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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
APO San Francisco 96383

UNCLASSIFIED

5 February 1969

AVDG-CA-E

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne
Division for period ending 31 January 1969.

Commanding General
101st Airborne Division
ATTN: AVDG-GC-H
APO San Francisco 96383

CLASSIFIED BY: 66 101
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON: 31 DECEMBER 1975

1. Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.

a. The Third Brigade received a warning order on 26 October 1968 to prepare for movement to Camp Evans, northwest of Hue and assume security of the installation on the departure of the 1st Cavalry Division, airmobile. The 3d Bn 187 Inf began the movement into the new AO by CH-47 and overland convoy on 30 October. The 3d Battalion, 187 Inf commenced the reporting period with its movement from Camp Eagle YD8115 to Camp Evans YD5432, and the assumption of these three missions: (1) Construction and security of the Fire Bases Miguel at YD485206, Long at YD571216, and Helen at YD517219; (2) Security of a portion of the Camp Evans perimeter; and (3) the conduct of reconnaissance in force operations to deny enemy access to Base Area 114, and the continuous surveillance of the Rocket Belt and the Song Bo River. At 011630H Nov the last elements of the Battalion closed Camp Evans by convoy.

Plans were initiated to completely rebuild the bases, and in the case of FB Miguel which was considered tactically untenable was it relocated. Dong Cung Cap mountain vic YD490198 was selected as the site for the new fire base to be named Fire Base Rakksan. FB Miguel would remain occupied until the new fire base was completed.

On the night of 1 Nov, FB Long was lightly probed, with the OP receiving one enemy hand grenade. The subsequent search of the contact area produced no findings. There were no US casualties in this incident. The first casualty of the reporting period occurred on 3 Nov when one man of A-3-187 was wounded by sniper fire in vicinity YD569199. Despite the use of blocking mortar and artillery fires, the sniper was not located during A Company's search of the area. Elements of the battalion conducting RIF operations in the new AO found many abandoned bunkers and installations left by the NVA/VC after the TET Offensive of 1968; but contact with the enemy was light and almost nonexistent. This was to prove to be

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characteristic of most of this reporting period - an enemy refurbishing his materials, refitting and retraining his units, presenting his strength and avoiding contact with US Forces at all costs.

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The Third Brigade CP moved from Camp Eagle to Camp Evans by CH-47 at 011650H together with C Co 2-506 Inf. The Brigade CP became operational at 021200H, with the 3-5 Cav becoming OPCON effective at this time. C-2-506 was made OPCON to 3-5 Cav. 1-506 Inf moved to Camp Evans on 3 Nov and assumed the security mission of Camp Evans. 2-506 Inf Bn Jump CP moved by CH-47 to Camp Evans 061630H, with elements of the advance party securing Fire Bases Jack YD496288 and Jeanie YD554394. On the following day elements of 2-506 moved by CH-47 and commenced operations in their assigned AO.

Offensive operations were characterized by multiple reconnaissance-in-force operations, small unit patrols and extensive night ambushes. Defensive efforts were directed toward the construction and improvement of Fire Bases and the Camp Evans perimeter. Enemy contact was extremely light during November with enemy personnel moving only in small groups, mostly during periods of reduced visibility. Much of this movement was detected by radar and fired upon by artillery with immediate results generally being negative or unknown. Patrols were to later find NVA/VC recently buried who had been killed by artillery shrapnel.

The 1-506 Inf initially secured Camp Evans perimeter and the immediate surrounding area. Operations in their AO were often combined in nature usually consisting of a PF Platoon and 12 NPPF collaborating in combined search and clear or multiple platoon reconnaissance-in-force operations. Kit Carson Scouts habitually accompanied these maneuver elements. The 2-506 Inf made their first contact with the enemy in their AO when at 091015H vic YD562246, B Co engaged 3 VC with small arms. The enemy withdrew without returning fire. The 2-506 was continually plagued with extensive enemy mining and booby-trap activities in the southern portion of their battalion AO. Many of the booby-trap techniques encountered were common throughout RVN but some innovations demanded the development of counter-techniques and extra precautions on the part of the maneuver elements. During the period 19 Nov - 19 Jan 3d Bde elements sustained 4 KHA, 24 WHA and 2 NPPF WHA in an area 5Km x 2Km. Extensive booby-trapping has caused this Brigade to initiate Rome Flow operations with Inf or Cav providing security for the engineers in this area.

The arrival of Brigade elements into the new area of operations coincided with the DEROS cycle which made it an acute necessity to conduct extensive training programs while becoming conditioned to the requirements of enemy tactics in different terrain as diverse as the mountains with triple-canopied jungle, to the rolling hills and piedmont, and the marshy sand areas bordering the South China Sea.

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During November enemy initiated contacts in the mountains were generally minor probing actions against night defensive positions or the exchange of small arms fire in meeting engagements followed by immediate withdrawal. In the "plains area" in addition to booby traps, the enemy used indirect fires in brief "standoff" harassment attacks with 60mm, 82mm mortar and RPG fires. At 110025H Camp Evans received 12-15 rounds, unknown type. Phong Dien District Headquarters (YD529345), at the same time received RPG-2 fires. Counter mortar/rocket fires were returned with unknown results. On 301000H Nov D-2-506 sighted 5-6 personnel entering their last NDP. Shortly afterwards at 1010H they observed 22-30 enemy with weapons and steel helmets at same location. The enemy was engaged with artillery fires and the area subsequently searched with negative results.

On the night of 6 December at 2050H the 1st platoon of C Co 3-187 ambushed a sampan killing all four occupants and capturing 2 AK47's and other miscellaneous clothing and equipment. The platoon had been conducting reconnaissance in force and ambush operations along that portion of the Song Bo River for three days. It had been thought for some time that the Viet Cong were using the river for movement by sampan; however, this incident indicated that in actuality the enemy were moving along the Song Bo by foot and using sampans only to cross the river. During the period 27 Nov - 10 Dec, 1-506 Inf continued their security missions and operations in the AO and completed their Increased Training Program. On 7 Dec in vicinity YD447336, A-1-506 spotted 25-30 armed Viet Cong dressed in black. When engaged by small arms fire, the enemy initiated evasive action in 4-5 man groups, and though engaged by artillery fires and aerial rocket artillery, the subsequent sweep of the area of contact produced negative results. The above mentioned were the largest enemy sightings during this reporting period.

Company A-3-187, while operating in the western portion of the battalion AO, spotted and engaged 3 VC moving West with negative results. In the initial encounter, the company sustained one WHA. A Forward Air Controller supporting during the contact observed several bunkers vicinity YD455186 and directed an air strike into the area. The strike produced secondary fires and a secondary explosion sending flames 800 meters high. An immediate reconnaissance of the target area produced 1 AK47 and 1 document. On the following day the company continued their search and ascertained that the secondary explosion was caused by TNT which caused the bunkers to collapse and exposed miscellaneous items of clothing, mess gear and medical supplies. At 1245H they were engaged harassingly by AK47 fires at the location of the cache with the enemy withdrawing before maneuver could be effected. The subsequent search of the area revealed a freshly dug tunnel in which they found three duffel bags of new charcoal grey NVA uniforms wrapped in plastic, and a communications bunker containing commo wire, batteries, medical supplies, gas masks, and offset printing material. Additional Air

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Strikes in the area resulted in another secondary explosion. The following day, the search of the second strike area discovered ten rifles and four sub-machine guns in the cache area. The cache also included several reels of VC propaganda film, 25 long-playing records and several hand-held electric speakers. There were two additional contacts in the cache area with 2-3 VC with negative results. On 9 Dec 4 rockets fired from vicinity YD4015 were aimed at FB RAKKASAN which became the Battalion Headquarters forward base on 1-2 Dec. The round hit between FB MIGUEL and RAKKASAN causing no damage or injury.

During the period 6 Nov - 16 Dec, Co A 2-506 Inf conducted search and clear and reconnaissance in force operations in the "Street Without Joy" area OPCON to 3-5 Cav. The Co dramatically demonstrated the impact of staying power on a given area over an extended period of time. The Company at times operated with Cavalry elements and at other times in combined operations with RF/PF elements. During the first days in the area they were almost constantly harassed by indirect fires in standoff attacks and booby-trap attempts. None of these deterred their continued efforts to thoroughly search and dominate the area. During the period the Company killed 7 VC, captured 2 VC (WLA), and apprehended 18 detainees who were later classified as civil defendants. Six males among these admitted to being VC recruits awaiting transportation to the mountains for training. The Company also captured 2 individual weapons, 4000 rds SA ammo, 10,000 lbs of rice, over 4 lbs of documents, and six M-26 grenades. Numerous booby-traps and bunkers were detected and destroyed.

The remainder of the reporting period was dominated by Operations Rawlins Valley, Todd Forest and Ohio Rapide all of which were multi-battalion combined operations with the latter still in process.

Operations Rawlins Valley 16 Dec - 24 Dec: This operation was conducted in Nam Hoa District, Thua Thien Province in an area which intelligence data indicated to be the Base Area of the 6th Front (6th NVA Regiment). It was believed that two unidentified battalions of the 6th Regiment and the K-35 Artillery were located here. This was supported by several agent reports, combined with numerous "people sniffer" readings, VR sightings and SLAK results in the area to confirm that there were enemy forces in the area. The task force maneuver elements were the 1-506 Inf and 3-187 Inf with the 3d and 4th Bns of the 3d ARVN Regt, 1st ARVN Div. The Task Force mission was for the 3d Bde(-) and 3d ARVN Regt(-) to conduct combined combat assaults and reconnaissance-in-force operations in assigned AO's commencing 170800H December (D-Day) to locate and destroy NVA/VC forces in base camps and cache materials. It was concluded in the Intelligence Annex to the OPORD that the enemy would attempt to avoid contact with allied forces in order to prevent heavy losses so that his plans for a new offensive would not be endangered. Enemy activity and therefore contact was minimal. In a total of eight actual physical contacts, four were initiated by the enemy and 4 by

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Brigade forces. US contacts were by ambush or meeting engagements with trail watchers. Enemy initiated actions were "standoff attacks" with indirect fires against FB's Miguel and Mooney, and futile attempts to infiltrate the perimeter at FB Miguel; and one engagement with RPG and M-79 fires. On D-1 Inf elements were moved to forward fire support bases Miguel YD485207, Mooney YD378163 and Strike YD577173 for the insertion of supporting artillery batteries and mortar platoons. The movement of forces on D-1 included elements from 2-506 who assumed the security and construction missions at FB's Jack, Helen and Long. The movement beginning approximately 160800H Dec was completed by 1520H. A total of ten 155mm How and 4 105's were positioned forward with necessary ammunition and tactical barrier equipment. On D-Day with chemicals having been dropped to block likely enemy routes of reinforcement or egression, and 3-3d and 4-3d ARVN Regt having completed their insertion at LZ Kathryn (YD468112), the 1-506 Inf conduct their combat assault into LZ Pam YD373183 and LZ Pat YD378163 beginning at 171205H Dec. The Bn CP moving with Co C closed into LZ Pat at 171351 completing the insertion without incident. Several non-battle casualties were experienced by units during the process of off-loading helicopters. The necessary medevacs were completed by 171445H. 3-187 commenced their combat assaults into LZ Maureen YD429120 and Kelly YD403119 starting at 171356H and completing at 171635H. Two VC fired SA at the Forward Air Controller who was orbiting during the insertions. The air strike into the area at 1449H followed by a search by A Co of the strike area produced negative results. The 1-506 Inf had little to no activity during D+1+2, finding only 1 VC in a hastily prepared grave who had been dead 24-36 hours.

On D+3 the 1st and 2d platoons of D Co made contact with 4-5 VC/NVA who initiated the engagement with RPG-2 and M-79 fires resulting in 3 US WHA. Both platoons returned fire and swept the area for 800-1000 meters with negative results. It was concluded that the enemy elements were "trail watchers". In their continued search along assigned axis of advance numerous bunkers and straw huts were found and destroyed. The enemy avoided making contact with the advancing elements of the 1-506 Inf, abandoning his bunkers and huts to their destruction.

In addition to the air strike directed on observed enemy during the insertion of 3-187, the only other incident of enemy activity on D-Day was the receipt of 6-8 60mm by elements at FB Mooney with negative damage. On D+2 A Co found and destroyed 5 huts which had not been recently used, several rounds of SA ammunition, an aiming stake, and copper commo wire and other miscellaneous equipment. D Co, conducting local reconnaissance-in-force from their night defensive position, found 3 60mm and 5 81mm mortar rounds, and 3 bunkers; all were destroyed. At 1540H the Recon Platoon observed 1 VC running across a trail; engaged him with SA, and in return were engaged by an unknown number of enemy about 300m away. The platoon confirmed 1 VC KIA and no US casualties. After artillery and AFA had been directed on the area of contact, the elements moved in to search and discovered a small base complex. The positions were destroyed.

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D+3 was the day of greatest significance during Rawlins Valley. The 3-187 continued on its axis of advance with A Co's movement W and NW toward the Rao Trang River being completely uneventful throughout the day. C Co departed their NDP at 200820H and moved NNE along a ridge line toward the Rao Trang River. Movement was uneventful until 1029H when in the vicinity of YD396142 they located 2 huts, a bunker and a cave. Local search revealed three more huts in the area and a platoon of 30 VC. All were destroyed. An observation post (tall tree with ladder), an AK47 magazine and a NVA gas mask and 40 bunkers were found 100 meters to the West of the 1st huts' location at 1200H. Another hut complex was destroyed at YD394146. Continuing their movement toward their objective, they found in vicinity YD387150 an old hut complex which had been used as a hospital complex. 100 meters north of the hospital was another bunker/hut complex containing 40 bunkers and 50 huts. C Co's continued movement to their NDP was uneventful. As the Recon Platoon moved along their axis they found and destroyed several enemy bunkers and miscellaneous items of equipment. Their findings included the filter for a Chicom gas mask, several spider holes, an old Cal 45 pistol, one Thompson sub-machine gun and a US MK7 grenade. 40 rounds of 82mm ammunition and 2 RPG rounds were found and destroyed in place in vicinity YD404138. A trail led from this area to nine bunkers which were also destroyed. D Co and the Jump CP flushed two VC vic YD406146. They were immediately engaged with small arms fire. The search of the area of contact revealed two straw hats, 1 RPG and 2 rucksacks (one covered with blood). The Bn CO requested that a tracker dog team be placed on a thirty minute alert. The rucksacks contained clean pressed fatigues, RPG ammo, three documents, food and personal equipment. D Co continued following the heavy blood trail. The tracker dog team was inserted, but night closed before the trackers could be fully exploited. An NDP was established at vic YD407150 at 1830 hours and two ambushes were positioned. Thirty-six minutes later D 16 vic YD409180 sprang their ambush against 3 VC; one was killed immediately and the two who dragged the body away were engaged by fires. At 1912H artillery was adjusted on the contact area and gunships, requested at the same time, arrived at 2003H. A flareship was requested along with the USAF gunship, Spooky 2, in that sporadic contact continued until 2043H. At 2110H D Co and the Jump CP heard movement around the NDP and engaged the suspected locations with grenades. At 2300H 2 hand held flares were seen West of the NDP and continued movement heard to the South and West of the NDP. Gunships were directed into the suspected enemy locations. At 210015H the helicopter gunships began firing along a stream running North and South of the NDP where movement had also been heard. The search of the contact area at daylight revealed one additional VC/NVA and an AK47. The VC was wearing A4VN fatigues and moccasins and had been traveling light-only his weapon, 1 magazine and a poncho. C Co, continuing to search towards their objective, found and destroyed several old huts and bunkers as they advanced. Inside two of the bunkers found in vicinity YD389143, were two Vietnamese radios and two Chinese hand-crank generators. These items were evacuated from the NDP the following morning. From this point until the time for extraction, the activities of 3-187 elements were limited to the destruction of bunkers found along the routes of advance. There were reports of movement during the hours of darkness but no visual observation or actual contact with the enemy. At 240002H

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A-2-501, securing FB Miguel, received two incoming mortar rounds 50-60 meters from the perimeter edge. Counter-mortar fires were directed into the suspected location. Twenty-three minutes later one VC was observed inside the perimeter and engaged with small arms fire. The search of the area revealed a heavy blood trail, olive drab cloth on the wire, and the wire barrier cut. At 0401H A-2-501 engaged a second VC trying to enter the perimeter; detected and fired on the enemy. Since it was necessary to have all elements in a new offensive posture by 241800H for the Christmas cease-fire, it had been planned to conduct the extraction phase on 23 December. However, severe weather conditions prevented this and only the 1-506 Inf and 1 battery of 155mm How's from FB Strike were extracted. The weather on the morning of 24 December was marginal and the extraction was delayed until 240936H. Using a 1-20-2 UH-1 combination, the 3-187 Bn, A-2-501 Inf, and 3-3 ARVN battalion were extracted by 241720H. CH-47's extracted all of the artillery, ammunition, the barrier material and the Bde and Regimental CP's during the same time frame.

