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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters 3D Brigade, 101st Airborne Division  
APO San Francisco 96383

700-40

AVDG-CA-E

UNCLASSIFIED

16 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3D Brigade 101st Airborne Division  
for period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CFOR-65 (RI)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. During the reporting period, the 3D Brigade conducted counter-insurgency operations in Bien Hoa and Binh Duong Provinces. Two organic and one attached battalion were responsible for security of the rocket belt north and east of Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex and interdiction of movement along primary avenues of approach into the area. The remaining organic battalion provided local security for Phuoc Vinh Base Camp and conducted Bushmaster-Type operations in Binh Duong Province.

b. The significant activities portion of this report will include only that period the 3d Brigade was OPCON to II FFORCE V, 5 March thru 30 April. The two major operations occurring during this period were:

(1) Operation BOX SPRINGS

(2) Operation TOAN THANG (AO LOS BANOS, initially Operation HARRISBURG)

(a) Operations

On 16 March the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 187th Infantry conducted Operation BOX SPRINGS in southern section of Binh Duong Province from 16 March to 22 March 1968. The area of operation included long time enemy sanctuaries in the western section of War Zone D. Numerous small unit actions to include airmobile assaults, reconnaissance in force, and Bushmaster-type operations were conducted throughout the area of operation. Participating units experienced light but steady contact with major action beginning in the afternoon and early evening hours and continuing into the night, the employment of night operations in conjunction with the use of scout dogs kept the enemy off balance; often catching him by surprise and forcing him to fight a brief but tenacious battle in an effort to break contact. The persistence of friendly forces forced the enemy to move his position constantly which apparently resulted in the permanent relocation of some enemy units. Base camps, which had been considered sanctuaries by the enemy, were cleared and destroyed. At 1650 hrs 22 March the last Company was moved by air to Phuoc Vinh Base and Operation BOX SPRINGS terminated. 16 US personnel were killed, 62 wounded of which 52 were evacuated from the battle field. Enemy losses were 147 killed.

On 21 March 1968 the 2d Battalion (Airborne) 506th Infantry was released from operation control of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade in AO UPSHUR and moved to a Fire Support Base in AO HARRISBURG, later changed to AO LOS BANOS. The 1st Battalion (Airborne) 506th Infantry moved by air to Fire Support Base Paris in AO HARRISBURG on the same day. The mission of the two battalions in the area of operation was to secure the Rocket Belts to the north, east and south of Bien Hoa in Bien Hoa Province and to protect the Bien Hoa/Long Binh military complex against ground and rocket attacks. The battalions conducted reconnaissance in force, airmobile assaults and ambush patrols in the oper

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The name of the area of operations was changed from AO HARRISBURG to AO LOS BANOS on 24 March 1968. On 8 April Operation AO LOS BANOS was incorporated into the III Corps Operation TOAN THANG, as were operations conducted in AO CLARKSVILLE in Binh Duong Province. On 9 April the 1st Battalion (Airborne) 506th Infantry returned to Phuoc Vinh Base and the 2d Battalion (Airborne) 506th Infantry assumed responsibility for the entire AO LOS BANOS. The 3d Battalion (Airborne) 187th Infantry went under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division on 16 April and conducted operations in the southern portion of Binh Duong Province and northern portion of Bien Hoa Province. On 23 April the 3d Battalion (Airborne) 187th Infantry was released from operational control of the 1st Infantry Division and moved to the southern end of AO LOS BANOS. With the increasing threat of rocket/ground attack on Long Binh/Bien Hoa area, the 5th Battalion 12th Infantry (199 LIB), A Troop 3d Squadron 17th Air Cavalry and F Company 51st Long Range Patrol were placed under the operational control of the 3d Brigade on 24 April. The 5th Battalion 12th Infantry was given tactical responsibility for Fire Support Base PARIS and AO LOS BANOS southeast of Long Binh. The 3d Battalion (Airborne) 187th Infantry moved all units into AO LOS BANOS CENTER, east of Bien Hoa and the 2d Battalion (Airborne) 506th Infantry assumed responsibility of AO LOS BANOS NORTH, north of the Dong Nai River.

F Company 51st Long Range Patrol conducted operations north of AO LOS BANOS in AO UPSHUR II. A Troop 3-17 Air Cav conducted air reconnaissance, provided Army Air support, and maintained the Brigade Ready Reaction Force. Contact during the period was sporadic to moderate with increasing activity and rocket/mortar attacks toward the end of the reporting period. The operation is continuing at present. 13 US personnel were killed, 81 wounded of which 67 were evacuated from the battlefield. Enemy losses were 57 killed. Cumulative results of the reporting period's operations are recorded in Inclosure 1.

c. The organizational structure to include attached units and units under the operational control of the 3d Brigade is attached as Inclosure 2.


d. Units of the Brigade, not participating in tactical operations, conducted training on a daily basis. Each battalion is required to maintain a master training chart as prescribed in 101st Airborne Regulation 350-1, dated 25 March 1968. Training included Code of Conduct, Safety, Mines and Boobytraps Warfare, Small Arms Familiarization Firing Program, Lesson Learned to include Vietnam Primer, Division and Brigade Combat Notes, and First Aid to include personal hygiene. Fifty-six days of tactical operations and training have been conducted since 5 March.

e. There were no major troop movements during the reporting period.

f. One major innovation was the consolidation of all 81mm mortars into one platoon attached to the combat support company. The 81mm mortar squads are returned to their parent unit and attached to other units, according to the tactical requirements. When there are no requirements by units operating outside the base camp, the 81mm mortars are incorporated into the base camp's fire support plan and provide ready close-in support as well as immediate illumination.

g. An additional asset that became available to the 3d Brigade in March was the Scout Dog Platoon of the 58th Infantry. Immediately scout dogs were incorporated into as many operations as possible. Primary emphasis was placed on using the scout dogs as a member of the point element. It was necessary to train troops and leaders at all levels in the employment of the scout dogs. Once the units had grown accustomed to the use of the scout dog and their idiosyncrasies, increased use was emphasized. Dogs were made available for ambushes, patrols, road clearing operations, cordon and search operations, and any other use the ground commander might desire which met with the scout platoon leaders approval.

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The scout dogs proved valuable in all cases. A rotational system to exchange dogs and handlers once their effectiveness and efficiency had decreased was implemented. This system assured the ground commander of a relatively fresh scout dog team at all times. Whenever possible each platoon was assigned its own dog to utilize on cloverleaf operations and platoon sweeps. Every effort was made to assign dogs to the same unit each time. This resulted in a greater familiarity between the soldiers and dogs which proved conducive to greater effectiveness.

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. NONE

b. Operations

Limited Resupply

(1) OBSERVATION. The ability of a unit to keep the enemy from pinpointing its location or having knowledge of its presence has tactical significance toward the success of the operation.

(2) EVALUATION. On 17 April, A Company 1st Battalion (Airborne) 506th Infantry began a 5 day reconnaissance in force operation. The company carried only rations, water, medical supplies, ammunitions, and minimum field equipment. No resupply, except for emergency was planned. On the evening of 20 April the company engaged a large enemy force, whose reaction indicated complete surprise at the presence of an Allied Force. 1 US personnel was killed, 6 wounded (evacuated) and 24 enemy killed by body count.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That Allied Forces conduct more small unit night operations with limited resupply or other activities that tend to pinpoint the location or reveal the presence of the unit in a specific area.

c. Training.

Replacement Personnel

(1) OBSERVATION. The 3d Battalion (Airborne) 187th Infantry conducted a series of classes for replacements newly assigned to the battalion. By means of analyzing student response and personal interview of students, it was apparent that the majority of replacements arriving in Vietnam for their first tour are under the misconception the Viet Cong is a ragged, poorly trained and ill-equipped guerrilla.

(2) EVALUATION. To under estimate the ability of the enemy is a mistake that has lost numerous battles throughout the history of war. Having to wait until engagement with the Viet Cong to discover he is a well trained, highly motivated soldier can be costly to the individual.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That Advance Individual Training for trainees and Vietnam Orientation Courses for other replacements stress the capabilities and motivation of the enemy.

d. Intelligence.

Chieu Hoi

(1) OBSERVATION. Chieu Hoi are of tremendous value when employed on a regular scout basis with company and platoon size elements.

(2) EVALUATION. The employment of ralliers as guides and scouts against their former comrades is hardly a new technique. However, building a Kissel Scout Program is a slow process. Chieu Hoi must be screened and selected from those who have completed the prescribed indoctrination course prior to their full time employment as scouts.

