

CONFIDENTIAL - Perm File

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
APO San Francisco 96383

AVDG-CA-U

30 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons learned Headquarters 3d bde,
101st Abn Div (Ambl) for the period 1 Nov 70-30 Apr 71
HCS for 65 - (R2).

Commanding General
101st Abn Div (Ambl)
ATTN: AVDG-CC-H
APO San Francisco 96383

1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities:

a. The 3d bde conducted operations in assigned AO in support of Operation JEFFERSON CIPHER/monsoon Plan 7C and Operation LAM SON 719. Operations were conducted to locate and destroy enemy forces, base camps and cache sites; to interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands, in order to provide maximum security for the population. Liaison teams were maintained at PHONG DINH and HUONG PHA Districts and Civic Action Support was provided to all districts in the 3d bde's tactical area of interest. Liaison teams were also maintained with the 1st Inf Regt (AVN) at FB MY CHANH (FB NANCY), 2d Inf Regt (AVN) at FB TAN LAM (CAMP CARROLL) and with the 1st Inf Div (AVN) Pwd Cpt at DONG HA Combat base. The 3d bde Pwd Cpt was located at FB TAN LAM (CAMP CARROLL) from 2 Feb 71 to 9 Apr 71 in support of Operation LAM SON 719; the Pwd Cpt was OTCON 1st Bde 5th Inf Div (Kech) from 21-24 Feb 71.

b. 1st Bn (Ambl) 506 Inf: The 1st Bn (Ambl) 506 Inf conducted patrol, surveillance and attack operations in vic FB KAKASAN with the Bn Cpt located at the firebase from 1-13 Nov 70; conducted refresher training during the period 13-19 Nov 70 at CAMP EVANS. Upon completion of refresher training, assaulted into AO JACK to conduct operations vic CAMP EVANS and FB JACK with the Bn Cpt located at the firebase from 20 Nov 70 to 11 Jan 71. Bn provided liaison between PHONG DINH District and 3d bde. Conducted an refresher training at CAMP EVANS from 13-21 Jan 71; assumed responsibility for AO KAKASAN-GIADIATCH, conducting operations vic FB's KAKASAN, HXICO and GIADIATCH with the Bn Cpt at CAMP EVANS and later at FB KAKASAN. Bn passed OTCON 1st Bde 26 Feb 71; returned to 3d bde control on 22 Mar 71 and assumed responsibility for FB VANDENHART AO in support of Operation LAM SON 719 with the Bn Cpt located at the firebase; conducted search and attack operations and secured part of Q19 in assigned AO; assumed responsibility

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for DONG TOAN (Fb SANG) AO from the 2-506 Inf on 7 Apr 71 and returned to the MEXICO-GLADITION AO on 9 Apr 71; conducted search and attack operations in that AO with the BN CP at FB GIADITION until the unit returned to CAMP EVANS to conduct refresher training from 15-22 Apr 71. Upon completion of training the unit moved into the FL GIADITION AO and conducted intensive search and attack, ambush and surveillance operations with the BN CP located at FB GIADITION.

c. 2d Bn (Ambl) 506 Inf: The 2d Bn (Ambl) 506 Inf conducted patrol, surveillance and ambush operations in the MEXICO-GLADITION AO with the BN CP at CAMP EVANS. On 13 Nov 70 assumed responsibility for FB NAKHSAW and AO vic of the firebase with the BN CP at the firebase. On 19 Nov 70 the BN returned to CAMP EVANS and conducted refresher training thru 25 Nov 70. Upon completion of standdown training, returned to the FB NAKHSAW with the BN CP at the firebase. Refresher training was again conducted at CAMP EVANS 10-12 Jan 71 after which responsibility was assumed for FB SONG and the Lowlands AO with the BN CP at the firebase. Liaison was maintained with PHONG BIEN District and assistance provided to the GVN forces there. 352 RF Co was gained OPCON 1-8 Mar 71 and 471 RF Co OPCON 8-18 Mar 71 and combined GVN-US operations were conducted during this period. On 21 Mar 71 the BN assumed responsibility for the MEXICO-DONG TOAN (Fb SANG) AO and conducted patrol, surveillance and ambush operations and provided security for Q19 in the assigned AO in support of Operation LA SON 719, with the BN CP located via the GIADITION bridge. Operations continued in that AO until 7 Apr 71, when the DONG TOAN (Fb SANG) and surrounding areas were passed to the 1-506 Inf. On 9 Apr 71 the BN moved to FB NAKHSAW and AO vic of the firebase where it conducted patrol and search operations until 21 Apr 71 when it returned to CAMP EVANS for refresher training. On 28 Apr 71 the BN relieved the 2-327 Inf of responsibility and returned to FB NAKHSAW and AO, conducting patrol, surveillance, ambush and security operations.

d. 3d Bn (Ambl) 187 Inf: The 3d Bn (Ambl) 187 Inf conducted patrol, surveillance and ambush operations in the FB SONG AO from 1 Nov to 4 Nov 70 with BN CP at the firebase. On 7 Nov BN returned to CAMP EVANS for BN refresher training, then conducted patrol, surveillance and ambush operations in MEXICO-GLADITION AO with BN CP at CAMP EVANS, and a Fwd CP at FB NAKHSAW. Conducted combined operations with 1st ARVN Div, Hoc Bao Co in Falls area vic YD355226 with BN CP (Fwd) vic B436185. On 19 Jan returned to CAMP EVANS to conduct BN refresher training. Upon conclusion of BN refresher training, continued refitting and training for participation in Operation LA SON 719. Passed OPCON to 1-506 Inf on 28-29 Jan 71. BN passed OPCON to 1st Lde 5th Inf Div (Mech) on 30 Jan 71 thru 07 Apr 71. BN returned to CAMP EVANS to conduct refitting and conducted BN refresher training 15 Apr 71. Upon completion of BN refresher training, assumed responsibility for FB JACK AO with BN CP at CAMP EVANS. Gained OPCON 956 RF Co and 360 RF Co on 16 and 17 Apr respectively and gained A Trp 1-1 Cav on 25 Apr 71. Conducted combined operations with GVN forces and provided liaison and assistance to PHONG BIEN District.