In Opns Rawlins Valley, eight VC/NVA were killed and six individual weapons captured. There were no US KIA's. The success of the units mission to locate and destroy NVA/VC forces in base camps and their cache material was limited by the enemy's total unwillingness to stand and fight. When not measured by the number killed or weapons captured the operation was successful, in that, the enemy was compelled to withdraw deeper into the mountains, abandoning forward areas with shelters, a hospital complex, many newly constructed bunkers, and fighting positions to the destruction of our attacking elements. This, together with the capture of and destruction to communications line spoiled and delayed the enemy's immediate capacity to launch offensive operations or position forces for future operations from this objective area.

Perhaps the most significant accomplishment of Opns Rawlins Valley was of a non-tactical nature. Invaluable training in the techniques of combat assaults and extractions and movement over mountainous terrain in triple-canopied jungle was gained for the largely new personnel who had been assigned to the Brigade during the annual rotation cycle.

During this same period, 2-506 Inf continued the security of Camp Evans, FB's Jack and Jeanie, Long and Helen, and conducted reconnaissance in force and night ambush operations in designated portions of the Bde AO. Other than recurring booby-trap incidents and the location of small caches of spoiled and unspoiled rice, the only incident of significance was the receipt of two rounds of mortar fire at FB Jack by D-2-506 on 200325H. There was no damage or casualties from the mortar fires. Throughout this period, radar detected periodic movement of enemy groups of 5-7 persons and engaged them with artillery fires with unknown results. The only incident during the Christmas cease fire was the detection of 10-12 personnel by radar vic YD518259. Artillery illumination was fired in response to the radar reading. Enemy movement began to increase following the cease fire with numerous radar detected targets being fired upon by artillery. On 28 Dec there were nine separate incidents of enemy contact resulting in 2 US WHA; 3 NVA/VC KIA and 3 VC PW's; 1 AK47 and a pair of binoculars, CIA. An additional NVA was killed.

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A-3-187 while he was washing in the Song Bo River on 29 Dec. Illustrative of the extensive enemy booby-trap activity in the Brigade AO is the incident on 30 Dec when A-2-506 Inf was engaged by an estimated enemy squad with small arms and automatic weapons fire in vicinity YD528262. The enemy broke up into small groups when fire was returned and fled to the South towards the mountains. While pursuing, A Co elements were drawn into a heavily booby-trapped area, detonated one, and sustained 1 US KIA and 5 WIA, with enemy casualties unknown. At the same time in vicinity YD537258 the Rcn Plat of 2-506 Inf was engaged in a similar manner by an estimated two enemy squads located in vicinity YD533257. The enemy again fled when fire was returned. The Rcn plat swept the contact area with negative results; but when A-2-506 joined the Rcn Plat effort to ferret out the evading enemy, they detonated a M14 Mine Type booby trap with a thirty meter bursting radius causing 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. Fifteen minutes later 3000 meters Northeast an APC of A-3-5 Cav detonated a 105mm How projectile booby-trapped resulting in 3 US WIA and 1 heavily damaged APC.

On 28 Dec a platoon of D Company 3-187 in vicinity YD435183 received one RPG round wounding the platoon leader and another man, neither seriously. Artillery, ARA and gunships were directed into the area of contact. The area was then searched; 1 VC with an AK47 was located and killed. In a running action beginning on 29 Dec vic YD396205 and ending on 2 Jan, C Co sustained 1 US KIA and 1 WIA and accounted for 5 NVA KIA and 3 weapons captured. Documents on one of the NVA bodies indicated that he was a lieutenant in the C-1 Company, 807 Battalion, 6th NVA Regiment.

Operation Todd Forest occurred during the period 31 Dec 68 - 13 Jan 69 involving 1-506 Inf and the 1-1 and 3-3 ARVN Battalions. This multi-battalion operation was a combined reconnaissance in force operation across a broad front in a portion of Base Area 101, a known enemy base area and infiltration route. Two battalions of the 812 Regiment and two unidentified battalions were believed to be located in the general area.

OPERATIONS NARRATIVE.

On D-Day, using a 2-20-6 combination, security elements for the Forward Fire Support Bases Barbara YD328337 and Sword YD427312 were combat assaulted into these locations. Artillery from Camp Evans and LZ Nancy YD445394 fired the preparatory fires followed by aerial rocket artillery. With the artillery on forward bases, the infantry elements of 1-1 and 3-3 ARVN combat assaulted in LZ's vic YD555425 (LZ Chris), YD265334 (LZ Betsy). The 1-506 Inf was combat assaulted into LZ Mary vic YD334273 and LZ Margaret vic YD335304. The combined force commenced their reconnaissance in force on their assigned axis of advance. The assaulting elements of the 1-1 ARVN captured 1 NVA, wounded by the artillery prep, sitting stunned on the LZ. Initial interrogation indicated that he was a member of C-2 Co, K-8 Bn and had infiltrated into

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the RVN in April 1968. The PW further related that he and two others had been searching for food in areas where allied forces had operated in the past. The PW's fellow soldiers had abandoned him. At 311608H the Recon Platoon found three bunkers and a supply area in the area vic YD356270 and detected signs of recent use. At 1433200H they came upon a burning cache, but could not enter the area because of exploding ammunition. After the fire had burned out, the search on the following morning uncovered 6 SKS carbines, 1 AK47 rifle, 1 light machine gun, 2 cases of Chicora grenades, 1 printing press with accessories, 2 shovels and a pick, plus 245,000 dollars in VC tax receipt booklets. Six burned huts were in the area.

On D+1 all units continued reconnaissance in force operations along their assigned axes of advance. At 0900H, Co A fired small arms at a small enemy force at YD352317. While pursuing these, about 15 other enemy soldiers were observed fleeing. One enemy was wounded. At 0915H, vicinity YD354283, Co D spotted 4 VC. At 0930H, Recon killed one VC, capturing an AK47, vicinity YD345268. The VC was wearing black pants, fatigue shirt, HO CHI MINH sandals and an ammo pouch. Subsequently, in the same area they found 2 more AK's and a Smith & Wesson .38 revolver. At 0931H, the 3d platoon of D Co had contact with one enemy soldier who fled to the Northeast. At 0945H, Co A found, vicinity YD344313, a sandbag containing 40 boxes of noodles, six one-pound bags of salt, two one-pound bags of sugar, 2 cans of Borden's Condensed milk, and a carton of "RUBY KING" cigarettes, dated 28 December 1968, with writing from regional forces on it. At the same location, Alpha subsequently found a dead enemy soldier in a grave. He had been buried approximately one week. Delta, at 1201H, reported that their 3d platoon found 7 bunkers that had possibly been used the night before at YD368274. One VC fired on them at that location. At 1345H, Co A found 3 bunkers, 5' x 4' x 3', having 2' of overhead cover and surrounded by a wooden fence at YD340319. At 1430H, Alpha closed on a bridge, constructed of vines, which had previously been spotted from the air. The point man of Co B's 3d platoon fired at a VC at 1450H, vicinity YD344290. The 2d platoon of Co C destroyed a 4x6' bunker at 1500H, vicinity YD358282. Fifteen minutes later, they found a hut containing the following medical supplies: 87 bottles containing penicillin, 200,000 units each, some 2mm units of novocaine, 36 tubes of an unknown medication; 2 tubes of red liquid, 12 tubes of yellow liquid, a tube of Vietnamese salve, 13 bottles of vitamin B12, 8 bottles of vitamins and 2 ounces of an unknown green powder. Further search of the area produced a light machine gun, a set of NVA khakis, 3 NVA ammo pouches, three 12x25' huts, one of which had a 6x6' bunker, a letter, a 75 pound bag of cornmeal, a set of child's clothing, a bar of Lux Soap, a bottle of US insect repellent and a set of VC clothing. At 1530H, Co B's third platoon found a poncho, a M26 grenade, a US canteen with cup, a pistol belt, 2 AK magazines, and a pair of NVA trousers with belt at YD343292. Co D completed a medevac at 1640H for a man with an injured ankle.

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At 1705H, Co D reported that their first platoon had found a bunker complex and fresh blood at YD367267. At 1725H, Co C reported finding a notebook containing names and weapons serial numbers of 4 VC, as well as the number of magazines and amount of ammo each had. Discovered also was a candy bar wrapper from Hue. At 1815H, 3d platoon of Co B had contact with 2 VC, killing one and wounding the other. One friendly WHA was medevaced at 1900H. All units reported their last contact by 2050H.

D+2 began quietly with no elements reporting anything significant until 1025H when Co C's 2d platoon found 1 NVA poncho and liner at YD370287. At 1120H 4th platoon, Co B found 1 bunker, 3x3x4' with reinforced roof and 1 well-used hut containing fresh vegetables. At 1125H, YD347292, Co B had one man wounded in the chest by sniper fire. Dust-off was completed at 1200H. Co B, at 1205H, took one WHA from incoming RPG fire. Medevac was complete at 1225H. An air strike was called on the suspected enemy firing position. At 1605H, Rcn found fresh blood trails at YD375267. The location had been an artillery target three hours earlier. At 1748H, Co C completed dust-off for one man with a back injury. All companies received scout dog and tracker teams during the afternoon.

On 5 January, Co C began the day with a medevac for a man with severe dysentery, completing it at 0820H. After a quiet morning, in which several units found signs of recent human presence, Co C at vic YD369299, found 3 huts, one of which was booby trapped. Time was 1335H. Findings included a medical pack, a diary, 25 lbs of rice, a US ammo can containing salt, a US canteen, a NVA ammo pack, 4 VC rucksacks, 1 NVA hammock with mosquito net, a NVA flashlight and a set of NVA clothing with fresh blood-stains. One VC, armed with an AK47 was spotted, but evaded pursuit. At 1615H, Co D's 2d platoon found a body, lying by an open grave, vicinity YD379270. The body had been prepared for burial and appeared to have been dead for 6-8 hours. At 1640H, troopers from Co B fired at two fleeing enemy soldiers, who evaded capture in the rapidly approaching darkness. The night passed without any enemy contact. In the morning all units continued reconnaissance in force. At 0925H, Co B found a 15x10x4' hut containing between 5 and 10 tons of rice. At 1025H, Co D had contact with two VC, vicinity YD385284, but lost them after a pursuit. About 1150H, Co D made contact with a VC at YD381218, where they found two huts. At YD384285, they spotted a straggler and gave pursuit. In the huts, Co D found 2 NVA canteens, 1 US canteen, one book with writing in it, 3 flashlight batteries and a wooden gun rack, capacity 10 guns. At YD391292, time 1645H, Co D found 3 huts, contents included a freshly made basket, a freshly made rope, 40 pounds of chow mein, a freshly opened can of sardines, a pair of black pajamas, a pair of civilian pants and a poncho. Later, at 1900H, vicinity YD390292, Co D found 6 huts and 2 fighting bunkers, containing 15 RPG rounds, 4 NVA gas masks, a NVA rucksack, a drum of machine gun ammunition, 2 NVA canteens, 150 rounds AK ammunition, one AK magazine, 2 NVA entrenching tools, 2 US entrenching tools, 14 sticks of TNT, an ammo pouch, 3 NVA fatigue shirts, 2 ponchos, 1 pick-

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head, and a 250 pound bomb.

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On the following day, Co D found a six-month old grave vicinity YD39292. At 1612H, Co D killed a VC at YD392293, capturing one AK47. They spotted two other VC and exchanged small arms fire with them. The VC withdrew after firing. At 1750H, Co D, vicinity YD394295, completed medevac of two men, one had a bullet in his arm and the other had shrapnel in his chest. At 1730H, vicinity YD394295, Co D's third platoon found 10 60mm mortar rounds. At 081045H in vic YD393288 D Co found two 75 pound bags of cornmeal, two 1x1x1' blocks of salt, 13 cans of Foremost concentrated milk, 1 1/2 gallons of salad dressing and 2 bags of incense. In the same area they also found 13 new and unusual huts. They had been built of logs and were 18x12' in size. Underneath were bunkers, 5x12' with one foot of overhead cover. Also found was a grave containing a male body, which had been dead approximately 24 to 48 hours from an abdominal wound. At YD396291, about 1122H, Co D's first platoon spotted one VC. He was pursued, but contact was lost. Co C, at 1359H, completed a dustoff for two men with high temperatures. At 1420H Co D's 2d platoon found 1000 pounds of polished rice, 26 sets of civilian clothing, a Russian light sub-machine gun and some documents, including a diary and a pamphlet, which mentioned Ho Chi Minh, in a 4x5' hut at YD387285.