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This Brigade has attempted to obtain ralliers who are familiar with the brigade area of operations. However, more important is obtaining ralliers who: are familiar with enemy techniques in the field, have served in the field and are willing to accompany US forces on sustained operations. Close liaison must be maintained with province Chieu Hoi centers to obtain personnel of this caliber. Once obtained the individual must be screened and a rapport established with the unit to which the rallier is assigned.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That the value of using Chieu Hoi as guides for combat operations be stressed to all units newly arrived or preparing for deployment to the Republic of Vietnam.

- e. Logistics. NONE
- f. Organization. NONE
- g. Other. NONE

Incl  
as

*Lawrence L. Mowery*  
LAWRENCE L. MOWERY  
Colonel Infantry  
Commanding

Distribution:

II FFORCEV  
USARPAC GPOP-DT  
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101ST ABN DIV

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OPERATION	DATES	FMMAP US KHA	FMMAP US WHA	VC KHA	PW DET	REMER	SA	C/S WPNS	SA AMMO	OTHER
	16 MAR									7,800 LBS Rice 357 Bunkers 58 Claymore mines
BOJ SPRINGS	22 MAR	16	52	147	0	0	14	8	175 RDS	
AO LOS BANOS	23 MAR									
JUAN PHANG	8 APR									
CONTINUING		13	81	57	7	0	20	0	1394 RDS	2130 LBS Rice, 2 AT mines, 2 AP mines, 6 Boobytraps, 67 Bunkers, 26 Structures, 26 rds HE, 60 LBS explosives, 6 RPD Drums, 2 Brgs, 7 Sampans, 6 Trucks, 7 Claymores, 53 Grenades

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Inclosure 1

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<u>ORGANIC UNITS</u>		<u>ATTACHED UNITS</u>		<u>OPCON UNITS</u>	<u>DATE OPCON</u>
HHC 3D Bde	186	2-319th Arty	437	5-12 Inf	24 April
1-506th Inf	875	326th Engr	126	A 3-17 A/C	24 April
2-506th Inf	849	501st Sig	45	F Co 51st LRP	24 April
3-187th Inf	909	326th Med	70		
		101st MP	29		
		801st Maint	31		
		265th RRU	24		
		101st MI	6		
		101st Adm	4		

Inclosure 2

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By 70187 NARA Date 9/19/00

**DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG**

(AR 220-346)

PAGE NO. 1

NO. OF PAGES 7

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION S3 3d Bde 101st Abn Div	LOCATION Cu Chi XT6516	PERIOD COVERED			
		FROM		TO	
		HOUR 0001	DATE 30 Jun 68	HOUR 2400	DATE 30 Jun 68

ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
	IN	OUT			
1	0001		Journal Opened		
2	0055		3-187: Sit Rep Neg		LBS
3	0100		1-506: 1-506 in Bn ni psn, A Co hit by est 10 man sapper sqd with grenades and satchel charges. They were supported by an est NVA Co. They employed SA/AW, RPG, and 60mm mort fire. Returned fire with all organic wpns to include 90mm cannister. They were supported by LFT and Arty. Contact broken 0300 with sporadic sniper. 1-506 had no contact with 1-25th, all support obtained through 3d Bde 101st Abn Div.		GLS
4	0145		1st Div: SLAR readout YT012518, one in open TOT from 2105-2400.		GLS
5	0153		1-506: Going to use resupply to bring out D wounded. Still getting fire, got spooky overhead, gunships overhead, dusteff enroute from Cu Chi.		WLB
6	0200		3-187: Sit Rep Neg		WLB
7	0235		1-506: A 1-506 count; 3 AK -47's, one RPG and 8 VC dead.		WLB
8	0245		1-506: A 1-506 reports the bodies are confirmed NVA.		WLB

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY	SIGNATURE
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ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
	IN	OUT			
9	0250		1-506: A 1-506 also found a light machine gun.		WLB
10	0310		1-506: We have a total of 18 NVA by BC. One light MG, three AK-47's, two RPG's, things are quite, just spordic fire, running second resupply now. Evac cas, Neg KHA.	G2, G3	WLB
11	0340		1-506: Urge very strongly these people be pulled out of field.		WLB
12		0450	G3 25th Inf: Will need extention for 1-506 A0 so they can make sweep in the morning of area of contact.	G3 OK'ed	JMP
13	0455		3-187: Sit Rep Neg		LBS
14	0635		1-506: A Co found total of 15 bodies so far, many more wpns AW, RPG's. Will keep you posted. Confirmed VC, well equiped.		LBS
15	0655		1-506: Sweep of area contact has provided 34 KIA BC, 22 WPNS captured. Sweep continues 38 KIA (BC). US: 15 WIA, 5 minor WIA.	25th Inf 0700	TFS
16	0655		1-506: Update on 1-506 body count: 38 NVA BC. 12 AK-47, 2 LMG (NFD), 9 RPG-2.	25th Inf 0607	TFS
17	0737		3-187: A 3-187 at XT599238 insertion complete 0735.	25th Inf 0740 Sgt Foil	TFS
18	0750		3-187: 1st lift B abn at 0745. B is in blocking psn. G3		HR

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		FROM		TO	
		HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
		0001	30 Jun 68	2400	30 Jun 68

ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
	IN	OUT			
19	0809		3-187: B complete 0800 1st lift 0748, 2nd lift 0803.	G3	HR
20	0813		1-506: 38 Body count - 12 AK-47, 9 RPG - 2 light MG.	S2	HR
21	0855		1-506: A 1-506 at 0830 XT487225 patrol checked area, found sand bags and base plate impressions, blood trails heading west.	G2	CLS
22	0915		1-506: C 1-506 at 0900 at XT496232 found a document which appears to be a diary. VC had on worn khaki uniform and black PJ's.	G2 0910	CLS
23	0945		1-506: Foxhole strength: 5 Off, 70 EM, 8 EM attached, 1 interpreter.		HR
24	1000		25th Inf: Initial readout document's brought in by 1st Bde CO indicates 275th VC Regt was element contacted by 1-506.	1-506 1001	TFS
25	1010		1-506: Wrap Up: 20 RPG rds, 11 RPG-2 boosters, 45 AK Mag, 2000 AK rds, 6 carriers for RFD Drums, 10 RFD Drums, 40 Chi Ccn grenades, 6 grenade pouches, 2 loose ammo pouches, 13 sets LBE, 7 pouches, 4 canteens, 4 hammocks, 13 VC protective masks, 1 pd documents evac, remainder to be evaced.	G2	RDS

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ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION 3d Bde 101st Abn Div	LOCATION Cu Chi XT6516	PERIOD COVERED			
		FROM		TO	
		HOUR 0001	DATE 30 Jun 68	HOUR 2400	DATE 30 Jun 68

ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
	IN	OUT			
26	1025		3-187: Insertion complete, beginning search now will have choppers refuel and then come up on ranger push.		JMP
27	1052		1-506: Sit Rep Neg		HR
28	1130		3-187: B Co at 1130 at XT599227 found 300 lbs of rice (raw).	Destroyed	HR
29	1156		1-506: Sit Rep Neg		HR
30	1215		3-187: Recn plat at 1140 at XT599234 found 1400 lbs of unpolished rice, in Vietnamese burlap bags.	Destroyed	CJW
31	1246		1-506: Will be completed at 1500 hrs today.	Neg release time.  (1415H)	FWB
32	1255		1-506: Sit Rep Neg		FWB
33		1304	3-187: You will have ANC from 1415H until 1630H.		FWB
34	1322		1-506: A 1-506 at 1320 1 lift & ships of A Co enroute Cu Chi.	C3	FWB
35	1348		1-506: A extraction complete at 1345.	C3	FWB
36	1350		2-506: CA complete 1347.		FWB
37	1430		S4: People that rec awards at FVN can not rtn to Cu Chi today because of bad weather. Suggest CH-47 be layed on if they are needed.	Get 1 CV2 or C7A  also there are 2 palets of mail	
				at FVN. S4	FWB

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PAGE NO. **5**

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ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION

LOCATION

PERIOD COVERED

33  
3d Lde  
101st Abn Div

Cu Chi  
XT6516

FROM		TO	
HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
0001	20 Jun 68	2400	30 Jun 68