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e. 1st Bn (Ambl) 502 Inf: 1st Bn (Ambl) 502 Inf gained OPCON 3d Bde 7 Nov 70 from 1st Bde, conducted patrol, surveillance and ambush operations in FB JACK AO with Bn C₁ at the firebase. On 19 Nov moved to KALKASAN AO and conducted patrol, surveillance, ambush operations in that AO with Bn C₁ at the firebase. Released to 1st Bde 25 Nov 70.

f. 1st Bn 77 Armor: The 1st Bn 77 Armor, 1st Bde 5th Inf Div (Mech) was gained OPCON 3d Bde 12 Dec 70 and conducted search and clear patrol, surveillance and ambush op west of Camp EVANS vic FB SWOUD with D/1-506 Inf OPCON 12-15 Dec 70. TF C₁ was located vic BU490339. BN(-) was released to 1st Bde 5th Inf Div (Mech) on 15 Dec 70. B/1-77 Armor continued operations OPCON 1-506 Inf 15-16 Dec 70, then released to parent unit. Bn was regained OPCON 3d Bde on 3-21 Mar 71. On 7-8 Apr 71 assuming responsibility for the FB VANDERGRAFT AO with the BN C₁ at the firebase and conducted patrol, surveillance op in that AO; provided security for assigned portion of Q19; passed OPCON to 1st Bde 5th Inf Div (Mech) on 8 Apr 71.

g. 1st Bn (Ambl) 501 Inf: 1st Bn (Ambl) 501 Inf gained OPCON 6 Jan 71 conducted patrol, surveillance and ambush operations vic FB KALKASAN with C₁ at the firebase. Released to 1st Bde 27 Jan 71. Regained OPCON 3d Bde 25 Feb. Conducted search and attack patrol, surveillance and ambush operations vic FB A-2 with C₁ at the firebase. On 5 Mar, Bn assumed responsibility for AO LEQUAN vic FB SCOTCH and conducted patrol, surveillance and ambush operations in that AO with Bn C₁ at FB VANDERGRAFT. On 21 Mar moved C₁ to FB TRUNDABIN 3. Passed OPCON to 1st Bde 07 Apr 71 and relieved of AO responsibility by 1-77 Armor (OPCON 3d Bde).

h. 2d Bn (Ambl) 502 Inf: 2d Bn (Ambl) 502 Inf gained OPCON 3d Bde 25 Feb, conducted patrol, surveillance and ambush operations in PAKHUNG District with Bn C₁ at AI ACC. Conducted combined operations with GVN forces and TF 1-61 vic BU0962. Passed OPCON 1-5 Mech on 06 Apr 71.

i. 2d Bn (Ambl) 327 Inf: 2d Bn (Ambl) 327 Inf gained OPCON 3d Bde 28 Feb by 3d Bde and conducted patrol, surveillance and ambush operations in FB GIO-SANG AO with Bn C₁ at FB GIO Bridge. Secured portion of Q19 in assigned AO. Passed OPCON 1st Bde on 21 Mar, relieved in place by 2-506 Inf. Regained OPCON 9 Apr 71 and assumed responsibility for AO JACK with Bn C₁ at the firebase. Deployed to FB XBO-GIAO LAM AO with Bn C₁ at FB GIANTON on 15 Apr 71 and conducted patrol, surveillance and ambush operations in that AO until 27 Apr 71, when again deployed to FB KALKASAN with C₁ at the firebase. Conducted patrol, surveillance and ambush operations until 28 Apr 71 when released OPCON to 1st Bde.

j. Task Force 1-61 Inf: Task Force 1-61 Inf gained OPCON 3d Bde on 25 Feb and conducted search and attack patrol in AO KALKASAN with TF C₁ at C-2. Passed OPCON 1-5 Mech 5 Mar 71. Regained OPCON 3d Bde 28 Mar 71 and continued search and attack and patrol operations in assigned AO with C₁ at FB C-2. Conducted joint operations with 2-502 Inf and GVN forces. Passed OPCON 1-5 Mec on 6 Mar 71.

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2. (C) Section II, lessons learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Personnel:

(1) Personnel Replacements:

(a) Observation: At the beginning of the reporting period there existed an administrative conflict between an unrealistic TOLM for personnel and the actual needs of a brigade headquarters in a combat environment.

(b) Evaluation: A detailed justification of all personnel needed in excess of TOLM authorization was submitted to the division G-1, in conjunction with a request that all the excess duty positions be authorized, request disapproved.

(c) Recommendation: Division increase our strength percentage, and authorize the required positions.

(2) Casualty Reporting of OPCON Units:

(a) Observation: There is no clear division policy as with regards to casualty reporting for OPCON units. This proved to create a potential threat to the success of the overall mission, because casualties were reported in a haphazard manner to whomever was most readily available. In some cases this caused delays of 2 days or more.

(b) Evaluation: It is absolutely necessary for OPCON battalions to report their casualties immediately and in completeness to their immediate command, the brigade. Casualty reports are extremely important for the timely notification of next of kin, providing timely replacements, and maintaining an adequate unit strength.

(c) Recommendation: The brigade S-1 makes liaison with OPCON units for the purpose of discussing and clarifying the 3d Brigade and 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Casualty Reporting SOP'S. To make certain that all casualties are reported, it is required that all OPCON units, divisional as well as non-divisional, process casualty reports through the brigade S-1. It is suggested that division define the responsibilities and procedures for casualty reporting as pertains to OPCON units. Also recommended that the division headquarters make provisions for casualty reporting when the brigade and division CP's are forward.

(3) Strength Reporting of OPCON Units:

(a) Observation: OPCON units, by and large, when in a forward CP, do not provide for administrative reporting of daily personnel strength. In addition, rear S-1's (there were no forward S-1's at the battalion CP's forward) were not kept informed as to the addition or

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subordination of OPCON units subordinate to the battalions. Consequently, rear S-1's could not provide complete strength reports. The brigade provided a forward S-1, but he had no one forward with which to make administrative liaison. This problem was augmented by non-divisional OPCON units due to the varied procedures and formats used, and the requirement for reporting to two major units.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the above inconsistencies, and in spite of constant liaison, all OPCON units did not report personnel strength consistently, nor did they consider such reporting of any tactical consequence. One unit did not make meaningful communication until their personnel situation became critical, and 100 personnel with 11B MUS and 6 officers were needed immediately.