Co D, at 091200H reported finding 2 new 15x6' huts containing 1 pair of black pants, fresh vegetables, a VC litter, 2 handkerchiefs, 2 empty sandbags, 2 sandbags with 25 pounds of polished rice and a page from an Akron, Ohio newspaper, dated 18 November 1968. The huts were located at YD399290. At 1430H, Co B completed a dustoff for two sick men at YD393327. At 1600H, they found, at YD399329, 3 huts containing bunkers, which had been reinforced with steel. The bunkers were destroyed. At 1645H, Co D reported spotting 26 enemy soldiers at YD405296. Two platoons were sent out in pursuit. Co C, at 1710H, engaged an enemy soldier carrying a weapon, vicinity YD410327. At 1730H, same location, Co C found 2 huts, containing 2 .45 Cal pistols and 2 SKS carbines. At 1800H, Co D's 2d platoon was reported in pursuit of 30 enemy soldiers at YD405296. At 1910H, Co D requested a medevac for a man shot in the arm and shoulder. Medevac was completed from YD405295 at 1935H. Co C, at 1955H, found a hut/tunnel complex, containing 3 SKS carbines, a .45 Cal pistol with holster and some documents, indicating that a VC cadre had been there. With darkness, a flareship assisted Co D in its pursuit. Other elements were maneuvered to enclose the suspected enemy location. The enemy managed to exfiltrate before the encirclement could be completed. The next morning Co D reported finding a dead VC at YD405296 at 0830H, who had been killed by M-16 rifle fire. At 1140H, vicinity YD410327, Co C found a complex that had been occupied by 10 to 15 persons, 3 of which were possibly female. Contents included a demolition charge, 2 loaded AK magazines, 4 US hand grenades, a Chicom grenade, a US .45 Cal pistol, 3 SKS carbines, 2 .45 Cal pistol holsters on Chicom pistol belts, 4 notebooks, 1 diary, 1 medical information book, 2 small bags, a photo of Ho Chi Minh

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signed by the Bn CO of the 52nd NVA Bn, a letter, 15 pounds of male and female clothing, a US canteen, 2 Chicom canteens, 40 US sandbags, 3 thermostats, a small medical bag with 3 ounces of penicillin and 3 ounces of an unknown medication, a plastic bag of VC documents, 10 US belts, 2 billfolds containing pictures and letters, 3 US ammo pouches, 2 US canteen covers, 160 rounds of AK ammo, a NVA helmet, a walking cane, some school papers and a flashlight. At 1345H, Co D at YD406293, found 9 miscellaneous surgical instruments, 4 bottles of unknown tablets, 50 capsules of penicillin, 20 bottles of water, 2 syringes, 5 sterile dressings, three 4x8" cotton pads, some papers and documents, 3 loaded AK magazines and a Chicom grenade.

Continuing to advance on 11 Jan, the 3d platoon of Co C, at YD417332 found an 8x10' hut containing 3 Russian carbines, 2 pair of pajamas, 200 pounds of rock salt and miscellaneous medical supplies. At 1155H, Co A's third platoon found six 5 gallon cans filled with polished rice. Two empty cans were also found. The rice had been cached, but the rain had washed the camouflage away. At 1340H, A Co spotted 1 VC wearing black pajamas, at YD389352. They pursued him for 20 minutes before losing him. At 1805H, Co D's third platoon found a storage hut at YD408292 containing one ton of polished rice, 2 dozen VC uniforms, a loaded AK magazine, 15 grams of morphine and a small medical bag. On 12 Jan elements of the battalion found and destroyed additional huts and bunkers and found 3 graves in vic YD411303. In the area there were bandages with fresh blood on them lying around.

On D+13 Operation Todd Forest ended with the extraction of all units back to Camp Evans of the 1-506, and the 1-1 ARVN to La Vang Air Strip vic YD329494. The 3-3 ARVN was moved to LZ NANCY by UH-1's and from there to Hue by CH-47's. The first lift of Co B was picked up at 0930H. The last lift of the 1-506 was completed at 1445H. FB Sword was subsequently closed out by Co D, 2-506 Inf.

Results:

Enemy Losses:

KIA (BC)	12
POW	3
Indiv Wpns	29
Rice (tons)	9
SA ammo (rds)	3018
Mortar/Rpg ammo	27
Bunkers dest	85
Huts dest	96
VC Tax Rept Scrpt	245,000 dollars VC

Friendly Losses:

US (WHA)	2
ARVN (WHA)	1

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During the conduct of Opns Todd Forest 3-187 and 2-506 Inf continued their security, construction and offensive operations in their assigned AO's with no significant contacts with enemy forces. ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ On 10 January there was a change of command ceremony for 3-187 Inf. LTC George M. Scheets, turned the command of the battalion over to LTC W.F. Honeycutt. On 17 January a report from Division Artillery Radar was received that a VC battalion was located in YD5819. Air strikes, artillery and ARA were employed in the area and B Company was inserted as a block while B-1-506 Inf effected the sweep. Several huts and tunnels, all empty, were found and destroyed; one NVA body was also found at this location. That same afternoon, at 171445H D Co observed the firing of two of the 4 rockets which impacted at Camp Evans, being launched from YD489251. The 4 rockets impacted an average of 100 meters from the Southern and Eastern edges of the Camp Evans perimeter, causing no damage or casualties. During the sweep of the launch area the next day, only a booby-trap was found; it was destroyed. The situation remained quiet in the 3-187 AO thru 23 January. On 20 January, C Co was inserted into the region of the Song Bo-Rao Trang River junctions (YD503135) to interdict a suspected infiltration route which had been indicated by seismic sensors previously placed in the area by the 101st LRRP's. On 16 Jan a change of command ceremony for 2-506 Inf was conducted. LTC John O. Childs turned the command of the battalion over to LTC Gene T. Sherron. At 160930H, 14th Engr elements from LZ Nancy began Rome Flow activities in the heavily booby-trapped area via YD5225. B Co 2-506 Inf with 1 plat 3-5 Cav was tasked to secure the Rome Flow activities. 2-506 Inf in addition to normal security missions and RIF operations conducted two cordon and search operations on 19 Jan and 22 Jan of Bo Dien Village (YD570310) and Dong Lai Village (YD510360). Seven detainees were apprehended in the former, three of whom were draft-dodgers. All six detainees from the latter were subsequently released. B and D Co 1-506 Inf operating North and South of Fire Base Sword (YD424312) during the period 19-23 January found much that indicated an NVA unit was operating in the area, possibly an artillery unit with infantry elements. In addition to observing 2 NVA moving to the Southwest from vic YD417308, they discovered 5 huts with bunkers and overhead cover vic YD426305 at 191230H. Inside one hut was 3 NVA uniforms and 4 empty rocket containers. There was a platoon size cooking area and a grave containing a decapitated body. Within a thousand meters of this location were numerous huts and bunkers containing overhead cover.

On 23 Jan 2-506 Inf elements were returned to Camp Evans by helicopter to be in a PZ posture for Opn Ohio Rapids. 1-506 Inf elements were moved by helicopter to assume the security of FB's Jack and Jeanie and Camp Evans and assume the offensive missions of the 2-506 Inf.

Ohio Rapids commenced on 24 Jan 69. This is a combined operation employing the 1st Bn 1st ARVN Regt, the 2d Bn 1st ARVN Regt, and

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2-506 Inf as the maneuver elements. Artillery was moved to forward fire support bases Davis, Mexico and Barbara, with Davis (YD253290) secured by 4th Co-2d Bn, 2d Co-2d Bn, and the Recon Co 1st Regiment; and FB's Mexico (YD405231) and Barbara (YD325333) secured by B and D Co's 3-187 Inf, respectively. 2-1 ARVN and 2-506 Inf combat assaulted LZ Carroll (YD344194) and 1-1 ARVN combat assaulted LZ Hoan (YD274277). The operation was planned to strike deep into the suspected base area of the 6th NVA Regt and engage and destroy their security forces and material in the objective areas. At 301420H, elements of 2-1 ARVN searching in vic YD305222 found a complex containing 10 huts w/bunkers. Maps, a sand table, and a notebook containing tactical information were also found in this location. Information contained therein verified that the operation had uncovered and destroyed the 6th Regt CP. Results of the operation to date are as follows:

2-506 Inf:

US	KHA	2	US WHA	3
NVA/VC	KIA	8	IWC	27 CSWC 6

Totals: Enemy KIA 21
IWC 37
CSWC 8

Friendly KHA 2
WHA 13

The combined multi-battalion operations Rawlins Valley, Todd Forest and Ohio Rapids were spoiling attacks which have had the total effect of greatly reducing the enemy's capability to position his forces and materials in sufficient quantity to launch another TET Offensive. The timing of and the objective areas selected during these operations has presently limited the enemy's offensive capability to "standoff attacks" by fire.

The reporting period ends with an element of the Brigade conducting combined operations in relentless pursuit of the enemy to deny him the initiative and freedom of action to stage his combat power in forward areas with impunity from detection and destruction. Other elements continue their active and passive security measures at fixed installation and near populated areas in order to thwart enemy efforts to achieve economy of force victories as concentrations of combat power is continually denied. Small unit reconnaissance in force and cordon and search operations, often combined in nature, continue in order to dominate the terrain while ferreting out local guerrilla forces and extending RVN governmental influence over the population. Throughout the AO multiple night ambush positions are employed to arrest even the night from the enemy by interdicting his efforts to establish or reestablish a link with the population and/or his sources of supply and intelligence.

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TASK ORGANIZATION

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- 1-2 Nov 3-187 OPCON Hqs 1st Cav
- 1-4 Nov 1-506 OPCON Hqs, 2d Bde 101st Abn Div
- 1-8 Nov 2-506(-) OPCON Hqs, 2d Bde 101st Abn Div
- 1-5 Nov C-2-506 OPCON Hqs, 2d Bde 1st Air Cav Div
- 2-3 Nov 1-7 Cav OPCON Hqs, 3d Bde 101st Abn Div
- 2 Nov 3-5 Cav OPCON Hqs, 3d Bde 101st Abn Div
- 2-8 Nov 5-7 Cav/D-1-9 Cav OPCON, OPCON Hqs 3d Bde 101st Abn Div
- 3-7 Nov 3-5 Cav OPCON Hqs 2d Bde, 1st Air Cav
- 8-12 Nov 3-5 Cav(-) OPCON Hqs, 3d Mar Div
- 8-12 Nov C-3-5 Cav OPCON Hqs, 2-506 Inf
- 13-15 Nov 3-5 Cav(-) OPCON Hqs, 1-5 Mech Inf
- 16 Nov 3-5 Cav OPCON Hqs, 3d Bde 101st Abn Div
- 11-14 Dec 2 plato 1-502 OPCON 3-5 Cav
- 11-14 Dec 1st Bn 3d Regt ARVN OPCON 3-5 Cav
- 16-24 Dec Opn Rawlins Valley

BDE CONTROL

3D ARVN REGT CONTROL

- 1-506 Inf and 3-187 Inf
- LRRPS, 2-17 Cav
- 58 Scout Dog Plat
- 2-319 Arty (DS)
- B-2-11 Arty (DS)
- B-1-83 Arty (GSR)
- B-326 Engr(-) (DS)
- 1 ARVN LNO Party
- T&CP

- 3-3 ARVN w/1 FO Party
- 4-3 ARVN w/1 FO Party
- 1 Arty LNO Party
- 1 Bde LNO Party
- A-34 Arty (DS)
- C-12 Arty (DS)

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TASK ORGANIZATION

31 Dec - 13 Jan Opns Todd Forest

BDE CONTROL

1-506 Inf w/D-2-506 Inf OFCON

1-77 ARMOR(-)

2-319 Arty (DS)

B-326 Engr(-) (DS)

TACP

C-2-94 Arty (GSR)

B-2-11 Arty (GSR)

C-326 Med

24 Jan - Opns Ohio Rapids

BDE CONTROL

2-506 Inf

B(-) 3-187, D-3-187

58 Scout Dog Plat

2-319 Arty (DS)

B-326 Engr (-) (DS)

TACP

B-2-11 Arty (GSR)

C-2-94 Arty (GSR)

C-1-83 Arty (GSR)

B-1-40 Arty (GSR)

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1-1 ARVN w/1 FO Party

3-3 ARVN w/1 FO Party

B-11 Arty

1 LNO Party

ARVN CONTROL

1-1 ARVN w/1 FO Party

2-1 ARVN w/1 FO Party

Rcn Co 1st ARVN

4 Co 2-2 ARVN

2 Co 2-2 ARVN

B-11 Arty (DS)

C-34 Arty (DS)

Arty LNO Party

Bde LNO Party

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ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Date Assigned-Date Reassigned

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- 1. Brigade Commander
 - COL Joseph B. Conny Jr. 23 Aug 68 - Present
- 2. Brigade Deputy CO
 - a. LTC Julius W. Becton Jr. 1 Nov 68 - 30 Nov 68
 - b. LTC Raymond P. Singer 30 Nov 68 - 30 Jan 69
 - c. LTC James M Bowers 31 Jan - Present
- 3. Brigade Executive Officer
 - a. LTC Manuel Alves 1 Nov 68 - 30 Nov 68
 - b. LTC James M Bowers 1 Dec 68 - Present
- 4. Battalion Commanders
 - a. 1-506 Inf
 - LTC Robert Arter 2 Jul 68 - 30 Nov 68
 - LTC Charles J. Bauer 1 Dec 68 - Present
 - b. 2-506 Inf
 - LTC John O. Childs 30 Aug 68 - 15 Jan 69
 - LTC Gene T. Sherron 16 Jan 69 - Present
 - c. 3-187 Inf
 - LTC George M. Scheets 17 July 68 - 10 Jan 69
 - LTC W. F. Honeycutt 11 Jan - Present
 - d. 3-5 Cav
 - LTC Angelo Grills 2 Jul 68 - 23 Dec 68
 - LTC Thomas E. Carpenter III 24 Dec - Present
 - e. 2-319 Arty
 - LTC Larry A. Caid 14 Jul 68 - 10 Jan 69
 - LTC Wilford R. Harrell 19 Jul 68 - Present

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SUBJECT: Section II, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Observation: Approximately 60% of the battalions' strength and 50% of HHC, 3d Bde rotated between 12 Nov 68 and 16 Dec 1968.

(a) Evaluation: Throughout the year 1968, active infusion programs were pursued by this organization. However, this program did not in fact eliminate the expected rotation hump. In addition to the high number of people rotating, 64.7% of all infantry personnel in pay grades E-7 and higher departed the organization. Nearly all key personnel such as Co CO's, Plat Ldrs, Plat Sgts and other skilled personnel such as PBO's, PSNCO's, clerks, mechanics, cooks, etc rotated during this period. The number of replacements received during the period was slightly less than the number of departing personnel. The preponderance of new inexperienced replacements in a unit impairs the aggressive momentum of a combat unit.

(b) Recommendation: It is recommended that a more vigorous infusion program be allowed for this organization in an attempt to reduce by at least two thirds the number of personnel departing in the months of November and December.

(2) Observation: Low-manning level of combat elements.

(a) Evaluation: During recent operations the rifle companies have been hindered in the accomplishment of their mission by a shortage of personnel. Current statistics (assigned personnel divided by authorized personnel) show our rifle companies to be at an average of 82% of authorized strength. One company was forced to work with three platoons, as it could not adequately man four.

(b) Recommendation: That the rifle companies be assigned personnel at 100% of authorized strength.

(3) Observation: Centralized Personnel Management Services, while good in theory and workable at a fixed installation, does not work well in a scattered situation. The physical separation between Division Rear (Bien Hoa) and Battalion areas (Camp Evans) makes for delayed personnel actions, incorrect action or information leading to inaccurate records. Telephone communication, at best, is poor and does not substitute for "eye to eye" contact.

(a) Evaluation: Company clerks, PSNCO and Adjutant plan visits to AG rear as often as possible, and call frequently to AG forward to follow up on personnel actions and to keep abreast of current policies affecting the personnel of the Battalion; but this is neither practical or at all times possible due to the demand for these personnel in accomplishing daily staff missions.