ITEM NO	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
	IN	OUT			
38	1524		1-506: Locations of B, D, E elements; B 503230, C 503233, D 408209.	Sent to Div	RFB
39	1525		3-187: 1517 hrs 3-187 A airborne	03	RFB
40	1545		3-187: The rice that 3-187 B had today was destroyed. There was no way of lifting it out.	Div	GJW
41	1600		3-187: A Co at 1557 at XT599239 gunships rec'd 2/4 fire.	Gunships are returning fire 25th 1605	GJW
42	1630		SA: C-130 will leave FVN bringing FAX and mail & 3/4 T to Cu Chi.		FWB
43	1815		1-506: Nite locations plotted & sent to Division.	JSP	LBS
44	1825		1-506: D in contact at this time, no other information, will keep you advised.		LBS
45	1920		1-506: Locations of all 3-187 elements, MACV would like to have them, there AC is next to their location.	Loc were called to 1-506 & relayed to MACV.	LBS
46	1937		Lde hour: Lde Avn Off can Ave 3-187 2 UN-1E tomorrow afternoon but a.m. poss five one for all day.		LBS

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(AR 220-346)

PAGE NO. **6**

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		FROM		TO	
		HOUR 0001	DATE 30 Jun 68	HOUR 2400	DATE 30 Jun 68

ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
	IN	OUT			
47	1945		3-187: Nite locations plotted and sent to Division.	JSP	LBS
48	2050		3-187: B Co 2nd plat ambush in position.		LBS
49	2052		1-506: Sit Rep Neg		LBS
50	2100		3-187: C 3-187 adjusting arty to location of suspected movement. As of 2054 all ambushes in position.		WLB
51	2120		3-187: Sit Rep Neg		WLB
52	2130		1-506: Wrap up of 1-506 activities today.	JSP	WLB
53	2153		Bde Rear: 2-506 YTO10590, A Co at FIMUOC VINH.		
54	2155		3-187: C Co 1st plat spotted 10 VC carrying weapons; arty being called in. 3.15UTE REPORT: 1) 10 VC 2) moving SE 3) XT620241 4) UnK 5) 2152 6) 1-506 opened up on VC. 7 1 Body count so far. Illumination rds coming in, going to keep close watch on this area, check it out in morning.		
55	2158		1-506: SITREP Neg.		WLB
56	2200		Bde Rear: 2-506 B Co MDF YTO15566, amb #1 YTO20552, #2 YTO23566.		WLB

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Headquarters 3d Brigade, 101st Air Cavalry Division  
APO San Francisco 96383

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12 August 1968

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for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65) (RI)

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED AT 1000 HRS  
ON 03/21/94 BY 10101

DECLASSIFIED ON: 31 DECEMBER 1974

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. During the reporting period, the 3d Brigade 101st Air Cavalry Division conducted counter-insurgency operations in Bien Hoa and Binh Duong Provinces; moved by C-130 aircraft to II Corps Tactical Zone, under operational control of the 4th Infantry Division; and returned to III Corps Tactical Zone and conducted operations in the 25th Infantry Division's Tactical Area of Responsibility, under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division.

b. While operating in Bien Hoa and Binh Duong Provinces, two organic battalions and one attached battalion were responsible for security of the rocket belt north and east of Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex and interdiction of movement along primary avenues of approach into the area. The remaining organic battalion continued to provide local security for Phuoc Vinh Base Camp and conducted bushmaster-type and reconnaissance in force operations in Binh Duong Province. The entire brigade conducted the move to II Corps Tactical Zone, and upon returning to III Corps Tactical Zone placed two battalions under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division, leaving one battalion for security of Phuoc Vinh Base.

c. The three major operations occurring during the reporting period were:

- (1) Operation TOAN THANG (1 Apr - 22 May)
- (2) Operation LUCAS GREEN (23 May - 9 Jun)
- (3) Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II (13 Jun - Cont)
  - (a) Operation TOAN THANG

At the beginning of the reporting period, the 3d Brigade was continuing to secure the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex against ground and mortar/rocket attack with two battalions and attached support elements.

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12 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade 101st Air Cavalry Division  
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65) (R1)

Extensive reconnaissance in force operations, night ambush patrols, and aerial surveillance were employed to interdict movement along avenues of approach to critical installations and population centers in the III Corps Tactical Area. The remaining battalion provided security of Phuoc Vinh Base, conducted bushmaster-type and reconnaissance-in-force operations in Binh Duong Province in an effort to interrupt logistical lines supporting hostile activity in the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area. Intelligence collected through deployment of long range patrols north of Area of Operation LOS BANOS, in early May, combined with an increase in enemy activity and contact to the east and west of the Area of Operation indicated the massing and positioning of units for the suspected second offensive was in process. Phuoc Vinh Base was subjected to mortar/rocket attacks on 5-8 May as the enemy applied pressure in areas and base camps detached from heavily populated centers. On 9 May, D Company 1st Battalion (AIRBORNE) 506th Infantry was engaged by an estimated Viet Cong company, YTOO3423. Small arms/automatic weapons fire were exchanged and D Company employed artillery and 6 TAC airstrikes in close support. Contact continued throughout the day, ranging from light to heavy in nature. The enemy, with the aid of reduced visibility, broke contact just prior to darkness. There were 2 US personnel killed and 4 wounded, all were evacuated. Enemy losses were 6 killed by body count. On 12 May, 1230 hours, C Company 1st Battalion engaged an estimated enemy squad, XT943404, with small arms and automatic weapons fire; employing artillery, light fire team and TAC air in support. The enemy returned small arms and automatic weapons fire. The light fire team received heavy ground fire. At 1320 hours, contact was heavy and the enemy force was estimated at platoon size. C Company directed artillery and requested TAC air. The unit was still receiving heavy fire after the airstrikes and additional artillery and two more airstrikes were directed into the area of contact, followed by light fire teams. C Company re-entered the area and received only sporadic to light small arms fire. Contact was broken at 1617 hours. Due to the heavy losses of personnel and equipment suffered in the areas surrounding Saigon and Long Binh/Bien Hoa, enemy activity in the northern portion of Area of Operation CLARKSVILLE increased as replacements and supplies moved south in support of combat operations and enemy casualties moved north to previous "rest" havens located in War Zone D. On 19 May, D Company 2d Battalion (AIRBORNE) 506th Infantry was engaged by an estimated enemy squad, YTOO6299. The enemy who demonstrated good fire discipline and battle field police was armed with small arms/automatic weapons and RPGs, and dressed in gray uniforms with red stars. Contact was shortly classified heavy and the size of the enemy force estimated as a reinforced platoon. D Company engaged the enemy with organic weapons, supported by artillery, light fire team, TAC air, and CS drop. The contact terminated at 1730 hours. There were 2 US personnel killed and 16 wounded, 15 of which were evacuated. Enemy losses were 28 killed by body count. The endless number of reconnaissance in force and bushmaster-type operations conducted by the Brigade during the period resulted in almost daily contact. In conjunction with the mission of protecting the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex against mortar/rocket attack, the Brigade conducted saturation patrolling in the northern portion of Area of Operation LOS BANOS and long range patrols north of the area of operation. The Rifle Platoon of A Troop 3d Squadron 17th Air Cavalry was inserted into the actual firing site or expected routes of escape and ambush patrols nearest the site would move to the firing site in an attempt to seal

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the area. This tactic resulted in the enemy moving firing sites out of the 3d Brigade's area of operation. On 22 May the Brigade received the mission of moving by Air Force C-130 aircraft to I Field Force Vietnam Tactical Zone. The Brigade moved from Area of Operation LOS BANOS by CH-47 and HULD to Phuoc Vinh and began preparation for the move.

