four culverts were repaired. Footers for two Butler buildings were built. The 2nd Pde Chapel, damaged by Typhoon Hester, was repaired. A water tower was built, and two guard towers were built at 8th PES. A grohridge was built in 3 sector of the bunkerline, and an ASP bunker at 1/502nd Inf was rehabilitated. Headquarters Company continued in general support of the division placing 11,200 gallons of cempire on SAGLE interior roads. Foshoes were used to improve drainage for a number of units at CAMP SAGLE, and dozers were used for various land clearing and backfilling missions.

a. Air Cavalry Operations.

(1) May 1971.

(a) During this reporting period Trp A provided general support to division, performing visual reconnaissance on a mission basis, direct support was rendered to 1st Bde, 5th Inf (Mech) and 369th VM Marines. On 3 May, while supporting ARVN operations near Fire Base BATOK, a Trp teams discovered and destroyed two .51 caliber weapons. On 8 May, the Trp conducted reconnaissance of Route 616 with activity noted all along the route. From 10-12 May while supporting the 369th VM Marines vicinity YC504987, A Trp
teams engaged and destroyed one .50 caliber MG I mortar and confirmed 8 NVA KIA. From 14 to 29 May A Trp worked along Route 616 and in the western AO. As in the past, the teams continued to receive mixed type of ground fire with five aircraft receiving hits. Five NVA were confirmed KIA. The Trp continued to employ TAC Air to disrupt the enemy road building efforts. A 6-ton truck was destroyed at X0631502 by A Trp gunships on the 29th. On 29-31 May, A Trp conducted operations in vicinity of XD9921 and Base Area 611. A Trp aircraft received hits and one scout pilot was WIA via YD052056, At XD022088, a training area was discovered complete with bleachers and blackboards. TAC Air was employed.

(b) During May Trp B continued with a primary mission of general support to division, providing visual reconnaissance. On 1 May, Trp B supported a D Trp insertion to secure a downed aircraft via Fire Base NORWANDY. On 9 May, Trp B ARP was inserted to destroy a communications wire network and bunkers in a SHAU Valley and to search for an enemy body previously killed by B Trp gunships. The 81mm team made contact with an enemy force resulting in 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA. On 12 May a CAY team from B Trp observed and destroyed a 2½ ton truck killing its driver. The truck was located North of ALOUI airstrip. On 23 May, Trp B gunships engaged 3 NVA resulting in 3 NVA KIA. On 23 May, an OH-6A from B Trp, while on a reconnaissance mission 1 km south of Tiger Mountain, in the A SHAU Valley, received a direct hit from an RFC round. The aircraft exploded in flight and crashed, resulting in two US WIA. Nothing remained of the aircraft.

(c) Trp C was employed in a general support role to division and occasionally in direct role supporting Brigades and ARVN elements. On 1 May, Trp C supported the ARVN elements assault on CO FUNK Mountain. Later that day the ARP was inserted on a downed aircraft on Fire Base ARROWHEAD. The insertion and extraction of the ARP were made under sporadic enemy fire. The crew was extracted. The aircraft was not. On 10 May the C Trp ARP was inserted on Fire Base ZON to secure and extract a downed UH-1H. The aircraft was extracted without incident. From 13 to 23 May C Trp alternated support between the 369th VN Marines and the 1st ARVN Division. On the 24th of May C Trp was repositioned to QUANG TRI to perform armed reconnaissance in the Northern AO, Routes 608, QL-9 and Red Devil Road. The Trp returned to their normal AO on 28 May and resumed their reconnaissance of the A SHAU and RIWONG RIWONG Valley.

(d) During this reporting period Trp D provided ground reconnaissance, downed aircraft security and acted as a reaction force for 2/17 units in contact. On 9 May Trp D was inserted at X2491865 to reinforce B Trp ARP in contact. The linkup was accomplished and the contact was broken. A LZ was secured and all elements were extracted from a cold LZ. Two NVA rucksacks were captured.
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(2) June 1971.

(a) During this reporting period, Trp A provided general support to Division performing visual reconnaissance. On mission basis, direct support was rendered to the 147th and 258th VN Marine units and 54th ARVN Bn. On 1 June, Trp A teams worked in Base Area 611, in IAGS, in the vicinity of YD 0508. Heavy antiaircraft fire from 37mm and 37mm weapons was received. The team moved out of range and continued to recon. Sixteen NVA were engaged and confirmed KIA during this incursion across the border. On 3 June, a Trp gunships flying in support of GCT1 vic Hickory took .50 caliber fire. One AH-1G was hit and the pilot gunner wounded, the aircraft returned to YN X3 TR1. From 11 to 28 June, a Trp supported VN Marine units in the vic of Fire Base SARGO, Fire Base EMBASSY, and Fire P BUMPER. During this period 18 NVA were engaged at confirmed KIA, a Trp team continued to take heavy fire, and seven aircraft sustained hits ranging from AK-47 to a 12.5mm hit in an AH-1G rotor blade. No crew injuries resulted. On 20 June, a Trp team discovered and destroyed an active .50 caliber position at YN0556X.

(b) For June, Trp B was used primarily in general support of division, however, limited direct support was rendered the Allied operations in the Fire Base FULMER area. On 1 June, Trp B ARP was inserted on a downed C Trp AH-1G and crew at YD723093. The crew and aircraft were extracted. On June 6, Trp B gunships engaged and destroyed a 24-ton truck at YC496X. On 7 June while flying a visual reconnaissance mission in the Northern AO, a Trp gunship engaged and confirmed 5 NVA KIA. On 9 June, a B Trp Cav team observed, engaged and destroyed two 24-ton trucks south of Fire Base PENDLETON. In support of the 1st ARVN Div on 22 June, B Trp gunships engaged and confirmed 7 NVA KIA near Fire Base FULMER. On 23 June B Trp ARP was inserted vic YD6656 to secure a downed B Trp AH-1G. The aircraft and crew were extracted.