(c) Recommendation: All OPCON units should be required to have an S-1 representative at all forward Cp's. OPCON units must respond to the brigade on a daily basis as pertains to casualty and strength reporting, and it should be done in accordance with the procedures and policies of the 3d Brigade and the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).

b. Intelligence:

(1) Proper debriefing of reconnaissance elements:

(a) Observation: Debriefing of reconnaissance elements should be conducted immediately after the elements field extraction. Too often, units will rely totally on information received from radio communications which may be incomplete or erroneous. The utilization of established debriefings proves to be the best means to receive accurate intelligence.

(b) Evaluation: To date units are not taking time to properly debrief reconnaissance elements. An established debriefing procedure needs to be approved in order to alleviate this problem.

(c) Recommendation: The 3d Lde has established a debriefing format that can be utilized by subordinate units to obtain accurate and recorded intelligence from extracted field units.

c. Operations:

(1) Simultaneous employment of Tube Artillery, TAC Air and Amb:

(a) Observation: Experience has demonstrated difficulty in employing simultaneous fire support assets. In most cases aircraft are wary of operating in the same area that tube artillery is being fired.

(b) Evaluation: Indirect fire assets are most effective when

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employed simultaneously. It is the responsibility of the ground unit commander to make maximum use of all available weapons systems.

(c) Recommendations: Ground unit commanders should coordinate the simultaneous employment of indirect fire assets. They should inform each aircraft of grid coordinates of artillery fire and the aircraft should obtain the posted air data. A common frequency, other than that of the tactical element on the ground, should be used by all aircraft to coordinate run-in heading, orbit area and impact grid.

(2) Employment of Mechanical Ambushes:

(a) Observations: During operation LAISON 719 the 2-506 Inf employed numerous mechanical ambushes both offensively and defensively. They proved to be extremely effective against a conventional force.

(b) Evaluation: Contacts made by the 2-506 Inf were generally initiated by or against a small enemy force, i.e. F. O. party, ambush or reconnaissance element. They habitually used the same trails consequently mechanical ambushes were employed on all existing trails encountered and along the initial line of defense around Nops. They were also employed as a stay-behind ambush on previously used trails and trails cut by the individual elements.

(c) Recommendations: That the ground unit commander continues maximum utilization of mechanical ambushes and to request additional or up-dated training on employment techniques and new triggering devices whenever tactically feasible.

(3) Marking of Friendly Unit Locations:

(a) Observation: Units have consistently utilized smoke to mark friendly locations. This has been an old established habit which has more tactical disadvantages than advantages.

1 The advantages are:

- a mark location during contact.
- b Internal unit signals for immediate action.
- c Inform pilots of wind direction.
- d Provide concealment during contacts for maneuvering elements.

2 The disadvantages are:

- a a habit that the enemy uses to his own advantage.

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b reveals friendly units locations, thus enemy mortar and indirect fire can be extremely accurate with initial rounds.

c Smoke has been used by the enemy to entice aircrafts toward his position.

d The enemy is smart enough to know that the aircraft will come into the wind thus he knows his avenue of approach making it an extremely vulnerable target.

(b) evaluation: A better technique must be established in order to alleviate this problem of providing the enemy with knowledge of field locations. Our basic infantry tactics reminds us to never establish a pattern that the enemy can use against us;

(c) recommendations: That field units utilize mirrors or panel markers to facilitate medical evacuation, resupply or to direct air strikes and gunships. The use of smoke should not be discontinued but should be integrated with the above mentioned method.

(4) Booby Traps in NDFs and Trails:

(a) Observation: The units operating in the field are more likely to encounter enemy emplaced booby traps on or near old night defensive positions, landing zones, pick-up zones and trail areas in the line of advance or reconnaissance.

(b) evaluation: Terrain selected for operations is frequently used by successive units so after a period of time, nearly all locations for an acceptable NDF or LZ have been used. This often causes a hard ship on the ground commander when attempting to locate a good NDF site or pass over a ridgeline heavily covered with old NDFs, LZs or trails. Often it is impossible to locate a defensible NDF in terrain that has been heavily worked by other units. The question is should the unit check the area at the risk of detonating booby traps or should a less secure NDF site be selected?

(c) recommendation: When selecting areas for operations, the higher level commander should utilize the smallest size force possible in areas known to be heavily booby trapped. The smaller the unit, the more suitable NDF sites will be available. The ground commander, on the other hand, will often have to fragment his unit into platoon, squad or even fireteam NDFs (if communications are available) in a heavily booby trapped area. Unless absolutely imperative, old LZs, NDFs and trails should be avoided, except for reconnaissance of trained units. Trails should not be utilized for travel, rather they should be followed on a parallel azimuth to one or both sides of the trail. Not only will this prevent detonating booby traps on the trail, but will avoid enemy ambushes in areas where the enemy might be active.

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d. Organization: None.

e. Training:

(1) Utilization of Training Ranges:

(a) Observation: During standdown training, due to the location of the ranges C-2 and C-3 at CAMP EVANS, tactical operations by other units in the area prevent the unit on standdown from utilizing these ranges for zeroing weapons.

(b) Evaluation: Personnel in the maneuvering units with weapons that have not been zeroed greatly affect the combat effectiveness of units in combat.

(c) Recommendation: That a 25 meter range be constructed at CAMP EVANS to accommodate stand down training without interfering with combat operations by other units.

f. Logistics:

(1) Consistency of Daily Logistical Reports from Firebases:

(a) Observation: Daily firebase status reports from units occupying a firebase are not consistent with established levels.

(b) Evaluation: It has been noted that the levels of supplies on the firebases are not kept up to existing stockage levels. This occurs mostly in the reporting of water, mogas, and diesel.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that the use of supplies be kept on a consistent level as much as possible. This will prevent the shortage of supplies on the firebase in instances where resupply problems are encountered. That any major discrepancies be reported to the Brigade S-4.