(b) Operation LUCAS GREEN

On 23 May, the Brigade began movement to I Field Force Vietnam Tactical Zone, Dak To, from Phuoc Vinh in the following five echelons:

<u>ECHELON</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
Advance Party	23 May	3	60	15 Tons
TF Alpha 1-506 A 2-319 Arty Plat 326 Engr	24 May	24	861	50 Tons
TF Bravo HHC Bde HHB(-) 2-319 MP 501 Sig Hq 326 Engr	24-25 May	32	150	52 Tons
TF Charlie 2-506 B 2-319 Arty Plat 326 Engr	25 May	24	840	50 Tons
TF Delta 3-187 C 2-319 Arty Plat 326 Engr	25 May	24	870	50 Tons
TF Echo HHB 2-319 Arty 265 RRU 326 Med PX	26 May	13	86	32 Tons

The 1st Battalion (AIRBORNE) 506th Infantry closed Dak To on 24 May and was immediately deployed to secure the high ground south of Dak To. Fire Support Base 5, YB988153, and Fire Support Base 6, YB935188, were secured and one company with the reconnaissance platoon attached was deployed to cover likely firing sites and avenues of approach to Dak To, headquarters for Task Force MATHEWS of the 4th Infantry Division. The 3d Battalion

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(AIRBORNE) 187th Infantry closed Dak To on 25 May. The 2d Battalion was placed under the operational control of the 1st Brigade 4th Infantry Division. A and B Companies 3d Battalion were placed under operational control of 1st Battalion 8th Infantry. D Company 3d Battalion had the mission of securing the 3d Brigade Base Camp, Camp Whitehead, ZB0322. On 28 May, the 1st Battalion was placed under operational control of the 1st Brigade 4th Infantry Division. The 2d and 3d Battalions were returned to control of the brigade and began movement by air to Dak Pek, YB9568, with the mission of defending the Special Forces/CIDG complex located there. The 3d Brigade minus the 1st Battalion closed Dak Pek on 29 May. The 2d Battalion occupied positions on hill 1207 (YB9071), hill (YB9269), and strong points at YB915713 and YB955708. The Brigade had no significant contact during this period. On 22 June the 2d Battalion returned to Dak To and was again placed under the operational control of the 1st Brigade 4th Infantry Division. The 3d Battalion continued to defend Dak Pek until 8 June and returned to Dak To. On 9 June the 3d Battalion began movement by C-130 aircraft to Phuoc Vinh, closing on the same day and the 2d Battalion was returned to control of the 3d Brigade and began preparation for movement to Phuoc Vinh. The Brigade minus the 1st Battalion closed Phuoc Vinh on 10 June utilizing a total of 79 C-130 sorties.

(c) Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II

Upon return to the III Corps Tactical Zone the 3d Brigade resumed defense of Phuoc Vinh Base/Song Be Bridge in Area of Operation YANKEE (previously Area of Operation CLARKSVILLE) and began preparation for movement to the 25th Division Tactical Area of Responsibility at Cu Chi. The 3d Battalion (AIRBORNE) 187th Infantry and 2d Battalion (AIRBORNE) 506th Infantry moved by air to Cu Chi on 13 and 14 June respectively. D Company and one platoon from each company 2d Battalion and one platoon from each company 3d Battalion remained at Phuoc Vinh for defense of the base. On 15 June the 2d Battalion conducted an airmobile assault during the hours of darkness into Area of Operation EAGLE, north of Cu Chi, without artillery preparation. During the insertion of B Company, the Assault Helicopter Company received small arms/automatic weapons fire. There were 1 US killed, 2 US wounded and 3 HULD damaged. Enemy losses were unknown. A Company, later in the day, engaged several VC running from the area, killing 2 by body count. The 3d Battalion also inserted by air into Area of Operation EAGLE on the morning of 15 June and sealed the village of Thanh An. The village was searched by National Police with negative results. At 1415 hours 16 June, D Company 3d Battalion engaged an estimated enemy squad. Small arms fire was exchanged and the enemy immediately broke contact. D Company fired artillery along the avenue of enemy withdrawal. One (1) US personnel was killed and another one wounded and evacuated. There were 2 VC killed by body count. On 17 June the 1st Battalion (AIRBORNE) 506th Infantry began movement by C-130 from II Corps Tactical Zone, Dak To, to Cu Chi, closing 1530 hours on the 18th. On 18 June, D Company 3d Battalion was engaged by an estimated enemy company. Small arms/automatic weapons fire were exchanged with D Company utilizing artillery, TAC air, and light fire teams in support. As contact continued D Company employed CS and

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additional artillery. After employment of CS the enemy broke contact. One (1) US personnel was killed and three (3) were wounded and evacuated. There were 7 enemy killed by body count. On 19 June the 1st Battalion conducted a maintenance stand down at Cu Chi and on 20 June moved by road into Area of Operation PEAR, southwest of Cu Chi. At 1146 hours 21 June A and C Companies 1st Battalion were engaged by an estimated reinforced enemy company. Small arms/automatic weapons fires were exchanged with the 1st Battalion employing artillery, 7 airstrikes, and light fire teams in support. A Company 3d Battalion was inserted by air into a blocking position and contact continued into the hours of darkness. A search of the contact area the following morning resulted in 77 enemy killed by body count and 1 prisoner. There were 9 US personnel killed and 40 wounded, 29 of which were evacuated. On 24 June the brigade received the mission of moving two battalions to Area of Operation QUICK, Dau Tieng (XT4947), in response to intelligence concerning enemy build up in the area. The 3d Battalion moved on the evening of 24 June deploying three companies to the northwest of Dau Tieng and one company in 3d Brigade Infantry Division's base for security. The 1st Battalion closed Dau Tieng on 25 June and immediately established a Fire Support Base and began reconnaissance in force operations in the Michelin Plantation. Only one significant contact developed in the Dau Tieng area. C Company 3d Battalion ambushed an enemy squad resulting in 7 enemy killed by body count and negative US casualties. On 25 June the 2d Battalion was released from control of the 25th Infantry Division and moved by C-130 to Phuoc Vinh and assumed the security mission of Phuoc Vinh Base/Song Be Bridge and Area of Operation YANKEE. On 27 June the 3d Battalion moved by air into Area of Operation RAPID, XT6723, and began reconnaissance in force operations. The 1st Battalion was placed under the operational control of the 25th Division on 28 June and began conducting operations in the area surrounding Trang Bang. At 0100 hours 30 June the 1st Battalion's night defensive position, XT4923, was attacked by an estimated company led by a sapper squad and supported by heavy 60mm mortar fire. Contact at close range continued until 0300 hours with the enemy employing heavy small arms/automatic weapons, RPG and mortar fires. The 1st Battalion returned fire with all organic weapons to include 90mm cannister rounds and were supported by artillery, light fire teams and SPOOKY. The enemy broke contact during the early morning hours. There were 20 US personnel wounded, all of which were evacuated. There were 38 enemy killed by body count. Light to sporadic contact continued for the next seven days and at 1930 hours, 8 July, B and C Companies 3d Battalion engaged an estimated enemy platoon. The enemy employed small arms/automatic weapons and light to heavy machine guns. B and C Companies utilized all organic weapons, artillery, light fire teams, SPOOKY, and CS in return. The contact continued until 2328 hours then the enemy was finally able to break contact and withdraw from the area. There were 4 US personnel killed and 3 wounded. All wounded and killed were evacuated from the battlefield. Enemy losses were 21 killed by body count. On 10 July, the 3d Battalion conducted a night insertion, followed by a cordon and search operation in response to a contact developed by D Troop 3d Squadron 4th Cavalry at XT475254. During the insertion C and D Companies received small arms and mortar fires. A and B Companies also received mortar fire during the insertion. Small arms/automatic weapons fires were exchanged and the 3d Battalion utilized artillery, light fire team in support.

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The contact was broken at 2221 hours. There were 18 US personnel wounded, 12 of which were evacuated. A search in force the following day resulted in 17 enemy killed by body count. On 10 July the 1st Battalion conducted a combat assault into Area of Operation TARO, XT6183, in response to intelligence reports of enemy build up. A search of the area resulted in small caches being found, but negative enemy contact. On 11 July the 1st Battalion returned to Cu Chi and began preparation for air assault into Area of Operation BRANCH, XT4402, west of the Oriental River. The assault into the area of operation on 12 July was executed without contact. The 1st Battalion remained in Area of Operations BRANCH until 14 July and then returned to Cu Chi in preparation for deployment into Area of Operation STREAM, northwest of Cu Chi. During the latter part of July the method of operation was changed to a very deliberate, coordinated, well planned pacification program. The majority of the southern portion of Area of Operation STREAM is a known sanctuary for Viet Cong forces and some type of contact, ranging from sniper fire to platoon size, was a daily occurrence. On 22 July at 1056 hours, B Company 2d Battalion, under the operational control of the 1st Battalion, was engaged by an estimated VC platoon at XT522206. Later, the estimated size of the enemy force was increased to a company. VC were in bunkers and spiderholes and armed with at least 2 machine guns, small arms, automatic weapons, RPGs and mortars. B Company returned fire with all organic weapons and was supported by light fire teams, artillery, and airstrikes. D Company 1st Battalion was inserted by air to the southwest of the contact in early afternoon. B Company was inserted later in the afternoon to complete the seal of the contact area, as C Company 2d Battalion, under control of the 1st Battalion, had moved to the north of the contact and established a blocking position. Contact continued until 1955 hours with the 1st Battalion being supported by artillery, light fire teams, CS drops, and 6 airstrikes. There were 11 US personnel killed and 23 wounded, all of which were evacuated. Enemy losses were 6 killed by body count. At 0815 hours, 25 July, C Company 2d Battalion, under the operational control of the 1st Battalion, made contact with an estimated 30 enemy positioned in spiderholes and bunkers. The enemy engaged with small arms/automatic weapons. C Company returned all organic weapons and was supported by artillery, light fire teams and TAC air. At 1000 hours, B Company 3d Battalion, placed under the operational control of the 1st Battalion, was inserted by air into LZ XT511226 to reinforce. During this contact the 2d Battalion and the 3d Battalion were exchanging missions at Cu Chi and Phuoc Vinh. The companies of the 2d Battalion were placed under the operational control of the 1st Battalion upon arrival at Cu Chi and inserted into the contact area as the situation dictated. At 1333 hours, A Company 2d Battalion was inserted in LZ XT500216 and received small arms and RPG fire from the woodline. There were 6 US personnel killed on the LZ. The second lift of A Company was inserted into LZ XT502224. A and C Companies 1st Battalion and D Company 2d Battalion were inserted into LZ, XT526226, and established portion of cordon to northeast, northwest and south respectively. B Company 2d Battalion inserted into LZ, XT502224, and established portion of the cordon to the east. Heavy contact continued until 2109 hours and sporadic fire was received throughout the night. There were 17 TAC airstrikes, 5 CS drops, 3 preplanned PSYOPS missions with continuous speaker coverage, and light fire teams, throughout the contact, employed by the 1st Battalion. At first light

