

REF ID: A66001
CLASSIFIED

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By 88 NARA Date 11-6-01

CONSOLIDATED AWARDS

OPERATION TOAN THANG, PHASE II

<u>AWARD</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Distinguished Service Cross	3*
Silver Star Medal	95
Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device	259
Army Commendation Medal with "V" Device	71
Air Medal with "V" Device	3
Distinguished Flying Cross	2
Legion of Merit	1
Bronze Star Medal (Meritorious Achievement)	19
Bronze Star Medal (Meritorious Service)	35
Army Commendation Medal (Meritorious Achievement)	22
Air Medal	25

*Pending final approval

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CONSOLIDATED RESULTS

OPERATION TOAN THANG, PHASE II

US FORCES

Casualties:

156 KHA
553 WHA

Equipment Captured:

None

Equipment Destroyed:

1 3/4 ton truck
1 Armored Personnel Carrier

ENEMY

Casualties:

888 KIA (BC)
333 KIA (EST)
44 POW
322 Detainees
10 Hoi Chanhs

Equipment Captured:

196 Individual weapons
70 Crew-served weapons
175 Grenades
4 Mines
874 HE rounds
16,737 Small arm rounds
3820 .50 cal rounds
30 lbs explosives
118 AK magazines
8 BAR magazines
23 RPD drums
2 Chicom radios
1 AN/PRC-9 radio
83 1/2 lbs documents
160,611 lbs rice

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1200 lbs salt
200 lbs tobacco
10 100-lb bags cement
500 lbs plastic
55 gals POL
44 Bicycles
3 Honda motorcycles
3 Water pumps
2 Sampan gasoline engines
1 Sewing machine

Equipment Destroyed:

1098 Bunkers
307 Fighting positions
3231 Meters trench
441 Spider holes
56 Punji pits
55 Tunnels
2 Antiaircraft positions
101 Military structures
47 Sampans
19 Huts
5 Bridges
2 Dining halls
1 Supply bin
8 RPG-2
3 RPG-7
4 AK-47
1 RPD
246 Grenades
20 Bangalore torpedos
3 RPD drums
218 HE rounds
288 .30 cal rounds
1547 Small arm rounds
37,743 lbs rice
55 gals POL
18 55-gal drums
10 Bicycles

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3d Brigade INTSUM 163-68, dtd 11 Jun 68, para 11:

"11. Brief Discussion of Enemy Capabilities and Vulnerabilities:

a. Capabilities: The enemy retains the capability to harrass and conduct fire and ground attacks against friendly installations in up to battalion-size attacks. He is also capable of maintaining pressure upon the Saigon area for an extended period, while continuing to replenish his supplies and personnel lost during the recent general offensive.

b. Vulnerabilities: The enemy continues to remain vulnerable to friendly air support and artillery fire.

12. Conclusion: The enemy will continue to conduct attacks by fire on friendly installations and ground attacks of a probing nature against fire bases and outposts. He will continue to maintain pressure on the Saigon area as long as it will benefit his position in the Paris Peace Talks."

3d Brigade INTSUM 179-68, dtd 27 Jun 68

"AO RAPID (AO STREAM) is used by the enemy as an infiltration route to the Saigon area. The principal infiltration route parallels the Saigon River. The 273C Regt (AKA Quyet Thang Regt), estimated strength 200 men, is presently attempting to infiltrate to base areas in the Trapezoid and Boi Loi woods to refit and retrain. This unit has suffered heavy losses in recent contacts and is probably moving in small dispersed units. The Cu Chi Regt, 400-600 men, composed of the 7th IF Bn and 8th Arty Bn, is felt to be dispersed in AO RAPID. The 275th VC Regt is believed to be located vic XT5221. One of its probable missions is to secure LOC's and assist the passage of reinforcing main force and infiltration elements to the Saigon area. These enemy units can be expected to remain dispersed and to assist the passage of enemy reinforcing elements to the Saigon area."

3d Brigade INTSUM 207-68, dtd 25 Jul 68, para 3f(3):

"25 July, source: 25th Inf Div G-2: Agent reports that the Cu Chi VC District Party Committee has been reinforced for 'C188'. Their intentions are to attack Cu Chi District from 22 to 29 July 1968. It was learned that their coming attack will rocket the 25th Inf Div with 200 rounds that have been brought into the area. Their principal intention is to block our reinforced road (Hwy 1). Source also reported that they will occupy this district during their coming attack from one to two days prior."

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By ~~88~~ NARA Date 11-6-013d Brigade INTSUM 210-68, dtd 28 ~~Aug~~ 68, para 3f(1):

"Source: 25th Inf Div G-2: On 27 July vic XT508224 B 1-506 Inf found 1 VC KIA (BC). Documents taken from the body identified C4 Company, K2 Bn, 268th Regt. Promotion orders trace Tung's advance in the unit from assistant platoon leader to platoon leader, to assistant company commander, to assistant political officer, to political officer. The documents identify the CO of the 268th Regt as Tran Ba Tong. OB NOTE: It is believed that the enemy unit contacted by the 3d Bde 101st Abn was the 7th Bn, Cu Chi, 268th Regt, and not the 275th VC Regt which was suspected earlier. The C4 Company, K2 Bn, is probably the 1st Co, 7th Bn, Cu Chi. A PW and other documents found in the area confirm the presence of the 1st Company. Both PW and documents indicate the 3d Bde 101st contacted the 7th Bn initially on 25 July. Shortly thereafter, three companies withdrew from the area and left the C1 Company behind. This company subsequently broke contact. Total known losses to the Bn are 28 VC KIA (BC); however, a PW stated his company strength alone had declined from 120 to 60-70 men, indicating far greater casualties were inflicted. Based upon interrogation, the 7th Bn is believed to be combat effective and to be composed mostly of NVA fillers."