(2) Usage and Backhaul of Blivets on Firebases:

(a) Observation: Due to the lack of empty blivets difficulty was experienced in resupplying firebases with water, mogas, and diesel.

(b) Evaluation: Units were tapping an excessive amount of blivets at one time. This resulted in blivets not being backhauled because of the number of blivets that were partially filled.

(c) Recommendation: That the importance of backhauling empty blivets be emphasized to the responsible individuals. Empty blivets should be backhauled as soon as possible so the resupply of class III items can be accomplished without delay. The number of blivets tapped at one time should be kept to a minimum. Empty blivets and air items should be placed

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on priority for backhaul.

(3) Construction on firebases:

(a) Observation: It has been noted that whenever a unit occupies a firebase for the first time class IV materials have to be ordered for the construction of latrines, blivet racks, showers, etc.

(b) Evaluation: It was noted that blivet racks, showers and latrines were in some instances not available on the firebase even though it was recently occupied by another unit. This resulted in the spending of additional money for the building of these items.

(c) Recommendation: That the unit coming off the firebase leave what constructions that are on the firebase intact, for the other unit to use. This will result in a great amount of savings in money and time.

E. Communications:

(1) Protection of electronics equipment:

(a) Observation: Equipment and personnel are sometimes endangered by water in bunkers.

(b) Evaluation: Some electronics equipment and their associated power supply units have been placed on the floors in bunkers. The floor is the best location for temperature and stability however during rainy season water sometimes seeps into the bunkers and becomes several inches deep. This condition presents an electrocution hazard and endangers both men and equipment.

(c) Recommendation: Equipment should be placed on stands 8 to 12 inches above the floor and adequate drainage for normal rain conditions should be provided.

(2) SOI and code materials:

(a) Observation: Units experienced difficulty distributing SOI and code material during inclement weather.

(b) Evaluation: The division policy to limit SOI and code material to no more than seven days duration below battalion headquarters level imposed a hardship in keeping field units and firebases supplied with current material. A relaxation of this policy to allow 14 days of material to secure areas such as firebases greatly reduced this problem by allowing for several days in which to find good distribution weather.

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(c) Recommendation: During rainy season all field units should be allowed to have up to 14 days material in their immediate possession. This would increase the probability of compromise, however that could be partially offset by requiring that no one individual be allowed to retain more than seven days.

(3) Antenna AN-292:

(a) Observation: The antenna gain for the Fr. antenna AN-292 drops considerably due to corrosive effects of rainy weather.

(b) Evaluation: The radio reception and transmission strength of the antenna AN-292 tend to drop drastically during the rainy season due to water collecting in the insulator bulbs and corrosion occurring at the element junctions.

(c) Recommendation: Antenna should be cleaned and well oiled before the beginning of rainy season. All junction points where elements and/or insulators meet should be cleaned and taped. Spare antennas should be erected and a routine service/maintenance schedule should be established.

(4) Loss or damage during transports:

(a) Observation: Signal equipment has occasionally been lost or damaged during transport.

(b) Evaluation: Signal items are relatively fragile and high desirable items of equipment which have unfortunately on occasions have disappeared or been damaged during shipment. Sometimes items are placed loosely in their containers and often containers are not properly secured. COMEX doors have broken during flight and caused the pilot to release the load. Items placed aboard unit courier flights with an escort occasionally disappear enroute.

(c) Recommendation: All signal items for transport should be carefully packed, properly secured, and accompanied by a qualified courier.

h. Materials: None.

i. Others: Civic/PSYOPS Operations:

(1) Item: Timely production of quick reaction (QR) leaflets:

(a) Observation: Presently, the development of a quick reaction leaflet is too time consuming. By the time the leaflet is returned to the requesting unit as much as 96 hours have passed.

(b) Evaluation: The distance between the requesting unit, 3d Lde 101st Abn Div (Abl), and the producing unit, 7th PSYOPS on in USA.

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results in precious time being consumed during the transport of the Q# request (Form 25) and picking up the finished product.

(c) Recommendation: That all leaflets be hand carried from ADE Headquarters to the 7th PSYOPS on immediately after the development of the leaflet request. Aerial transportation should be employed to deliver the Q# request and pick-up the finished product.

(2) Item: Aircraft radio transmission "override" in the UHF aerial loudspeaker system.

(a) Observation: Any time the M1 aircraft FM radio net is employed during a prerecorded (taped) aerial broadcast the radio transmissions are broadcasted through the UHF aerial loudspeaker system mounted on the exterior of the aircraft.

(b) Evaluation: This "override" is a result of the magnetic head on the tape recorder employed in conjunction with the UHF speaker system. The head picks-up the FM transmission and projects it into the externally mounted speaker system thus broadcasting the pilots transmissions outside the helicopter.

(c) That the UHF radio source be separated from the tape recorder by placing the recorder in an enclosed metal container (such as an ammo box) a hole could be drilled into the side of the box to allow for the wiring connecting the recorder to the amplifier of the speaker system.

(3) Item: PSYOPS Campaign Control Sheets:

(a) Observation: At present there is a lack of planned campaigns targeted against specific enemy units within the rigade TAOR.

(b) Evaluation: Although data concerning enemy units is available from a variety of intelligence sources it can be time consuming to collect. In the event there is a requirement the rigade PSYOPS office may not have sufficient time to develop an adequate themes from the limited information they have at their immediate disposal.

(c) Recommendation: As each enemy unit within the rigade TAOR is identified a PSYOPS campaign control sheet should be developed immediately based on all available intelligence. Each calendar quarter, or as intelligence information is available, the campaign control sheets should be reviewed and up-dated.

(4) Item: Leaflet drops in the populated lowlands:

(a) Observation: Excessive aerial leaflet drops into populated lowlands areas have had a detrimental effect on US/Vietnamese relations at times.

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(b) evaluation: Vietnamese farmers and land owners object to numerous leaflet drops because they must remove or contend with the leaflets particularly during harvest time.

(c) recommendation: Carefully regulate the number and amount of leaflet drops in the populated lowland areas. Restrict leaflet drops to the following: Quick Reaction, Special Productions, and Miscellaneous Themes.