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(b) Recommendation: It is recommended that teams from the Division Rear visit the Battalions on a regularly scheduled basis. Teams should bring with them, the 201 files of the Battalions' personnel so they may be examined and verified by the individuals concerned. In addition, 201 files would be available to commanders to personally evaluate their personnel and aid in assignment.

(4) Observation: It has been observed that by a company submitting a feeder report to the Division Rear and waiting approximately five days for the return of the morning report, the personnel status will change or there are additions to the feeder report by the Division Rear which are not validated in the company. A good example of this is finding a soldier's name on the morning report but not having any orders assigning him to the company.

(a) Evaluation: It has been found that the Morning Report clerk at the Division Rear has access to information and appointing orders before they reach the gaining company. The correct procedure is to send any appointing orders with the feeder report. Additions should not be made at Division Rear because some appointing orders never reach the company or the individual never reaches the company.

(b) Recommendation: It is recommended that the morning report clerk make the morning report out only from the information contained in the feeder report.

b. Operations.

(1) Observation: Small groups (3-7) of VC/NVA have on two occasions (within a 10 day period), fired at US units with a plan of having the US units chase them through booby-trapped areas.

(a) Evaluation: US units that have chased these small groups of VC/NVA have suffered casualties they would not have suffered if they were not involved in a fast and careless chase of fleet VC/NVA personnel.

(b) Recommendation: Units in pursuit of the enemy should not sacrifice caution in their movement for speed. Small airmobile elements should be deployed to block routes of escape of fleeing VC/NVA small units when no ground elements are in a position to set up blocking positions. All previously detected booby-trap areas must be plotted on all maps and avoided in the pursuit of the enemy.

(2) Observation: Day and night observations, radar sightings, tracker teams and agent reports, all indicate that VC/NVA units within the Bn AO, move in small groups (3-7) and at varying times of the day and night.

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(a) Evaluation: If ambushes are to be successful they must avoid setting patterns in time and distance of movement into and out of ambush positions.

(b) Recommendation: Thorough reconnaissance of AO's should be made during daylight hours. Some ambushes that are positioned during the night should remain hidden until the following day to detect daytime movement. Small "Floating" ambushes should be utilized in familiar terrain. Occasionally, ambush positions should be relocated during the night.

(3) Observation: Graphs made of the locations of booby traps that were set off or found in the AO, indicates that there are safety lanes in some of the areas.

(a) Evaluation: It is believed that these safety lanes are routes of movement for VC/NVA elements. It is also believed that VC/NVA personnel may use these lanes for movement of sojourning VC/NVA forces and later booby trap them when the routes are discovered by US/Allied troops,

(b) Recommendation: Efforts should be made to locate such safety lanes and ambush routes or trails within these lanes.

(4) Observation: A Jump CP should be ready to be moved forward at all times. The number and duty assignments of the personnel who normally are required to operate a Jump CP should be known by the HHC Company Commander. The material and equipment needed by these men should be maintained and as centrally located as possible so the Jump CP can go forward very rapidly.

(a) Evaluation: It has been found that Jump CP's can easily be moved from one location to another if the personnel and equipment have been prepared and have actually performed a simulated move.

(b) Recommendations: That personnel be trained in coordination and movement of a Jump CP and that each job be delegated and performed by the individual before a Jump CP is initiated. Also that all equipment be maintained in a posture to be quickly employed forward. For example, a Conex container outfitted with communications equipment can be easily hooked forward at a moments notice.

c. Training.

(1) Observation: Inadequate training of replacements.

(a) Evaluation: Most new replacements were not in physical condition for field duty. They were not equipped for long

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marches over rough terrain with 60 pound rucksacks. Additionally, they were woefully unprepared to care for themselves in the field; simple tasks such as keeping dry, using field expedients such as ponchos for night shelters, and care of feet were major problems.

(b) Recommendation: That in correspondence with DA, CG advise DCSPP of the requirement for increased physical conditioning during BCT and AIT, and the CONUS bivouac training be conducted under more adverse conditions without shelter halves and with more reliance placed on use of field expedients.

(2) Observation: Conduct of training during operational activity.

(a) Evaluation: The increased training program was conducted concurrently with the battalion providing security for Camp Evans. This required a minimum of two presentations per unit in order to ensure that all personnel received the training, since the mission of providing security, conducting daily squad and platoon RIF's, establishing NDP's and AP's and providing road clearing teams daily made it impossible for the units to assemble all of their personnel for training at one time.

(b) Recommendation: The battalions need a four to five day full marshalling period in order to conduct training efficiently.

(3) Observation: The training program for the last training quarter was increased because of the large turn-over in personnel.

(a) Evaluation: There was a definite lack of qualified instructors in the intensified training program. The lack of qualified instructors was due mainly to rotation of personnel.

(b) Recommendation: All qualified instructors should be pooled to form a committee group or mobile training teams.

(4) Observation: One battalion initiated a rigorous training program commencing in October. The training was directed toward new arrivals, with a total of 47 man days of formal instruction ranging from an Introduction to Vietnam to Techniques of River Crossings and Small Unit Operations. In a more practical vein, training was conducted informally during operations in the AO in Jungle Operations, Personal Hygiene and First Aid, and techniques of Ambushes and OP and LP positions and formations. Weapons familiarization was conducted during marshalling and field operations.

(a) Evaluation: A continuing program within the battalion is in effect to increase the proficiency of the individual soldier and develop such essentials as initiative, teamwork and esprit-de-corps. In-country schools are utilized to the maximum extent commensurate with operational requirements.

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(b) Recommendations: It is recommended that the mandatory requirement to furnish 3 attendees per week to Combat Leaders Courses, be reduced to a monthly requirement. The weekly requirement places difficulties on maneuver companies by removing key and depended upon personnel all too frequently from squads and platoons. It also has the effect of lowering the status of a successful graduate on return to a unit where almost all of his contemporaries have already attended. He thus does not become outstanding but just one of the "herd".

d. Intelligence.

(1) Observation: Comprehensive describing of enemy structures and material.

(a) Evaluation: During operations, enemy caches, hut and bunker complexes, trail markers, and booby traps were discovered. Requirements from higher headquarters necessitated a comprehensive description concerning each find. In many cases, the item could not be evacuated (bunkers, buildings, BBT's) and in some cases a description of the surrounding environment was required (caches, BBT's). Due to personal differences in observation and reporting techniques, the quality and accuracy of the intelligence report varied. Also, on occasions, added requirements were levied subsequent to the discovering unit's departure from the area.

(b) Recommendation: Division consider acquisition and issue of Polaroid Swinger Cameras (cost under \$20.00) and film, on the basis of six per infantry battalion. Photos with identifying data, could be available at division level within hours after discovery.

(2) Observation: Evacuation of intelligence material.

(a) Evaluation: Several valuable finds during operations were enemy documents of considerable importance. Expeditious evacuation for subsequent exploitation was required. Most of the operations were conducted in a thickly vegetated, mountainous region. Established LZ's were few and additional LZ's difficult and time consuming to prepare. Extraction of such finds was made by having a LOH hover over the area of least vegetation, lowering a rope from the LOH to the ground and lifting the material out.

(b) Recommendation: That this technique be adopted division-wide to insure timely availability of captured documents to qualified document exploitation personnel.

(3) Observation: Throughout the period local VC/NVA forces employed numerous booby traps in 2-506 area of operations. The enemy avoided contact with US troops and changed his tactics of confronting US forces to harrasing through the extensive use of booby traps. This tactic has proved effective as our casualty rate indicates. A new

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technique in the employment of the M-26 hand grenade as a booby trap was encountered.

(a) Evaluation: These booby traps are armed with the delay element removed. The spoon is held in place by a tuft of grass or vine. Troops moving through the area, move the grass or vine and detonate the booby trap.

(b) Recommendation: All units become familiar with this technique of emplacing booby traps and be instructed to make maximum use of long probing poles or rope with a weighted end to clear areas where booby traps are suspected.

e. Logistics.

(1) Observation: The geographical location of one battalion has placed demands on the logistical personnel of the battalion to an extent never encountered before. Terrain and weather has created unusual supply problems due to lack of LZ's and low clouds and fog creating flying hazards within the mountainous areas.

The battalion has undertaken the construction of three semi-permanent Fire Bases while continuing its combat missions. The construction effort alone placed a Class IV demand on the S-4, while continuing its normal resupply of units in the field, created a dimension never before handled.

(a) Evaluation: Some of the problem areas encountered which are not within the battalions capabilities are: 1-Class IV construction materials not on hand at direct support echelons for immediate response to user demands; 2- lack of self-service store in the immediate vicinity to allow, as a minimum, a two or three times a week check for user requirements; 3- a lack of trained personnel in the logistics field especially supply NCO's, property Book Officer and NCO, Air movement specialists and ammunition handlers.

(b) Recommendations: Recommend that Bde's operating in AO's where permanent or semi-permanent fire bases are to be built and occupied be authorized to maintain Class IV construction material in the base camp area. It is further recommended that a self-service supply center or outlet, be placed in a closer proximity to user units (nearest one at present is 30 miles away). It is felt that this would eliminate many of the logistical resupply in user requirements of office supplies, paint, kitchen utensils, etc. The Annual MTOE "Update" submitted by this Hqs allowed for increases in the Supply Section of Hq Co, Airmobile Bn.

(2) Observation: Resupply.

(a) Evaluation: Resupply operations for units engaged in operations in jungle terrain are dependent upon the availability of adequate landing zones rather than the availability of aircraft: accordingly,

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5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Section II, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

resupply times (the availability of helicopters) should be more flexible to permit resupply over a greater period of time.

(b) Recommendations: That an adequate number of resupply ships be programmed to support units engaged in operations and be controlled exclusively by those units.

f. Organization. NONE

g. Escape, Evasion and Survival. NONE

h. Others.

(1) Observation: Use of Jungle Penetrator.

(a) Evaluation: At present, personnel who are extracted by the jungle penetrator are required to leave behind their rucksack, gear and weapon. This places a significant burden on the element on the ground as the equipment must be carried by other individuals. Since the jungle penetrator is designed to lift two men, it appears logical that it will safely lift one man with his LBE and weapon.

(b) Recommendation: allow medevacs to extract the man and his individual equipment during extended operations. NOTE: This observation requires further evaluation. There are several possible solutions:

1. The individual's equipment could be evacuated with the casualty, but this would require personnel and facilities at the receiving hospital to handle and store the equipment. There would further be a requirement for the reclaiming of stored equipment for redistribution, as the unit has no means of reclaiming said and should therefore be relieved of accountability at the time of evacuation. Equipment evacuated would not include the individual's weapon which can be carried until extraction by a unit log ship.

2. A 2d possibility is to equip units with necessary penetrator equipment so that when the medevac occurs, the units log ship can also be employed to retrieve the individual (s) equipment and return it to the units rear. This procedure would simplify handling and accountability requirements. An expedient method of using a weighted rope could be employed as an interim measure.

(2) Observation: Land Navigation.

(a) Evaluation: Only 1:50,000 maps and 1:25,000 photo-maps are available. The latter are acceptable supplements because of their lack of detail and accuracy. The former are good maps for battalion and higher headquarters, but lack of detail at 20 meter

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contour lines do not permit accurate land navigation at company level. Even with well trained map readers (and those are rare) accurate land navigation is not always possible with the present 1:50,000 maps. Many predominant terrain features on the ground: Hill masses, fingers, compartments, etc., simply don't appear on the 1:50,000 maps.

(b) Recommendations: That a requirement be stated for 1:25,000 maps at company level.

(4) Observation: ~~Inadequate Communications.~~

(a) Evaluation: The present squad radios are not a satisfactory means of reliable communications. The problem is not now acute because the relatively small-sized platoons (20-25 men) permit operating in two elements with the use of two PRC-25 radios. Should the rifle platoons ever experience full-strength status, communications will be a most serious problem.

(b) Recommendations: Pending development of a satisfactory squad radio, an additional 2 PRC-25 radios be authorized each platoon which is manned at full TOE strength.

(5) Observation: Reliable, Secure Communications.

(a) Evaluation: Both the RT-77 and KY-38 do not function properly in wet weather. Attempts to use field expedient methods to fabricate a waterproof cover have not been satisfactory.

(b) Recommendation: DISCOM be tasked to fabricate waterproof covers for both the RT-77 and KY-38.

(6) Observation: Communications Security.

(a) Evaluation: In many instances, supporting personnel and agencies do not possess copies of the SOI or KAC codes; consequently, radio frequencies must be transmitted in the clear if the necessary support is to be provided. This is particularly true in the case of AF support (flareships) and Army Aviation support.

(b) Recommendation: That this action be noted. While this matter is a communications security violation, it would be serious only in a situation where enemy COMSEC measures were extremely unsophisticated. In RVN environment, the compromise of a unit frequency is not a serious security violation. NOTE: In instances where the request for support comes through Bde Hqs, the problem is eliminated because of immediate availability of Air Force "Wheel" at our location to encode frequencies which can be transmitted with initial request to higher.

(7) Observation: Inadequate C & C communications.

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(a) Evaluation: Discussion: In many cases, aircraft sent to be used as C & C—particularly LOH's—do not have satisfactory communications equipment. In one instance, on 11 January, a LOH was dispatched to the field to perform as a C & C aircraft with only a single radio headset. The LOH can perform the role of a C & C aircraft only when adequate communications equipment is on board. This includes the installed FM set and two extra PRC-25 radios carried by the S3 and the Arty LNO. However, since these officers must also monitor the commander over the intercom, there is a requirement for a "Y" cord attachment to connect the intercom to a set of head phones. While most battalions have such a device, they are of the "home-made" type and not particularly satisfactory and generally degrade the capability of the intercom system. When a "slick" is used as a C & C, it requires a cord that can accommodate four head phones.

(b) Recommendations: 1. That Division Signal Battalion fabricate three (3) pair of headsets for each battalion which will permit attachment to a PRC-25 radio and an aircraft intercom system. 2. That LOH aircraft dispatched for use as a C & C aircraft habitually carry a set of head phones or extra helmet for the ground commander. 3. That a small battery powered amplifier be constructed locally, to be used as a intercom between the commander and his staff when either a UH-1 without console or an LOH is used as a C & C ship. Such a device can be procured as an "off-the-shelf" item in Japan or Hong Kong, and then modified locally to accept head sets.

(8) Observation: Signal continues to be a problem especially in an area where line of sight is not always possible. One significant area is an over-riding in frequencies which causes station clutter, but so far has not caused a lack of communications ability.

(9) Observation: The health of the battalion has remained excellent and loss of combat effectiveness for medical reasons was minimal. The incidence of malaria increased slightly during the reporting period, which can be attributed in part to unseasonably warm weather. The major health area was skin infection, primarily among troops in static defense positions at the Fire Bases. This was due to an inadequate supply of water to Fire Bases, and in part to inadequate early treatment.

A continual effort to supply water to the bases in adequate amounts and the installation of small shower units, has eliminated the problem of skin infections to some degree. Command emphasis has been placed on the taking of anti-malaria pills throughout the Battalion to reduce even lower, any incidence of malaria.

(10) Observation: Civic action in the Battalion is conducted by the Battalion S-5. The Battalion has been assigned the ConSon Refugee Camp as our area for Civic Action. The area has only recently been assigned and a preliminary survey has been conducted to determine

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impact and long term projects.