3d Brigade INTSUM 238-68, dtd 25 Aug 68, Inclosure 1:

"The enemy attacks in northern III CTZ signalled initiation of the combat phase of the third general offensive. These attacks were undoubtedly designed as a diversion from the enemy's primary objective, the capitol city of Saigon. Analysis of contacts during the week indicates that the 7th NVA and 9th VC Divisions committed only token forces from each of their Regts in an attempt to get significant allied forces committed to those areas, while the two divisions moved around their flanks. We believe that the 5th VC Division was attempting to move down the axis of the Saigon River and was inadvertently involved in the fighting west of Dau Tieng. We believe it was the most seriously hurt of the three divisions and has probably withdrawn into southern War Zone 'C'. This action, as well as allied operations, particularly in Long An Province, and the exposure of the movement of the Dong Nai Regiment, has probably caused the enemy to once more slip his schedule for the attacks on Saigon. Considering current enemy dispositions, the only units in position to attack Saigon immediately are the 268/273C Regt's of SR-1 and the 1st Regt, SR-4.

The nature of the heavier attacks by fire throughout the week indicates that Arty units are either in position, or are accompanying Sub-Region main force units.

We can expect attacks by both rocket and mortar in support of limited objective ground attacks to continue throughout the Corps to force our attention from Saigon.

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The 5th VC Div was intercepted in its southward movement with the 33D NVA Regt suffering rather extensive casualties. It now appears that the entire division has returned to southern War Zone 'C'. Failure of the 5th Div to succeed in its southward move has likely caused a postponement of the assault on Saigon. Depending on the extent to which the 33d Regt was hurt and on the immediate availability of replacements, it may be necessary for new missions to be assigned to the Regt's prior to a renewed attempt to move.

The 7th NVA Div remains in the vicinity of Loc Ninh and is expected to move south along the Song Be River axis at a predetermined time.

The 9th VC Div has broken contact and moved west to the Tay Ninh-Cambodian border area. We suspect that the 273d Regt has remained in the vicinity of Tay Ninh city for several days both to feign the presence of the Div in the area and to screen the movement of the other two Regt's. The 271st and 272d Regt's may have begun their southward movement toward BA THU with the 273d Regt probably scheduled to follow.

In summary, we believe that the enemy will continue harassing and diversionary attacks throughout III CTZ. Finally, we now believe that the enemy will make his major effort against Saigon after 1 September."

3d Brigade INTSUM 242-68, dtd 29 Aug 68, para 3f:

"(3) 28 August, source: 525th MID Intelligence Report: On 17 August 1968 the Central Communist Party sent to the NLF SVN a secret order to launch the THU DONG (summer and autumn) campaign beginning on 19 August 1968 and ending 2 September 1968. After 2 September 1968, the 3d general attack campaign will begin and last to November 1968. The principal targets are: a. destroying the radar installations near Cambodia and Tay Ninh City, b. ravaging Hau Nghia Province in order to set up a way for troops to enter Saigon, c. move troops to 'y' Bridge near Saigon. As of 27 August 1968, the 269 Bn along with 2 NVA companies are located in the vicinity of My Thanh village XT440025.

(8) 28 August, source: 25th Inf Div Agent Report: Agent reports elements of the 275th and 101st NVA Regts are to attack Trang Bang and 2 US fire bases (3d Bde 101st fire bases are in the area) during nights of 28 and 29 August. Source also stated that if the units noticed heavy reinforcement, they would not attack."

3d Brigade INTSUM 243-68, dtd 30 Aug 68, Inclosure 1:

POW Reports

POWs 1-5: All wounded, no interrogation.

6. NGUYEN TIEN DUC, D 2-506, 280800 Aug, XT515275, NVA SGT, 3d Mortar Company, assigned to the 2d Bn, had approx 400 men before contact with US Forces. He did not know the 2d Bn's mission, but it was rumored that they would attack Trang Bang in the near future.
7. NGUYEN VAN THANH, A 2-506, 281330 Aug, vic XT5217, NVA PFC, 2d Platoon, 6th Company, 2d Bn, Q16 Regt. Subject arrived in RVN on 10 July 68. The Q16 Regt has 3 infantry battalions, and his battalion had 150 men. Subject believes that his regional CP is in the Thanh An Woods vic XT5438.
8. NGUYEN VAN KHIEM, D 2-506, 281020 Aug, XT5217, NVA SSG, 1st Platoon, 2d Company, 2d Bn, 16th Regt. Subject states that the mission of the 2d Bn was to conduct ambushes in vic XT5217. His unit's strength was 250 men. Subject stated that supplies such as ammunition, food, and clothing came from the 83d Rear Service Group, subordinate to the 1st Sub Region which has supply points scattered from Trang Bang to Saigon.
9. DUONG VAN DAO, D 2-506, 281030 Aug, XT5217, NVA CPL, 2d Platoon, 16th Company, 16th Regt. Subject states that the 16th Regt has 3 infantry battalions and that for over a year the 16th Regimental HQ was located at XT545385. When allied troops entered the area the Regimental HQ would move to a secondary base camp located vic XT5738. The permanent location of the 2d Bn is vic XT509345, to which they were supposed to return after attacking Trang Bang. Since arriving with the 16th Regt, subject has taken part in 7 contacts against US Forces.
10. NGUYEN VAN KHA, D 2-506, 281030 Aug, XT5217, NVA PVT, D-16 Mortar Company, assigned to the D61 Regt. He infiltrated into RVN in March 1968 with the 272 Bn which was broken up and assigned to different units as replacements. Subject states Bn D61 Regt was formerly called the 101st NVA Regt. Their mission was to attack Trang Bang in the near future.
11. VU XUAN THUA, D 2-506, 281735 Aug, XT514269, NVA PFC, 1st Platoon, K-2 Company, Gia Dinh Bn, 16 Regt. Subject states that the code names for the Battalions are Gia Dinh 1, 2, and 3. Morale is low due to a shortage of food and heavy casualties.
12. NGUYEN VAN TUONG, D 2-506, 281530 Aug, XT514269, NVA PFC, K-2 Company, D6 Battalion, 16th Regt. Subject arrived in RVN in July 1968 and his infiltration group D201 was assigned to the 16th Regt. This was the first contact his company had had. Subject was frightened when his commander was killed, so he surrendered.