(5) Civil Affairs:

(a) Observation: Vietnamese Special interest groups often times request material assistance from U.S. units without receiving prior approval from district or province officials or determining if the assistance required is available through Vietnamese channels.

(b) evaluation: Vietnamese self development funds (VSD) are available through hamlet and village administrations. U.S. may duplicate materials for projects thus encouraging black market or other illegal transactions with the excess materials.

(c) Recommendation: That the CA officer insure that those Vietnamese interest groups requesting assistance have exhausted every available Vietnamese source of assistance prior to requesting US/FWAF materials. The CA officer must also insure that all projects initiated by Vietnamese and requiring US/FWAF supports have been approved by the appropriate district and province officials.

k. Chemical: The use of flame against enemy in caves or tunnels:

(1) Observation: During LAKE SON 719 the tenacious enemy was encountered holding up in caves which were not vulnerable to direct or indirect fire. From these positions the enemy could keep the allies pinned down or at least engaged without suffering significant casualties.

(2) evaluation: The terrain was such that a frontal assault would have been murderous; commanders requested flame support in the form of portable flame throwers or M202 flame rocket launchers to clear the enemy from the caves. The battalion chemical NCO should be called in immediately to evaluate the situation, to advise on the employment of these weapons, which are organic to the battalion. Safety is of prime consideration in using the M202 flame rocket launcher as heavy brush and trees will detonate the rocket while in flight, thus a 20 meter minimum safe distance is required.

(3) Recommendation: recommend that the M202 be kept on standby so that they may be delivered to the field immediately upon request of ground commanders in the field. Also recommend a minimum of three rocket

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clips per launcher be collocated with the launchers to facilitate rapid deployment to field locations.

David E. Grams, Jr.

- 2 Incl
1. Task Organization
2. Roster of Key Personnel.

DAVID E. GRAMS, Jr.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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TASK ORGANIZATION DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD

HQ 3d Lde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl)

3-187 Inf (OPCON 1st Lde 5th Inf Div (Mech),
30 Jan 71 - 7 Apr 71)
Recon/3-187 Inf (OPCON 2-327 Inf,
17-20, 22-28 Apr 71)
(OPCON 2-506 Inf, 28-30 Apr 71)
2/B/3-187 Inf (OPCON DISCON, 23-29 Apr 71)
3/B/3-187 Inf (OPCON 2-506 Inf, 25-26 Jan 71)
E/3-187 Inf (OPCON 1-506 Inf, 28-29 Jan 71)
D(-)/3-187 Inf (OPCON 2-506 Inf, 20-22 Apr 71)
(OPCON 2-327 Inf, 22-25 Apr 71)
1/D/3-187 Inf (OPCON DISCON, 15-23 Apr 71)

1-506 Inf (OPCON 1st Lde, 26 Feb 71 - 21 Mar 71)
A/1-506 Inf (OPCON 2-506 Inf, 26-27 Feb 71)
1/A/1-506 Inf (OPCON 2-506 Inf, 1-3 Apr 71)
B(-)/1-506 Inf (OPCON 2-506 Inf, 31 Mar 71 -
7 Apr 71)
C/D/Recon/1-506 Inf (OPCON TF HA LITON,
21 Mar 71 - 9 Apr 71)
D/1-506 Inf (OPCON 2-327 Inf, 9-10 Apr 71)
C/1-506 Inf (OPCON 2-327 Inf, 8-9 Apr 71)

2-506 Inf
A/2-506 Inf (OPCON 2-327 Inf, 19-20 Mar 71)
B/2-506 Inf (OPCON TF 1-77 armor,
10-20 Mar 71)
C(-)/2-506 Inf (OPCON 1-506 Inf, 29 Jan 71
1 Feb 71)
D(-)/2-506 Inf (OPCON 2-327 Inf, 19-20
Mar 71)
1/D/2-506 Inf (OPCON 1st Lde 5th Inf Div
(Mech), 19 Mar 71 - 5 Apr 71)

1-502 Inf (OPCON 3d Lde, 7-25 Nov 70)

TF 1-77 Armor (OPCON 3d Lde, 12-15 Dec 70,
3-21 Mar 71, 7-8 Apr 71)
B/1-77 armor (OPCON 1-506 Inf, 15-16 Dec 70)
C/1-77 armor (OPCON 2-327 Inf, 12-19 Mar 71)
D/1-61 Inf (OPCON 1-506 Inf, 21-26 Mar 71)

1-501 Inf (OPCON 3d Lde, 6-27 Jan 71,
25 Feb 71 - 8 Apr 71)

Recon Co/1st Regt (AnVn) (OPCON 2-506 Inf
24-25 Jan 71)

Incl #1

HQ 3d Lde
3d Lde rwd Cpt (OPCON
1st Lde 5th Inf
Div (Mech) 21-24 Feb
71)

1st C 3d Lde
3d Lde Recon and Secty Plt
(OPCON 3-187 Inf,
1-3, 5-8 Nov 71)
(OPCON 1-502 Inf,
12-14 Nov 71)

(OPCON 1-506 Inf,
27 Nov 70 - 4 Dec
71, 17 Dec 70 -
12 Jan 71, 1-26
Feb 71)
(OPCON 2-506 Inf,
7-11 Dec 70,
13 Jan 71 - 9 Feb
71, 21 Mar 71 -
9 Apr 71, 12-25,
28-30 Apr 71)
(OPCON 2-502 Inf,
2-8 Mar 71)
(OPCON 2-327 Inf,
9-16 Mar 71,
26-28 Apr 71)

2-319 arty (US)
B/326 engr (US)
3d RS&S, DISCON (US)
C/326 ed bn (US)
D/801 sig bn (US)
Tm 101 maint bn (US)
FWD SPT Plt A 426 S&S
bn (US)

Tm 101st I Co (Div) (US)
3/265th sig
3/101st AF Co
58th Inf Plt (Scout
Reg) (US)
D/14th engr (US)
C/27th engr (US)
T&E, 20th T&E
25th PI Det (Field
Service) (US)

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AVLG-CA-C

30 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons Learned Headquarters 3d Bde,
1-1st Abn Div (AAB1) for the period 1 Nov 70-30 Apr 71
ACS for 65 - (A2).