(c) Trp C continued to perform aerial reconnaissance throughout the entire Division AO. Operating from FNU BAI to YWAN BAI, the troop supported both US and ARVN forces. The first week of June was spent in its entirety in Base Area 607, to develop possible targets for HOG FOG raid. Numerous lucrative targets were developed but the raid was cancelled. Trp C teams were repositioned to YWAN TR1 on a mission basis to support ARVN operations in the Northern AO in the vicinity of Fire Base FULMER.

(d) During this reporting period, Trp D provided route security for Division units and acted as the reaction force to 2/17 Cav units in contact. Their additional role of downed aircraft security was also exercised during the month. On 1 June, one platoon of D Troop was inserted at YD788002 to secure a downed C Trp aircraft. The aircraft was rigged and extracted successfully. On 25 June, one platoon was placed ECON to 1st Brigade. They provided route security from Fire Base TR1XHAN to Fire Base YANGHE through the end of the month.
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1/1st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(3) July 1971.

During this reporting period Trp A concentrated its visual efforts along Route 616 in general support to division. On 1 July, Trp A working near XD990667 took fire from two .51 caliber weapons. The positions were engaged resulting in one .51 caliber weapon damaged and 4 NVA KIA. Trp A resumed its visual reconnaissance of Route 616. From 10 to 16 July, Trp A engaged and confirmed 11 NVA KIA. Additionally, one LH took hits from small arms fire and crashed. The crew and aircraft were extracted. On 15 July, an AH-1G took .51 caliber fire near XD948330. An explosion occurred from unknown causes. The aircraft lost power and after missing an attempt to land at Fire Base SHEPARD was forced to autorotate into the river at XD996444. One crewman was recovered KIA by ground forces and the other was presumed drowned and listed MIA. Ten NVA were engaged and confirmed KIA on this day. On 19 July while working with the 238th VN Marines, 4 NVA were engaged and confirmed KIA. Additionally, later on the 19th, at XD012240 and XD052328, Trp A teams spotted an undetermined number of NVA in green uniforms. The gunships engaged the known locations, resulting in two .50 caliber machine guns destroyed and 14 NVA KIA. On 25 July, Trp A teams worked the OA KRONG Valley near Fire Base LANDLEY and Fire Base TAVERN. Working with TAL air the car teams confirmed 7 NVA KIA and two .51 caliber pits destroyed along with 4 bunkers. On 30 July, a Trp shifted its attention north along Route 638 and Red Devil Road. Heavy activity was noted with numerous shots-at's reported. At XD94504 4 NVA were engaged and KIA. At XD947502 a .50 caliber weapon was destroyed and 2 NVA KIA. At XD 954498 an AH-1G gunship took .51 caliber fire. The location was engaged with 2 NVA KIA.

(b) B Trp continued its primary mission of general support to the division and direct support to RVN Forces on a mission basis. On 1 July, B Trp ARP was inserted on a doomed LH at Fire Base ZON; the aircraft and crew were extracted. On 3 July, B Trp gunships destroyed a 2½ ton truck on the A SHAU Airstrip. On 8 July, at XD915386 and XD91264 gunships engaged and confirmed 3 NVA KIA and destroyed a .51 caliber weapon. On 16 July, a Bravo Trp LH on a visual reconnaissance mission along Route 548 took fire and was forced to land. The crew was extracted. From 19 to 29 July B Trp accounted for 11 NVA KIA and destroyed a 5 ton truck at XD307097. The A SHAU Valley was suitable for burning and 25 to 30 fires were started resulting in large areas destroyed.

(c) C Trp continued in the general support role with primary emphasis on the A SHAU and RUONG RUONG Valleys. On 4 July, C Trp experienced heavy combat damage while conducting an armed reconnaissance mission in the A SHAU Valley. Just north of the A SHAU Airstrip a C Trp LH received heavy multiple hits and was forced to land near Fire Base BLAZE with a hydraulic failure. The gun team supporting the extraction took heavy fire resulting in one AH-1G being hit and crashing. The crew was extracted from the aircraft as it burst into flames and was destroyed. All personnel, in all aircraft were safely returned.
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS C3994-65 (P3) (T)

To HU PAV. On 21-22 July emphasis was placed on Fire Base KUTS in preparation for an assault by the 3rd ARVN Regt. The remainder of the month was spent in direct support of the attack.

(a) D Trp provided route security for division units and acted as the reaction force to 2/17 Cav units in contact. 1-11 July, 1 Plt of D Trp was ORCON to 1st Bde providing route security from Fire Base HUE to Fire Base WICHAI. Sweeps of the base defense sector were performed.

(4) August 1971.

(a) A Trp again was in general support to division with limited support to 1st ARVN Division. From 1-9 August, A Trp teams concentrated their efforts in the Northern AO. Heavy fire was received along Route 608 and 616. At XD044315 a LOE took one hit and the team engaged the location, resulting in 2 KIA. At XD058312, 3 NVA were KIA. At XD056345 a LOE took fire from a .51 caliber and returned to base. An AH-1C was shot down at XD069’56. The crew was extracted. On 16 August A Trp teams while on a visual reconnaissance mission received fire from a .51 caliber weapon at XD92312. The weapon and 6 NVA were destroyed by gunships. On 20 August, A Trp team working in the vicinity of XD953551 took heavy fire. The aircraft took hits and was forced to land. The crew and aircraft were extracted. On 22 August, an A Trp team at XD917488 took fire from one .30 and .51 caliber fire. The aircraft took numerous hits and was forced down. The result were 1 US KIA major and 1 US KIA minor.