The Battalions current program is organized around MEDCAP Operations and support is drawn from various staff sections, the Headquarters & Headquarters and the line companies. Some of the problems encountered are: 1 - lack of area in which to conduct Civic Action Projects; 2 - lack of RF/PF Medics with which to conduct MEDCAP operations; 3 - lack of qualified interpreters; and 4 - rapid turn-over of officers appointed S-5, causing a lack of continuity in operations.

Due to the Battalions AO being uninhabited, CA operations have been limited to MEDCAP Operations. The MEDCAP Operations have been stabilized on a once per week basis and coordination through the District Chief and his advisor in setting up a schedule for each week has proved effective in obtaining RF/PF support. A Standing Operating Procedure for S-5 operations and activities in this area has been developed to effect continuity in operations.

It is recommended that Civic Action Projects not become a "give-away" type of operation, but be used to motivate the people to help themselves.

J. B. Conmy Jr.
J. B. CONMY JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
APO San Francisco 96383

AVDG-CA-E

13 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned
Hq 3d Bde 101st Abn Div- Period
1 Feb 69 - 30 April 69

Commanding General
101st Airborne Division
ATTN: AVDG-GC-H
APO San Francisco 96383

I. Significant Unit Activities

a. Combat Operations

The reporting period began with elements of the 3d Bde involved in Operation Ohio Rapids Phase I-III, in Base Area 101, while other elements continued the accomplishment of their existing missions in the Bde area of operations. The 1-506 Inf was conducting extensive RIF and night ambush operations, complemented by short range reconnaissance patrols, and was providing the security for Phong Dien, Camp Evans, and the FSB Jack and Jeanie from 1-13 Feb. On 14 Feb the Bn(-) combat assaulted into LZ's NW of FB SWORD (YD426312) to interdict the jungled foothill portion of the Song O Lau-My Chanh rivers infiltration routes. This was to complete the scouring of the terrain covered by 2-506 in Phases I and II of Ohio Rapids and was complementary to the maneuver scheme of 4-3-187 interdicting the known infiltration routes North from Coc A Bo Mtn vic YD3922. In addition to the maneuver of 4 Co the 3-187 Bn had deployed B and D Co's to secure the FSB's Barbara (YD253290) and Mexico (YD405231) while C Co cont RIF and security operations in vicinity of FB RAKKASAN. Ohio Rapids was a multi-battalion combined CA and reconnaissance in force operation conducted in cooperation with the 1st ARVN Regiment. Phase I began on 24 Jan when artillery was moved to the forward fire support bases DAVIS, MEXICO and BARBARA with DAVIS (YD253290) secured by the 4th Co 2d Bn, 2d Co 2d Bn and Ron Co 1st Regt; and MEXICO (YD405231) and BARBARA (YD325335) secured by B and D Co's 3-187 Inf respectively. 2-1 ARVN and 2-506 combat assaulted into LZ Carrol (YD344194) and 1-1 ARVN combat assaulted into LZ Heidi (YD274277). Elements then conducted reconnaissance in force operations on multiple axes to strike deep into the suspected base area of the 6th NVA Regiment and to engage and destroy their security forces and material in assigned objective areas. Upon completion of the thorough search of assigned objectives, 2-506 Inf was to continue their RIF on order to the North to the Ngon O' Lau River; 1-1 was to RIF to the NE and 2-1 was to RIF to the NW.

NOTE: During Phase I on 301420H, elements of the 2-1 ARVN searching in vicinity YD305222 found a complex containing 10 huts w/bunkers. Maps, a sand table, and a notebook containing tactical information were also found in the complex. Information contained therein verified that the operation had located and destroyed the 6th Regt CP. The contacts with the enemy prior to this date had been clearly determined to have been delaying actions by mobile blocking forces. It was decided to pursue vigorously with two battalions along probable routes of withdrawal, while one continued to search in the objective areas.

PHASE II: 2-506 Inf continued the pursuit North of the Ngon O' Lau River and East of the My Chanh. 1-1 ARVN was combat assaulted into LZ's East and West of FB BARBARA, and in conjunction with 2-506 Inf continued

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the pursuit on multiple axes in zone. 2-1 ARVN continued to seek out and destroy cache materials and base camp areas and destroy or capture small groups seeking to exfiltrate the initial objective area.

PHASE III: A Co 3-187 was combat assaulted into FB MEXICO (YD405231) on 10 Feb and commenced reconnaissance in force operations to the South in an area East of LZ Carrol and North of the Coc & Bo Mtn (YD3918). 1-506 Inf(-) was combat assaulted into vic FB SWORD (YD425312). 1-1 ARVN was reinserted into FB CARROL of the original AO and 4-1 ARVN commenced reconnaissance in force operations Southeastward from FB JEROME (YD193279). This multi-battalion combined operations which terminated on 28 Feb was a spoiling attack which disrupted or preempted any 6th NVA Regiment plans to launch offensive operations during the TET season, forcing them to disperse and relocate, and preventing them from deploying forces forward for attacks into the lowlands. Enemy losses are categorized as follows:

KIA 102 (BC); KBAA 1 (BC); KBA 4 (BC);

PW 4; Hoi Chanh 1; IWC 73; CS.G 15.

Allied forces sustained 12 KIA, 6 US and 6 ARVN. (See After Action Report for Ohio Rapids for details).

One of the more significant contacts with the enemy during this period, occurred on 23 Feb when 1-506 Inf elements repulsed a sapper attack against FB SWORD. The bodies of 7 sappers were found in the area along with numerous blood trails, satchel charges and RPG rounds. (See attached After Action Report on Sapper attack at FB SWORD for detailed account). Prior to their commitment into Phase II of Ohio Rapids, the 1st Bn 506th Abn Inf continued their responsibility for the defense of Camp Evans which had been assumed on 4 November 1968. Relief from this responsibility was by 2d Bn, 506th Abn Inf on 13 Feb 1969, when the Bn(-) combat assaulted into multiple LZ's West of FB SWORD (YD425312). Defense of the base camp had been accomplished by static bunkerline activity, periodic cordon and search operations of nearby villages, and extensive small unit patrolling and combat assault operations. There were no significant changes in enemy activities in or around Camp Evans during this period.

The battalion continued responsibility for FB JACK until relieved by the 3d Bn (JMBL), 187 Abn Inf on 19 March 1969. The defense of FB JACK was essentially a one company operation with support from one 81mm mortar section and a battery of 155mm Howitzers. Initially Alpha Company was employed in the defense of FB JACK until relieved by Charlie Company on 14 February 1969. Both units conducted continuous reconnaissance in force (RIF) and ambush patrol operations in the surrounding area. On 13 March one platoon from Charlie Company engaged an unknown number of enemy snipers after being fired upon by small arms. A subsequent search of the suspected enemy location revealed blood trails and bloody bandages. No other enemy contact was made during the operation.

The battalion also provided for the defense of FB JEANIE through the beginning of this reporting period until relieved of the responsibility by C Company, 2d Bn, 34 Armor on 13 February 1969. Echo Company in conjunction with Alpha Troop, 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, which 1st Bn, 506th Inf had OPCON, conducted Gordon and Search operations of nearby villages. The battalion Reconnaissance Platoon conducted daily RIF and ambush operations in the AO surrounding FB JEANIE finding and destroying numerous enemy fortifications and caches. The Reconnaissance Platoon during RIF operations had several successful meeting engagements with small size enemy units.

Since 11 Feb 69, the 2-506 has been deployed in the coastal lowlands, actively engaged in pacification, elimination of VCI/VC and resources denial. All of these missions have been accomplished in cooperation

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with GVN/ARVN forces. The battalion maintains liaison with four districts in Thua Thien Province (Phong Dien, Huong Dien, Quang Dien and Huong Tra). In addition, the battalion has worked with Hai Lang District, Quang Tri Province. A sound professional relationship between district and battalion has resulted in the execution of numerous combined operations.

On 14 Mar 69, Co A, with 1 plat of Co B, 1 plat NFFF, 1 plat PF, 3/C/504th MP(-) and the 3d Bde PSYOPS Section OPCON, conducted a complete cordon and search operation at Gia Long B Hamlet, Phong Dien District (YD534437). Throughout March and April 1969, continued operations in Phong Dien have resulted in a systematic search by US/ARVN troops of nearly all populated areas in Phong Dien District. The results of these operations have not been significant in terms of enemy body count or captured weapons, but American presence in the area has materially reduced acts of terror, attacks by fire and other anti-GVN activities.

On 2 Mar 69, Co A established its CP adjacent to Phong Dien District Headquarters. The company combat elements operate in the vicinity of Phong Dien, but do not stay in the compound itself. The close relationship developed between District Chief and Company Commander has made combined operations easy to plan and execute. Since a company has been operating near Phong Dien, there have been no attacks by fire or ground attacks on the Headquarters. There were attacks by fire in December and January. Several agent reports have indicated that Allied presence in and around Phong Dien makes movement, communications and liaison extremely difficult.

During the period 1-15 Apr 69, six combined operations were conducted. These operations included PF/RF elements from Phong Dien, Quang Dien, Huong Dien and Navy air cushion vehicles. Although these operations were not exceptionally productive, they served as excellent training exercises for improving RF/PF airmobile techniques and tactics.

In an effort to give greater tactical flexibility and free maneuver elements for offensive operations, a maximum number of fire bases have been dismantled and abandoned. On 12 Apr 69, FSB JEANIE (YD551391) was closed by Co D 2-506. By 23 Apr FSB T-BONE (YD659201) had been closed, with FSB JACK (YD497288) scheduled for closing by 1 May.

On 15 Apr 69, the 2d Bn, 506th Abn Inf began intensive rice denial operations. Two maneuver companies and the Reconnaissance Platoon of the battalion are involved. The units conduct screening, sweep and Reconnaissance in Force operations in their assigned AO's during the daylight hours. At night the units establish multiple ambushes along known and suspected routes of infiltration. The mission is to prevent NVA/VC infiltrators from the mountains, north into the lowlands from obtaining large amounts of rice during the harvest period. Based on Intelligence reports the mission is being accomplished.

As a part of the rice denial operation, the battalion has conducted five "Turkey Harvest" operations during the reporting period. These operations are aimed at preventing the VC and VCI from interfering with the friendly civilians during the actual harvesting of the rice. Two operations were conducted with Phong Dien District, two with Huong Tra District and one with Quang Dien District. A total of eight combined operations were conducted with NP/PF elements from Phong Dien, Huong Tra and Quang Dien Districts.

From 15-18 Apr 69, ARP/B-2-17 operated with A/2-506 vicinity YD4630 and from 18-19 Apr 69, with D/2-506 vicinity YD5822. The operations gave both units cross training in the other's concept of operation.

1 February 1969, found the 3d Battalion 187 Infantry (airmobile) with the following missions: (1) Construction and security of 3 Firebases, FB RAKKASAN, HELEN, and LONG; (2) Conduct of Reconnaissance in Force operations in the Battalion area of operations; (3) Occupation and security for two additional firebases in support of operation "Ohio Rapids".

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No significant activities occurred until the 9th of February when A Company was moved by air to FB MEXICO to replace D Company who assumed security at FB RAKKASAN. A Co conducted RIF operations in support of Ohio Rapids, Phase III as mentioned previously. 3-187 Inf elements received a warning order to prepare for operations with the 1st Bde in Operation Spokane Rapids on the 18th of February. All units prepared to stage at Camp Evans. C Company and B Company closed and conducted marshalling. Bravo Company prepared to conduct a combat assault into FB BRICK (YD834996) to secure and reopen the base. The operation was directed against elements of the 5th NVA Regiment who were believed to be utilizing the Ta Trach and Rao Nai River as LOC's to resupply their combat elements in the forward areas.

As the operation unfolded it became evident that the original estimates of the enemy situation and disposition were basically correct; however operational difficulties due to extremely poor weather, and changes in the Division operational priorities combined to reduce the time available to fully exploit the situation as found in the area of operation. Originally, A, C, and D Companies were to assault into two LZ's and begin their RIF. However, weather conditions did not permit flight until 23 Feb, at which time three companies were moved into LZ Susan YC797922. Each day some contact was made with the enemy, however, no unit identification was determined. Contact indicated that there was a large number of 2 to 3 man NVA groups who were engaged in trail watching activities.

1 March 1969, marked the last phase of Spokane Rapids with the extraction of the maneuver elements at 1300 hours. C, D, and A Companies were extracted in that order and moved to Camp Evans. On 3 March at 2400 Operation Spokane Rapids officially ended. The operation resulted in 9 enemy killed, 2 wounded, 2 prisoners of war and the discovery of one grave. 3-187 units suffered 3 killed and 11 wounded. 2 AK 47's, 1 US rifle cal 30, 3 K-44 Chicom Carbines, 1 French Mas 36, 1 JKS Chicom rifle, and 6 AK47 magazines were captured during the operation.

The first major multi-unit operation in Kentucky Jumper began as an interdiction of Song Bo River infiltration routes by A and B Co's 3-187 Inf. On 5 March, A and B Companies conducted a combat assault to an LZ in vic YD525137. They were to move to the East to interdict enemy movement in the Song Bo area.

Both companies in the field reported only bunker sightings and trail discoveries until the 9th of March when A Company made contact with 2 VC at YD571137. They pursued the enemy with negative results. On 12 March A Company was again in contact, resulting in 2 VC KIA and the capture of 1 AK47. Enemy contact for the remainder of the operation was sporadic, limited to a few enemy sightings and fresh tracks. On 13 March both A and B Co came under the operational control of the 1-506 and participated in a multi-company combined sweep with 4-3 ARVN in the area south of the Central Nago RE Thai-Song Bo River junction. On 14 March A Co found a VC body estimated 2-3 days old and believed to be one of those killed during the contact on the 12th. During the same afternoon B Co discovered a sizeable cache in a ten bunker complex at YD557153, including 44 Chicom claymores, 19 cases of 7.62mm ammunition, 10 60mm mortar rounds and one Thompson submachine gun. On 20 March with 1-506 assuming the route 547 security mission, B and A Co returned to the control of their parent headquarters and were extracted from the field to Camp Evans early in the evening. On 21 March A Co assumed the security of FB JACK and B Co to FB RAKKASAN. D Co made a combat assault into an LZ vic YD404233, and moved to the North to check enemy movement in that area. 2 platoons of C Co combat assaulted from FB T-BONE to an LZ at YD605225 and assumed the mission of searching rocket ridge to the West. The weather had cleared, temperatures rose and the extreme heat took its toll, both C and D Co's had a number of heat casualties evacuated.

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The period 21 March to 25 March yielded only scattered sightings of the enemy by 3-187 Inf elements.