POWs 13-18: Little or no data from interrogation at this time.

3d Brigade INTSUM 246-68, dtd 2 Sep 68, Inclosure 1:

Assessment of the Current Enemy Thrust

"1. Indications and evidence increased during the week that the enemy plans to make the 3d offensive a prolonged campaign. The current enemy plan appears to be as follows:

a. The 5th VC Division and the 101st NVA Regiment will continue operations against the 25th ARVN and 25th US Infantry Divisions in order to inflict casualties and tie down friendly forces. This will be accomplished by attacks on allied installations, centers of communications, interdiction of lines of communication by ambush.

b. The 7th NVA Division will operate against the 5th ARVN and 1st US Infantry Divisions while securing the Binh My base areas and enemy lines of communication to Cambodia.

c. Forces in MR-2 will operate against the 9th US Division in order to hold it in place. MY THO, CAI LAY, and Hwy 4 are the most likely targets.

d. Enemy forces in outlying areas will conduct limited objective attacks within their capabilities.

e. The Sub Regional Forces will attack Saigon. However, rather than the commitment of all available forces simultaneously, the Sub Regions will commit only elements to that main objective with the remaining elements assigned other objectives within the respective Sub Regions. The attacks on Saigon will be supported by attacks by fire as well as by sapper and terrorist activity. Since the GVN will have little choice but to attempt to keep the life of the city as normal as possible, these activities will mostly be conducted during daylight hours with the attacks by fire at night. We can expect increased interdiction of the main lines of supply into the city, primarily routes 1, 4, and 20, as well as the LONG TAI shipping channel. In short, the enemy will attempt to disrupt the city as much as possible.

f. The 9th VC Division will most likely not participate in the early stages of the attacks, but will either await a favorable opportunity to attack, or will be committed in a desperation effort at a later time.

g. In conclusion, the enemy's primary objective is still, as it consistently has been, the city of Saigon. High ranking PW's and captured documents state that the enemy considers the period of US elections and the Paris Peace Talks as critical to his efforts to cause the withdrawal of the US forces and the formation of a coalition government. The third offensive is aimed directly at obtaining his objectives by the exertion of military pressure. The enemy will therefore attack and attempt to maintain constant pressure on the city while simultaneously conducting operations throughout the remainder of the III Corps Zone. We believe that the first ground action will commence on or shortly after 1 September 1968."

3d Brigade INTSUM, 261-68, dtd 18 Sep 68, para 3f:

"(3) 17 September, source: 25th Inf Div G-2: PW's captured during the attack on FSB Pope XT546308, 16 Sep 68, report the assault was conducted by the 1st and 2d Battalions of 101st NVA Regt. The CP location of the 101st NVA Regt is north of Thanh An (XT530378). The two battalions were detected before the attack began. One of the four prisoners stated 40 of his company consisting of 60 men were killed or wounded during the attack, so he ran. All four of the prisoners were from different companies. The 2d Bn had been in the area for only three weeks. Over 50% of the Battalion consisted of new replacements. They had come to RVN in infiltration group 2010, some 500 strong. They had received 3 months of training in NVN. 2d Bn is located in the Boi Loi, one and one half hours march from FSB Pope. The morale of the unit is low because of B-52 strikes and artillery. This prisoner was 18 years old and of the Buddhist faith. Upon arrival in RVN, all troops were issued new equipment."

3d Brigade INTSUM:

"Assessment of the current enemy threat: While the enemy maintains the same capability and geographic dispositions noted last week, he has temporarily scaled down his third offensive.

(1) There are no indications of any movement away from the Saigon area. The Dong Nai Regt, the Quyét Thag Regt, and the 1st Regt of SR-4 will probably initiate minor ground actions around the Saigon area, but will not launch a sustained assault on the city. Sapper and terrorist patterns will continue.

(2) Though we do not believe the enemy has altered his primary objective, that being the assault on Saigon, it is apparent that the schedule to be used in that assault has been substantially changed. Near the end of August, all indications pointed to an imminent attack on Saigon led by the sub-regional forces and exploited by the 9th VC Div. The attacks on Tay Ninh and Loc Ninh areas among others, the assaults on the 25th Div by elements of the 5th VC Div, the reported and indicated southward movement of at least elements of the 7th NVA Div and finally, the relative lull in activity the end of August all led to that conclusion. One week ago it became apparent that the enemy had altered his plan for a major assault on the capital and that much smaller scale attacks, if any, could be expected. During this past week it has become clear that the enemy has slowed down his offensive. Among the possible explanations for this, two are foremost. First the enemy's tactical plan- the very heart of his plan was the need to draw friendly forces away from Saigon; that plan failed. Second - and not so clearly known - is the extent to which allied operations have hurt his posture. His forces in SR-3 have certainly been seriously disrupted and this fact, in itself, may have forced the current standdown. The 33d NVA Regt suffered serious casualties in its engagements with the 25th Div and those

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
losses may have been greater than the enemy could sustain. Casualties as a result of air strikes are seldom accurately determined, but there have been reports that they have been heavy. The reports and indications of the southward movement of the 7th NVA have ceased, the heavy ground attacks against the US 25th Div have been substantially scaled down, and the overall level of enemy initiated incidents have declined.

(3) We have concluded that based on the enemy's current operations, he has been forced to re-assess his tactics as well as his timetable. The halt in the expected assault on Saigon was itself a change from his previous pattern. Never before had he halted or pulled back once committed. This new found flexibility will likely be repeated in the weeks ahead if at all possible. He will attempt to become more opportunistic, he will probe for possible weak spots and he will attempt to exploit any favorable situation that might arise.