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A and D Companies 2d Battalion conducted a search in force through the contact area with remaining units holding the cordon. There were several small contacts throughout the day. There were 13 US personnel killed and 30 wounded, all of which were evacuated. Enemy losses were 55 killed by body count. The 3d Brigade is continuing to conduct reconnaissance in force operations in Area of Operation STREAM and additional areas of operation in response to intelligence collected throughout the 25th Infantry Division's Tactical Area of Responsibility. (Cumulative results of the reporting period's operations are recorded in Inclosure 1).

d. The organizational structure to include attached units and units under the operational control of the 3d Brigade is attached as Inclosure 2.

e. Units of the Brigade, not participating in tactical operations, conducted training on a daily basis. Each battalion conducted the quarterly training required by 101st Airborne Division Regulation 350-1, dated 25 March 1968, during the period it was responsible for security of Phuoc Vinh Base. In addition to the required training, each company received instruction in employment of close support weapons to include artillery, light fire teams, and TAC air. Quarterly training included Code of Conduct, Safety, Mines and Boobytraps, Small Arms Familiarization Program, Lesson Learned to include Vietnam Primer, Division, and Brigade Combat Notes, and First Aid to include personal hygiene.

f. There were seven (7) major troop movements during the reporting period. Basic data is the same as the data recorded for the move to II Corps Tactical Zone.

g. Two problem areas the Brigade did experience in Area of Operation LOS BANOS were the gaining of clearance for firing prompt counter-rocket/mortar fire against suspected and actual enemy rocket/mortar firing sites and control by the ground commander of light fire teams deployed against rocket/mortar attacks. Clearance to fire artillery in the area of operation was obtained from the Dong Nai Sensitive control station, who granted both ARVN ground and US air clearance. During rocket/mortar attacks, clearance to fire counter-rocket/mortar artillery was denied on numerous occasions because of aircraft dispatched to find the firing sites or light fire teams with the mission of engaging the target were in the area trying to determine the location of the site or that targets to be fired were denied ARVN clearance. In addition, the gunships would not contact the ground commander on his frequency so that the ground commander could not control the deployment of the air assets, resulting in the gunships being unable to fire for fear of engaging friendly units and the units on the ground being unable to maneuver for fear of being fired on by friendly air.

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. Operations.

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
(1) OBSERVATION. In the course of normal operations, certain loads become standard, based on the helicopter lift capability of the area of operation. After a unit moves to another area of operation, it is found that a load that was suitable for helicopter lift in one area is too heavy for the new area, even though the same type of helicopter is being utilized.

(2) EVALUATION. When the 3d Brigade moved to II Corps Tactical Zone, the change of altitude was quite apparent in the utilization of helicopters. Loads that were standard in III Corps Tactical Zone were too heavy for lift in the new area of operation. This required last minute shifting of loads during the initial period the Brigade was operating in II Corps Tactical Zone.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. The advance party that normally precedes the units arrival must determine the lift capability of helicopters in the new area of operations. This information must be made available to all concerned as soon as possible so that rigging equipment can be determined, loads reconfigured, and sortie requirements recomputed.

- c. Training. None
- d. Intelligence. None
- e. Logistics. None
- f. Organization. None
- g. Other. None

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Colonel Infantry  
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Inclosure 1 to Operational Report of 3d Brigade 101st Air Cavalry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65) (R1), dtd 12 August 1968.

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OPERATION	DATES	FM/AF US KHA	FM/AF US WHA	VC KHA	PM DET	RT/NER	SA	CS WPNS	SA AWMO	OTHER
TOAN THANG	1 Apr- 22 May	27	180	163	12	12	32	7		11,560 lbs rice, 2 122mm rkt. 5 122mm warheads, 39 IHE, 110 structures, 11 rucksacks, 79 grenades, 200 lbs salt, 500 lbs wheat, 405 bunkers, 185 lbs explosives, 7 trks, 3 AT mines, 2 AP mines, 7 RPD drums, 11 sompans, 2 bldg, 15 claymores, 22 Engr tools, 100cc antroprine, 2 AA positions
LUCAS GREEN	23 May- 9 Jun	1	15		1		1	2		7 122mm rkt, 20 foxholes, 23 spider holes, 1 Chicom grenade, 29 bunkers, 1 cable bry, 4 bull- dozers, 500m trench, 6 1/2 lbs documents
TOAN THANG, Phase II	13 Jun- Cont	53	284	303	74	2	93	33	7784	132,941 lbs rice, 200 lbs fo- bacco, 1 sewing mach, 2 Honda motorcycles, 40 bikes, 2 sam- pan gas eng, 3 water pumps, 788 HR rds, 54 grenades, 10 100 lb bags cement, 2 Chicom radios, 1 82mm mort sight, 718 bunkers, 55 fighting pans, 1,241m trench 202 spider holes, 11 tunnels, 38 punji pits, 1 bry, 2 butel messhalls, 134 mil structures, 34 sompens, 24 mines, 20 bank alor torpedoes.

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Inclosure 2 to Operational Report of 3d Brigade 101st Air Cavalry Division  
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65(R1), dtd 12 August 1968.

<u>ORGANIC UNITS</u>	<u>ATTACHED UNITS</u>	<u>OPCON UNITS</u>	<u>DATE OPCON</u>
HHC 3d Bde 161	2-319 Arty 437	5-12 Inf	24 Apr-22 May
1-506th Inf 849	326th Engr 126	A 3-17 A/C	24 Apr-22 May
2-506th Inf 780	501st Sig 45	F Co 51st LRP	24 Apr-22 May
3-187th Inf 796	326th Med 70		
	101st MP 29		
	265th RRU 24		
	101st MI 6		

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)  
APO San Francisco 96383

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 3d Brigade 101st Airborne Division  
(Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (3)

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1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. During the reporting period, the 3d Brigade 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) continued counter-insurgency operations in the 25th Infantry Divisions Tactical Area of Responsibility with the Brigade minus one battalion under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division. The remaining battalion provided security for the Brigade's Base at Phuoc Vinh in Binh Duong Province. On 1 September Operation Golden Sword began with the departure of the advance party from Phuoc Vinh enroute to the 101st Airborne Division Base, Camp Eagle, in I Corps Tactical Zone.

b. At the beginning of the reporting period, the 3d Brigade was continuing to conduct combat operations in the 25th Infantry Divisions Tactical Area of Responsibility with two battalions and attached support elements. The principal area of interest was Area of Operations STREAM which lay north, northwest and west of Cu Chi in Hau Nghia and Tay Ninh Provinces. Extensive reconnaissance in force operations, Eagle Flights, Airmobile operations, night ambush patrols, and aerial surveillance were employed to interdict movement along avenues of approach to critical installations and populated centers in III Corps Tactical Area from Cambodia and War Zone C. Fire Support Bases were established as hard spots in known enemy havens to disrupt massing of units for large offensive operations. Snatch operations were conducted in an effort to eliminate and disorganize the Viet Cong infrastructure and an extensive pacification program was initiated in conjunction with all combat operations. In late August the Brigade began preparation to move north to rejoin the 101st Airborne Division southwest of Hue in I Corps Tactical Zone. The move was conducted over a fifty-four day period with the advance party departing 1 September and the rear detachment closing Camp Eagle 24 October. The Brigade conducted reconnaissance in force, airmobile, road clearing operations, and fire base security operations in I Corps Tactical Zone. On 26 October the Brigade was ordered to prepare for deployment to Camp Evans north of Hue. Movement to Camp Evans began 30 October.

c. The three major operations occurring during the reporting period were: Operation TOAN THANG, PHASE II (1 Aug - 24 Sept), Operation GOLDEN SWORD (1 Sept - 24 Oct), and Operation NEVADA EAGLE (cont).