- 352 AF Co (OPCON 2-506 Inf, 5 Feb 71 - 8 Mar 71)
- 471 AF Co (OPCON 2-506 Inf, 8-18 Mar 71)
- 213 AF Co (OPCON 2-327 Inf, 2-12 Mar 71)
- 1-2 Inf negt (AAVN) (OPCON 3d Bde, 2-3 Mar 71)
- 256 AF Co (OPCON 2-327 Inf, 12-20 Mar 71)
(OPCON 1-506 Inf, 7-8 Apr 71)
- 1st AB Co (OPCON 2-502 Inf, 1 Apr 71)
- 2d AF Co (OPCON 2-502 Inf, 1 Apr 71)
- 360 AF Co (OPCON 3-187 Inf, 16-30 Apr 71)
- 956 AF Co (OPCON 3-187 Inf, 17-30 Apr 71)
- 2-502 Inf (OPCON 3d Bde, 25 Feb 71 - 7 Apr 71)
 - A/2-502 Inf (OPCON 1-501 Inf, 29 Mar 71 - 4 Apr 71)
 - B/2-502 Inf (OPCON 1-501 Inf, 26-27 Jan 71)
(OPCON 1-506 Inf, 28-31 Jan 71)
 - 3/A/2-502 Inf (OPCON 1-506 Inf, 29 Jan 71 - 4 Feb 71)
- TF HAMILTON (OPCON 3d Bde, 21 Mar 71 - 9 Apr 71)
 - A/1-1 Cav (OPCON 3-187 Inf, 25-29 Apr 71)
 - 2-327 Inf (OPCON 3d Bde, 28 Feb 71 - 20 Mar 71,
9 - 28 Apr 71)
 - A(-)/2-327 Inf (OPCON 2-506 Inf, 19-20 Mar 71)
 - B/2-327 Inf (OPCON 2-506 Inf, 21-22 Apr 71)
 - C/2-327 Inf (OPCON 1-506 Inf, 13-15 Apr 71)
 - D/2-327 Inf (OPCON 2-506 Inf, 19-20 Mar 71)
(OPCON 3-187 Inf, 15-17 Apr 71)
 - necon/2-327 Inf (OPCON 3-187 Inf, 15-20 Apr 71)
(OPCON 2-506 Inf, 21-22 Apr 71)
- TF 1-61 Inf (OPCON 3d Bde, 25 Feb 71 - 4 Mar 71,
28 Mar 71 - 7 Apr 71)
 - 3/E/1-1 Cav (OPCON 1-506 Inf, 28 Mar 71 - 7 Apr 71)
 - C/1-1 Cav (OPCON 1-506 Inf, 26 Mar 71 - 7 Apr 71)
 - 2/C/1-1 Cav (OPCON 2-506 Inf, 1-7 Apr 71)

Clt weather Tm 5 Tm
weather Tm
2 Tm's 4th SIG Set (US)
A/2-11 Arty (US Div
Arty)
A/1-39 Art (US XXIV
Corps, Div Art)
C/1-83 Arty (US Div
(US XXIV Corps)
B/2-320 Arty (US)
C(-)/2-11 Art, (US)
Sgt Tm/501 Sig Bn (US)
C/1-39 Arty (US XXIV
Corps)
PSE/A/501 Sig Bn (US)
C/4-77 AAA (US 2-319
Arty, GS, US,
Div Art.)
A/D C/158 ABN (US)

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30 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters 3d ADE,
101st Abn Div (AABD) for the period 1 Nov 70-30 Apr 71
MOS for 65 - (A2).

A/4-12 Cav (OFCON 1-506 Inf, 21-27 Mar 71)
3/A/4-12 Cav (OFCON 2-506 Inf, 7-8 Apr 71)

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30 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters 3d Bde,
101st Abn Div (Abnl) for the period 1 Nov 70-30 Apr 71
MCS for 65 - (A2)

ROSTER OF ASY PERSONNEL

CO, 3d Brigade	
COL Benjamin I. Harrison	1 Nov 70 - 22 Dec 70
COL David E. Grange, Jr.	22 Dec 70 - 30 April 71
DCO, 3d Brigade	
LTC John D. Hamilton	1 Nov 70 - 30 Apr 71
XO, 3d Brigade	
LTC Joseph F. Bellochi	1 Nov 70 - 20 Nov 70
LTC Roy S. Dunaway, Jr.	28 Nov 70 - 12 Mar 71
LTC Gerald C. Whitmire	23 Mar 71 - 30 Apr 71
CO, 3d Bn (Abnl) 187th Inf	
LTC Bryon J. Sutton	14 Oct 70 - 17 Mar 71
LTC James R. Steverson	17 Mar 71 - 30 Apr 71
CO, 1st Bn (Abnl) 506th Inf	
LTC Bobby B. Porter	1 Nov 70 - 17 Jan 71
LTC Keith A. Barlow	17 Jan 71 - 30 Apr 71
CO, 2d Bn (Abnl) 506th Inf	
LTC John C. Bard	1 Nov 70 - 19 Nov 70
LTC Joseph F. Bellochi	19 Nov 70 - 30 Apr 71
CO, TF HAMILTON	
LTC John D. Hamilton	21 Mar 71 - 9 Apr 71
CO, 1st Bn 2d Inf Regt (ARVN)	
MAJ Truong Thanh Hung	2 Mar 71 - 3 Mar 71
CO, 2d Bn (Abnl) 327 Inf	
LTC John M. Hamilton, Jr.	28 Feb 71 - 20 Mar 71
	9 Apr 71 - 28 Apr 71
CO, 1st Bn (Abnl) 502d Inf	
LTC Richard N. Lang	7 Nov 70 - 25 Nov 70
CO, 1st Bn (Abnl) 501st Inf	
LTC Arthur C. Dister, Jr.	25 Feb 71 - 14 Mar 71
LTC Wade Hampton	14 Mar 71 - 8 Apr 71
CO, 2d Bn (Abnl) 502d Inf	
LTC Lloyd N. Cosby	25 Feb 71 - 7 Apr 71
CO, TF 1-77 Armor	
LTC Richard M. Myer	12 Dec 70 - 15 Dec 70
	3 Mar 71 - 21 Mar 71
	7 Apr 71 - 8 Apr 71

Incl #2

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
APO San Francisco 96383

AVDG-CA-C

4 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (Feeder Report), 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period ending 31 October 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U).