The 1-506 Inf was given the mission to provide the security for the Engr construction of Rte 547 on 20 March and the Bn CP relocated to FB BASTOGNE, the initial base area, and commenced security operations. Initially, the units operating in the AO were A Co, D Co, E Co(-). Additionally, the 3d Company, 4th Battalion, 3d ARVN Regiment was OPCON to the battalion for the defense of FB BASTOGNE. B Co and C Co were OPCON to the 2d Battalion (AMBL), 506th Airborne Infantry and 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne Infantry respectively. A Company and the ARVN unit conducted the defense of FB BASTOGNE by continuous RIF and patrolling operations in the AO. The ARVN Company was relieved in place on 2 April by Bravo Company, 2d Battalion (AMBL), 506th Airborne Infantry. Charlie Company secured the Engineer construction of Route 547 to the Southwest by conducting platoon size RIF's on parallel axes East and West of Route 547. Echo Company supported Battalion operations from FB BASTOGNE initially and later from successive Firebases to the Southwest as Route 547 construction progressed. The Reconnaissance Platoon conducted local RIF and short range reconnaissance patrol operations. Extensive enemy fortifications, weapons, and supplies were discovered by units conducting RIF operations. On 4 April the Reconnaissance Platoon engaged an unknown number of enemy vic YD545017 until darkness. On 5 April 1969, Echo Company with one platoon of Bravo Company OPCON and Delta Company conducted a coordinated attack on the suspected location of the enemy engaged by the Reconnaissance Platoon on 4 April 1969. The attack supported by Artillery and air preparations succeeded in penetrating to the edge of the objective by nightfall. The attacking companies were joined by Bravo Company the following morning and successfully overran the enemy positions. A search of the objective revealed four NVA KIA and evidence of bodies being dragged away. On 24 April a NVA Ho Chi Minh revealed that his unit was the occupant of the position attacked on 4, 5 and 6 April. He also stated that his unit lost 26 KIA during the attack. The Battalion was providing security for the construction of Route 547 and supporting bases at the conclusion of this period.

On the morning of 26 March C Co(-) 3-187 Inf was extracted from the area of the Rocket Belt and inserted in an area North of the Ngan O Lau River, at an LZ vic YD114276, where it was joined by its 3d platoon. The 3-187 had been directed to move two companies North from the Ngan O Lau River to interdict forces from the 812 NVA Regiment who were reported to be operating in that general area. Again the extreme heat necessitated the evacuation of a number of people from C Co. During the afternoon the Co's started their push North and made sporadic contact with negative results.

During the early morning hours of the 27th FB JACK, occupied by A Co came under a heavy RPG and mortar bombardment. At 0327 hrs the attackers were breaching the tactical wire on the Northwest side of the perimeter. ARA was requested and employed. By 0420 hrs the attack had been repulsed and the fleeing enemy was being pursued by AAA. An immediate appraisal disclosed that the FB had come under attack from 2-3 platoons of sappers. There was one enemy found in one of the mess halls on the Northern end of the base. He was wearing only blue loin cloth and had numerous satchel charges tied to his body. However, subsequent search disclosed a great number of blood trails and additional bodies. The total number of enemy KIA was finally established at 15. Friendly casualties included 17 wounded and one man who died of wounds. In that area around the perimeter, A Co elements found 254 satchel charges, 24 RPG rounds, one RPG launcher and other miscellaneous equipment. Later in the day elements inserted West of FB JACK as blocking forces sighted a few VC and took them under fire with negative results. There had been sporadic contact around FB JACK by Ranger teams on the night of the 27th which produced negative results. (See incl 2 After Action Report - FB JACK, for details). On 28 March C Co made contact. A VC walked up on one of C Co's elements and the rear security engaged him with his M-16 with negative results. The enemy

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fled to the East. On 29 and 30 March both C and D Co reported finding bunkers, signs of recent enemy activity, and on two occasions engaged VC with negative results. An airstrike called in the vicinity of D Co sightings at YD370290 resulted in secondary explosions. On the evening of 29 March the dismantling of FB HELEN was completed and the Recon Platoon which had been occupying that Firebase was extracted to Camp Evans for marshalling. D Co had one man wounded in an exchange of gunfire at YD370291. At 1120 hours on 1 April at YD399321, C Company was moving in densely wooded area when the point man detected two VC and engaged them, killing one and wounding the other. The remaining VC returned a few rounds wounding one of C Co's men in the jaw. The enemy KIA was an NVA wearing green khakis carrying an AK47 with a folding stock. Further search of the area uncovered 2 more AK47's and a heavy blood trail.

Both companies continued on their assigned axis, reporting sightings of bunkers, trails, and other signs of enemy activity. On 6 April C Co came under the Op control of the 1-506 and was moved from its field location to FB VEGHEL to secure it.

B Co conducting a local RIF on the 7th of April, discovered at YD499191 a large cache, approx 900 meters South of FB RAKKASAN. Included in the cache were: 139 82mm mortar rounds, 65 RPG rounds, 13 boxes of AK47 ammunition. An additional 35 82mm rounds were found on the 8th. On 9 April D Co was extracted from the field and moved to Camp Evans for marshalling.

On 10 April D Co relieved A Co of the security of FB JACK allowing them to begin further operations in the field. A Co combat assaulted into an LZ at vicinity YD525086, with the mission to conduct a RIF to the Northwest in the area of FB VEGHEL and East of the Song Bo River. The 10th of April also marked the start of the battalion's Eagle Flight Operations. Each day one platoon from one of the companies securing a firebase conducted combat assault to an LZ in the AO. They conducted a RIF, then were extracted and returned to their parent Firebase prior to darkness. Eagle Flights conducted from the 10th to the 15th yielded no enemy contact or other significant results. A Co did however discover a cache on 12 April containing 75 75mm recoilless rifle rounds and assorted other ammunition and weapons at vicinity YD458095.

E Co completed the dismantling of FB LONG on the 14th of April and moved to Camp Evans for marshalling. On 16 April A Company initiated contact with approximately seven VC at YD579115, pursuing the enemy, they recovered one carbine. During the afternoon the same company was moving South along a trail when they sighted a bunker and hut. While searching the bunker at YD580113, they spotted four to five VC and immediately engaged the enemy killing two. The remaining NVA were pursued by the 1st platoon as they fled North. In addition to the enemy KIA's, one AK47 and one M-2 carbine were captured as a result of the action.

Later in the afternoon, while the Company B Eagle Flight was being extracted, the helicopter pilots observed four to five VC in the vicinity of the PZ at YD486238. The platoon was reinserted at a neighboring LZ, searched the area with negative results and were then extracted back to FB RAKKASAN. On 17 April, Company A reported being engaged by two to three NVA using automatic weapons and RPG. They returned fire and pursued, with negative results.

Later in the day, Company C relieved Company B in the security of FB RAKKASAN. Company B combat assaulted into FB KATHERINE and were to conduct a Reconnaissance in Force operation to the Southeast. The combat assault was originally intended for FB MAUREEN but due to low ceiling and visibility FB KATHERINE was chosen as an alternative.

(On 18 April at YD472112 Company B found a cache approximately two weeks old, consisting of medical supplies. The cache was buried in holes 2 1/2

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to 3 feet deep and camouflaged with local vegetation. Later Company A engaged one NVA with negative results, however, they discovered 2 weapons and some small arms ammo at YD569120.


During the next two days, Company A again engaged 2-3 VC, each encounter yielding negative results. On 19 April Company E moved to FB RAKKASAN and joined Company C in its security mission. For the next two days, Company A established multiple daylight ambush points, and during the afternoon of 21 April, the 2d platoon of Company A reported killing one NVA who was engaged at a distance of ten meters. Members of Company A recovered two RPG rounds and one AK50. On 23 April, Company A was extracted from the field and moved to Camp Evans for unit marshalling. Company B, continuing its Reconnaissance in Force mission, engaged three VC who fled to the South - Southeast, pursued by the 2d platoon. A half hour later they engaged the same individuals, killing two. Captured as a result of the action were: one rucksack containing documents, one AK magazine, a first aid pouch and medical bag. On the 24th, Company A was assigned the mission of providing security for the LCU Ramp and pumping station in Hue and Col Co Beach. However, tactical considerations necessitated a complete change of plans. 2-17 Cav units operating in the Eastern edge of the A Shau Valley encountered very stiff enemy resistance. A number of observation helicopters and one gunship were shot down. As a result of this development, it was decided that 3-187 would combat assault to the area of contact with three companies. On 24 April Company B was extracted from its field location and moved to Camp Evans in preparation for a combat assault into the area of the Cav contact. Likewise, Company D at FB BASOGNE and Company A at Col Co Beach and Hue were alerted for movement the following day. All 3-187 maneuver elements were to stage at FB BLAZE and be ready for a combat assault on the 26th. Company C was assigned the mission of securing FB BERCHTESGADEN which was to be the forward Brigade CP.

On 25 April, Company C occupied FB BERCHTESGADEN and began construction of a defensive perimeter. Company D released the Recon platoon to Company E and moved to FB BLAZE for staging. Company B followed later in the afternoon. Company A was also to reach FB BLAZE on the 25th but a combination of lack of air assets and unsatisfactory flying conditions delayed this move until the following day. At approximately 1100 hours both Company's B and D were at FB BLAZE. Due to the rapid development of the tactical situation, and in order to maintain momentum and insure contact it was decided to combat assault Company B into an LZ at YD357068 that afternoon. This event set the stage for the beginning of the most extensive combat operation since the 3d Bde's arrival in the Northern I Corps AO.

At 1230 hours the Battalion Commander of 3-187 informed Company B to be prepared for movement at 1600 hours and to have LAWS and 90mm ready for employment against fortified enemy positions. At approximately 1500 hours, the combat assault of Company B began. The LZ was prepped extensively with artillery, airstrikes and rocket artillery and at 1600 hours the insertion began. The 2d ship on the LZ was shot down and crashed. The Battalion Commander instructed the remaining lift ships to use an alternate LZ approximately 600 meters away at YD356062. Lieutenant Boccia, the platoon leader on the 1st ship reported that there were 3 injured personnel on the LZ, one with gunshot wounds and 2 with broken legs. At 1700 hours the 1st lift of Company B was complete on the secure LZ at YD356062. The Battalion Commander, unwilling to leave such a small element on the initial LZ, decided to insert the rest of B Company in the unsecure LZ at YD357068. The 1st helicopter landed without incident, while the second backed into a tree and damaged the tail rotor. A third helicopter fell short of the LZ making it the 3d downed aircraft on the upper LZ. Later a fourth helicopter was downed. The attempt to insert the rest of Company B at the upper LZ was abandoned and the rest of the Company was landed at the secure lower LZ. Medevac's were requested

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for the injured, and they were flown out. During the insertion and subsequent action, numerous airstrikes and ARA strikes were employed and throughout the night helicopter gunships and Spooky were used to support the units on the ground.

Early on the 26th, Company B received incoming mortar and RPG fire, sustaining 3 casualties who were Medevac'd. The insertion of Company D was delayed until 1130 hours while airstrikes and artillery were employed in the areas of the LZ's. Company A was moved by CH47 to FB BLAZE during D Company's move. The first lift ship crashed in the LZ, wounding both pilots. As a result, the remainder of Company D was moved into the lower LZ. Company D was followed by Company A with part of Company A inserted into the upper LZ to link up with B Company elements. As the last ships into the upper LZ had received no hostile fire, the decision was made to shuttle the rest of Company A from the lower to the upper LZ. At 1435 hours, one of the shuttle ships took an RPG round and crashed. All air movement was discontinued. There were 4 WIA and 1 KIA as a result of the helicopter crash. At 1517 hours the Battalion Headquarters group joined the elements on the ground at YD356062. During the ensuing four hours, elements on the ground reported incoming mortar and RPG fire, with Company B sustaining one KIA as a result of the bombardment. During the night, Spooky and Air Force fighters provided fire support for 3-187 elements.

On April 27th, the 3-187 elements were in firm tactical positions and began Reconnaissance in Force operations in the area of both LZ's finding numerous caches, bunker complexes and running into scattered groups of enemy. At 1000 hours, Company B found, at YD348061, 10,000 rifle grenades, 2,000 rounds of small arms ammo, 200 RPG rounds, 36 82mm mortar rounds, 5,000 .51 caliber rounds, all in good condition. During the afternoon the companies began finding booby traps and were engaged in sporadic fire fights. Again airstrikes and gunships were used extensively in support of the operation. As the companies defeated enemy resistance and searched out more and more of the area, enemy KIA's began to increase.


Following up the tactical advantage on the 28th, the Battalion Commander decided to employ a PSYOPS aircraft in the area to demoralize the enemy. The Battalion elements were supported by a number of airstrikes and constant gunship coverage. Throughout the day companies reported extensive caches and sporadic enemy contact. During the morning, a jet fighter crashed near FB RAKKASAN, both pilots parachuted to safety and were extracted to FB RAKKASAN with only minor cuts and bruises.

DISCOVERIES FOR THE DAY:

Company D: 200 pounds of rice, 102 mortar rounds, at YD356064, 10,000 AK47 rounds, 10 pounds powdered rice, 20 pounds of cereal food, 3,000 pounds of rice. Company B found 294 60mm mortar rounds, 12 cans of 60mm mortar fuses, six Chicom claymores, and 12 fresh graves.

The morning of the 29th, again found aerial fire support plentiful. Contact was made with the enemy on three occasions during the day. Company D, continuing its search, discovered approximately 20 tons of rice, 21 RPG rounds, 138 122mm rockets, 340 60mm mortar rounds, 21 cases of SKS ammo, 20 cases of AK47 ammo, 18 57mm rounds etc. The total body count on the 29th stood at 60 enemy KIA.

On the morning of 30 April Company B reported some incoming sniper fire with negative casualties. All three companies continued their Reconnaissance in Force missions. While searching a hut complex, Company D was engaged by a command detonated mine and enemy small arms fire, two US wounded were medevac'd. By the last day of this reporting period 3-187 maneuver elements were firmly in control of the situation and Company A was beginning the construction of a firebase at the upper LZ. Companies B



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
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and D continue to search for caches and to interdict and destroy enemy forces in the area.

The reporting period closed with elements of the Brigade committed to three diverse and critical missions. The 1-506 Inf was providing the security for the Engr construction of Route 547 and building and defending forward fire support bases as construction progressed towards the A Shau Valley. The 2-506 Inf was committed to the demanding task of resource denial during the rice harvest. The battalion is responding to this task with imaginative and innovative techniques maximizing the use of airmobile assets in combined operations with GVN/ARVN forces. The 3-187 Inf was engaging the enemy deep in his supposed haven areas, locating and destroying his logistical caches and poised to exploit the developing situation.

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
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B. Tactics and Techniques.

Brigade elements have made maximum utilization of airmobile assets to effectively cover the extended AO for which we have been responsible. Aside from the normal Eagle Flights and small unit combat assaults, the Owl Flight technique has been utilized with relative success. The latter involves employing two man sniper teams with starlight scopes mounted in a UH-1 aircraft. The UH-1 is trailed at a higher altitude by ARA gunships. The snipers mark located targets with tracers and the ARA attacks the target marked. During resource denial operations the 2-506 Inf has utilized a technique which involves air patrols over harvest areas by a platoon size element who fly and land in a diamond formation and corral workers into an area in which they can be screened by GVN authorities.

C. Training.

Each battalion, in addition to regularly scheduled training, has in this reporting period conducted extensive classes on Sapper Attacks and Counter techniques. The Brigade has also provided a Reciprocal Mobile Training Team in support of the training of two RF Co's for Thua Thien Sector. Classes have been taught on the Care, Maintenance and Operation of the Starlight Scope, live fire exercises with the Starlight Scope, and night patrolling and ambush techniques.