(4) The current concentration of forces around Trang Bang (101st and 33d NVA Regt, 267 Bn, 269 and D QY Bns, elements of Cu Chi Regt and at least one Bn of 275th NVA Regt) are indications of major forthcoming activity in this area designed to decisively engage the 25th US Div. In addition, recently received information suggests that the 9th VC Div has a similar mission secondary to its primary mission of conducting operations in the Saigon area. We conclude that the enemy's stated objective of destroying the 25th US Div prior to an assault on Saigon has not changed; only the locale in which that effort will be made has been altered. Instead of seeking to engage the 25th Div in the vicinity of Tay Ninh, the scene has shifted to the Trang Bang area. It is expected that the pattern of activity observed in Tay Ninh in August will be repeated in the Trang Bang area in the near future. If the attacks succeed in drawing forces away from Saigon or in inflicting extensive damage on the 25th US Div, the assault on Saigon would likely proceed. If the attacks in the Trang Bang area failed, it is likely that the 5th VC Div will again withdraw northward to replenish its forces and plan future operations.

(5) Concurrently with the anticipated enemy activity in the Trang Bang area, we expect that attacks by fire and ground probes will continue throughout the III CTZ. Finally, the enemy will increase LOC interdiction and may attempt to destroy major bridges.

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SYNOPSIS OF BATTLE

21 June 1968

At 1146 hours vicinity XT430116 A Co 1-506th Inf came under intense enemy automatic and small arms fires from an estimated reinforced Viet Cong company. At 1148 hours vicinity XT428113 C Co 1-506th Inf began receiving small arms fire from what appeared to be same unit A Co had contacted. A and C Companies maneuvered to sustain contact while light fire teams, artillery, and tactical airstrikes were directed against the enemy bunkers. At 1750 hours two platoons A Co 3-187th Inf air assaulted into LZ XT417108, receiving murderous enemy fire during the insertion. More tactical airstrikes were directed into the enemy complex. At 1840 hours remainder of A Co 3-187th Inf air assaulted into LZ XT417108 to join two platoons on ground. The 3 companies encircled the enemy position as darkness closed. Throughout the night the enemy probed the encirclement in a futile effort to escape. Artillery and tactical airstrikes continuously worked the center of the encirclement. At first light the contact area was swept, eliminating the last pocket of resistance.

RESULTS:

Casualties

US

9 KHA
45 WHA


ENEMY

77 VC KIA (BC)
3 NVA KIA (BC)
11 VC KIA (EST)

Enemy Equipment

2 LM6
15 AK-47
.2 RPG-2
1 9mm Chicom Pistol
23 Chicom grenades
19 RPG-2 rounds
7 Chicom smoke grenades
1 Chicom radio


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By 88 NARA Date 11-6-01



A 3-187

C 1-506

A 1-506

Ap Giang Giang
 Ap An Son
 Ap An Hai
 Ap An Thanh
 Ap An Binh Thuy (4)
 Ap Bao
 Ap An Giang
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SYNOPSIS OF BATTLE

30 June 1968

At 0100 hours 30 June 1968 vicinity XT495235 1-506th Inf night position received an intense barrage of 60mm mortar, small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fires followed by "human wave" ground attack led by sapper units. Heavy contact continued for approximately two hours. US troops employed 90mm recoilless rifle fire with cannister ammunition, light fire teams, "Spooky" C-47 gunship, artillery, and organic weapons. Continuous artillery blocking fires and illumination were employed during the close-quarter fighting with the estimated NVA company. At approximately 0300 hours the enemy retreated. Contact area was swept at first light.

RESULTS:

Casualties

US

20 WHA


ENEMY

38 NVA KIA (BC)

Enemy Equipment

12 AK-47
2 LMG
9 RPG-2
20 RPG-2 rounds
45 AK-47 magazines
10 RPD drums
40 Chicom grenades
13 VC protective masks
2000 AK rounds


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By 88 NARA Date 11-6-01



SYNOPSIS OF BATTLE

25 July 1968

At 0815 hours vicinity XT511219 C Co 2-506th Inf was engaged by estimated enemy platoons in bunker complex later determined to be NVA battalion. C Co was conducting reconnaissance in force from night position vicinity XT516219. C Co immediately returned fire with organic weapons, light fire teams, and tactical airstrikes. CS gas was dropped into the enemy position. A Co 1-506th Inf air assaulted into LZ XT526226 and established blocking position XT513223. B Co 1-506th Inf air assaulted into LZ XT502224 and established blocking position XT506227. A Co 2-506th Inf air assaulted into LZ XT500215. Second lift of A Co 2-506th Inf, due to intense ground fire received during first insertion (6 US KHA and 10 WHA on initial lift) air assaulted into LZ XT502224 and moved overland to reinforce two platoons on initial lift. A Co pushed into enemy and established blocking position XT501216. C Co 1-506th Inf air assaulted in LZ XT502224 and established blocking position XT503227. B Co 2-506th Inf air assaulted into LZ XT502224 and established blocking position XT502223. D Co 2-506th Inf air assaulted into LZ XT526226 and moved overland to blocking position XT508218. B Co 3-187th Inf air assaulted into LZ XT511228 and established blocking position XT509227. Contact continued until first light. Seventeen airstrikes were directed into enemy position during night. C and D Companies 2-506th Inf eliminated last pockets of enemy resistance during sweep at first light.