(1) Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II (1 Aug - 24 Sept)

The 3d Brigade continued to conduct reconnaissance in force operations in Area of Operation STREAM and additional areas of interest in response to intelligence collected throughout the 25th Infantry Divisions Tactical Area of Responsibility. The 1st and 2nd Battalions

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 3d Brigade 101st Airborne Division  
(Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)(U)

506th Infantry were conducting operations in the Cu Chi area with B Company 3rd Battalion 187th Infantry under the operational control of the 2nd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion minus had the mission of securing Phuoc Vinh Base and Song Be Bridge. The first two weeks of August were characterized by frequent light contact. In addition, the Brigade's pacification programs and operations targeted against the enemy's infrastructure began to produce tangible results. Chieu Hoi's and prisoners began identifying key Viet Cong figures in villages and reported locations of tunnels, aid stations, bunker complexes and enemy methods of operations within Area of Operation STREAM. During the hours of darkness on 1 August, D Company 2nd Battalion conducted a "snatch" operation in response to intelligence indicating a three-man cell with an 82mm mortar was living in a village located at XT566212. The three-man cell could not be located, however, the "snatch" team did capture an individual that had knowledge and names of key Viet Cong leaders in that portion of Area of Operation STREAM. On 4 August C Co 1st Battalion discovered and evacuated a 12,000 lb rice cache. On 5 August the 1st Battalion with operational control of A, B, C, and D Companies 2nd Battalion conducted a night combat assault in Area of Operation ZIP, vic XT4907, in an attempt to seal an area which an estimated Viet Cong Battalion was reported. A and B companies inserted into hot landing zones, receiving small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire on the initial insertion. Throughout the contact, which lasted from 1718 hours until the following morning, the ground units and Fire Support Base Linda, XT525043, received mortar fire. Heavy anti-aircraft fire was received from at least fourteen (14) 50 caliber machine gun positions. During the contact the 3d Brigade Command and Control aircraft and a Brigade OH23 were damaged by ground fire. The OH23 was forced to land as a result of extensive damage. Small groups of Viet Cong attempting to exfiltrate were engaged throughout the night. Throughout the contact US forces were supported by artillery, light fire teams, flareships and 15 airstrikes. Enemy losses were 14 killed by body count. There were 2 US personnel killed and 12 wounded, 8 were evacuated. On 6 August the 1st Battalion released operation control of the 2nd Battalion's companies who returned to Area of Operation STREAM. On 6 August B Company 3rd Battalion, under the operational control of 2nd Battalion, discovered 26,000 lbs of rice, 1200 lbs of rice was stored in a hut. All rice was evacuated to 25th Infantry Division Base Camp at Cu Chi. On 7 August 1st Battalion returned by air to Area of Operation STREAM. On 8 August C Co 2nd Battalion made contact with an estimated enemy platoon at 1645 hours. C Co was reinforced by A Company 2nd Battalion just prior to dark and both companies were supported by artillery, light fire teams, "Spooky", and tactical air. Contact was broken at 2125 hours. There were 11 enemy killed. Friendly casualties were 2 killed and 10 wounded; all were evacuated. Through the middle of August, contact with the enemy was light but frequent. The Brigade units concentrated on pacification operations and rapid exploration of intelligence on enemy locations and supply caches. During this period the 3rd Battalion minus at Phuoc Vinh conducted extensive platoon size operations and night combat patrols designed to disrupt enemy re-supply activities and small unit movement in the Phuoc Vinh area. On 10 August, C Company 3rd Battalion engaged an estimated Viet Cong platoon in the vicinity of the Song Be Bridge, XT9242. After a brief but aggressive fire fight the enemy withdrew leaving 6 enemy killed. There were no US casualties. On 14 August C Company once again engaged an estimated enemy platoon south of the Song Be Bridge, XT9040, using organic weapons, artillery and tactical air support. Aggressive and tenacious efforts to sustain the fleeing enemy again resulted in 6 enemy killed and negative US casualties. On 16 August the 1st Battalion conducted an airmobile move to an area of operation approximately 20 kilometers north of Tay Ninh, under the operational control of the 1st Brigade 25th Infantry Division, in an effort to thwart a suspected enemy build up in the area. After arrival of the Battalion, the suspected enemy threat subsided and the Battalion returned to Area of Operation STREAM and 3d Brigade control. During the period of 17-23 August a definite increase in the use of mortar and other indirect fire weapons was noted in both the Cu Chi and Phuoc

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Vinh areas. The 1st Battalion operations were concentrated on interdiction of enemy movement in the vicinity of and along Highway 6A, XT6126. No significant engagements developed in spite of light contact occurring almost daily. On 21 August, A Company, 2nd Battalion made contact with an estimated enemy platoon. The exchange of fire was brief and resulted in 2 enemy killed. There were 2 US wounded and 1 killed. Later the same day A Company reestablished contact, XT439248, at 1323 hours. The enemy engaged with small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire. A Company returned fire with all organic weapons supported with artillery, light fire teams and tactical air. The contact was broken by the enemy at 1825 hours. Enemy losses were 13 killed and 1 captured. There were no US casualties. On 22 August the Brigade received operational control of the 2nd Battalion 14th Infantry, C Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry and B Company, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry. In addition, the Brigade's Area of Operation was increased to include the Phu Cuong, XT6013, and Ba Bep, XT7813, bridges, and for providing Ready Reaction Force for the 25th Infantry Division area of operation from Saigon to the Cambodian border and south and west of the Saigon river. At 0140 hours 22 August the 1st Battalion Command post at Fire Support Base PATTON, XT592214, received six (6) 122mm rockets, one (1) 75mm recoilless rifle round and one (1) 107mm rocket. Later the same night Fire Support Base PATTON received approximately 100 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 3 US wounded; all wounded were evacuated. The final week of August was characterized by an increase in enemy activity throughout the Area of Operation. On 27 August the 1st Battalion moved by C-123 to Phuoc Vinh and was replaced at Fire Support Base PATTON by the 3d Battalion 187th Infantry. During this period, Eagle Flights were used extensively to locate the enemy. When located, the "Pile On" technique was employed using tactical air, artillery, and ground forces. On 27 August, A Company 2nd Battalion drew extremely heavy small arms fire while conducting an Eagle Flight 8 kilometers north of Trang Bang. The contact continued for more than two hours despite employment of artillery and tactical air. B, C, and D Companies of the 2nd Battalion were then inserted on the west, east and south and a tight cordon was established by 1800 hours. During the night, the enemy attempted to break out of the cordon supported by mortar and RPG fire. During these periods artillery support and illumination were used. At first light 28 August, a slow methodical search of the area was conducted by B and D Companies. There were frequent contacts throughout the day. The entire operation netted 105 enemy killed and 13 captured. There were 16 US personnel killed and 28 wounded. All wounded were evacuated. An analysis of the documents captured indicated the enemy force was an NVA Battalion of the 101st NVA Regiment. On 29 August at 2345 hours the 2nd Battalion Command Post at Fire Support Base PERSHING, XT5125, received approximately 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 14 US wounded, 6 of whom were evacuated. The first week of September again marked an increase of enemy activity. This resulted in a reconfiguration of forces with the closing of Fire Support Base PATTON and the construction of Fire Support Base SHAFER, XT6525, by the 3d Battalion on 3 September. During this period the 2nd Battalion had three companies employed securing Fire Support Base PERSHING, and Fire Support Base STUART on Highway 1A just east of Trang Bang. Therefore, the Battalion relied heavily on Eagle Flights and airmobile operations to investigate intelligence reports and activity along avenues of approach to US and ARVN base areas. Numerous small contacts occurred with the contact of 5-6 September being the most significant. At 1226 hours on 5 September B Company, while investigating a Hoi Chanh's report of 3 enemy companies being located in the vicinity of XT5419 made contact with an estimated enemy platoon. Using the "Pile On" technique, B Company was immediately reinforced with A and D Companies with light fire teams, artillery and air strikes used in support. A Troop 3d Squadron 4th Cavalry, A and C Companies 2nd Battalion 27th Infantry, A Company with elements of D Company 3rd Battalion were later inserted to complete the cordon of the enemy unit then estimated to be battalion strength. The enemy employed mortars, small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire. US units returned fire with all organic weapons and were supported by airstrikes, artillery, light fire teams and "Spooky." The contact continued into the night in the form of sharp, severe probes by the enemy against various points of the