During August, a Trp worked the Route 608 area and 3rd Devil Road. Operating under heavy enemy fire, A Trp engaged and confirmed 22 NVA KIA. A scout observer engaged three NVA at XD078775 resulting in two NVA KIA and one FOI captured.

(b) During this reporting period C Trp was used in the primary role of general support to division. On 6 August, C Trp of FSB was inserted on a dancir C-47 at XD878195. The aircraft was secured for 24 hours and extracted. On 7 August, at XD158383 B Trp gunships destroyed a .51 caliber weapon. 0n 19 August gunships at XD27964 engaged and confirmed 1 NVA KIA. Again, while on a visual reconnaissance mission near XD753407, B Trp gunships engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA.

(c) During this reporting period C Trp performed visual reconnaissance in direct support of division. Emphasis was on the A FSB and ARVN forward areas. Limited support was provided the 3rd ARVN Regt. The 3rd Regt was working in the C Trp area of operations thus making it relatively easy to combine visual reconnaissance with direct support to the ground elements. On 10 August, the Trp noted a higher level of activity in the area vicinity Fire Base SEP. On 13 August an A0 extension was obtained from the 23rd Inf Div east of that location. Numerous shot-alls resulted. FSB air was employed with the
OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIRMOBILE),
Period Ending 31 October 1971, ROG DCFOR-65/R3 (R)

Airstrikes destroying a large living complex containing many bunkers and
huts. Fourteen secondary explosions were recorded during these airstrikes.

(a) During this reporting period Trp D provided ground reconnaissance
ability in general support to division. Plt sized sweeps were provided
for EAGLE Base Defense along with ambushes in B and C sectors.

(b) During this reporting period Trp A continued its visual reconnaissance
in general support to division and direct support to RVN forces. On 2-6
September, Trp conducted reconnaissance in the Route 608, Green Alpine Road,
QL-9 area of operations. On 6 September, Trp lent its support to LAMSON
810. During the day teams accounted for a .51 caliber weapon at XD32247 and
engaged and confirmed 13 NVA KIA. On 11 September, Trp scouts located the
first of four NVA 122mm field artillery pieces. These were located in the
vicinity of XD67249 and were engaged by Trp gunship with HEAT rockets
destroying them. Between the 16th and 17th of September Trp teams destroyed
6 trucks and an artillery tractor along with large quantities of ammunition
and supplies. On the 16th the Hac Bao Co was inserted to ground assess the
damage. The Hac Bao Co was instrumental in the destruction of even greater
amounts of ordnance and supplies. On 12 September, the Hac Bao Co was combat
assaulted into a suspected cache site at the junction of Route 608 and the
Green Alpine Road. The results of this raid were: 2,000 rounds of 122mm
artillery ammunition, 4,000 liters of PDL, 20 cases of AK-47 ammunition, 200
50 kilo bags of rice, 5,000 meters of telephone wire and 100,000 rounds of
37mm ammunition. In the same general area a large quantity of 75mm recoilless
ammunition was found. EOC personnel were inserted and it was destroyed. Later
TAC Air was employed as insurance that all cache pits were uncovered and
destroyed. From 22 to 29 September, Trp returned to the visual reconnaissance
role in the Route 616, Di Khong Valley area. A truck park with three trucks
was found and destroyed at XD199427. An additional 5 ton truck was found at
XD937257 and destroyed. At XD201155 an A Trp IDN took fire and was shot down.
The crew was extracted with the pilots listed as VIA serious. Ground fire was
light and 1 NVA KIA.

(b) During this reporting period B Trp assisted during LAMSON 810 and
repositioned the Trp to QUANG TRI. Visual reconnaissance was also performed
in general support of division in the recon zone. On 11 September, a B Trp
11-18 while supporting an insertion on OP HICKORY received intense small arms
fire and was riddled by claymore pellets from a command detonated mine. Eighty-
eight holes were counted in the aircraft which made a forced landing on NIE
SAHN. Results were 1 US KIA and 5 US WIA. On 12 September, B Trp gunships
destroyed a 30mm mortar at XD342452. The remainder of the month was spent
in a visual reconnaissance role, first in support of the VN withdrawal from
PAcs during LAMSON 810 and later in the division recon zone.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air-mobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, KCS CSFC-85 (R) (11)

(c) Trp C remained in general support of division and operated out of PHU BAI Combat Base. On 8 September, a team from Trp C located several NVA. They were engaged by guns ships resulting in one NVA KIA. On 9 Sept, while on a last light check of the HUEY-SMALLS perimeter, an LCH took fire. The enemy was engaged resulting in 1 NVA KIA. On 11 September, a G. Trp Cav team discovered a 2½ ton truck on XD9222. The truck was destroyed. On 13 September, an LCH took intense .51 caliber fire and crashed. The crew was extracted. Results were one US KIA and the aircraft totally destroyed. Armed reconnaissance and Cav support to a combat assault occupied Trp C for the remainder of the month of September.