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TASK ORGANIZATION 3D BDE

From 1 Feb to 10 Feb, A Trp 3-5 Cav was OPCON to 1-506 Inf.
From 8 Feb to 10 Feb C Co 1-506 Inf was OPCON to 3-5 Cav.
From 11 Feb to 23 Feb C Trp 3-5 Cav was OPCON to 1-5 Mech.
From 20 Feb to 1 Mar 3-187 Inf(-) was OPCON to 1st Bde
From 23 Feb to 22 Apr, B Trp 3-5 Cav was OPCON to 3d Mar Div.
From 23 Feb to 17 Mar, C Trp 3-5 Cav was OPCON to 3d Mar Div.
From 28 Feb to 23 Mar, 3-5 Cav(-) was OPCON to 3d Mar Div.
From 28 Feb to 1 Mar, C-2-34 Armor was OPCON to 2-506 Inf.
From 1 Mar to 15 Apr, C-2-34 Armor was OPCON to 1-506 Inf.
From 1 Mar to 13 Mar, A Trp 3-5 Cav was OPCON to 2-506 Inf.
From 10 Mar to 19 Mar, A and B Co 3-187 Inf was OPCON to 1-506 Inf.
From 19 Mar to 21 Mar, C Co 1-506 Inf was OPCON to 3-187 Inf.
From 25 Mar to 31 Mar, B Co(-) 2-506 Inf was OPCON to 3-187 Inf.
From 7 Apr to 14 Apr, C Co 3-187 Inf was OPCON to 1-506 Inf.


TASK ORGANIZATION FOR OHIO RAPIDS PHASE I - III

Bde Control

1-506 Inf. 14-28 Feb	TACP 24 Jan-28 Feb
2-506 Inf 24 Jan-10 Feb	C-2-94 Arty (GSR) 24 Jan-28 Feb
3-187 Inf(-) 9 Feb-19 Feb	B-2-11 Arty (GSR) 24 Jan-28 Feb
2-319 Arty(DS) 24 Jan-28 Feb	C-1-83 Arty (GSR) 24 Jan-28 Feb
B-326 Engr(-)(DS) 24 Jan-28 Feb	C-326 Med 24 Jan-28 Feb
58th Sct Dog Plat 24 Jan-28 Feb	

1st ARVN Regiment Control 24 Jan-28 Feb

1-1 ARVN
2-1 ARVN
4-1 ARVN
Rcn Co
C-11 Arty
B-34 Arty
3d Bde LNO Party



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
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ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

	<u>Date Assigned</u>	<u>Date Reassigned</u>
1. Brigade Commander		
COL Joseph B. Conmy Jr.	23 Aug 68	- Present
2. Brigade Deputy CO		
LTC James M. Bowers	31 Jan 69	- Present
3. Battalion Commanders		
a. 1-506 Inf		
LTC Charles J. Bauer	1 Dec 68	- Present
b. 2-506 Inf		
LTC Gene T. Sherron	16 Jan 69	- Present
c. 3-187 Inf		
LTC W. F. Honeycutt	11 Jan 69	- Present
d. 3-5 Cav		
LTC Thomas E. Carpenter III	24 Dec 68	- Present
e. 2-319 Arty		
LTC Wilford R. Harrell	19 Nov 68	- Present



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1. PERSONNEL

a. Observation: A unit, while under operational control of or attached to other than its parent unit, experiences vast difficulty reporting casualties through normal channels. This results in late casualty reports, additional paperwork, and inconvenience to the family. It was found that proper coordination with the controlling unit of the operation made it possible for casualty reports to go through that unit's channels and then back down through channels to the parent unit.

b. Observation: During any period of time there was a great amount of duplicated effort due to lost or missent paper work. It was found that by keeping a log or using a hand receipt system this problem was lessened, especially in the area of Letters of Sympathy, awards, and correspondence of special interest.

c. Observation: Strength figures for the reporting period were low. In an effort to increase the number of troops available for combat operations, a thorough study of the Battalion rear was conducted with emphasis on utilization of personnel and operation procedures. The company clerks and supply sergeants were consolidated under the S-1 and the S-4 respectively. This eliminated indorsements from the Battalion to the companies and back. The ISG and XO were released to operate with their companies. The reorganization and reduction in size of the Headquarters Company freed almost 20% of the rear for combat operations.

d. Observation: Personnel Information Roster - Each month this roster is submitted to the rear area and each month it comes back with the personnel not being carried in the slots we had indicated the month before. An example of this is an aviation mechanic being carried against a communication's radio telephone operator slot.

Evaluation: The number on the TO&E used by this unit and the rear seem to agree but in many cases the line numbers do not match-up. The clerks in the rear should check the corrected roster submitted by the unit and match-up personnel and line numbers to agree with the unit.

e. Observation: One unit has received a number of replacements with profiles. The individuals are of little use to the unit and spend an excessive period waiting for profile transfer orders. It is recommended that all medical records be screened for assignment limitations at SERTS.


2. OPERATIONS

a. Observation: Operations loss of personnel due to the "Rotational Hump" of October and November 1968, especially in non-commissioned officers, caused the Battalion to initiate an extensive training program that continued into this quarter. To preclude an unacceptable reduction in combat effectiveness in the future, careful consideration should be given to measures to eliminate future "rotation humps". The emphasis in this program should be to insure avoiding loss in a short time of most of the experienced junior leaders, platoon and squad leaders.

b. Observation: Combat assault operation in mountains and densely vegetated terrain is restricted by hastily prepared landing zones. The location of this type landing zone is often oriented by sparse vegetation and partially cleared areas instead of suspected enemy activity.

Evaluation: None.

Recommendation: In dense jungle and mountainous terrain, numerous landing zones should be cleared by air delivered ordnance so that the exact locations of future airmobile operations are not revealed to the enemy.



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c. Observation: CH-47's, carrying Class IV from FSB JEANIE during closing operations, were underloaded in many instances.

Evaluation: Infantrymen, who were rigging and loading barrier materials, were not trained in weight estimation and allowable cargo loads for large aircraft. The additional sorties required to close the base were not programmed and the result was a last minute rearrangement of priorities to meet the closing deadline. Liaison personnel from the Assault Support Helicopter Battalion (ASHB) could advise and provide technical assistance to the Company Commander. This assistance could conserve blade time on cargo aircraft and provide maximum effective employment of rigging equipment and air items.

Recommendation: That a qualified representative from the ASHB be assigned to advise the local commander before and during large scale cargo moves.

d. Observation: The possible need for aero-medical evacuation was foreseen during planning for this operation. A request was submitted to have MEDEVAC helicopters on aerial standby during the assault into a known enemy strong point.

Evaluation: The assault was made into a "hot" landing zone without the standby MEDEVAC ships. Several casualties were sustained during the first few minutes, and there was some delay in securing MEDEVAC aircraft, due to the flying time from Camp Eagle to the LZ. On the second day of the combat assault, MEDEVAC aircraft were on standby and when casualties were sustained by another element landing on the still unsecured LZ, reaction time was considerably improved.

Recommendations: In the future, all helicopter assaults be accompanied by airborne medical evacuation helicopters when the landing zone is expected to be "hot".

3. LOGISTICS

a. Observation: Extreme weather severely restricted daylight resupply operations to mountainous areas during the monsoon season.

Evaluation: Night resupply was used to resupply units located at fire bases in mountainous terrain during the monsoon season. Even though it looked like the sky was clear from the ground the pilots complained of a slight haze making it very difficult to see and judge distances.

Recommendation: Night resupply can be accomplished, weather permitting, if an emergency exists for a unit to be resupplied. Night resupply is very difficult and dangerous during the hours of darkness.

b. Observation: Maintaining a seven day operational load at mountainous fire bases.


Evaluation: Large operational supply loads must be maintained at mountainous fire bases because of the inability to rapidly resupply and reinforce units in mountainous terrain during the monsoon season.

Recommendation: Inure fire bases located in mountainous terrain during the monsoon season have at least a seven day level of supply.

c. Observation: Body Armor Aircrewman (FSN 8470-999-1474) worn by infantry units' point men.

Evaluation: The standard Army "Flak Jacket" is relatively ineffective for close-in fighting. One point man's life was saved

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by wearing a "Chicken Plate" (Body Armor, Aircrewman). A quantity of subject items were procured from a retrograde/salvage yard and have been issued to all rifle companies.

Recommendation: The Body Armor Aircrewman has proved successful against direct small arms fire and could be utilized effectively by the infantryman in the field.

d. Observation: Supply points immediately adjacent to "Hook Pads".

Evaluation: The Class IV yard is adjacent to the hook out pad at Camp Evans. This greatly reduces the time of transporting barrier material for the majority of barrier material is hooked out of Camp Evans for construction of tactical fire bases.

Recommendation: Supply points in which the majority of the items (barrier material, ammunition) are hooked out be located adjacent to hook out pad to eliminate transporting time.

e. Observation: As the battalion field locations are in the mountainous jungle areas of ICTZ, the terrain is in itself a hazard to flight, and aerial resupply is the only method of resupply feasible. On many occasions LZ's were not available and the field units did not have time to cut LZ's. In this situation ropes and snap links were utilized to lower fragile items through the jungle canopy. Water supply, when necessary was either lowered by rope or kicked out in artillery canisters. In addition, most of the reporting period was spent during the North East Monsoon Season, and the fire bases and field locations were closed due to fog and rain for several days at a time. It was found that during late night and early morning, the skies would clear for several hours, with fog and clouds obscuring the base by dawn.


f. Observation: The nearest Self-Service Supply Counter or outlet is located approximately 30 miles away. The distance precludes having expendable items such as self-help items, office supplies, paints, and kitchen utensils readily available. It is recommended that the self-service outlet initiate a want list system to insure necessary items are available for units that are located away from the immediate area of the Self-Service Supply Center.

4. COMMUNICATIONS

Observation: Communications were hardly adequate at the start of the operation due to limited time for installation and testing of retransmission equipment prior to the assault of the combat troopers into LZ X on 25 April 1969.

Evaluation: Although the need for retransmission equipment was foreseen during the planning phase of the operation, the rapidly changing tactical situation dictated the air landing would be made a day earlier than originally scheduled. This development did not allow the thorough preparation and testing of the communication facilities that had been planned beforehand. The equipment was transported and emplaced as rapidly as the situation would permit, but was installed after assault elements were on the ground. The resultant loss of communication for and incomplete radio transmissions.

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Recommendation: Aerial relay should be used as a backup system when rapidly changing plans and extreme distances may effect the communications effort.


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as

J. B. Conmy Jr.
J. B. CONMY JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
APO San Francisco 96383

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4 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned
Hq 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div - Period
1 May 69 - 31 Jul 69

Commanding General
101st Abn Div
ATTN: AVDG-GC-H
APO SF 96383

CLASSIFIED BY: CG 101
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON: 31 DECEMBER 1975

Section I. Significant Unit Activities - Requirements for this section rescinded by 101st Abn Div unclassified message 7-180A, AVDG-GC-H, dated 20 July 1969.

Section II. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

- (1) Replacements:
(c) Observation: 3d Bde is receiving replacements with 11B MOS who have permanent profiles.
- (b) Evaluation: These personnel are in-capable of performing their duties in their primary MOS, and are therefore of no use to the unit.
- (c) Recommendation: It is recommended that medical records be screened and such personnel be assigned to units to where they can be properly utilized within their profiles.

(2) Personnel Information Roster:

- (a) Observation: Personnel Information Roster continues to contain numerous errors each month. Although the unit submits a corrected copy of the roster to the rear each month, corrections are not accurately reflected in subsequent rosters.
- (b) Evaluation: The monthly roster as of the end of a month is not received until the 20th of the following month by the unit. By this time still another incorrect roster has been published, even though the previous roster has been corrected and returned.
- (c) Recommendation: That each unit in the division submit a Personnel Information Roster on a preprinted form to the rear. This roster should be prepared at unit level and forwarded, rather than corrected at company level.

(3) Lack of Unit Patches:

- (a) Observation: Troop morale suffers from a lack of uniforms with 101st Airborne Division patches.

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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Authority <u>873541</u>
By <u>Q</u> NARA Date <u>7/2/01</u>

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(b) Evaluation: 101st Airborne Division patches could be sewn on fatigue jackets for issue by DISCOM super contact teams.

(c) Recommendation: That fatigue jackets be issued by DISCOM at unit stand downs with 101st Airborne Division patches and US ARMY tapes already sewn on.

(4) Lack of Barbers:

(a) Observation: Lack of sufficient personnel in combat elements precludes having troops assigned to duty as barbers.

(b) Evaluation: Civilian barbers are available through the PX system. Permanent arrangements should be made to have barbers available with super contact teams.

(c) Recommendations: That either;

1. Super Contact teams have barbers as an integral part, or;

2. The PX system make barbers available to combat elements on fire bases.

b. Operations:

(1) Use of Light Observation Helicopter (LOH)

(a) Observation: During recent operations the LOH has been particularly valuable in the evacuation of wounded from forward areas and for delivery of ammunition and other essential supplies to elements in contact.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the close proximity of the contact area to the position of attacking troops, LOG and MEDEVAC aircraft were not able to land safely in the LZ. The LOH with its great maneuverability and speed was able to get in and out of the forward LZ with little difficulty. Casualties were extracted from the forward LZ, by LOH, to a more secure LZ a few hundred meters away from the contact area. From there they were further evacuated by MEDEVAC aircraft. Ammunition, medical supplies and water were likewise shuttled by LOH from the secure LZ to the forward position.

(c) Recommendation: If a sustained contact is anticipated in a fixed area, it is imperative that a LOH LZ be cleared to the immediate rear of the attacking troops. The LOH will provide not only MEDEVAC capability, but will keep the troops supplied with ammunition and other combat essentials.

(2) Target Marking methods for C-47 gunships.

(a) Observation: During cloudy or misty nights it has been difficult to accurately direct the fires of the C-47 gunships. The aerial flares are not sufficient to light up a target, particularly when the wind carries the flare out of the target area.

(b) Evaluation: A more accurate means of target indication is necessary. The 81mm mortar is an effective system of marking targets for the gunships. The mortar is laid on the target and an illumination round is fired and fused so that it ignites just before impact and

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continues to burn upon hitting the ground. In this manner, the gunship while illuminating a general area with its flares, is also aware of the specific target.

(c) Recommendation: Recommend targets for C-47 gunships, during conditions of adverse visibility, be marked with 81mm illumination rounds.

(3) Extraction of Rifle Companies:

(a) Observation: Very few LZ's were available within the area of operations.

(b) Evaluation: A rifle company must remain within a one hour distance from an LZ for immediate extraction, contingency plans, medevacs, resupply, and reinforcements.

(c) Recommendation: That all rifle companies cut a minimum of one LZ daily. This can be accomplished by the platoon providing security for the company CP, while the remaining platoons are conducting search and destroy or reconnaissance in force operations.

(4) Recon by Observed Indirect Fire:

(a) Observation: Maneuver elements encountered small NVA teams, usually employing delaying and harassing tactics creating casualties and time lost through deployment of the unit.

(b) Evaluation: Frequent reconnaissance by observed indirect fire reduces the probability of this type encounter and causes the enemy to move.