RESULTS:

Casualties

<u>US</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
13 KHA	38 NVA KIA (BC)
30 WHA	16 NVA KIA (EST)
	2 POW


Enemy Equipment

- 3 AK-47
- 2 RPD
- 2 82mm mortar tubes
- 1 82mm mortar sight
- 1330 AK rounds
- 2 60mm mortar rounds
- 4 RPG-2 rounds
- 1 82mm mortar round
- 4 Chicom grenades
- 6 AK magazines
- 1 RPD drum
- 4 Protective masks

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SYNOPSIS OF BATTLE

27 August 1963

At 1038 hours vicinity XT513275 A Co 2-506th Inf engaged an estimated NVA company. NVA employed small arms, automatic weapons, RPG, and mortar fires. A Co 2-506th Inf retaliated with artillery, light fire teams, and tactical airstrikes. C Co 2-506th Inf air assaulted in LZ XT520271 to reinforce A Co. C Co established blocking position XT516275. B Co air assaulted in LZ XT505275 and established blocking position XT509275. D Co moved from night position XT497245 overland to a blocking position XT511270. As US troops continued artillery bombardment, enemy attempted unsuccessfully to reinforce encircled unit from north. Both forces were estimated NVA battalions. Heavy contact continued throughout the night. Repeated attempts to penetrate encirclement were thwarted. B Co 2-506th Inf attempted to sweep enemy position at first light 28 August. Bombardment by artillery, tactical airstrikes, and CS gas drops was continued. At 1800 hours 28 August B Co was still in heavy contact. Contact decreased to sporadic after increased artillery and airstrike bombardment. At 1230 hours 29 August last pocket of resistance was eliminated by B Co.

RESULTS:

Casualties

<u>US</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
16 KHA	105 NVA KIA (BC)
28 WHA	1 NVA KIA (EST)
	19 POW
	3 Retainees


Enemy Equipment

- 18 AK-47
- 3 RPD
- 3 RPG-2
- 2 SKS
- 1 9mm pistol
- 2 60mm mortars
- 3 82mm mortars
- 2 RPG-7 rounds
- 15 RPG-2 rounds
- 4 AT generators
- 20 Chicom grenades
- 4 RPD drums
- 27 AK-47 magazines
- 2142 AK rounds

AUTHENTICATED BY:

Robert C. Chipps

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ASST AG



A 2-506

B 2-506

C 2-506

A
2-506

25D
2-506

QUAN PHU ĐỨC
QUAN CU CHI

TỈNH TÂY NINH
TỈNH BÌNH HẠNG

8 73 541
NARA Date 11-6-01

SYNOPSIS OF BATTLE

5 September 1963

At 1226 hours vicinity XT543196 B Co 2-506th Inf engaged what was originally believed to be a Viet Cong platoon. Enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fires. US troops returned fire with organic weapons, artillery, light fire teams, "Spooky" C-47 gunship, and tactical airstrikes. A Co 2-506th Inf air assaulted from FSB STUART into LZ XT538191 and maneuvered to a blocking position XT537193 to reinforce B Co. D Co 2-506th Inf (minus 1 platoon) air assaulted from FSB STUART into a LZ XT550190 and established a blocking position XT541189. A Co 3-187th Inf air assaulted from PZ XT651259 into LZ XT553194 and established blocking position XT550199. D Co 3-187th Inf air assaulted from PZ XT661261 into LZ XT553194 and established blocking position XT551191. B Co 2-27th Inf air assaulted into LZ XT545203 and established blocking position XT548202. C Co 2-27th Inf air assaulted into LZ XT545203 and established a blocking position XT540199. A Troop 3-4th Cav established two blocking positions XT541189 and XT549189. During insertions units on ground pressed into enemy positions. Enemy strength revised to estimated Viet Cong Battalion. Units established encirclement from blocking positions as enemy attempted to penetrate. Repeated violent enemy probes were repulsed while artillery was directed into center of cordon. At approximately 0230 hours 6 September the enemy battalion massed its strength and assaulted the center of the A Co 3-187th Inf sector after intense preparation by mortar fire. A three-phase "human wave" attack broke into the company command post. For approximately 30 minutes A Co engaged the enemy in savage hand to hand combat. Enemy finally broke into area behind A Co and retreated to the north. Sporadic contact continued until 0430 hours 6 September. Sweep of contact area was conducted at first light.

RESULTS:

Casualties

<u>US</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
31 KHA	103 VC KIA (BC)
41 WHA	38 VC KIA (EST)
	6 POW
	118 Detainees

Enemy Equipment

9 AK-47
 3 AK-50
 3 RPD
 2 SKS
 2 RPG-2
 500 lbs plastic


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Authority **8 73 541**

By **88** NARA Date **11-6-01**



SYNOPSIS OF BATTLE

7 September 1968

At 1520 hours C Co 3-187th Inf received heavy enemy small arms and automatic weapons fires during an insertion vicinity XT560266 while conducting Eagle Flights north of Cu Chi. C Co returned fire with artillery, light fire teams, tactical airstrikes, and organic weapons. B Co received fire from the enemy between its position and C Co. Recon platoon inserted into LZ XT577250 conducting Eagle Flight operations. When C Co came into contact, recon platoon moved overland to reinforce C Co. D Co, as the Brigade RRF at Cu Chi, air assaulted in LZ XT562264 and moved to reinforce C Co. As night closed, all units formed night defensive position at XT560262. Brigade Commander and jump command post inserted into position for duration of night. Enemy force was estimated battalion. Under direction of Brigade Commander, enemy position and axis of withdrawal was pounded with artillery and tactical airstrikes. Enemy retreated and broke contact 0030 hours 8 September.

RESULTS:

Casualties

<u>US</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
12 KHA	46 KIA (BC)
20 WHA	2 POW


Enemy Equipment

- 6 AK-47
- 5 SKS
- 1 RPD
- 2 60mm mortar
- 2 82mm mortar
- 21 RPG-2 rounds
- 18 60mm mortar rounds
- 3 82mm mortar rounds
- 3 Chicom grenades
- 6 AP mines
- 12 Rifle grenades
- 6 AT mines
- 8 Protective masks (Russian)
- 565 AK rounds

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ASST AG



B 3-187

C 3-187

D 3-187

RECON 3-187

QUAN PHU ĐUC
QUAN CU SUI

H. BINH DUONG SONG

QUAN PHU

SYNOPSIS OF BATTLE

16 September 1968

At 1040 hours vicinity XT523240 16 September D Co 2-506th Inf was engaged with small arms and automatic weapons fires by an estimated Viet Cong platoon. D Co responded with artillery and all organic weapons fires. Viet Cong retreated and broke contact 1155 hours. D Co pursued enemy. At 1411 hours D Co came under heavy enemy small arms and automatic weapons fires vicinity XT520241. Enemy unit was estimated to be NVA company. D Co employed light fire teams, artillery, and airstrikes to sustain contact. A Co 2-506th Inf was extracted from a PZ XT562178 at 1505 hours and air assaulted into a LZ XT532249. Heavy enemy fires were received during the insertion. A and D Companies assaulted enemy force. Enemy retreated, breaking contact at 1530 hours.