(d) Trp D was repositioned to YUCH TRI Combat Base to reinforce the 2/17th Cav in its role in IACS 810. On September 16th, a Plt of D Trp was inserted on NG SAFI airstrip to rig and extract a downed medvac helicopter. The mission was completed without enemy contact. On 11 September a Plt was inserted on OP Hickory. The first U-12 in the lift received heavy small arms fire and two command detonated mines were employed against the assault. A B Trp US-881 was heavily damaged resulting in 1 US KIA, 5 WIA, and 1 KCS WIA. From 12 September to 16 September a mortar squad and anti-tank section stayed on OP HICKORY to secure a Via Via Radio Relay team that had been inserted there. On 26-27 September two Plts secured the 27th Bn 11th on Highway 545.

(6) October 1971.

(a) During this reporting period A Trp missions were for visual reconnaissance of NG SAFI, Leatherneck Extension, Tarntaka to Shiloh, Route 36, I-1 and I-6, Lawley to XD033355 area, and the 3rd Cav area. A large living area with cache pits, bunkers, cooking utensils, food cans and washing, and laundry hanging out was found and engaged at XD93364. Another smaller living area with heavy trail activity nearby was found at XD93376. One NVA was seen and engaged at XD931330, resulting in 1 NVA KIA. One AH-1C took a small amount of AK-47 fire with negative hits at XD953344. Road construction work was observed by the scout observers at XD873599. Bulldozer tracks and truck turnaround point were found at XD90347. Three NVA were engaged with negative results at XD953344. Evidence of 12 personnel moving east on Route 616 was observed at XDO43215. Vicinity XDO52076 a .51 caliber weapon fired on the team which immediately engaged. The result was 1 NVA KIA. A living area with bunkers, huts, and cache pits was engaged with unknown results at XDO59616. At XDO59375 the team took .51 caliber weapon fir, the team engaged resulting in 3 NVA KIA. On 2 October, A Trp mission was visual reconnaissance of Route 616 and CUNNINGHAM area. During the day the team was diverted twice to cover an NVA medvac mission and to support AVN in heavy contact. The team took AK-47 and .51 caliber fire at XD201131, XD21131, and...
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Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 10th Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS COSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

YD209131. One A2-10 sustained two .51 caliber hits in the upper portion of the fuel cell. All of the areas were engaged with unknown results. Bunkers, huts and cache pits were found at YD175175. At YD213153 the team engaged a field approximately ten workers had been digging. Negative results were observed. While supporting ARVN, the team received .30 caliber fire, but sustained no hits, at YD002584. The engagement produced two secondary explosions. A mortar pit with 30 rounds of ammunition was engaged at the same coordinates. Some of the mortar rounds were destroyed, the rest were scattered. On 3-4 October, A Trp did not fly in the AO due to poor weather. On 5 October, an HL-1K from A Trp took 10 rounds of .51 caliber fire with negative hits from the vicinity of YD112065. Because the position of the enemy gun could not be determined, it was not engaged. On 6 October, missions were cancelled due to poor weather. On 7 October, A Trp flew the KHE SAMI-HAVENHEIM Extension. The road had had heavy foot traffic. It was estimated that two companies of NVA troops were moving in the road. During the day the team spotted a XD911343, XD930342, XD930335, XD980313, and XD930303. There was also a build up of bunkers and spider holes in the area. The team engaged a bunker/spider hole complex at XD885386 with unknown results. On 8 to 10 October, missions were cancelled due to poor weather. On 11 October, visual reconnaissance was made of KHE SAMI-HAVENHEIM Extension and BARNETT, HENDERSON, TUN TAVERN, 616 Extension, and CUNNINGHAM to THUNDER area. During the day the team observed trails in all directions, scattered cache pits, and cleared out areas. Five of the cache pits were still full. At XD893282 a .51 caliber pit and bunker were found with activity within the last 24 hours. On 12 October, the Trp received the mission of visual reconnaissance of CUNNINGHAM, THUNDER, SHILCH, 616, and IN FRONT Valley - CUNNINGHAM NORTH area. One LOH was fired on three times with negative hits. The team engaged each area with unknown results. Four empty .51 caliber rounds were located at YD093007. At XD945251 the team found one five ton truck and one damaged 2½ ton truck. A small arms cache with 20 ammo cases was also sighted. A Trp teams engaged and directed engagement by ARA of targets resulting in one truck and five ammo cases destroyed. A truck park with negative vehicles but with activity within the last 24-48 hours was found at XD945236. The team sighted three fighting positions with heavy trail activity of two personnel in the last 1-24 hours. At YD006292 five log bunkers were spotted and at YD099302 four log bunkers.
were spotted. The team sighted five cache pits recently built at 300389 and four CPs and five tents at the same location. Six huts were spotted at YD115233. At XD945353 the team engaged six XM near a tent and hut. The results were two XM KB and one tent destroyed. The team also engaged five full saves, three tents, seven huts, a bridge, and five bursters. On 17 October, the missions of A Trp were to WR Y-9 south along the border and YG5 53 area. The team sighted aSummary at XD763306 and a raft at XD772249. The team engaged and destroyed both. At XD39226 an LC received 20-25 rounds of XM-769 with negative hits. The team engaged the area with unknown results. On 16 October, missions were cancelled due to weather. On 17 October at XD442436 an LC received 25 rounds of XM-769 with negative hits. The team engaged the area with unknown results. There was heavy activity at XD553180 by 7-100 personnel moving in an undetermined direction. Two .51 caliber hits with no weapons were found at XD257750. Activity at these sites was estimated to be within two hours. On the 616 extension, bulldozer tracks were found at XD593261, XD678261, XD 920303, and XD773204, all with activity within the last 24 hours. On 21 October, A Trp found the 616 extension interdicted by bomb craters and close to vehicle traffic at XD788232, XD792232, and XD854246. The bulldozers that were previously destroyed were partially cannibalized. Sensor teams were made at XD92226 to XD94249. On 22 October the missions were to make visual reconnaissance of the fire bases XD7033, XD700203, and XD 32655 areas for dazed aircraft. Due to poor weather the missions were cancelled. On 23 October the mission was to search the same area for the dazed aircraft. On 25 October the team found the missing aircraft and remains at XD373302. After the remains were extracted, the heavy team performed a 2R of the 616 extension. The team observed that 616 extension is not being used by either foot over vehicle traffic. An effort is being made to renew the damage made by airstrikes and weather. From 26 October to 31 October no missions were flown due to poor weather.