(c) Recommendation: Extensive use of recon by observed indirect fire on planned routes of advance and the use of Pink Teams to screen areas to immediate front and flanks of maneuver elements should be used. In addition to reducing this type of encounter, this benefits the ground commander in that he is able to engage the enemy with indirect fire quickly by shifting from recently fired targets. The use of observed fire; however, is essential in the effective use of indirect fire.

(5) Stay Behind Force:

(a) Observation: In efforts to maintain continual surveillance of friendly elements, small NVA units, usually two to three individuals, attempt to follow maneuver elements.

(b) Evaluation: By leaving a small "stay-behind" force set up in an ambush posture in the previous night's NDP, the enemy can be detected and destroyed.

(c) Recommendation: Elements should employ stay-behind ambushes whenever possible.

(6) Sapper Attacks: See Inclosure 6.

c. Training.

(1) Use of Organic Mortars:

(a) Observation: On some occasions direct support artillery has not proven responsive enough to provide immediate fire support for elements in contact. Due to clearance delays, computation delays, communication difficulties and other commitments, artillery is not always available on a few minutes notice.

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(b) Evaluation: There is a need for increased emphasis on organic infantry indirect support weapons. During both the fight at Airborne and Dong Ap Bia heavy, multi-unit, contacts fragmented artillery assets, decreasing their effectiveness. Mortars are available at all times and can follow closely the progress of friendly units, providing them instantaneous fire support especially if airmobile assets are used to keep the mortars mobile.

(c) Recommendation: All Infantry Battalions emphasize importance of fully utilizing mortars and training mortar crews in quick response and mobility.

(2) Employment of the 90mm RR.

(a) Observation: Many troops are not familiar with the operation and employment of the 90mm RR.

(b) Evaluation: The 90mm RR is excellent for use against the fortified enemy positions often encountered in the Bde AO. The HE or HEAT round effectively neutralizes bunkers, while the cannister round is useful in a recon-by-fire role and in FB defense.

(c) Recommendation: An accelerated program of practical instruction on the M67, 90mm RR should be implemented at rifle Co level in all Infantry Bn's.

d. Intelligence:

(1) Aerial Photography.

(a) Observation: Delay in receiving Aerial Photography.

(b) Evaluation: Hand held photography taken at Brigade level has been used extensively to plan LZ insertions, and to target enemy locations. Exposed film submitted for developing and printing at times has not returned within the required time needed for planning purposes. Often film submitted 2-3 days prior to an operation has returned 2-3 days after the operation has begun, and on occasion after the termination of the operation.

(c) Recommendation: That development of prints be given a high priority when requested for a NLT date due to tactical reasons.

(2) Airborne Personnel Detectors Readings.

(a) Observation: Airborne Personnel Detectors Readings are sometimes received too late for effective exploitation.

(b) Evaluation: Sniffer readings must be received at time of actual reading. In many cases a time lag will significantly reduce the value of the readings.

(c) Recommendation: That sniffer aircraft relay readings via FM radio directly to Brigade as soon as possible so that readings can be acted upon immediately.

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e. Logistics.

(1) Refueling of Logistics and Lift Helicopters:

(a) Observation: When conducting combat assaults and resupply operations in areas far from fixed installations, as much or more blade time is used travelling to and from refuel points as is spent in conducting the operations. During inclement weather, time spent flying to and from refuel points may mean the mission cannot be accomplished.

(b) Evaluation: Establishing a refuel point at the FB where units stage for combat assaults and unit resupply originates will eliminate excessive non-productive blade time and substantially reduce the time required to conduct these operations. Additionally, it allows units to take advantage of breaks in weather to effect their resupply.

(c) Recommendation: As combat units move forward and establish FB's, direct support helicopter units establish a forward refuel point at the FB from which resupply to units in the field will be effected.

(2) Maintenance:

(a) Observation: Spot painting of vehicles and equipment with brush when aerosol spray paint is unavailable produces an uneven and streaked finish.

(b) Evaluation: By using a hand operated insecticide atomizer and properly thinned paint, a smooth, quick drying finish can be applied using a minimum of paint.

(c) Recommendation: Hand operated sprayer be utilized whenever feasible for spot painting.

(3) The XM-571 Articulated Vehicle.

(a) Observation: Several problem areas were encountered with the XM-571 Articulated Vehicles. Of the five XM-571's assigned to the 3d Brigade, all five are deadlined. Three deadlined for rear drive shafts: one for services and 3d echelon maintenance, (replace transmission indicator, road wheel, and tighten tracks), and one has been wrecked, left front.

(b) Evaluation: Rear drive shafts have been a continuous maintenance problem. The parts are nearly impossible to obtain. Second and third echelon maintenance is very hard to perform due to the locations of the units. Repair parts continue to be a large problem as they are nearly non-existent. The repair parts are not in all cases interchangeable with other vehicles of same type and model. The lack of a tech-representative has impaired the operation and maintenance of the XM-571.

(c) Recommendation: That a larger supply of repair parts be made available within the supply channels for ENSURE or test items of equipment. That care be taken to assure all like items are 100% interchangeable. That a tech-representative be made available at least at Division level for any ENSURE item when maintenance of that item is required.

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(4) Use of saws for cutting LZ's;

(a) Observation: The necessity of cutting LZ's while operating in the mountains requires constant availability of chain saws.

(b) Evaluation: Fragile equipment and a lack of repair parts has resulted in a high deadline rate which has created a situation wherein supply does not equal demand.

(c) Recommendations:

1. That all Infantry units be authorized and issued two-man cross-cut saws.

2. That chain saws be immediately available at DSU for direct exchanges.

3. That stronger, higher quality chain saws be procured.

(5) Use of demolitions for cutting LZ's:

(a) Observation: Airmobile operations in mountainous terrain require LZ's to be cut at frequent intervals.

(b) Evaluation: Significant amounts of demolition, to include detonating cord, are used to clear LZ's. These items are presently in short supply.

(c) Recommendations:

1. Maximum use be made of masking tape to fasten C-4 to trees. This would eliminate much of the detonating cord used to cut LZ's.

2. That training be given and emphasis be placed on using electric blasting caps, WD-1 wire and claymore generators to save more detonating cord.

3. That C-4 be authorized as part of the Infantry's basic load.

f. Organization: See Appendix 1.

g. Escape, Evasion, and Survival: None.

h1. Other: CHEMICAL:

(1) Use of CS at Dong Ap Bia.

(a) Observation: Effectiveness of 105mm CS Artillery round was minimized due to the fact that the enemy was equipped with protective masks while defending his heavily-fortified bunker positions.

(b) Evaluation: The 105mm CS Artillery round can be employed with a variable time (VT) or a Mechanical time (MT) fuze to obtain an air burst, allowing a more rapid build-up of an incapacitating concentration of agent. Thus the enemy will be allowed less time to don his protective mask. In the event that protective measures are taken, in spite of this more rapid build-up, the use of the 105mm CS artillery round over a more prolonged period of time (i.e., several

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hours) will harass the enemy, by forcing him to wear his protective mask and limiting his freedom of movement. The combat effectiveness of the enemy can thus be significantly reduced.

(c) Recommendation: 105mm CS Artillery rounds be fired exclusively with VT or MT fuzing; also that fire missions using these munitions be extended as necessary to maintain an incapacitating amount of agent over a prolonged period of time.

(2) Emplacement of Fougasse.

(a) Observation: Emplacement of 55-gal drums of Fougasse (weight 450 to 500 lbs) in mountainous terrain (i.e., on the perimeter of fire bases) by manual labor is slow, cumbersome, and dangerous for personnel involved in such emplacement.

(b) Evaluation: UH-1 type helicopters can be used very effectively to emplace fougasse in pre-determined positions. The emplacement can thus be accomplished easily, rapidly, and with considerably less hazard to personnel involved.

(c) Recommendation: Security units pre-positioning fougasse into the perimeter defense of their fire bases utilize UH-1 helicopters to aid them in the emplacement of the drums.

h2. SIGNAL:

(1) AN/VRC-46 Power Supply.

(a) Observation: Currently, Inf battalions utilize the AN/VRC-46 radio as a portion of the Communications equipment in the battalion TOC. The problem is to provide an adequate power supply.

(b) Evaluation: The setup as originally employed is connected in the following manner:

A 1.5 KW 28 V DC generator is the primary power supply source. The generator is hooked to a pair of 1/4 ton batteries wired in parallel. The radios are hooked to the batteries. The problem arises when the system proves inadequate for the load. The insertion of 2 1/2 ton batteries in lieu of 1/4 ton and the addition of a second pair of 2 1/2 ton batteries wired in series to the first set effectively handles the situation. The batteries in this new setup are able to handle all peak loads placed on them.

h3. Civic Action: See inclosure #3.

h4. Engr Support: See Inclosure #4.

R. H. Siegrist

R. H. SIEGRIST
COL, INF
Commanding

6 Inclosures

1. Task Organization
2. Strength Report and Roster of Key Personnel
3. Civic Action Report
4. Engineer Projects for Quarter
5. 3/5 Cav ORLL
6. FB Berchtsgaden - Sapper Attack
7. Distribution

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DURING THE REPORT PERIOD

TASK ORGANIZATION FOR APACHE SNOW
(10 May - 7 June)

3d Bde Control

1-506

2-501

3-187

Bde Scty Plat	B/326 Engr (DS)
Rcn 1-506	A/158 AHB (DS)
A-2-17 Cav	B/158 AHB (DS)
2-319 Arty (DS)	TACP 20 TASS
C-2-11 Arty (GSR)	58th Sct Dog Plat
C-2-94 Arty (GSR)	3d FSSE
C-1-83 Arty (GSR)	

1st ARVN Regt

3d ARVN Regt

1-1 ARVN Bn w/FO Party
 2-3 ARVN Bn w/FO Party
 3-1 ARVN Bn w/FO Party
 4-1 ARVN Bn w/FO Party
 Battery 11 ARVN Arty (DS)
 Battery 34 ARVN Arty (GSR)
 1 LNO Party

1-3 ARVN Bn w/FO Party
 2-3 ARVN Bn w/FO Party
 3-3 ARVN Bn w/FO Party
 Battery 12 ARVN Arty (DS)

TASK ORGANIZATION FOR MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS
3 PHASES

8 June - 21 June PHASE I
 22 June - 8 July PHASE II
 9 July - 25 July PHASE III

PHASE I

3d Bde Control

1-506

2-506

2-327

375 Cav

2-502

Scty Plat
 B(-)/1-506
 2-319 Arty (DS)
 A-2-17 Cav (DS)
 B/326 Engr (DS)
 B/158 AHB (DS)
 TACP 20 TASS
 3d FSSE

Trp 3/5 Cav C-2-327

3d ARVN Regt

1-1 Bn
 4-3 Bn
 2-3 Bn
 B-34 Arty
 A-12 Arty

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TASK ORGANIZATION FOR MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS

PHASE II

<u>3d Bde Control</u>	<u>1-506</u>	<u>2-506</u>	<u>2-327</u>
Bde Scty Plat B/1-506		A(-)/1-506	C(-)/2-34 Armor TF Sec A, B Trp 3-5 Cav
2-319 Arty (DS)			
A-2-17 Cav (DS)			
B/326 Engr (DS)			
C/158 AHB (DS)			
TACP 20 TASS			
3d FSSE			

<u>3-5 Cav</u>	<u>3d ARVN Regt</u>
3/7 ARVN Cav C-2-327	1-1 Bn 4-3 Bn 2-3 Bn B-34 Arty

PHASE III

<u>3d Bde Control</u>	<u>1-506/3-3 ARVN</u>	<u>2-506/1-3 ARVN</u>
Co 2-506 Plat/Co/1-506 Bde Scty Plat A/2-17 Cav (DS) 2-319 Arty (DS) B/326 Engr (DS) C/158 AHB (DS) TACP 20 TASS 3d FSSE	Hac Bao Co	Co 1-506 (-)

<u>3-5 Cav</u>	<u>3d ARVN Regt</u>
3-7 ARVN Cav B/2-327 1/A/2-327 Co/3-3 ARVN Co/3-187	1-3 ARVN Hac Bao Co B/34 ARTY 3-3 ARVN 3-7 ARVN Cav

TASK ORGANIZATION (OPCON UNITS)
 APACHE SNOW (10 May - 7 June)

9 May - 18 May	A/2-506 OPCON to 2d Bde
9 May - 8 June	2-501 OPCON to 3d Bde
9 May - 21 June	2-506(-) OPCON to 2d Bde
18 May - 21 May	A/2-506 OPCON to 3-187
18 May - 7 June	3-5 Cav OPCON to 2d Bde
21 May - 9 July	3-187 OPCON to 2d Bde

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TASK ORGANIZATION
MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS (8 June - 31 July)

8 June - 17 June	2-502 OPCON 3d Bde
8 June - 9 July	2-327 OPCON 3d Bde
8 June - 31 July	3-5 Cav OPCON 3d Bde
10 June - 28 June	B/1-506 OPCON 3d Bde Hqs
18 June - 18 July	A/1-506 OPCON to 2-506
29 June - 10 July	C/1-506 OPCON to 3d Bde Hqs
2 July - 19 July	B/2-327 OPCON 3-5 Cav
9 July - 13 July	A(-)/2-327 OPCON 3-187
9 July - 19 July	A(-), B(-) 3-5 Cav OPCON 3-187
10 July - 24 July	C/2-506 OPCON to 1-506
10 July - 31 July	B/2-506 OPCON to 3d Bde Hqs
12 July - 26 July	1-327 OPCON to 3d Bde
13 July - 19 July	A/2-327 OPCON to 3-5 Cav
19 July - 31 July	B/3-187 OPCON to 3-5 Cav
19 July - 31 July	C(-)/2-34 Armor OPCON to 3-187
25 July - 31 July	C/1-506 OPCON to 3-5 Cav

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STRENGTH REPORT AND ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

1. Bde CO: COL J. B. Conroy Jr. 1 May 69 - 14 Jun 69
COL Robert H. Siegrist 14 Jun 69 - 31 Jul 69
2. Bde DCO: LTC Len M. Hanawald 1 May 69 - 17 Jun 69
LTC B. A. Arthur 18 Jun 69 - 29 Jul 69
LTC Howard G. Crowell 29 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69
3. Bn Commanders:
 - a. 1-506 Abn Inf: LTC James M. Bowers 1 May 69 - 30 Jun 69
LTC Arnold Hayward 1 Jul 69 - 11 Jul 69
MAJ Dale A. Burroughs 12 Jul 69 - 18 Jul 69
LTC Leon McCall 18 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69
 - b. 2-506 Abn Inf: LTC Gene T. Sherron 1 May 69 - 16 Jun 69
LTC Len M. Hanawald 17 Jun 69 - 31 Jul 69
 - c. 3-187 Abn Inf: LTC W. F. Honeycutt 1 May 69 - 9 Jul 69
LTC William K. Steinberg 10 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69
 - d. 2-319 Arty: LTC Wilford R. Harrell 1 May 69 - 6 May 69
LTC Niles J. Fulwyler 7 May 69 - 31 Jul 69
 - e. 3-5 Cav: LTC Thomas E. Carpenter III 1 May 69 - 26 Jun 69
LTC Joseph L. Hadaway 27 Jun 69 - 31 Jul 69

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