RESULTS:

Casualties

US

5 KHA
7 WHA

ENEMY

31 NVA KIA (BC)


Enemy Equipment

7 AK-47
2 RPD

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SYNOPSIS OF BATTLE

16-17 September 1968

At 2310 hours 16 September an ambush patrol from D Co 3-187th Inf, vicinity XT543304, sighted an estimated 300 NVA moving west to east toward FSB POPE. The patrol directed artillery on the enemy unit. Results of the artillery are unknown. At 2330 hours FSB POPE began receiving heavy 82mm mortar, RPG, M-79, automatic weapons, and small arms fires. After approximately 5-10 minutes of heavy assault by fire, a "human wave" ground attack was launched against FSB POPE. An estimated two NVA battalions were involved in the attack. Assault after assault of enemy was repulsed. Artillery, light fire teams, tactical airstrikes, "Spooky" C-47 gunship, and organic infantry weapons were employed. Contact was broken at 0630 hours when enemy withdrew.

RESULTS:


Casualties

<u>US</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
4 KHA	131 NVA KIA (BC)
48 WHA	137 NVA KIA (EST)
	4 NVA POW

Enemy Equipment

6 AK-50
 1 RPD
 1 Carbine (Chicom)
 2 RPG-7
 1 RPG-2
 4 Claymore mines (US)
 1 AN/PRC-9 radio
 5 Rifle grenades
 10 60mm mortar rounds
 3 RPG-7 rounds
 24 Chicom grenades
 1100 AK rounds
 3 RPD drums
 20 AK magazines

AUTHENTICATED BY:




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CLASSIFIED

Author: 8 73 541

By: NARA Date: 11-6-01



SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD OF PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION

3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), U.S. Army

MISSION:

Provide a ready reaction strike force for entire 25th Infantry Division area of operations in the Trang Bang - Cu Chi area to deny access to avenues of approach into Saigon.

CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

The enemy infiltration routes and staging areas in the 25th Infantry Division area of interest will be interdicted and denied through the conduct of both day and night heliborne assaults into areas of suspected enemy concentration.

EXECUTION:

The 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), commenced OPERATION TOAN THANG, PHASE II, on 13 June 1968 by moving to Cu Chi under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division. The imminence of the enemy's feared attack on Saigon established the traditional enemy base area northwest of Cu Chi near the Bo Loi and Ho Bo Woods as the vital corridor of advance and staging area for potential attacks.

The 3d Brigade was employed as an airmobile fast-reacting strike force. On 21 June 1968, A Company, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, while conducting a reconnaissance in force mission south of Trang Bang, engaged an estimated enemy reinforced company. The paratroopers pushed into the enemy position as C Company, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, maneuvered to sustain the contact. As the bitter fighting increased and enemy resistance stiffened, A Company, 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry, air assaulted into a landing zone on the enemy's immediate rear. Throughout the night the paratroopers gave battle to the enemy until at first light the last pocket of resistance was eliminated. A sweep of the area revealed 80 enemy dead and one prisoner.

On 25 July 1968, C Company, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry, engaged an estimated enemy battalion northeast of Trang Bang. The enemy, in concrete and rock bunkers, put forth a fusillade of automatic and heavy machine gun fire. As the C Company Commander directed tactical airstrikes, helicopter gunships, and artillery into the ferocious enemy, B Company, 3d Battalion 187th Infantry, was inserted to reinforce C Company. C Company, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, was inserted to block the enemy's axis of withdrawal. As the fighting became more intense, A Company, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry, was inserted to flank the enemy's position. Intense mortar and automatic weapons fire were received during the insertion. Six paratroopers died while off-loading. A and B Companies, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry, made daring air assaults into pitch black landing zones, receiving heavy hostile fire as they assaulted in an effort to cordon the enemy's positions and rescue their comrades not 50 meters from the enemy stronghold. At first light A and D Companies, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry, began to push the desperate enemy who had been attempting to infiltrate the cordon all night. After more than 36 hours of steady fighting, the paratroopers eliminated the last pocket of resistance. Thirty-eight NVA were killed by count and 16 NVA by estimate, and two prisoners were captured. The battle cost the paratroopers 13 killed and 30 wounded. A prisoner captured on 27 July revealed his unit, 7th Cu Chi Battalion, 268th Regiment, was involved in the contact on 25 July, and his company alone had been reduced from 120 to 60-70 men as a result of the night-long battle.

The 3d Brigade Screaming Eagles continued a relentless pursuit for the next 30 days, resulting in 193 enemy killed by actual count, 21 prisoners of war, 65

detainees, two Hoi Chanh, 49 individual weapons, and 16 crew-served weapons. On 27 August 1968, in a dense cluster of trees due north of Trang Bang, A Company, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry, made contact with an estimated NVA battalion. The enemy employed automatic weapons, RPG's, and mortar fire in an effort to repulse the Screaming Eagles. As the A Company Commander directed tactical airstrikes and artillery against the enemy, B and C Companies were inserted to establish a blocking position north of the enemy. At the same time, D Company, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry, moved to reinforce A Company. D Company pushed forward into the enemy positions but was met with stiff resistance. Heavy contact continued throughout the night while repeated attempts by the determined enemy to break the cordon were repulsed. Analysis of the documents captured confirmed the enemy unit to be the 2d Battalion of the 101st NVA Regiment. 3d Brigade casualties were 16 killed and 28 wounded as a result of two days of bitter fighting. The 2d Battalion, 101st NVA Regiment, lost 105 NVA dead by count, 19 prisoners of war, three detainees, 20 individual weapons, and 11 crew-served weapons.