(b) Trp B was used in general support of the 101st Abn Div (Airl) and the 1st Inf Div (Airl). The primary mission was to gather intelligence through visual reconnaissance missions. The secondary mission included screening for troop movements, dazed aircraft security in the division area of operation, bomb damage assessment for 3-52 airstriker, NC Air, Artillery, and, in addition, supplying an instant reaction force for the division. On 2 October, 2 Trp gunships killed two XM, destroyed five huts and damaged fifteen huts in the vicinity of YG12888 - YG12882.

(c) Trp C, during visual reconnaissance missions, discovered an noticeable increase in activity around cultivated fields. Paratroopers of the division...
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, CCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Cultivated. C Trp employed several flame and CS drop operations on these fields. Several attempts to incite the enemy through this method of harassment proved futile until 15 October when a scout received 20 rounds of 0.51 caliber fire and heavy automatic rifle fire in the vicinity of SEAR. We had dropped flame and CS in this area just two days prior. Weather prevented us from further developing the situation. The third week showed a continuation of field cultivation vicinity southern RUONG RUONG, aircraft received light automatic rifle fire in areas with close proximity to fields. On 22 October, the ARP secured a CH-47 that made a precautionary landing east of HU BAII. The insertion and extraction was cold. On 25 October, a scout received heavy automatic fire from three locations vicinity of WHIP with negative hits. The team engaged with gunships and artillery resulting in 3 Mغا KBH and 1 Mغا KM. There were 32 days in October that we could not work the area of operations due to weather. Low ceilings and poor visibility hampered our efforts the remaining days.

(d) During the month of October 1971, Trp D provided ground reconnaissance reaction for ground elements in contact, and also was available for downed aircraft security and recovery. Additionally, Trp D provided convoy escort for the 1st Bde, ambushes and area reconnaissance outside of CAMP EAGLE, served as the EAGLE Base Defense Reaction Force, and provided security for a MEDCAP and an engineer construction site. Statistically, Trp D was employed for the following: Twenty-three ambushes, six area reconnaissances, four convoy escort missions, four route reconnaissance missions, one MEDCAP security mission, one engineer construction site mission, and EAGLE Base Defense Reaction Force four times. Also effective 24 October, Trp D was tasked with providing convoy escort for the EAGLE-EVANS convoy every five days.

n. Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry.

(1) Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf provides the 101st Abn Div (Amb) with the capability of conducting long range reconnaissance patrols, surveillance of enemy infiltration routes and prisoners of war snatch missions when tactically feasible. Areas of operation and mission assignments were directed by ACoF, 03, 101st Abn Div (Amb).

(2) During May, eleven Ranger teams performed area reconnaissance in the RUONG RUONG Valley region and one team was deployed as advisors to the ARVN Nac Sao Co on the eastern ridge of the A SHAU Valley.

(3) L Co deployed twenty-three Ranger teams during June. Teams were employed in the vicinity of Fire Bases MAHEREN, SHOCK and OP SATAN. There were two enemy sightings and two contacts. A reconnaissance team employed near Fire Base BARNETT found indications of enemy activity which, coupled with other hard intelligence, indicated the presence of an enemy hospital.
Another capability of the Ranger Company was utilized when the entire company conducted a raid on the area.

(4) Fourteen Rangers teams performed reconnaissance missions during the month of July. Areas of operations were in the vicinity of Fire Bases HOGGER, WASHO and OP SATAN. There were two enemy sightings and signs of recent activity in each area. One team was deployed with the ARVN 1st Bn Company in the Southern Shau Valley.

(5) Twenty-nine Ranger teams were deployed during the month of August. One team acted as advisors for the 3rd Bn Company northwest of Fire Base PESTOL. The remainder of the teams performed area reconnaissance near the Ra Lai Valley, near Fire Bases VOBEL and 107TH MOUT and OP SATAN. A team inserted north of Fire Base DUNG discovered several enemy and the contact was exploited with the insertion of 2 more Ranger teams to determine the extent of enemy activity in the area. All three teams were soon in contact and a company was inserted to exploit.

(6) During the month of September, twenty-three Ranger teams were deployed. Fourteen teams worked for the 3/5 Cavalry. Reconnaissance revealed foot and vehicular traffic along the Bong Da and Bau River and the presence of about 20 enemy between Fire Base DANCON and Fire Base DOCTOR. Six reconnaissance teams were employed along the Bao Da and 7015, 320 Rivers in support of the 2nd Bde, 101st Abn Div (Air). A team operating south of Fire Base MAC discovered signs of as many as 100 enemy. A patrol operating north of Fire Base 2073 initiated ground contact with an unknown size enemy force and had an emergency extraction. Three ranger teams reconnoitered south of Fire Base HUE and one contact was made with the enemy. Contacts were exploited by 2nd Bde with gunships, artillery, and a GS drop.