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cordon. At approximately 0230 hours the enemy massed a human wave attack supported by mortar, small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire against a small sector of the cordon held by A Company 3d Battalion. After a short vicious assault the enemy succeeded in penetrating the cordon and a portion of the enemy force broke out while suffering heavy losses. The cordon was resealed and no significant fire was received after 0430 hours. A search of the area was conducted at first light revealing 48 enemy killed, 6 captured and 118 detainees. Reports from the contact area and information received from prisoners indicated that an additional 100 enemy were killed in the contact. On 7 September 1520 hours C Company 3d Battalion while conducting Eagle Flight operations was inserted into a "hot" LZ XT560266. The initial platoon of C Company was immediately reinforced with the remainder of C Company, B and D Companies and the Reconnaissance platoon as the contact rapidly increased and the enemy force was estimated battalion size with numerous mortars, automatic and crew-served weapons and RPG's. The 3d Battalion was supported by artillery, tactical air, light fire teams and Spooky. The enemy broke contact at 0030 hours 8 September, but the Brigade artillery and Tactical air support continued to pound the contact area and all avenues of withdrawal. A search of the contact area, into which 6520 artillery rounds and 17 airstrikes had been directed, revealed 38 enemy killed and 2 prisoners. There were 12 US personnel killed and 20 wounded. On 11 September F Company 51st Long Range Patrol was placed in direct support of the Brigade and conducted operations along the Saigon river north and east of Cu Chi. Through the remainder of September the Brigade Area of Operation STREAM was modified to include the central section between Trang Bang and Cu Chi and renamed Area of Operation MAE WEST. On 16 September the 1st Battalion started Operation GOLDEN SWORD with the initial elements moving to I Corps Tactical Zone. On 14 September the 1st Infantry Division assumed responsibility for security of Phuoc Vinh Base and Song Bo Bridge. On 16 September D Company 2nd Battalion received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated enemy platoon vicinity XT5224. Contact was initiated at 1040 hours and as D Company continued to sustain the contact and the intensity of fire increased A Company was inserted into a "hot" LZ XT532249 at 1505 hours to reinforce. The two companies continued the contact supported by artillery, airstrikes, and light fire teams until 1530 hours, when the then estimated NVA Company disbanded into small elements and fled the battle area. A thorough search of the area revealed 31 NVA killed. US losses were 5 killed and 7 wounded. At 2310 hours on the evening of 16-17 September an ambush patrol from D Company 3d Battalion reported sighting an estimated 300 enemy moving east to west toward Fire Support Base POPE. Artillery was immediately directed on the enemy element. At 2330 hours Fire Support Base POPE began receiving an intense volume of fire from 82mm mortars, RPG, M79, small arms and automatic weapons. As the fire intensified, a ground attack by an estimated two enemy battalions was directed at the Fire Support Base. The 3d Battalion elements and B Battery 2nd Battalion 319th Artillery responded with a fusillade of small arms, mortars, claymores and artillery fire both direct and indirect in nature. A constant assault by light fire teams, Spooky, and tactical air was directed against the enemy flanks and rear and along avenues of approach and withdrawal around Fire Support Base POPE. Contact continued until 0630 hours 17 September. Saturation patrols around Fire Support Base POPE on 17 September revealed 127 enemy killed and 4 prisoners. On 24 September the Brigade Headquarters and the 2nd Battalion returned to Phuoc Vinh Base to prepare for deployment to I Corps Tactical Zone. The 3d Battalion and all elements under the operational control of the Brigade were placed under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division.

(2) Operation GOLDEN SWORD (1 Sept - 24 Oct)

See Inclosure 3, After-Action Report. As the Brigade units arrived in I Corps Tactical Zone, they were assigned security missions and areas of operation to the southwest of Hue, and began participation in Operation NEVADA EAGLE.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RUC CSPO 469 (R1) (U)

(3) Operation NEVADA EAGLE (3 Oct - cont)

Upon arrival to I Corps Tactical Zone, the 1st Battalion 506th Infantry had been assigned security missions and areas of operation to the southwest of Hue. The battalion was still in this posture when the Brigade Headquarters and the 2nd Battalion 506th closed Camp Eagle on 3 October. The 2nd Battalion 506th Infantry then relieved the 1st Battalion of their fire base security missions. On 8 October, A Company 1st Battalion discovered forty (40) decomposed enemy bodies in a stream bed vicinity YD764073. The enemy personnel appeared to have been killed by artillery. On 12 October, the 1st Battalion began a battalion size combined operation with A, B, C and D Companies and the Hoc Bao (Black Panthers) Co, 1st ARVN Div, conducting a reconnaissance-in-force from the north to the "Salad Bowl", YD7303. After a weather delay of almost thirty hours, C Company and the ARVN Hoc Bao Company from Hue conducted air assault into the area of operation. C Co joined A, B and D Companies on a four axis reconnaissance-in-force into the "Salad Bowl" and the Hoc Bao Company established a moving blocking force to the east. The battalion-size combined operation continued until 20 October with the airmobile extraction of the units from the area of operation. Contact during the operation continued to be sporadic. There were a total of seven (7) caches discovered during the operation, the most significant discovered by B Company on 19 October. A battalion size base camp/hospital complex was located at YD718046. There were twelve (12) SKS's, two (2) M-1 carbines, two (2) RPD's, two (2) 12.7mm machine guns, two (2) 57mm Recoilless Rifles, one (1) 82mm mortar complete, two (2) 60mm mortars complete, one (1) 60mm mortar tube w/sight, and a large amount of small arms ammunition evacuated from the area. In addition twenty-one (21) huts and twelve (12) underground bunkers were destroyed. On 23 October the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 1st Battalion discovered a nine (9) hut complex and large cache at YD758051 containing two (2) BAR's, thirty-nine (39) M-1 carbines, one (1) M-3 carbine, seven (7) SKS's, five (5) bolt action rifles; one (1) Thompson submachine-gun, seventeen (17) Kkh Chicom carbines, three (3) K-50 sub-machineguns, five (5) M-1 rifles, and one (1) 57mm Recoilless Rifle, which were evacuated. In addition the 9 huts, 6000 rounds 30 cal ammunition, six (6) 57mm RR rounds, and one (1) US claymore were destroyed. On 26 October, A Company, 1st Battalion, located a possible base camp consisting of two (2) bunkers, two (2) huts, and five (5) foxholes. The remains of 80 enemy who appeared to have been dead from two to three months were also discovered. The Brigade received a warning order on 26 October to prepare for movement to Camp Evans, northwest of Hue and assume security of the installation on departure of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The 3d Battalion began movement by CH-47 and overland convoy on 30 October. Upon arrival the Battalion assumed security of Fire Base MONG, YD5721, HELEN YD5122, and MIGUEL YD4820. The move is continuing as of the end of the reporting period. (Cumulative results of the reporting period's operations are recorded in Inclosure 1).

d. The organizational structure to include attached units and units under operational control of the 3d Brigade is attached as Inclosure 2.

e. Units of the Brigade, not participating in tactical operations, accomplished quarterly training requirement on a daily basis. Each battalion conducted the quarterly training required by 101st Airborne Division Regulation 350-1, dated 25 March 1968, during the period it was responsible for security for security of Phuoc Vinh Base. In addition to the required training, each company received instruction in employment of close support weapons to include artillery, light fire teams and TAC Air. Quarterly Training included Code of Conduct, Safety, Mines and Booby Traps, Small Arms Familiarization Program, Lessons Learned, and Combat First Aid.

f. There was one major troop move during the reporting period. Data is contained in Operation GOLDEN SWORD After-Action Report, Inclosure 3.

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2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations:

(1) Cordon and Search Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION - Cordon and search operations require close and continuous command supervision and excellent communications. Immediate artillery and air response is a must.