On 5 September 1968, B Company, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry, engaged an estimated VC battalion. A and D Companies were immediately inserted to reinforce their fighting comrades. Enemy counterattacks repeatedly thwarted attempts to complete a seal and effectively reinforce B Company, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry. On 6 September 1968, a three-phase human wave attack hit the center of the cordon. Intense hand to hand combat by the members of A Company, 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry, and the two companies on A Company's flank ensued. At 0430 hours, in the face of sporadic small arms fire, the seal was once again complete, and the remaining members of A Company, 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry, were reinforced. A sweep of the area revealed 103 enemy bodies by count, six prisoners of war, 118 detainees, 14 individual weapons, and five crew-served weapons. The Screaming Eagles had lost 31 paratroopers killed and 41 wounded.

A reconfiguration of the Brigade's area of operation found the 3d Brigade in defensive positions along the enemy main line of advance and on the periphery of the Boi Loi Woods. Little contact developed until 16 September 1968, when D Company, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry, just north of Trang Bang, came under murderous automatic and small arms fire. A Company, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry, air assaulted east of the enemy position. While light fire teams lashed the now encircled enemy, the Screaming Eagles inched their way through the hail of small arms fire. The enemy scattered, leaving 31 NVA bodies strewn on the battlefield.

As night approached, enemy activity in the Boi Loi Woods increased substantially. At 2310 hours, 16 September 1968, a patrol from D Company, 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry, reported more than 300 NVA moving east toward FSB Pope, due north of Trang Bang. Artillery fire was immediately directed on the unit. At 2330 hours, FSB Pope came under a ground attack by an estimated two NVA battalions. The 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry, companies and the 2d Battalion, 319th Artillery, batteries responded with a fusillade of fire. Heavy contact continued until 0730 hours, 17 September 1968, when the last enemy assault was repulsed. The enemy left 264 dead by count on the defensive obstacles. Four paratroopers died in the courageous effort and 48 were wounded. Subsequent POW and agent reports substantiate the belief that the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, during OPERATION TOAN THANG, PHASE II, in the Cu Chi - Trang Bang area contributed significantly to the failure of the enemy's 3d offensive. The Screaming Eagles of the 3d Brigade accounted for 888 enemy dead by count, 333 enemy dead by estimate, 44 prisoners of war, ten Hoi Chanh, and 322 detainees. The cost of victory was great; 156 paratroopers died in action and 533 were wounded. The Screaming Eagles had upheld the honor of the 101st Airborne Division through a valiant display of heroism and fortitude.

The facts contained in this summary are a matter of record.

ATTESTED BY:

LEE J. WILWERDING

CPT, AGC

Assistant AG

By RS NARA Date 11-6-01

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
APO San Francisco 96383

AVDG-CA-A

25 November 1968

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Award of the Presidential Unit Citation

Commanding General
101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
APO San Francisco 96383

1. The following units of the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Task Force and attached units are recommended for award of the Presidential Unit Citation:

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Brigade, 101st Abn Div (AM)
1st Battalion (Airmobile), 506th Airborne Infantry, 101st Abn Div (AM)
2d Battalion (Airmobile), 506th Airborne Infantry, 101st Abn Div (AM)
3d Battalion (Airmobile), 187th Airborne Infantry, 101st Abn Div (AM)
2d Battalion (Airmobile), 319th Airborne Artillery, 101st Abn Div (AM)
C Company, 326th Medical Battalion, 101st Abn Div (AM)
B Company, 326th Engineer Battalion, 101st Abn Div (AM)
58th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog), 101st Abn Div (AM)
A Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 25th Inf Div
C Company, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, 25th Inf Div
D Company, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, 25th Inf Div
B Company, 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, 25th Inf Div
2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 25th Inf Div
25th Infantry Division Aviation Battalion, 25th Inf Div
187th Assault Helicopter Company
116th Assault Helicopter Company
B Company, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor
3d Platoon, D Company, 501st Signal Battalion, 101st Abn Div (AM)
3d Platoon, 101st Military Police Company, 101st Abn Div (AM)
3d Platoon, 265th Radio Research Company, 101st Abn Div (AM)
Team #3, 101st Military Intelligence Company, 101st Abn Div (AM)
3d Forward Element, 101st Forward Service Support Element, 101st Abn Div (AM)
25th Public Information Detachment
19th TASS, United States Air Force

2. The 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), and attached units, while under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division from 13 June 1963 until 23 September 1963, distinguished themselves in

Approved: **8 73 541**By **88** NARA Date **11-6-01**


AVDG-CA-A

25 November 1968

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Award of the Presidential Unit Citation

combat by repeatedly displaying extraordinary heroism in the face of intense hostile fire. As an integral part of OPERATION TOAN THANG, PHASE II, the 3d Brigade was involved daily in bitter engagements with the enemy. On numerous occasions enemy units of superior size were overwhelmingly defeated by units of the 3d Brigade. Through intense desire to succeed, complete disregard for individual welfare, and extraordinary esprit de corps, the Screaming Eagles sought the enemy in his base areas, forcing him to flee from his traditional sanctuaries. Throughout OPERATION TOAN THANG, PHASE II, the paratroopers of the 3d Brigade sought, engaged, and conquered the enemy. After more than one hundred bloody days and one hundred long nights of continuous vicious fighting, the formerly impregnable enemy area had been breached and the enemy forced to flee. Due in large part to the 3d Brigade's relentless pursuit and outstanding courage, the impending 3d offensive and the assault on Saigon were thwarted.