(7) During the month of October, 22 ranger teams were employed. Twelve teams reconnoitered for the 3/5 Cav in the Ba Long Valley between Fire Base HOGGER and Fire Base HOGGER. Observations of enemy movement, rocket and mortar fire, and sleeping positions were made. One contact was made with an estimated 12 vehicle platoon. Ten reconnaissance teams were employed for 2nd Bde west of Fire Base GHOST, east of Fire Base FALCON, and south of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Several enemy observations, sleeping positions, and trails were found.

o, Artillery.

(8) The 101st Abn Div Artillery (Air) provided close and continuous fire support to division maneuver units participating in Operation EAGLE.
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RSC CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

JEFFERSON GLEN/HOSON PLAN 70), OPORD 11-71, HAMSON 720, and LAMSON 810. The 2nd Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty (105mm) provided direct support to the 3rd Bde; the 2nd Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty (105mm) provided direct support to the 1st Bde; the 1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty (105mm) provided direct support to the 2nd Bde. In addition, the 2nd Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty (155mm) and the 4th Bn (Aerial Artillery), 77th Artillery provided general support to the division.

(2) During the months of May, June, July, and August Division Artillery units were positioned to support JEFFERSON GLEN/HOSON PLAN 70 and LAMSON 720. During May, 17 unit moves were conducted and a total of 106,010 Arty rounds and 30,496 aerial arty rockets were expended. During June, 17 unit moves were conducted and a total of 107,612 artillery rounds and 24,791 aerial artillery rockets were expended. In July, 17 moves were conducted and 81,106 artillery rounds and 10,106 aerial artillery rockets were expended. For August, only seven moves were conducted and 104,155 artillery rounds and 18,047 aerial artillery rockets were expended.

(3) During the month of September, Division Artillery units were positioned to support JEFFERSON GLEN/HOSON PLAN 70 and LAMSON 810. A total of 13 moves were conducted and 65,605 artillery rounds and 8,996 aerial artillery rockets were expended. Units also began repositioning in preparation for the northeast monsoon season. The majority of the fire bases were accessible by road which insured an adequate stockage of ammunition regardless of the weather.

(4) On 8 October, OPORD 11-71 went into effect terminating OPORD 13-70. During the period 8-31 October, Division Artillery units continued to assume positions necessary to support the 101st Abn Division's new posture of a "dynamic defense." Nine battery moves were conducted to place Division Artillery units in location for the coming monsoon period. A total of 36,378 artillery rounds and 6,905 aerial artillery rockets were expended.

(5) Division Artillery moves for the reporting period:

MAY 17
JUNE 17
JULY 17
AUGUST 7
SEPTEMBER 13
OCTOBER 9

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (AirMobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS OCPRR-65 (R3) (v)

(6) Cannon Artillery Ammunition Expenditures:

- MAY: 108,019
- JUNE: 107,512
- JULY: 81,106
- AUGUST: 104,155
- SEPTEMBER: 65,606
- OCTOBER: 36,378

(7) Aerial Rocket Artillery Expenditures:

- JUN: 30,486
- JUNE: 26,791
- JULY: 10,106
- AUGUST: 18,047
- SEPTEMBER: 9,966
- OCTOBER: 6,905

2. Information:

(a) Number of hometown news release forwarded: 5,777

(b) Number of individual news/feature stories released to public and military media: 524

(c) Number of individual photographs released prepared for release to public and military media: 270

(d) Number of correspondents provided support by the information office: 93

(e) Coverage was also provided for 30 distinguished visitors to the division including: LTC Melvin Delvin, CC XXIV Corps; LTG William J. Straub, DCC, TARV; LTG George B. Pauch, TMAC; LTG James F. Hollyington, DCC, "P" Corps; LT John T. Carley, MCJ 13; Honorable Stanley R. Know, Secretary of the Army; and General William E. Pollock, GiaO, USAMAC.

(f) Special projects included command and public information support of the Miss America Show.

(3) Command Information:

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air-mobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(a) During the reporting period, 13 issues of the division newspaper, "The Screaming Eagle", were published and distributed.

(b) Sixteen taped reports were produced and released to AFVN, Saigon, for use over AFVN radio.

(c) Forty-five taped spots were produced and released for use over AFVN radio and TV on such subjects as Weather, Driving Safety, Drug Abuse, and Aviation Safety.

(d) Three command information fact sheets were published and distributed to division personnel:

"Hold Fire" — May 1971

"Proper Uniform" — September 1971

"Travel Uniform Requirements and Baggage Storage" — October 1971
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period ending 31 October 1971, RIC: C9F9R-65(R)(U)

3. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluation and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. Intelligence.

(1) Confirming Devices.

(a) Observations: Confirming devices utilized on 101st Abn Div sensors include the ACOUSID, Magid-T, with MINISID, and AEU-MINISID combinations. The ACOUSID is used with the air-dropped ABSIDE.

(b) Evaluation: Confirming devices have proven to be a valuable asset to the Division Sensor Program to confirm what is actually there. All devices have operated effectively.

(c) Recommendations: The use of confirming devices should be expanded to all sensor strings within the Division TAD.

(2) Expendable Sensor Relay.

(a) Observations: The EXRAY was hand-implanted and tested by the 1st Brigade on 19 July 1971. The test proved highly successful.

(b) Evaluation: The EXRAY provides monitoring capability for Brigade sensor strings in areas where it is impractical to utilize a monitoring site. This is particularly applicable to low level routes of infiltration where line-of-sight transmission between a sensor string and its monitor is not available. The 60 day battery life of the EXRAY was considerably shorter than that of most sensors, requiring frequent replacement of EXRays.

(c) Recommendations: The EXRAY should be extensively utilized at Brigade level when it becomes available. The EXRAY battery life should be increased to correspond with sensor battery life.

(3) IFW Liaison.

(a) Due to the disengagement of U.S. Forces and the assumption of a greater tactical role by ARVN Forces in Northern NRV I it has become necessary for IFW teams to expand their liaison activities to maintain a flow of information comparable to earlier levels of operations.

(b) Evaluation: Close coordination must take place to ensure the exchange of information with ARVN and RVN agencies. Vietnamese procedures for processing of documents, equipment, prisoners, and detainees differ from those of U.S. Forces. Delays in transportation and communications have adversely affected the flow of IFW-related information from ARVN agencies to U.S. Intelligence agencies.

(c) Recommendations: It must be stressed to IFW Section personnel that close liaison with Vietnamese IFW agencies is necessary to capitalize on this lucrative source of information. Whenever possible, telephonic and electronic means of communications should be utilized to avoid delays inherent in a courier system. Further efforts must be made to inform ARVN and GVN agencies of the need for
greater communication of information during the final phase of U.S. operations in Northern SR I.

b. Operations.

(1) Employment of the Integrated Observation System.

(a) Observation: The Integrated Observation System (IOS) has been found to be effective in remote field locations where accurate survey is not available.

(b) Evaluation: In the early part of the reporting period, there were no fire bases in the divided area of operations which offered good IOS employment opportunities. Rather than misuse the equipment, it was employed in field locations in conjunction with ground surveillance radar and a squad of infantry for security. The locations were those which allowed the IOS to sight on known landmarks, and thus determine its location by reaction within tolerable limits. This method of field employment allowed maximum use of the instrument at times when surveyed locations were not suitable.

(a) Recommendation: That the employment of the Integrated Observation System not be confined to areas accessible to accurate survey.

(2) Movement Control.

(a) Observation: Before strict movement controls on QL-1 were initiated, an inordinate number of traffic accidents occurred between US and Vietnamese Nationals. These traffic accidents usually generated into confrontation situations. Moreover, unrestricted movement on QL-1 afforded US and Vietnamese blackmarket dealers/dog pushers unlimited opportunities for establishing contacts.

(b) Evaluation: illicit drug activities and serious incidents between US and Vietnamese Nationals were reduced substantially after strict movement controls were initiated.

(c) Recommendation: That vehicular traffic between base camps and civilian population centers be reduced to the minimum required for effective operations and that essential traffic be grouped at Military Police check points for travel on NSR’s.

(3) Airmobile Reamm Points:

(a) Observation: During recent operations a requirement for highly mobile rear points materialized. To meet this requirement shelves were constructed in advance so that ready-to-load rockets and other ammo could be transported without damage or danger. In this way, as the operation progressed, the rear points could be rapidly airlifted forward to meet commitments. Two such points were utilized at Birmingham and Mai Loo.

(b) Evaluation: Both points proved to be highly effective.

(c) Recommendation: If the situation warrants, this type of rear point should be used in the future to transport ammo.
CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1971, RSO: CSR0B-65(23)(U)

(4) Pioneer road traces reconnaissance.

(a) Observation: Difficulty was experienced in determining the proper alignment while cutting a new road, Route 328, through triple canopy jungle.

(b) Evaluation: On several occasions pioneers on the ground found themselves cutting traces into terrain which would not lend itself to the expedient cutting of a pioneer road. Although aircraft were utilized continually in an effort to keep the trace on course, it was found that an aerial recon, even at low level, would not be accurate in determining contour beneath the triple canopy.

(c) Recommendation: More time must be allotted for an "on-the-ground" engineer recon prior to the start of any new road project. A security patrol must be provided by the supported unit to enable an engineer recon party to walk the proposed route. The recon team should have information from a low altitude recon to enable them to explore all possible routes and determine that most advantageous for construction.

d. Organization. None

e. Training. None

f. Logistics,

(1) Resupply of Class I.

(a) Observation: The requirement to feed one hot meal per day is causing an overdrawn rations problem.

(b) Evaluation: Presently, the units resupply every four days. In some cases, due to bad weather, the logistics helicopters have been unable to deliver the hot rations. In order to insure that elements in the field have three meals per day for four days, units have continued to supply nine (9) C-Ration meals and three (3) I/RX meals per man. With the addition of the hot rations this means that four (4) meals are issued per man per day. This results in an overdrawn meal per man each day that hot rations are delivered.

(c) Recommendation: As long as one hot meal per day is required, during the monsoon season (when delivery is uncertain) an additional ration allocation per day per man in the field should be authorized.

(2) Class II.

(a) Observation: Durability and availability of NORMEX gloves and NORMEX flight clothing was less than satisfactory during the period of this report. Many sizes of NORMEX clothing, especially in the small and medium categories (into which most aviators fall) are out of stock continually. Aviators and crew members are required to accept ill-fitting clothing in order to perform their mission. This causes a draw down on the sizes for which there is usually no high demand. This erroneous draw down ultimately results in quantitative stockage of normally low demand sizes, while high demand sizes become less available.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 16th Airborne Squadron (Airborne), Period Ending 31 October 1971, AB R56-65(R3)(5)

Lack of durability of NOMEX gloves is compensated by the shortage of these items. This shortage has been alleviated in the past by issuing large quantities of gloves to property book officers for further issue to members and crew members. However, this supply has been depleted and there is no indication that bulk issues will meet anticipated demands.