Commanding General
101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
ATTN: AVDG-GC-H
APO San Francisco 96383

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.

a. During the reporting period, the 3d Brigade continued Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70 until 1200 hours, 8 October, at which time that operation concluded and the brigade initiated execution of OPORD 11-71 (MONSOON DYNAMIC DEFENSE). Operations were conducted in northern Thua Thien and southern Quang Tri Provinces to locate and destroy enemy forces, staging areas and forward cache sites, to protect vital lines of communication, and to interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands in order to provide maximum security for the population. Working in close cooperation with the 1st Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), the brigade sought to maintain a protective shield beyond the periphery of the populated lowlands of Phong Dien and Hai Lang Districts to prevent incursion of enemy forces into the populated areas, and to insure a secure environment for the pacification and development programs. The brigade conducted extensive patrolling, surveillance and screening operations to deny use of the lowland areas to the enemy. During the first six weeks of the reporting period, the brigade participated in airmobile raids east of Base Area 129 in the vicinity of FB Ripcord in support of Operation Lam Son 720. The objective of the raids was to locate and destroy enemy supplies and cache sites. In late June, the brigade assumed responsibility for the 1st Infantry Regiment's traditional area of operations in southern Quang Tri Province as the latter unit redeployed farther to the north. The brigade returned to its area of operations in Thua Thien Province when the 1st Regiment resumed its normal mission, but repeated the same relief in place in early September when the 1st Regiment combat assaulted into the Da Krong Valley area north of the Laotian salient. The Vietnamese drive was an integral part of Operation Lam Son 810, aimed at disrupting suspected enemy build-ups in western Quang Tri Province prior to the onset of the northeast monsoon. In late September the operation concluded, and the brigade again returned to its normal area of operations, where it continued to operate through the end of the reporting period.

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AFTER 12 YRS DOD DIR
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (Feeder Report), 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period ending 31 October 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U).

b. Operation JEFFERSON 'GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70 included two significant operational highlights. The first became evident in the execution of the airmobile raids in conjunction with Operation Lam Son 720. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Infantry and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf received missions requiring them to commit a major portion of their troops into objective areas between FB Ripcord and FB Berchtesgaden. Concurrently, they were also responsible for maintaining a presence in their normal areas of operations around FB Gladiator and FB Rakkasan, in addition to actively defending those fire bases. Realizing the need for responsive fire support for those elements conducting the airmobile raids into areas beyond the range of supporting artillery at Fire Bases Gladiator and Rakkasan, both battalions utilized their organic 81mm mortar platoons to organize forward command posts/fire support bases in the immediate vicinity of the troops conducting the raids. Such bases, lightly defended but containing the command and control necessary to accomplish the mission, were moved frequently, both to be in position to constantly provide the most effective fire support for the steadily advancing ground forces, and to reduce the possibility of the bases themselves coming under attack. The concept proved to be efficient, and played a significant role in the overall success of the operation.

c. The second operational highlight occurred while the brigade operated in northern Quang Tri Province in conjunction with Operation Lam Son 810. It was found that due to a scarcity of aircraft, which were heavily committed in support of the Vietnamese drive into the western portion of the province, it was necessary to resupply FB Barbara and FB Anne almost entirely by road. Such resupply by road also was advantageous in that it served to generate the experience and standing operating procedures that would be needed when aerial resupply would become the exception rather than the rule during the upcoming monsoon season. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Infantry, with the assistance of B Company, 326th Engineer, and 3d Platoon, 101st Military Police Company, opened the road and conducted convoys on an almost daily basis to one fire base or the other, and frequently to both fire bases simultaneously. With the passage of time, confidence and efficiency increased, and when Operation Lam Son 810 concluded in late September and the brigade redeployed to Thua Thien Province, the process of road resupply had become routine.

d. Throughout the final phase of the reporting period, the brigade was engaged in the MONSOON DYNAMIC DEFENSE, conducting screening and mobile defense operations designed to protect Camp Evans and occupied fire bases from ground and indirect fire attacks. Notable during this period was the attachment to the brigade of Company L, 75th Infantry (Ranger), and D Troop, 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry. The attachment of the cavalry troop added significantly to the brigade's tactical area of interest and tactical area of responsibility, since the troop retained its area of operations in the extreme northwestern portion of Quang Tri Province, and also its responsibility to conduct daily reconnaissance of the eastern Demilitarized Zone and northeastern Quang Tri Province.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (Feeder Report), 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile); Period ending 31 October 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U).

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel: Critical Aviation Maintenance Personnel.

(1) OBSERVATION: Key maintenance personnel in the Brigade Aviation Platoon should be as experienced and as qualified as personnel resources within the division permit.

(2) EVALUATION: Brigade Aviation Platoons within the division are authorized only one each of certain critical maintenance personnel such as maintenance supervisors, technical inspectors, and avionics repairmen. Therefore, individuals with these particular MOS's or skills do not receive the benefit of supervision from a senior and more experienced man in the same field. Although in each case the individual has received formal MOS training, he usually does not possess the skill and knowledge necessary to insure that maintenance operations are performed smoothly and efficiently in his area of interest.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: That only well qualified key maintenance personnel be assigned to fill vacancies in Brigade Aviation Platoons, and that personnel within the division who have had prior experience with a direct support maintenance unit be reassigned to the Brigade Aviation Platoons as necessary.

b. Intelligence: None.

c. Operations:

(1) Employment of the Integrated Observation System.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Integrated Observation System (IOS) has been found to be effective in remote field locations where accurate survey is not available.

(b) EVALUATION: In the early part of the reporting period, there were no fire bases in the brigade area of operations which offered good IOS employment opportunities. Rather than misuse the equipment, it was employed in field locations in conjunction with ground surveillance radar and a squad of infantry for security. The locations were those which allowed the IOS to sight on known landmarks, and thus determine its location by resection within tolerable limits. This method of field employment allowed maximum use of the instrument at times when surveyed locations were not suitable.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the employment of the Integrated Observation System not be confined to areas accessible to accurate survey.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (Feeder Report), 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period ending 31 October 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U).