(b) EVALUATION - When several units are involved in a seal-type operation, command and control becomes more difficult. Air assets are extremely important and must be on station at all times during the operation. Unity of command is essential and can be achieved on a continuous basis by rotating battalion commanders into the area of control, or by the Brigade headquarters assuming control of the operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS - When seal operations are conducted which require the utilization of units from two or more organizations and when there are definite indications of enemy forces within the seal, every effort should be made to destroy the enemy within the area by the Pile On Technique using all available supporting weapons and tactical air. In addition, constant aerial surveillance, aerial communications and control must be exercised in order to respond to any effort on the part of the enemy to break the seal.

(2) Night Operations

(a) OBSERVATION - Maximum use of night operations will yield more enemy contact.

(b) EVALUATION - The maximum use of night reconnaissance-in-force operations will result in more enemy contact and will further confuse the enemy so that his plans must be changed. The Brigade conducted numerous successful operations at night to include hamlet cordon operations. Night operations further aid in pacification and intelligence programs since nationals realize that the enemy is no longer free to operate in the area, even at night.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - Reconnaissance-in-force operations should be conducted whenever possible during the hours of darkness. One successful method is to establish "fake" night locations in the early afternoon and move out after dark.

(3) Combined Operations

(a) OBSERVATION - Combined forces conduct more successful cordon operations.

(b) EVALUATION - The 3d Brigade has operated extensively with and without Vietnamese support in heavily populated areas. RF/PF, National Police, PRU's or ARVN soldiers are more prone to notice many indicators which American soldiers completely overlook. Even in cases where enemy contact does not result, more intelligence information is generally gained and subsequent pacification programs in the area are more apt to be successful.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - Combined operations in heavily populated centers should be conducted whenever possible.

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c. Training - Boobytraps.

(1) OBSERVATIONS - There have been too many casualties as a result of boobytraps.

(2) EVALUATION - Excessive booby trap casualties reflect three things: (1) A lack of training, (2) carelessness, (3) improper movement.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS - After action, spot-type reports should be submitted whenever possible within 24 hours of each booby trap incident. These reports should be utilized at all levels of command to orient new troops, re-orient other soldiers, and for use in the preparation of classes at various levels which should be presented to units on a recurring basis. Commanders operating in areas known to be heavily mined and booby trapped should be thoroughly oriented concerning the area and there should be less emphasis on speed of movement when there is no tactical requirement. Commander's and their soldiers must constantly be reminded of the fact that troops must not bunch up. Scout Dogs should be trained to detect boobytraps and be employed in a detection role. Suspicious areas should be checked by engineer detection teams and/or by one individual soldier. When indigenous personnel are in the area, they should be used as guides for US forces. See Inclosure 4, Combat Notes #42, VC/NVA Mines & Booby Traps.

d. Intelligence: None

e. Logistics: See After Action Report for operation GOLDEN SWORD, Inclosure 3.

f. Organizations: None

g. Others: None

## 3. (U) Section 3. Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information.

The 3d Brigade has negative input for the Department of Army Survey concerning "Escape, Evasion and Survival."

*J. B. Conmy*  
J. B. CONMY  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

## 4 Inclosures

- 1 - Cumulative Results
- 2 - Organizational Structure
- 3 - After Action Report "GOLDEN SWORD"
- 4 - 3D Brigade Combat Notes #42

## Distribution: A (+)

- 6 - CG, 25th Inf Div, APO 96225
- 6 - CG, 101st Abn Div (Airmobile) APO 96383
- 2 - CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
- 3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

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Inclosure 1 (Cumulative Results) to Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 101st Abn Div for period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI), dtd 15 November 1968. (U)

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OPERATION	DATES	FMKAF		VC	PW	RINEE	SA	CS	SA AMMO	OTHER
		US KHA	WHA							
TOAN THANG, Phase II	13 Jun - 24 Sep	125	534	888	296	4	191	70	16,757	

83 1/2 lbs documents, 160,611 lbs rice, 200 lbs tobacco, 1 sewing machine, 3 Honda motorcycles, 44 bikes, 2 sampan gas engines, 3 water pumps, 118 AK magazines, 8 BAR magazines, 175 grenades, 874 HE rds, 4 mines, 3820 50 Cal rds, 23 KPD drums, 10 x 100 lb bags cement, 2 Chicom radios, 1 82mm mortar sight, 30 lbs explosives, 55 gals FOL, 12,000 lbs salt, 500 lbs plastic material, 1 heavy machinegun barrel, 1 AM/FHC 9 radio.

GOLDEN SWORD to  
NEVADA EAGLE

1 Sep -  
24 Oct

NEVADA EAGLE -  
3 Oct -  
Cont

0 1 134 0 2 125 14 6,130


281 bunkers, 83 foxholes, 16 structures, 1 bridge, 3 tunnels, 185 HE rounds, 1 sampan, 90 meters trench, 300 rds 50 cal, 111 huts, 60 lbs explosives, 175mm RR position, 75ft Det Cord, 5 bags powder.

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Inclosure 2 (Organizational Structure) to Operational Report of 3d  
 Brigade, 101st Abn Div for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65  
 (RL), dtd 15 November 1968. (U)

<u>ORGANIC UNITS</u>	<u>ATTACHED UNITS</u>	<u>OPCON UNITS</u>	<u>DATE OPCON</u>
HHC 3d Bde <u>196</u>	2-319 Arty <u>387</u>	2-114th Inf	22 Aug-24 Sep
1-506th Inf <u>782</u>	326th Engr <u>136</u>	C 2-27th Inf	22 Aug-24 Sep
2-506th Inf <u>806</u>	501st Sig <u>40</u>	B 3-22th Inf	22 Aug-24 Sep
3-187th Inf <u>823</u>	326th Med <u>69</u>	F Co 51st LRP	11 Sep-24 Sep
	101st MP <u>23</u>		
	265th RRU <u>21</u>		
	101st MI <u>7</u>		

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Inclosure 4 (3D Brigade Combat Notes #42) to operational Report of  
3D Brigade, 101st Abn Div for period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65  
(RI), dtd 15 November 1968. (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)  
APO San Francisco 96383

AVDG-CA-E

3 November 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Notes #42

SEE DISTRIBUTION

VC/NVA MINES & BOOBY TRAPS

1. Once again we will be faced with an old VC/NVA tactic in our new area, i.e., mines and booby traps. In this respect, an old adage is appropriate "to be forewarned is to be forearmed." We do not have to sustain casualties from these tactics. The alert trooper will be able to avoid them. Listed below are some measures which may be employed to counter intense saturation of a given area with mines and booby traps.

a. If the area is clear of civilians use artillery preparations prior to entering a suspected mined or booby trapped area.

b. If civilians are available, hold a meeting in the center of the village. The allied troops should cordon the village and observe the villagers entering the hamlets. Then follow the villagers into the center of the hamlet. At this point explain to them the policies indicated in para "c", below. Also, offers of rewards, such as, medical care, captured rice, clothing, etc, may be made if mines and booby traps are pointed out by the villagers.

c. If village is occupied and continuous mining and booby traps are encountered, warn villagers that friendly forces must be shown where all mines and booby traps are located. (They know because the VC/NVA normally warn them to preclude antagonizing the local populace). Advise the villagers that if friendly forces sustain any casualties and the forces were not warned, the village will be evacuated and destroyed.

d. Use civilian volunteers or village leaders to guide the way through the village and its adjoining fields.

e. Use village animals, e.g., water buffaloes, to clear paths through suspected areas.

f. Use information from PW's captured in the area in which the unit is working. Typical questions that should be asked - How, what methods used, and where are booby traps normally emplaced? What markers are used to warn local people of mines and booby traps?

g. Use grappling hooks or artillery fuse plugs tied to nylon cord or light rope to detonate booby traps which may be emplaced in your axis of advance.

h. Use long (5-10 ft) thin, flexible bamboo poles to sweep the area. The pole will bend or flex if it encounters wire or vines.

i. The Regional and Popular forces are experts in their particular areas and can provide a great deal of assistance in the detection of mines and booby traps.

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2. The use of each method indicated above depends on the tactical situation; however, you must bear in mind that the best detector we have for booby traps is an alert trooper.

3. I expect commanders to do everything in their power to minimize casualties caused by this relatively cheap tactic of the enemy.

/s/ Joseph B. Conmy  
/t/ JOSEPH B. CONMY  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

Distribution: A

"A TRUE COPY"

*Dominic W Ruggiero*  
DOMINIC W RUGGERIO  
Major, Armor  
Adjutant