(b) Evaluation: Availability of serviceable NOMEX clothing and gloves is of paramount importance to the aviation mission. Pilots and crew members may not fly without NOMEX clothing and gloves. Several pilots and crew members in this unit are performing the mission wearing gloves that have been made easy by perspiration and JF-2. Although washing the gloves extends their life somewhat, it is only a temporary measure at best. Experience has proven that a pair of NOMEX gloves, worn daily, will last approximately 45 days for a pilot. Shorter equipment life for crew members is caused by their more frequent exposure to JF-2.

(a) Recommendations: That units be authorized to stock, at the property book level, sufficient NOMEX clothing and NOMEX gloves to provide an emergency DQ capability. Recommended bases for stockage would be two sets of NOMEX clothing in each tariff size and two pairs of NOMEX gloves in each tariff size. This emergency supply could be used to DQ flight clothing and gloves when the requirements of the mission prohibit the individual concerned from personally exchanging the items at the Central Issue Facility.

g. Communications.

(1) CB-64 radio and instruments.

(a) Observations: During the periods of heavy rain the CB-64's have increased radio and instrument problems directly related to moisture seeping within the instrument and radio compartment.

(b) Evaluation: Several methods have been sought to eliminate this problem. Possibly the one that has proved most effective is the placing of a large sheet of plastic over the console and instrument panel. The plastic can be of any of the various types found within an organization of this type. The plastic may easily be stored safely under one of the cockpit seats when not in use.

(c) Recommendation: That until a more desirable and effective method of waterproofing can be found, other units utilize this means of protection of the instrument panel and radio console.

(2) Corrosion of the RC-292 Antenna.

(a) Observation: It has been found that elements of the RC-292 antenna corrode after exposure to damp air, and that the components of the antenna head become water-logged.

(b) Evaluation: Either of these conditions will greatly reduce the effectiveness of the antenna, necessitating replacement of the old and new.
(c) Recommendation: That the RC-292 antenna be constructed of material less susceptible to corrosion, and that the head be made less susceptible to water-logging.

(3) Leakage of BA-30 Battery.

(a) Observation: With continuous use during periods when the temperature is high, leakage occurs in the BA-30 battery.

(b) Evaluation: It has been found that due to leaking batteries, malfunctions have occurred although the batteries were still serviceable. The leaking acid coats the battery terminals and prevents proper contact.

(c) Recommendation: That a more suitable seal be provided for the BA-30 battery in order to prevent leakage.

h. Material.

(1) OH6A Tail Rotor Blades

(a) Observation: OH6A Tail Rotor Blades still present constant maintenance problems. The onset of the monsoon season will add an additional burden on the supply system and the overall aircraft availability will be greatly affected.

(b) Evaluation: In order to ensure safe utilization of the fiberglass blades for the OH6A, inspections in accordance with TR 55-1525-214-2063D must be performed daily. If separations are small, fiberglass can be used to rework tip caps and minor damage. This method of repair requires grounding of the aircraft for a minimum of eight hours as the blade repairs set. No spare tail rotors are authorized, although this would greatly decrease aircraft down time.

(c) Recommendation: That all-metal tail rotor blades for the OH6A should be introduced into the field as soon as possible. These units with the highest ccmumation of fiberglass blades should be given the highest priority for receipt of these blades.

(2) Test Equipment.

(a) Observation: 34th CS Group Calibration team visits are insufficient to maintain the aircraft ground support test equipment.

(b) Evaluation: With all ground support test equipment requiring calibration every ninety (90) days and the 34th Group Calibration team visiting this area at ninety (90) day intervals, all test equipment requires calibration at the same time, which places a restriction on maintenance every three months.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that the 34th Group calibration team visits be placed on a 45 day basis to alleviate the problem of 100% of the test equipment requiring calibration at the same time.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS: C30G2-65 (R3)(G)

(c) Recommendation. That aerial spraying of contaminated diesel be discontinued and research continue to find an acceptable substitute for herbicide agents.

(a) Aerial Flame Drops.

(b) Evaluation. If the fraction of contaminated/excess petroleum products is kept to a ratio of 2:1 or 3:1, 4% thickened fuel in 55-gallon drums, the effectiveness of the bulk flame sortie is not degraded. In fact, due to a longer sustained burn, the effectiveness may be enhanced depending on the nature of target. Flame drops using the above ratios of 55-gallon drums of contaminated oil and excess asphalt binder have been employed successfully. This procedure not only provides an outlet for use of unwanted petroleum products but also allows for conservation of 4% thickened fuel.

(c) Recommendation. Excess and contaminated petroleum products continue to be made available for tactical use in bulk flame drops.

(5) Preparation of thickened fuel.

(a) Observation. The large amount of 4% thickened fuel needed to support the division's tactical flame drops requires a fast, efficient, large-scale method of mixing. This is accomplished by bubbling compressed air through the mixture of HCM and thickening compound.

(b) Evaluation. The AH-1H compressor, with an outlet hose of three branches, has been used to mix 4% thickened fuel with minimum effort by bubbling air through 55-gallon drums containing HCM and thickening compound. With 3-4 thickener, the time required to produce 165 (3 x 55-1 ton drum) gallons of 4% thickened fuel is about 5 minutes. This setup has proven to be a fast, efficient, and dependable means of producing the large quantities of 4% thickened fuel required for combat operations.

(c) Recommendation. That this method be further studied for application on a larger scale, adaptation as a standard procedure, and possible application on the M-4 Flame Thrower Service Unit.

CONFIDENTIAL

73