(2) Resiliency of Enemy Booby Traps.

(a) OBSERVATION: Booby traps are most likely to be found on old landing zones within the brigade's area of operations, and despite thorough preparation with tactical flame drops and tube and aerial rocket artillery, buried pressure-type booby traps are very likely to remain active.

(b) EVALUATION: There have been numerous instances of buried pressure-type booby traps remaining active on landing zones which have been thoroughly prepared with tactical flame drops and tube and aerial rocket artillery.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When tactical requirements make the use of old landing zones imperative, consideration should be given to the employment of tactical air strikes and heavy artillery with fuse delay.

(3) Security of Small Reconnaissance Elements.

(a) OBSERVATION: A reconnaissance team which had been resupplied earlier in the day and which had failed to move an appreciable distance following resupply was engaged in its night defensive position and suffered three casualties.

(b) EVALUATION: Lack of enemy contact over an extended period of time caused the reconnaissance element to adopt a sense of complacency which eventually proved fatal.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That explicit instructions regarding security measures to be followed in various circumstances be disseminated to all small units prior to each mission, and that only the strongest of individuals be chosen as reconnaissance team leaders.

(4) Enemy Use of Confiscated US Material.

(a) OBSERVATION: Confiscated US material continues to be uncovered in enemy caches and base camps.

(b) EVALUATION: Little progress has been made in alerting individual soldiers to the hazards of leaving equipment in night defensive positions or on fire bases, and the enemy takes maximum advantage of this shortcoming. In many cases, explosive devices are discarded and these are eventually employed by the enemy as booby traps.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders at all levels stress more emphatically the perils of abandoning equipment which may be of use to the enemy, and that disciplinary action be taken in cases involving abandoned ordnance.

d. Organization: None.

e. Training: None.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (Feeder Report), 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period ending 31 October 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U).

f. Logistics: Usage and Backhaul of Blivets on Fire Bases.

(1) OBSERVATION: Due to the lack of empty blivets, difficulty was experienced in resupplying fire bases with water, mogas and diesel.

(2) EVALUATION: Units were found to be tapping an excessive amount of blivets at one time, resulting in blivets not being backhauled because of the number of blivets which were partially filled.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the number of blivets being tapped at one time be held to a minimum, and that the importance of backhauling empty blivets promptly be emphasized by all commanders.

g. Communications:

(1) Corrosion of the RC-292 Antenna.

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been found that elements of the RC-292 antenna corrode after exposure to damp air, and that the components of the antenna head become water-logged.

(b) EVALUATION: Either of these conditions will greatly reduce the effectiveness of the antenna, and necessitates frequent inspection and repair.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the RC-292 antenna be constructed of a material less susceptible to corrosion, and that the head be made less susceptible to water-logging.

(2) Leakage of BA-30 Battery.

(a) OBSERVATION: With continuous use during periods when the temperature is high, leakage occurs in the BA-30 battery.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that due to leaking batteries, malfunctions have occurred although the batteries were still serviceable. The leading acid coats the battery terminals and prevents proper contact.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a more suitable seal be provided for the BA-30 battery in order to prevent leakage.

(3) Push-to-talk Switch on TA-312 Telephone.

(a) OBSERVATION: Depression of the push-to-talk switch on the TA-312 telephone often becomes difficult or impossible.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (Feeder Report), 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period ending 31 October 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U).

(b) **EVALUATION:** The rubber push-to-talk switch tends to dry out and harden with use, often rendering the telephone inoperative unless removed. If replacements are not available and the telephone must continue to be used, dirt and water can enter the handset causing further damage to the switch and handset components.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That the rubber push-to-talk cover be constructed of a pliable material which is not prone to hardening with heat and age.


h. **Material:** None.

i. **Chemical:** Rigging of Tactical Flame Sorties.

(1) **OBSERVATION:** Using a three-foot sling with an attached clevis as the stationary hook has proven to be considerably faster when rigging the flame cargo.

(2) **EVALUATION:** It has been determined that using the doughnut system to hook up the flame cargo from inside the CH-47 helicopter was too slow and often quite difficult, creating a safety hazard especially if the helicopter had to hover in a crosswind. The new system incorporates a medium size clevis, a modified type-four connector link, and a three-foot sling which is attached to the crossbar, adjacent to the helicopter's main cargo hook. One metal sleeve on the connector link is machined down to fit flush inside one eye of the clevis. The three-foot sling is attached to the other end of the connector link, then tied to the crossbar with a choker hitch. A stationary, open hook is formed whereby the ground crew simply loops the doughnut from the cargo net over the hook. This system is faster, therefore safer for both the air and ground crew since less time is spent hovering over the flame cargo.

(3) **RECOMMENDATION:** That this system be adopted for use for all tactical flame missions.


RICHARD J. TALLMAN
COL, INF
Commanding

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Inclōsure † (Task Organization as of 31 October 1971) to Operational Report -
Lessons Learned (Feeder Report), 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period ending 31 October 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R3) (U).

TASK ORGANIZATION AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1971

3d Bde

3-187 Inf:

1-506 Inf:

2-506 Inf:

D/3-5 Cav (Attached):

L/75 Inf (Ranger) (Attached):

176 RF Co (OPCON):

742 RF Co (OPCON):

2-319 Arty (DS)
B/2-320 Arty (DS)
A/B/2-11 Arty (GS)
C/4-77 ARA (GSR)
A/B/C/2-94 Arty (GSR)
A/1-39 Arty (GSR)
B/326 Engr (DS)
3d FSSE, DISCOM (DS)
Tm/101 MI Co (DS)
3/265 RR Co (DS)
TACP, 20th TASS (DS)
FSE/A/501 Sig (DS)
3/101 MP Co (DS)
D/801 Maint (DS)
3/A/426 S&S (DS)
G/326 Med (GS)
Tm/5 Cbt Wea Sqdn (GS)
Tm/4 PSYOP Det (GS)
101st Avn Gp (GS)

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