3. The inclosed documentation further amplifies the detailed performance of all participating units.



J. B. CONMY, JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

- 10 Incl
1. Summary of Recommendation
 2. Battle Synopses (with maps)
 3. Summary of Strengths and Casualties
 4. Participating Units
 5. Proposed Citation
 6. Consolidated Awards (OPERATION TOAN THANG, PHASE II)
 7. Consolidated Results (OPERATION TOAN THANG, PHASE II)
 8. 3d Brigade Operation Order 7-68
 9. 3d Brigade Frag Orders, 19-68 thru 25-68
 10. Extracts from 3d Brigade Intelligence Summaries

PARTICIPATING UNITS

Part I. Units assigned and recommended for award of the Presidential Unit Citation:

Unit	Period	Previous US Unit Decorations and Dates
HHC, 3d Bde	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	None
1st Bn (AM), 506th Abn Inf	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	*DUC 6-11 Jun 44 DUC 18-27 Dec 44
2d Bn (AM), 506th Abn Inf	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	DUC 6-11 Jun 44 DUC 18-27 Dec 44
3d Bn (AM), 187th Abn Inf	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	*NUC (Korea), date unknown DUC 20-26 Oct 50

Part II. Units attached (A) and OPCON (B) and recommended for award of the Presidential Unit Citation:

Unit	Period	Previous US Unit Decorations and Dates
A. C Co, 326th Med Bn	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	PUC 18-27 Dec 44
B Co, 326th Eng Bn	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	PUC 6-11 Jun 44 PUC 18-27 Dec 44
58th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	None
3d Plt, B Co, 501st Sig Bn	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	PUC 18-27 Dec 44
3d Plt, 101st MP Co	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	PUC 18-27 Dec 44
3d Plt, 265th Rdo Rsch Co	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	None
Tm #3, 101st MI Co	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	PUC 18-27 Dec 44
3d Fwd Elm, 101st Fwd Svc	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	PUC 18-27 Dec 44
25th PI Det	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	None
2d Bn (AM), 319th Abn Arty	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	PUC 18-27 Dec 44
19th TASS, USAF	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	MUC 28Jul66-28May67 MUC 12Mar68-1Apr68 ***VUA 27Aug68-31Oct68
B. A Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	**VUA 30Jan66-5Apr66
C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	VUA 30Jan66-5Apr66
D Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	VUA 30Jan66-5Apr66
B Co, 3d Bn, 22d Inf	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	**VUA 27Aug68-31Oct68 PUC 21Mar67
2d Bn, 14th Inf	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	None
25th Inf Div Avn Bn	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	***VUA 30Jan66-5Apr66 MUC 2Apr66 VUA 19Jul66
187th Aslt Hel Co	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	MUC 1Jan57-31Dec67
116th Aslt Hel Co	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	MUC 1Jan67-31Dec67 VUA 19Jul66 VUA 22Oct66 VUA 4-20Nov66
B Co, 2d Bn, 34th Arm	13 Jun 68-23 Oct 68	None

* DUC (Distinguished Unit Citation); NUC (Naval Unit Citation)
 ** 1st Plt of Trp A, PUC pending 18 Aug 68 - 20 Sep 68 Delete this portion of period from this recommendation

8 73 541

By RS NARA Date 11-6-01

SUMMARY OF STRENGTH AND CASUALTIES

Friendly Forces

<u>Totals Assigned</u>	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MHA</u>	<u>CAP</u>
3000 (avg strength organic units)	156*	553*	0	0

*Total casualties of all participating friendly forces

Enemy Forces

<u>Estimated Strength</u>	<u>Body Count</u>	<u>Probable Casualties</u>	<u>Cap</u>
4000	888	333	44

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 CW2, USA
 ASST AG

force, rendering it ineffective for future combat operations. By decisively defeating the enemy in two separate engagements, Companies B and C contributed significantly to the success of operation SAM HOUSTON. The dedication, tireless efforts and individual bravery exhibited by the members of these units reflect great credit on them and the Armed Forces of the United States.

III. THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION (ARMY). Award of the Presidential Unit Citation (Army) by the President of the United States of America to the following units of the Armed Forces of the United States is confirmed in accordance with paragraph 194, AR 672-5-1. The text of the citation, signed by President Richard Nixon on 10 May 1971, reads as follows:

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, I have today awarded

THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION (ARMY)
FOR EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM
TO THE
2ND BATTALION, 506TH AIRBORNE INFANTRY
AND TO THE
3RD BATTALION, 187TH AIRBORNE INFANTRY,
3RD BRIGADE, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
UNITED STATES ARMY

The 2nd Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry and the 3rd Battalion, 187th Airborne Infantry distinguished themselves by extraordinary heroism in action against hostile forces in the vicinity of Trang Bang, Hau Nghia Province, Republic of South Vietnam, during the period 13 June 1968 to 23 September 1968. As a reaction force these units repeatedly deployed into areas of heavy enemy concentration to destroy his thrusts against Saigon from the Trang Bang area west of the capital. Mounting daring day and night combat assaults, these battalions relentlessly sought, engaged, and pursued the enemy, interdicting his infiltration routes and smashing his staging areas. Despite heavy casualties and frequently numerically superior enemy forces, the men of these battalions routed insurgents and North Vietnamese Army main force units and drove them from their traditional sanctuaries near the Cambodian border. In their widespread operations, the battalions were responsible for capturing numerous prisoners, confiscating or destroying tons of enemy equipment, and inflicting devastating casualties on the hostile forces. Throughout these operations the men of the 2nd Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne Infantry, displayed exemplary esprit and an unwavering commitment to mission accomplishment which inspired them to uncommon feats of gallantry and sacrifice. Their demonstrated determination, devotion to duty, indomitable courage, and extraordinary heroism are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit on the men of these units and the Armed Forces of the United States.

IV. MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMENDATION. By direction of the Secretary of the Army under the provisions of paragraph 203, AR 672-5-1, the Meritorious Unit Commendation is awarded to the following units of the United States Army for exceptionally meritorious achievement in the performance of outstanding service during the period indicated: